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PREFACE 
 
When the National Government passed the Employment Contracts Act 1991, I was a 
solicitor working for the Ministry of Women’s Affairs in Wellington. As part of my 
work, I had to consider the effects of the new legislation on women and to some extent 
on other equal employment opportunity targets groups such as Maori, Pacific Island 
people, and people with disabilities. I felt some responsibility for bits of the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991 for at the time of its development, I was a solicitor in 
the Legal Section of the State Services Commission with responsibility for a small part 
of the Employment Contracts Bill; the part on personal grievances. As a person who 
had previously been active in a trade union and subsequently worked for one, I still 
had strong connections in that field. My partner also worked as an industrial officer for 
a State Sector union; I was therefore very familiar with the sort of rhetoric which 
surrounded the legislation and naturally had an interest in the development of the law. 
 
Upon shifting to Christchurch in 1994, I was employed by the Human Rights 
Commission for approximately two years as a mediator. After a time, I decided that I 
would like to undertake some postgraduate study in employment law and human 
rights. On completion of a Master of Laws, my supervisor suggested I might like to 
consider undertaking a PhD. 
 
At the time I was astounded. I had been involved in a serious road accident and did not 
have a great deal of confidence in my abilities. However, I decided in August 1998 to 
give the PhD a go. Naturally, I gravitated toward the effects of the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991 and its operation over the time since its inception. While the focus 
 xii 
was subsequently narrowed, it took a huge amount of time to study for the topic of the 
operation of the Employment Tribunal and then to focus in on the detail of how the 
provisions relating to the Employment Tribunal affected users of the personal 
grievance adjudication system. 
 
I decided I did not want my PhD to be strictly law based. I wanted to consult the users 
of the system to determine their views, and to interview Employment Tribunal 
adjudicators to find out their perspective. 
 
At the time of undertaking this thesis, I was also doing voluntary work on various 
boards of directors and Government appointed advisory boards, which took up a 
considerable amount of my time. I also had some difficulties with a detached retina 
and other health problems which resulted in some absence from the university. 
However, I had excellent research assistants, who have really helped with finding 
relevant material, proof reading, keeping me and my two guide dogs in order and also 
giving me lots of cheek, good humour, and moral support for this ‘spiritual journey’1. 
Without their assistance, it would have been impossible for me to succeed, so I thank 
them very warmly. To Rachel Cray, Triona Ducey, Magda van Rouyen, Tim Turnball, 
Helen McAra, Louise Petrie, John Grant, Tharron McIvor, Katie Ellena, Lisa 
Yarwood, Kylie Scott, Regina Posorski, David Goldwater, Tamsin Laird and last but 
not least, Emily Hewitt for her excellent good humour and editing skills: you have my 
hearty thanks. 
 
                                                             
1
 Co-supervisor, Dr Ramzi Addison, Department of Commerce, Lincoln University. 
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I would also like to say a huge thank you to my co-supervisors, John Hughes from the 
University of Canterbury and Dr Ramzi Addison from Lincoln University. They have 
both been absolutely terrific. John, I think, is a walking employment law 
encyclopaedia; he is simply amazing. Ramzi too is terrific; his supervision focussed 
more on the survey and interviewing analysis in this thesis. He is the one with 
expertise on statistics and that type of thing. On Dr Addison’s resignation, Dr Alison 
Loveridge from Sociology agreed to assist with the Social Science side of things. I 
warmly thank her for her endless patience in working with a non Social Science 
student and giving me a crash-course in statistical analysis. Thanks are also extended 
to Professor Steve Weaver, Dean of Postgraduate Studies, for his much-appreciated 
understanding and support in assisting me to complete the research.   
 
I would also like to say a warm thank you to employees at the Department of Labour 
and to staff at the Employment Tribunal itself. All have been very supportive and 
encouraging in assisting with this research and their help is greatly appreciated. 
 
I’d also like to thank my partner, David Beck, who has put up with my complaints 
over the years when I felt really fed up with the whole thesis business. His support has 
helped me carry on until the end along with the unending support I have received from 
both my supervisors and the research workers who have assisted me. 
 
Linda M Beck 
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ABSTRACT 
 
The passage of the Employment Contracts Act by the National government in 1991 
caused considerable controversy amongst trade unions in New Zealand and legal 
practitioners. I decided to examine whether the government had met its stated 
intentions to create a straight-forward, cheap, and accessible system for resolving 
personal grievances. Therefore the main questions to be asked related to what people’s 
experiences were using adjudication under the Act, and whether the system adequately 
resolved personal grievance issues. In particular, I focused on the experiences of 
participants using the personal grievance adjudication procedure. The question of 
whether the process actually worked for participants could be measured by examining 
available access to the system in terms of cost and accessibility of representation. 
Another factor to be considered related to whether ultimate conclusions reached by the 
employment tribunal adequately addressed the issues raised. For example – did 
grievance receive adequate compensation? What were the costs involved to the parties 
and did the grievant have suitable employment? This research investigated whether the 
personal grievance adjudication system work in the manner intended by the 
government of the day for those participants. 
 
Interviews with employment tribunal adjudicators were a crucial art of determining 
whether or not the adjudication process worked successfully. Adjudicators were very 
open and willing to participate, and a considerable amount of unexpected, useful 
information was forthcoming. Surveys of participants in 150 personal grievances 
which occurred in 1997 supported the information provided by adjudicators. Data 
obtained from researching all personal grievance and cost decisions in 1997 provided 
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quantitative support to the comments made by adjudicators, and those received by 
survey participants.  
 
The wide range of research methodologies used in conducting this thesis gives some 
credence to the conclusions reached as the range of processes used covered many 
different aspects of the adjudication system and how it affected participants in an 
unprecedented manor. The research conducted by Ian McAndrew in Otago covered the 
entire period during which the Employment Contracts Act 1991 was enforced. 
However, the questions asked in this thesis have tended to be more specific.  
 
In summary, my research has suggested that whether or not the Employment Contracts 
Act 1991 adjudication system worked largely depended on circumstances of each 
individual participant. Members of the legal profession felt most at home using 
adjudication, whilst many applicants and some respondents felt varying degrees of 
trepidation. Likewise, the views of adjudicators regarding the success of the system 
often depended on their background and experience.   
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C h a p t e r  1  
A STUDY OF PERSONAL GRIEVANCES 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Upon assuming office in 1990 the National Government swiftly enacted the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991 taking effect from 19 August of that year. The Act 
came into force following much debate between employer and employee groups. 
Central to the personal grievance resolution mechanism in the Act was the formation 
of the Employment Tribunal, replacing previous tripartite conciliation services. The 
newly formed Employment Tribunal was described as a ‘low level, informal, 
specialist’ institution which would provide ‘…speedy, fair and just resolutions of 
differences between parties to employment contracts’.1 However, the objects of the 
Act, with emphasis on strict contractual principles, were subject to a polarised debate 
between unions and employer groups. The Act was welcomed by employers but 
unions vigorously opposed its introduction and its failure to recognise them. During 
the life of the Employment Contracts Act 1991, this controversy continued unabated.
2
 
 
Rhetoric aside, this thesis examines the actual experiences of users of the personal 
grievance adjudication process and their perception of the Employment Tribunal’s 
                                                             
1
 Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 76(c). 
2
 Since the completion of research for this thesis, the Employment Contracts Act 1991 was repealed by 
the Employment Relations Act 2000, and a new system for resolving personal grievances was put into 
place. However, this innovation had no impact on my thesis findings. Significantly, some of the 
improvements suggested by adjudicators and participants within this thesis were incorporated into the 
resolution process for personal grievances contained in the Employment Relations Act 2000, as 
discussed in Chapter Eight. 
 3 
efficacy and ability to address employment issues as they arose (for example, did 
users have access to a fair, inexpensive, and straightforward process to resolve their 
personal grievances?) Looking at these factors illustrates whether users found access 
to justice in the Employment Tribunal system. By identifying the effective features 
and negative aspects of the process, this thesis will determine whether the procedure 
benefits not only policy makers, but all participants in the personal grievance 
adjudication system. In this context, the thesis addresses two basic questions:  
 What were the experiences of participants using the personal grievance 
adjudication procedure?  
 Did the personal grievance adjudication system work in the manner intended 
by the government of the day for those participants? 
1.2 INITIAL PROPOSAL FOR STUDY 
 
The reason for conducting this research was largely due to an interest in the historical 
development of the personal grievance framework and how legislative changes 
impacted on those using the system. As the intention of the National Government had 
been to extend access of the personal grievance procedure to all employees, it was 
important to investigate the impact of this policy. For instance, did all employees 
enjoy equal access or were there limitations on its availability? It was not intended 
that this thesis be an extensive study of the interpretation and application of the law 
which has been addressed elsewhere.
3
 However, it is acknowledged that the personal 
grievance adjudication process took place within a formal legal framework. It was 
therefore intended that readers of this thesis need not be familiar with the application 
                                                             
3
 See Chapter 2.2 Historical Background for information on the development of personal grievance 
law, for example: K Hince (n 1); G L Anderson (n 21); N S Woods (n 11); D L Mathieson (n 18). 
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of personal grievance law, but the thesis should explain the legal framework within 
which adjudication took place.  
 
The initial proposal was therefore to study the establishment of the Employment 
Tribunal in a historical context and determine the effects of the institutional and 
procedural changes under the Employment Contracts Act 1991. This raised numerous 
issues relating to the use of the Employment Tribunal, such as potential constraints on 
accessing the personal grievance process, the nature of representation (and associated 
costs) the adjudication procedure itself, and delays with adjudication hearings 
including delays with adjudicators providing decisions and parties receiving them. 
One measure of assessing the adjudication process was to evaluate the effectiveness 
of outcomes provided by the Employment Tribunal in light of these issues, providing 
some insight into whether access to justice was achieved.  
 
To explore these issues, it was decided to study all personal grievance decisions that 
took place in 1997 in the Employment Tribunal. By that time, the changes that 
occurred under the Employment Contracts Act 1991 were well established and 
therefore it reflected a representative year in the working life of the Employment 
Tribunal. The first stage of the proposed research involved entering relevant 
information from 1997 cases into a specially created database.   
 
Stage two of the proposed research involved a representative selection of participants 
from 150 of the above personal grievance decisions and surveying them on their 
practical experiences, the costs involved and outcomes of using the Employment 
Tribunal. It was also important to consider any benefits achieved and rewards gained 
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from using adjudication. These benefits could have related to, for example, either 
financial gain or retaining employment, and associated positive outcomes. 
 
Stage three proposed to conduct an in-depth study from twenty cases from stage two 
and carry out surveys of 150 participants in personal grievance cases. This initial 
proposal comprised an analysis of Employment Tribunal decisions, interviews with 
adjudicators and surveys of participants to determine the answers to the research 
questions. It was decided that it would be practical to confine the study to 
interviewing all available Employment Tribunal members who were adjudicating in 
1997. It was hoped that these interviews would highlight the different approaches 
taken by adjudicators and the methods which they used to resolve different types of 
personal grievances. In the event, it became clear that an in-depth case study of the 
detailed experiences of participants in twenty personal grievance adjudication cases 
would not have been cost-effective or practicable due to time constraints and access to 
resources.  
1.3 THESIS OVERVIEW 
 
Including this introduction, the thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter Two 
describes the historical development of the resolution of personal grievances in New 
Zealand. Tracking the origin of legislative intervention since the Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1894, Chapter Two involves a brief study of the 
development of sophisticated employment related dispute mechanisms, which finally 
crystallised as the personal grievance provisions in the Industrial Relations Act 1973. 
Beyond this, developments introduced by the Labour Relations Act 1987 and the State 
Sector Act 1988 are examined as precursors to the passage of the Employment 
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Contracts Act 1991. The Chapter examines the political context of the passing of the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991 and then details the Act’s institutional structures, 
categories of personal grievances, procedure (including alternatives and common law 
actions), remedies, and the operation of the Employment Tribunal set against a 
background of relevant case law and commentary.
4
 Chapter Two illustrates how the 
legislation developed when attempting to resolve personal grievance-type issues and 
whether at each stage of its development the questions at issue had been resolved. 
Chapter Two finally examines whether the development of the legislative framework 
assisted with the resolution of the questions raised in this thesis.  
 
Chapter Three explores the realities of access to justice issues raised by the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991. Access to justice is assessed in the context of the 
Act’s expressed aims in Section 76 to provide a low level, informal, specialist 
tribunal.  
 
Chapter Four generally describes how and why information for this thesis was 
collected and recorded. The chapter describes methodology used to collect and 
analyse data for this research, why this methodology was chosen and briefly compares 
methods used by others who researched in this area. This required an informal ‘crash 
course’ in qualitative and quantitative research methods to ensure the data collected 
was informative and relevant to the thesis questions. This information gathering and 
analysis was divided into three stages: 
                                                             
4
 Commentary on case law in relation to Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 76, which relates to the 
objects of the Employment Tribunal, is discussed more fully in Chapter Two. 
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 Firstly, the creation of a database of all 1997 Employment Tribunal personal 
grievance and related costs decisions. 1997 was selected as a representative 
year in the operation of the Employment Tribunal; by this stage any 
unresolved personal grievances left from the operation of the Labour 
Relations Act 1987 had been settled, and processes under the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991 had been firmly established. 
 The second stage describes how interviews with Employment Tribunal 
adjudicators were arranged and conducted. It discusses how the questions 
were devised, how the interviews proceeded, how the data was analysed, and 
how this related to the research questions.   
 Finally, Chapter Four examines how survey participants were selected, 
contacted and details the methodology used to survey the participants in 150 
personal grievance cases from 1997. It also discusses how the survey 
questions were constructed in order to obtain relevant answers, what specific 
questions were asked and how the results were collated and related to the 
research topic.   
Chapters Five, Six and Seven discuss the processes used to determine answers to the 
first two thesis questions, outlining the research findings. Chapter Five examines the 
objective data collected from all 1997 Employment Tribunal personal grievance 
decisions; Chapter Six considers detailed interviews with Employment Tribunal 
adjudicators; and Chapter Seven records the results from the survey of participants 
and their representatives from 150 personal grievance decisions in 1997.  
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By using illustrative tables, Chapter Five details information gained from all 1997 
Employment Tribunal personal grievance and related costs decisions. The analysis 
includes information on gender, occupational background, choice of representation, 
causes of action, delay, outcomes, remedies sought and granted, contributory fault, 
impact of adjudicators’ discretion and legal costs; thus profiling participants and their 
experiences of using adjudication. Chapter Five also identifies potential areas of 
difficulty for those using the personal grievance procedure. This information is 
compared with the findings of other related research and explores any differences and 
similarities found. This investigation provides a comprehensive examination of the 
differing factors affecting the nature of personal grievances in the Employment 
Tribunal, and how such factors can be used as indicators of success. For example, I 
consider the cost of taking the case (legal costs and lodging fees), potential lost 
wages, and delay in receiving any compensation. The information obtained through 
case analysis has provided an objective indicator of whether or not applicants would 
have believed that their personal grievance had been successfully resolved. This 
information was compared with the subjective data obtained through surveys that is 
considered in Chapter Seven. The overall success of the adjudication system is further 
analysed in Chapter Eight when determining whether there was access to justice and 
whether the adjudication system for personal grievances actually worked.  
 
In assisting to determine this question, Chapter Six records interviews with 
Employment Tribunal adjudicators and provided a unique opportunity to examine the 
views of the decision-makers. The interviews were extensive, averaging ninety 
minutes each, and adjudicators provided rich responses and feedback to the topics 
addressed. To my knowledge, the views of adjudicators have never been sought to 
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this extent before. The chapter explores the views of those who had influence on 
whether the adjudication process itself was effective in the manner intended in 
resolving personal grievances under the Employment Contracts Act 1991. The chapter 
is divided into the five categories of questions that were asked of adjudicators:  
 Process: It was important to determine adjudicators’ opinions of the 
adjudication procedure itself. This section compares adjudicators’ views 
with the government and statutory intentions and explores procedural 
requirements that may have resulted in the process becoming overly 
complex and legalistic. 
 Types of Personal Grievance: This section looks at the approach taken by 
adjudicators when hearing different types of personal grievances. For 
example, was a more sensitive approach used in sexual harassment or 
discrimination cases? 
 Parties: Similarly to above, the third category examines whether certain 
characteristics of parties, such as gender, occupation, ethnicity, and 
disability, have any impact on adjudicators’ attitudes and their decision 
making process. It also considers potential power imbalances between 
parties and other inequalities and adjudicators’ responses to them. 
 Representation: This section discusses issues of representation from the 
perspective of adjudicators. For example, did the type of representative and 
the standard of representation provided have any affect on the attitude of 
adjudicators and potentially the outcome of the case? Differing levels of 
training and experience may also have been influential on the final outcome 
of the adjudication process.  
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 Costs: The final section in Chapter Six explores adjudicators’ opinions on 
costs, what factors they took into account when awarding them and the 
impact of Legal Aid. This was important in determining whether 
adjudication was accessible to the parties involved, and thus if the personal 
grievance adjudication system worked in the manner intended by the 
government of the day. 
 
Chapter Seven, the final stage in examining the research findings, investigates the 
surveys of participants of 150 personal grievance cases heard in the Employment 
Tribunal in 1997. Participants included in this survey were employees, employers, and 
their representatives from each case. Chapter Seven therefore explores the issues 
raised from the perspective of all parties involved (except for adjudicators) and 
identifies relevant issues facing participants in the personal grievance procedure. The 
survey results illustrate what parties and their representatives thought of the personal 
grievance process (including views on why their mediation was unsuccessful); the 
impact of the choice of representation, and then contrasts participant views with the 
stated legislative objectives. This chapter addresses the specific personal experiences 
of participants using the personal grievance procedure, and whether they believed 
adjudication worked for them.   
 
Finally, the main focus of Chapter Eight, the last chapter, is to draw the thesis 
together, determining whether the adjudication system worked in the manner 
intended. Drawing from the issues raised in Chapter Three, this chapter examines the 
principle of access to justice, determining whether it has been achieved by comparing 
the findings of this thesis with the declared objects of institutional process under 
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Section 76, Employment Contracts Act 1991. The case law interpreting these objects 
is also considered with the impact of delay, legal cost and choice of representation. 
 
Chapter Eight also summarises the findings of Chapters Five to Seven and places 
these in the context of the Employment Relations Act 2000, identifying any 
outstanding issues and how they might be resolved. By identifying the effective 
features and negative aspects of the process, this thesis determines what the 
experiences were of participants using the personal grievance adjudication procedure, 
if the personal grievance adjudication system worked in the manner intended by the 
government of the day and whether the procedure has benefited not only policy 
makers, but all participants in the personal grievance adjudication system. 
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C h a p t e r  2  
PERSONAL GRIEVANCES – BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter briefly outlines the historical and political evolution of the personal 
grievance procedure in New Zealand and focusses upon the differing definitions of 
personal grievances under changing statutory authority. The chapter also examines 
relevant institutional structures, the statutory personal grievance procedure itself, and 
briefly considers alternative grievance procedures. In addition, a contrast is drawn 
between the procedure available to pursue a personal grievance in the Employment 
Tribunal and the complaints procedure contained in the Human Rights Act 1993. 
2.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
During the 1890s New Zealand was viewed as a country of social experimentation.
1
 
Against a backdrop of industrial disruption by Australian workers in key export 
orientated industries, the New Zealand Government enacted major structural industrial 
legislation to prevent similar disruption and guarantee access to emerging export 
                                                             
1
 K Hince, „From William Pember Reeves to William Francis Birch: From Conciliation to Contracts‟, 7–12 
in R Harbridge (ed), Employment Contracts: New Zealand Experiences (1993).  
15 
 
markets.
2
 In 1891, a Department of Labour was established to administer social and 
industrial reforms including programmes to assist the unemployed, minimum conditions 
of employment in factories and shops, control of domestic trading activities and the 
protection of women and minors in the labour market.
3
  
 
A key component of reform was the passage of the Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act 1894, which established a process of conciliation and arbitration of 
industrial disputes.
4
 The Act required unions to register and the principle of collective 
activity, including collective bargaining, was regulated.
5
 Union registration provided 
access to state controlled conciliation, arbitration and bargaining mechanisms.
6
 
Registration also guaranteed workers access to minimum wages and conditions of 
employment specified in awards and industrial agreements.
7
 State enforcement of awards 
and industrial agreements were significant features of the legislation.
8
 The Act provided 
that each award would state the industrial union, trade union, association, person or 
                                                             
2
 Ibid. 
3
 The Labour Department was formally established by The Labour Department Act 1908. See also J E 
Martin, Holding the Balance (1996) and A E C Hare, Industrial Relations in New Zealand (1946) 276. 
4
 Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1894, ss 42 and 46. See J Holt, Compulsory Arbitration in 
New Zealand (1986) and N S Woods, Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration in New Zealand (1963) for a 
detailed history on the origins and history of the New Zealand Arbitration system. 
5
 Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1894, s 17 which allowed industrial unions and associations to 
be a party to an industrial agreement. The general provisions regarding registration of associations and 
unions contained in the Act legitimised the existence of unions and associations and their ability to 
negotiate awards and agreements; refer Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1894, ss 3–16. 
6
 Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1894, ss 42 and 53. 
7
 Ibid, s 74 stated that every award must contain definitions of the parties on whom it was to be binding and 
the duration of the award, which could not exceed two years. Section 17 of the same Act defined who 
parties to an agreement could be and s 21 stated the effect of the agreement. 
8
 Ibid, ss 74–81 provided for the enforcement procedures relevant to awards. Section 23 of the same Act 
stated that the provisions enforcing awards also applied to industrial agreements. 
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persons bound by the award.9 Section 17 of the Act indicated that the parties to industrial 
agreements could be trade unions, industrial unions, industrial associations or employers 
and that any such agreement could provide for „any matter or thing affecting any 
industrial matter or any thing affecting any industrial matter or dispute.‟10  
 
Awards and agreements were distinguished by coverage differences. Awards contained 
„blanket coverage‟ and „subsequent parties‟ clauses that extended the terms and 
conditions across industries or occupations. Consequently, the award bound workers and 
employers who had not been directly involved in negotiation. In contrast, an agreement 
covered only the negotiating parties and relevant employees.11  
 
The 1894 Act established specialist employment institutions
12
 to resolve disputes over 
awards and industrial agreements.
13
 A specialist Court of Arbitration was established 
with limited jurisdiction over workers covered by an award or agreement.
14
 The 
legislation provided for the types of issues that the Court of Arbitration could determine. 
Dismissal or unfair treatment cases were excluded from the functions that the court was 
                                                             
9
 Ibid, s 74.  
10
 Ibid, s 17. 
11
 N S Woods, Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration in New Zealand (1963) 69. 
12
 Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1894, s 30 established Boards of Conciliation. Section 32(1) 
provided that every Board was to consist of between four and six members elected by the industrial unions 
of employers and workers in the industrial districts. The Chairman was elected separately. Section 43 gave 
the power to Boards to „carefully and expeditiously‟ inquire into and investigate industrial disputes. Section 
44 of this Act stated that Boards of Conciliation were empowered to make any suggestions, which appeared 
to them to be right and proper in order to resolve and settle any industrial dispute in a fair and amicable 
manner. Alternatively, they could decide the issue based on the merits and substantive justice of the case. 
13
 Ibid, ss 44 and 52. 
14
 Ibid, s 52. 
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authorised to determine. These were matters that remained within the jurisdiction of the 
common law and the ordinary courts regardless of award or agreement coverage.15 The 
Court of Arbitration had authority to make decisions on the grounds of „equity and good 
conscience‟16 with appeals from decisions restricted to points of law. The Court structure 
was tripartite, consisting of a judge and lay members appointed after consultation with 
the central bodies of unions of workers and employers.
17
  
 
The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1894 survived largely intact with 
periodic fine-tuning and amendments up until 1954
18
 when a consolidated Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act was enacted.
19
 This legislation updated the conciliation 
and arbitration process applicable in New Zealand.  
 
However, until 1973 the only action available to a dismissed worker remained a restricted 
common law claim for wrongful dismissal. Lawful grounds for wrongful dismissal were 
principally dismissal on notice for misconduct, wilful disobedience and neglect.
20 
Anderson suggested that at this stage, industrial law had not yet developed protective 
mechanisms, which would take into account the reality of the working environment for 
                                                             
15
 Ibid, ss 45, 46 and 52. 
16
 Ibid, s 61. 
17
 Ibid, s 48(1). 
18
 D L Mathieson, Industrial Law in New Zealand (1970) 2. 
19
 The long title to the Act was, „An Act to consolidate and amend the Law Relating to the Settlement of 
Industrial Disputes by Conciliation and Arbitration‟. 
20
 D L Mathieson, Industrial Law in New Zealand (1970), ch IV; A Szakats, Introduction to the Law of 
Employment (1975), ch 18. 
18 
 
most workers.
21
 Anderson drew a comparison between a 1963 ILO Convention aimed at 
the provision of relatively secure employment
22
 and the applicable common law, which 
permitted the employer to dismiss at will, subject only to the observance of proper 
notice.
23
 Green suggested, during this period, that employers firmly believed in the 
exercise of managerial prerogative and that the right to hire and fire should not be subject 
to legislative or procedural constraint.24 Green also observed a strong belief that the 
number of workers required by an effective business was an exclusive employer 
prerogative. In the 1960s, Green suggested that if a worker lost their employment, it 
would be easy for them to find alternative work, although they would lose some service-
related benefits, for example employer-subsidised superannuation.
25
  
By contrast, in the state sector the State Services Act 1962 legislated for disciplinary and 
dismissal matters.
26
 This provided state servants with exclusive access to statutory 
dispute resolution tribunals.  
                                                             
21
 G J Anderson, Procedures to Settle Personal Grievances: An Examination of Section 117 of the 
Industrial Relations Act 1973 (1978). 
22
 ILO Recommendation 119 Concerning the Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer 
(1963). Clause 2(1) of the recommendation provides: Termination of employment should not take place 
unless there is a valid reason for such termination connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker or 
based on the operational requirements of the undertaking, establishment or service.  
Although New Zealand is a member of the International Labour Organisation, New Zealand did not ratify 
this recommendation.  
23
 G J Anderson, Procedures to Settle Personal Grievances: An Examination of Section 117 of the 
Industrial Relations Act 1973 (1978) 2.  
24
 R L Green, Procedures to Settle Disputes Over Alleged Wrongful Dismissal (1966) 1. 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 State Services Act 1962, ss 40, 55–58. These sections governed offences and penalties, which could be 
imposed on public servants who committed offences within the provisions of the Act. Also see J Hughes, 
Labour Law in New Zealand (1990) 1814. The 1962 Act was repealed by the State Sector Act 1988, which 
19 
 
 
Compulsory conciliation and arbitration resulted in a relatively stable private sector 
employment environment, with little legislative amendment until the 1970s. The 
exception during this period was a tendency for workers to directly challenge a dismissal 
by utilising industrial action as „leverage‟.27 This led to the passage of the Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Amendment Act 1970. This legislation enabled workers to 
pursue a personal grievance against their employer on the grounds of wrongful dismissal 
or in respect of any action by the employer which affected the worker‟s employment to 
his or her disadvantage.
28
 If no agreement was reached between the parties, the Chairman 
of a Disputes Committee
29
 was given an indirect authority to make a decision.
30
 Standard 
personal grievance procedures were outlined in s 4 of the Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Amendment Act 1970 and deemed to be included in all awards and 
agreements to enable settlement of personal grievance and interpretation disputes.
31
 The 
provisions included a requirement that the worker make an initial, direct approach to the 
employer. If not resolved, the union was notified and was required to take up the matter 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
unified application of the relevant law, so that for the first time personal grievance procedure applied to 
state sector employees. 
27
 Faulkner (1970) 369 NZPD 3606. 
28
 Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Amendment Act 1970, s 4 inserting a new s 179 in Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1954. See D L Mathieson, Industrial Law in New Zealand (1970), 49–53 
for a detailed discussion of wrongful dismissal. 
29
 Ibid, s 3 inserting a new s 178(3) in Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1954, defined a Disputes 
Committee as an equal number of representatives appointed by the union and employer, and a mutually 
agreed Chairman. Under subsection (4) the Committee reached its decisions by majority. If no agreement 
could be reached, the Chairman made a decision or referred the case to the Court for determination. 
30
 Ibid, s 4 inserting new ss 178 and 179 in Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1954. See G J 
Anderson, Procedures to Settle Personal Grievances; An Examination of Section 117 of the Industrial 
Relations Act, 1973 (1978) 6 who notes it is unclear what authority the chair actually had, as although there 
was intent to give the chair the decision making capacity, express authority was absent. 
31
 Ibid, s 4 inserting a new s 179(3) in Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1954. 
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with the employer on the worker‟s behalf. If this process was unsuccessful, the matter 
was then referred to either a Disputes Committee or an independent arbitrator. Whether 
the Disputes Committee or an arbitrator heard the personal grievance was determined by 
the relevant industrial instrument.
32
 If no arbitrator was specified in the instrument or 
agreed upon by the parties, the Minister of Labour appointed an arbitrator. Personal 
grievance remedies were reimbursement of lost wages, reinstatement and 
compensation.
33
 The decision of either the Disputes Committee or arbitrator was binding 
on the parties.
34
 If the complaint against the employer did not meet the basic legal 
requirements of a personal grievance, that is, if the action complained of was not a 
dismissal or if the action complained of did not result in disadvantage to the employee, or 
if the complainant did not have access to the personal grievance procedure, it was 
possible for the employee to pursue a common law claim for breach of contract in the 
ordinary courts. 
 
                                                             
32
 Defined as any award or industrial agreement under the Labour Disputes Investigation Act 1913, s 8 and 
any other agreement in the nature of an industrial agreement made between a workers‟ union and an 
employer or a body of employers. Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Amendment Act 1970, s 3. 
33
 Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Amendment Act 1970, s 4 inserting a new s 179(5) in Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1954. 
34
 Ibid, s 4 inserting a new s 179 in Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1954. 
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A Mediation Service was established in 1970. The Government viewed mediation as a 
method of avoiding workplace industrial action over personal grievances,
35
 and as a 
general dispute-prevention mechanism.
36
 
2.2.1 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACT 1973 
 
In 1972, the Minister of Labour introduced an Industrial Relations Bill, describing it as 
„the most complete recasting of our industrial legislation since the Industrial Conciliation 
and Arbitration Act was first enacted in 1894‟.37 This led to the passage of the Industrial 
Relations Act 1973, replacing the concept of „wrongful dismissal‟ with a statutory right to 
take a personal grievance for „unjustifiable‟ dismissal.38 A personal grievance could still 
be taken on the grounds of any other action by the employer that „disadvantaged‟ a 
worker.
39
  
Personal grievances were defined in s 117 of the Industrial Relations Act 1973 as: 
 Any grievance that a worker may have against his employer because of a claim that he has been 
unjustifiably dismissed, or that other action by the employer (not being an action of a kind 
                                                             
35
 R Ryan and P Walsh, „Common Law v Labour Law: The New Zealand Debate‟ (1993) Australian 
Journal of Labour Law 230, 232. 
36The Mediation Service‟s functions were found in Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Amendment Act 
1970, s 5 inserting a new s 180(3)(4) in Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1954. Functions were: 
to assist with maintenance of harmonious industrial relations; to use best endeavours to prevent industrial 
disputes; to assist with the prevention of an industrial dispute when the mediator or either of the parties 
became aware of that possibility; when dispute arose, to offer their services to the parties to assist with 
settlement; to inquire fully into the dispute and to make suggestions and recommendations to assist with its 
settlement; if the parties agree, to decide such matters which are referred to the mediator for decision; and 
to exercise any other function conferred by this or any other Act. 
37
 381 NZPD 3476. 
38
 See s 117 of the Industrial Relations Act 1973, which defined personal grievances and established a 
procedure for their resolution. 
39
 Industrial Relations Act 1973, s 117. 
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applicable generally to workers of the same class employed by the employer) affects his 
employment to his disadvantage.  
Anderson suggested the reason for the change to „unjustifiable dismissal‟ was to prevent 
a narrow interpretation of the previous term „wrongful dismissal‟, which had the potential 
for confusion with its common law counterpart.
40
 Wrongful dismissal at common law 
was a narrow concept entailing dismissal without contractual notice or if no notice was 
stipulated in the contract, dismissal without reasonable notice,41 unless grounds existed 
for summary dismissal for cause.42 The remedy for wrongful dismissal was restricted to 
payment for the notice period.43 The change to a concept of „unjustifiable dismissal‟ was 
prompted by the legislature‟s desire for a broader, fairer approach to unlawful 
dismissals.44  
Section 117 of the Industrial Relations Act 1973 restricted access to the personal 
grievance procedure to workers covered by awards and collective agreements.45 The 1973 
Act also established a procedure for processing personal grievances. This entailed a 
Grievance Committee consisting of an equal number of representatives from both 
                                                             
40
 G J Anderson, Procedures to Settle Personal Grievances: An Examination of Section 117 of the 
Industrial Relations Act 1973 (1978) 7. 
41
 Baker v Denkara Ashanti Mining Corporation Ltd (1903) 20 TLR 37; Hartley v Harman (1840) 11 A 
and E 798. 
42
See D L Mathieson, Industrial Law in New Zealand (1970) 49–53 for a detailed discussion on wrongful 
dismissals. 
43
 Baker v Denkara Ashanti Mining Corporation Ltd (1903) 20 TLR 37. 
44
 G J Anderson, Procedures to Settle Personal Grievances: An Examination of Section 117 Industrial 
Relations Act, 1973 (1978) 7. 
45
 See s 117(2) and (4) of the Industrial Relations Act 1973 which required workers covered by awards and 
collective agreements to notify the employer of a personal grievance, and for the worker to notify the 
relevant union which had to take up the matter as soon as practicable. This subsection contained detailed 
procedures on steps which workers and employers were required to follow in personal grievance situations. 
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employers and unions. The disputants determined the necessity of appointing a chair.46 If 
unresolved, the matter was referred to the Industrial Court, which had the power to make 
a binding determination.47 All parties to the relevant award or agreement were obliged to 
attempt to resolve personal grievances as soon as practicable
48
 using the standard 
mechanisms contained in the Act.
49
 Parties were also obliged to abstain from any action 
that restricted the operation of the procedure and it was an obligation of the parties to 
promote the resolution of personal grievances.
50
 Remedies available under s 117(7) were 
reimbursement of lost wages; reinstatement to the worker‟s former position or a position 
not less advantageous to the worker; and payment of compensation to the aggrieved 
worker. Approval could be granted by an Industrial Commission
51
 for the adoption of a 
written alternative disputes procedure to that contained in the Act.
52
 
 
In 1977 the Arbitration Court was established by way of an amendment to the Industrial 
Relations Act 1973.
53
 The Court‟s main functions included the settlement of personal 
grievances that had not been resolved at mediation.
54
   
                                                             
46
 Industrial Relations Act 1973, s 117 (4) (e). 
47
Ibid. The Industrial Court was established by s 32 and it replaced the Court of Arbitration. 
48
 Industrial Relations Act 1973, s 117(4)(b). 
49
 See D L Mathieson, Industrial Law in New Zealand (Supplement 1975) 21–22 for details of standard 
personal grievance procedure. 
50
 Industrial Relations Act 1973, s 117(4)(j). 
51
 The Industrial Commission was established by Industrial Relations Act 1973, s 17(1). Its jurisdiction was 
contained in s 26 which included „settling disputes of interest; and any other functions conferred on it by 
legislation‟. 
52
 Industrial Relations Act 1973, s 117(3). A Szakats, Introduction to the Law of Employment (1975) 309–
310. 
53
 Industrial Relations Amendment Act 1977, s 32. 
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2.2.2 LABOUR RELATIONS ACT 1987 
 
In 1985, the Labour Government circulated a green paper on reform of the industrial 
relations system.
55
 The purpose of the paper was to generate debate on the industrial 
relations regime and to encourage participants in the system to comment. This process 
culminated in the passage of the Labour Relations Act 1987.
56
 The Government‟s 
intention was to move towards an industrial relations system where the roles of all parties 
were clear and where the participants could take responsibility for their actions.
57
 It was 
also emphasised that the new legislation would enable the parties to „conclusively settle‟ 
a personal grievance without recourse to a strike or lockout.
58
 Section 209(e) of the 
Labour Relations Act 1987 made it unlawful for settlement of a personal grievance to be 
disrupted by deliberate lack of co-operation of any person. The Act required all awards 
and agreements to contain procedures for the resolution of personal grievances or for the 
insertion of standard clauses from the Act‟s sixth schedule where no alternative 
procedure was agreed.
59
 Access to the personal grievance procedure was dependent upon 
union membership at the time the personal grievance was submitted, except in limited 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
54
 Industrial Relations Act 1973, s 48(b)(c). 
55
 Department of Labour, Industrial Relations: A Framework for Review (1985) vol 1. See also Department 
of Labour, Industrial Relations: A Framework for Review, vol 2, and Department of Labour, Industrial 
Relations: A Framework for Review, Summary of Submissions (1986). 
56
 Department of Labour, Industrial Relations: A Framework for Review (1985) vol 1, 3. 
57
 Ibid. 
58
 Labour Relations Bill 1987, Explanatory Note vi. 
59
 Labour Relations Act 1987, s 215. (For an outline of the distinction between awards and agreements, see 
above n 14 and accompanying text). 
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circumstances.
60
 „Parties‟ to a personal grievance were the union representing the worker 
and the relevant employer party.
61
  
 
Under the Labour Relations Act 1987, Grievance Committees were established to hear 
personal grievances.
62
 Award and agreement enforcement was transferred from the 
Department of Labour to the parties involved.
63
 If the Grievance Committee was 
unsuccessful in resolving the personal grievance, the standard personal grievance 
procedure provided for the final determination to be made by the Labour Court.64 The 
Labour Relations Act 1987 also established a nation-wide Mediation Service
65
 that was 
independent of any government department or agency.
66
  
 
                                                             
60
 Labour Relations Act 1987, ss 209(d) and 216. Exceptional circumstances were described in s 218(1) as: 
(a) the worker‟s inability to have the grievance dealt with, or dealt with promptly, by the worker‟s union or 
the employer, or (b) discrimination against the worker due to membership of a union or an organisation 
which has applied to be registered as a union, or (c) duress in relation to a worker‟s membership or non 
membership of a union, or (d) the holding of a certificate of exemption from union membership.  
To bring a personal grievance, the worker did not have to be a union member at the time of the actual 
dismissal, but was required to join a union to access the personal grievance procedures. See NZ Workers 
IOUW v Proprietors of Tahora 2F2 – Papuni Station (1990) 3 NZELC 97, 325.  
61
 Ibid, s 216(1) and (2). Section 83 of the Labour Relations Act 1987 stated that if a worker held a strong 
objection to union membership on the grounds of deeply held personal conviction or conscience, they could 
apply under s 82 of the same Act, for a certificate of exemption from the Secretary of the Union 
Membership Exemption Tribunal. Section 95(2) provided that a certificate of exemption when granted 
meant that the person to whom it had been granted would be treated as if they were a member of a union. 
62
 Clause 7 sch 7, Labour Relations Act 1987 provided that a Grievance Committee was to have an equal 
number of representatives from employer and union parties, and a Chairperson who would be a mediator 
appointed from the Mediation Service. 
63
 Department of Labour, Industrial Relations: A Framework for Review (1985). 
64
 Labour Relations Act 1987 s 217(1)(b). 
65
 Ibid, s 251(1).  
66
 Ibid, s 217. 
26 
 
An appeal from a decision of a Grievance Committee was heard by the Labour Court
67
 on 
a de novo basis. Both parties had the opportunity to be heard in full and to bring evidence 
as if the Grievance Committee had not heard it.
68
 The Labour Court was established as a 
court of record
69
 with the right to appeal to the Court of Appeal.
70
 Section 295 of the 
Labour Relations Act 1987 removed the tripartite nature of dispute resolution in the 
specialist court, except in the case of personal grievances and demarcation disputes.
71
 
 
The personal grievance procedures remained restricted to union members through s 
209(d) of the Labour Relations Act 1987. However, a non-union member could take 
action against his or her employer in the Small Claims Tribunal
72
 or they could take 
common law action in the ordinary courts.
73
 
 
 
 
                                                             
67
 Labour Relations Act 1987, sch 7, cl 15(1). 
68
 Ibid, s 218(2). 
69
 Ibid, s 278. In 1998, the Employment Court was held to be an inferior court. See Attorney General v Reid 
[2000] 2 NZLR 377 (HC).  
70
 Labour Relations Act 1987, ss 309–313. Section 312 stated that appeals could be made by any party who 
was dissatisfied with any decision of the Labour Court, except if it was on the grounds of the construction 
of any award or agreement.   
71
 See Labour Relations Act 1987, s 217(2) which provides for a judge with two panel members to hear 
personal grievance cases. Section 108 provided that a judge and two panel members also heard demarcation 
disputes. 
72
 See Small Claims Tribunals Act 1976, s 9(1)(a) which gave jurisdiction to the Small Claims Tribunal to 
hear claims based on contract or quasi contract. This section was carried forward to the Disputes Tribunal 
Act 1988, s 10(1)(a). 
73
 J Hughes, Labour Law in New Zealand (1990) ch 3, part VII.  
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2.2.3 THE STATE SECTOR 
 
Prior to 1987, industrial relations practice in the State Sector was the subject of distinct, 
separate legislation.
74
 However, the State Sector Act 1988 synchronised industrial 
relations in both the public and private sectors.
75
 There was no longer a separate 
procedure for settling personal grievances in the public sector. All personal grievances 
became subject to the same mechanism as applied to the private sector.
76
  
2.2.4 DEFINITIONS OF PERSONAL GRIEVANCES UNDER THE LABOUR RELATIONS ACT 
1987 
 
The Labour Relations Act 1987 defined personal grievances as:
77
  
(1) For the purposes of this Act, „personal grievance‟ means any grievance that a worker may 
have against the worker‟s employer or former employer because of a claim- 
(a) That the worker has been unjustifiably dismissed; or 
(b) That the worker's employment, or one or more conditions thereof, is or are affected to 
the worker‟s disadvantage by some unjustifiable action by the employer (not being an 
action deriving solely from the interpretation, application, or operation, or disputed 
interpretation, application, or operation, of any provision of any award or agreement); 
or 
(c) That the worker has been discriminated against in the worker‟s employment; or 
(d) That the worker has been sexually harassed in the worker‟s employment; or 
                                                             
74
 State Services Act 1962, s 56 and s 58(6); Education Act 1964, ss 157–161, ss 175–180; and Health 
Services Personnel Act 1983, s 37. See J Hughes, Labour Law in New Zealand (1989) ch 15, part XI. 
75
 State Sector Act 1988, s 67 provided that the Labour Relations Act 1987 would apply to the Public 
Service.  
76
 J Hughes, Labour Law in New Zealand (1990) ch 4, part II. 
77
 Labour Relations Act 1987, s 210. A discussion of case law on this topic will be covered under the 
„Employment Contracts Act‟ heading. The relevant definitions of personal grievances are identical, save for 
purely grammatical changes, under s 27 of the Employment Contracts Act 1991.  
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(e)  That the worker has been subject to duress in the worker‟s employment in relation to 
membership or non-membership of a union.  
 
Section 210(1)(d) provided that „sexual harassment‟ became a ground for a personal 
grievance. However, under s 226, workers experiencing sexual harassment or complaints 
of discrimination were required to choose whether to use the personal grievance regime 
or to make a complaint to either the Human Rights Commission or the Race Relations 
Conciliator.
78
 
2.2.5 REMEDIES UNDER THE LABOUR RELATIONS ACT 1987 
 
Sections 227–229 of the Labour Relations Act 1987 indicated the remedies available 
when a personal grievance had been proven. They were: reinstatement, reimbursement, 
compensation and recommendations.
79
 The Act stated that „reinstatement‟ was the 
primary remedy available to a dismissed worker.80  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
78
 Labour Relations Act 1987, s 226(1)(a)(b). However, under the Human Rights Commission Act 1977, 
sexual harassment was not a ground per se, but actions could be brought under the heading of sex 
discrimination. See H v E (1985) 5 NZAR 333. Sexual Harassment is now a separate ground under the 
Human Rights Act 1993, s 62. 
79
 See J Hughes, Labour Law in New Zealand (1989) 4.515–4.535 for a discussion of s 227 remedies. See 
also A Szakats and M A Mulgan, Dismissal and Redundancy Procedures (2
nd
 ed, 1990) 134–137. 
80
 Labour Relations Act 1987, s 228. 
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2.3 EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS ACT 1991 
2.3.1 POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
When the National Government came to power in 1990 it had a strong commitment to 
reforming the industrial relations system. Fundamental policy issues raised during 
discussion of the hastily introduced Employment Contracts Bill 1990, included the 
question of retention or otherwise of the specialist institutions and the procedures to be 
followed during disputes and personal grievances.
81
 The Minister of Labour, Bill Birch, 
claimed that the new institutional framework:82 
…will be more democratic and more accessible than in the past. Furthermore, these bodies will be 
accessible to all employees; no longer will employees have to belong to a union to pursue [sic] a 
personal grievance. 
 Prior to the introduction of the Employment Contracts Bill, the Government issued an 
„options‟ paper, which presented four possible options for the specialist institutions to 
operate within, and for the resolution of personal grievances.
83
 The options raised in 
relation to employment institutions were: retention of the Labour Court and Mediation 
                                                             
81
 See R Ryan and P Walsh, „Common Law v Labour Law: The New Zealand Debate‟ (1993) AJLL 230; 
and B Boon, „Procedural Fairness and the Unjustified Dismissal Decision‟ (1992) 17 NZJIR 301. Also see 
P Walsh and R Ryan, „The Making of the Employment Contracts Act‟ in R Harbridge (ed), Employment 
Contracts: New Zealand Experiences, (1993). Walsh, reviewing the legislative process, records the Select 
Committee as recommending:  
(i) that the specialist institutions should be retained,  
(ii) that an Employment Tribunal be established providing both a mediation and adjudication function, 
(iii) that the Employment Court be established, being a court of record hearing appeals from decisions of 
the Employment Tribunal; and 
(iv) that all employment contracts disputes should be heard and determined by the specialist labour law 
institutions, and not split between them and the ordinary civil courts.  
82
 [1991] 514 NZPD 1437. 
83
 Report of the Labour Committee on the Employment Contracts Bill, April 1991.  
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Service; creation of a specialist lower tribunal with retention of the Labour Court; 
creation of a specialist lower tribunal and abolition of the Labour Court, with appellate 
rights to the High Court; or abolition of all specialist institutions.  
 
 
Similarly, the options raised in relation to personal grievance procedures were retention 
of provisions contained in the Employment Contracts Bill;84 retention of personal 
grievance provisions as a legislated minimum condition; no provision for personal 
grievances other than that available under common law; or optional inclusion of 
prescribed personal grievance procedures in employment contracts. 
 
The options paper produced vigorous debate, which eventually culminated in the 
establishment of an Employment Tribunal. The Minister of Labour, Bill Birch, had 
claimed that the Employment Tribunal would „provide easy, quick and inexpensive 
access for all New Zealanders to pursue personal grievance procedures where 
necessary‟.85 
                                                             
84
 Ibid. The Employment Contracts Bill 1991 attempted to provide non-discriminatory access to 
employment, equal treatment in employment and protections against unjustified loss of employment. The 
Bill provided that personal grievance procedures were required to be included in collective employment 
contracts, and were discretionary in individual employment contracts.   
85
 W F Birch, Report Back Speech Notes – Press Release 22 April 1991. 
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When the Employment Contracts Act 1991 was enacted, employers were required to 
recognise the representatives of employees
86
 but the Act did not require the parties to 
negotiate nor did it recognise the existence of unions, instead it recognised employees 
organisations which had the right to represent employees. Section 2 of the Act defined 
„employee‟s organisation‟ as:87  
any group society association or other collection of employees however described and whether 
incorporated or not which existed in whole or in part to further the employment interests of the 
employees belonging to it.  
The legislation contained no mention or recognition of unions and placed no obligation 
on employers to discuss employment matters with them. Further, the removal of unions 
as formal bargaining agents was reflected in unions not being formally recognised as 
parties to personal grievances.88  
 
One significant intention of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 was to „de-collectivise‟ 
the New Zealand workforce.89 Harbridge estimated „over 110,000 workers lost their 
collective bargaining coverage‟ in the first major wage round after the Act‟s 
introduction,90 and by 1997 a Department of Labour survey noted that employees under 
the Employment Contracts Act 1991 were covered in equal proportions by individual and 
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 Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 12(2) and s 59(1). For further discussion on representation and the 
duty to recognise see Mazengarb’s Employment Law, (5th ed, 2000) Part II, 12.2–12.3A. 
87
 Employment Contracts Act 1991. 
88
 See P Roth, „Editorial: The Cost of “Individualising” Labour Law‟ [1997] 5 ELB 81–96.  
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 See P Walsh and R Ryan, „The Making of The Employment Contracts Act‟ in R Harbridge (ed), 
Employment Contracts: New Zealand Experiences (1993) 13–30. 
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 R Harbridge, „Bargaining and the Employment Contracts Act: an overview‟ in R Harbridge (ed) 
Employment Contracts: New Zealand Experiences (1993) 34. 
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collective contracts. The Act also facilitated a trend for smaller employers to utilise 
individual contracts.
91
 
2.3.2 STRUCTURE OF INSTITUTIONS 
 
The Objects section of Part III of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 provided that:  
(a) All employment contracts must contain an effective procedure for the settlement of personal 
grievances: 
(b) Personal grievances are distinguishable from disputes by their subject matter and not by the 
number of employees involved: 
(c) The application of a personal grievance procedure is not able to be frustrated by deliberate lack 
of co-operation on the part of any person: 
(d) The remedy for a proven grievance is determined in each case by the circumstances of the 
case: 
(e) The personal grievance procedure is an alternative to, and is not in addition to, any right to 
make a complaint under the Human Rights Commission Act 1977 or the Race Relations Act 1971. 
 
Section 77 of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 established the Employment Tribunal 
to hear, amongst other matters, personal grievances which had not been successfully 
resolved at mediation or where direct application had been submitted to resolve 
differences between parties to employment disputes.
92
 The Employment Court was 
created as a Court of Record under s 103 of the Employment Contracts Act 1991.
93
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 Department of Labour, Industrial Relations Service, Survey of Labour Market Adjustment Under the 
Employment Contracts Act (August 1997) 18–19. See also R Harbridge and K Hince, „The Employment 
Contracts Act: An Interim Assessment‟ (1994) 19 NZJIR 235. 
92
 Employment Contracts Act 1991, ss 76–79. See Mazengarb’s Employment Law, 5th ed (2000) 76–79. 
93
 See s 104 of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 for details of the jurisdiction of the Employment Court.  
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Section 78 of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 stated that the functions of the 
Employment Tribunal included: assisting employees and employers to resolve 
differences; providing mediation; adjudicating differences between parties; and providing 
mediation assistance outside the general terms of its jurisdiction, including where no 
formal application for mediation had been received.
94
  
 
Section 79 of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 established the jurisdiction of the 
Employment Tribunal, which included the provision of mediation assistance; 
adjudication of personal grievances and disputes; adjudication of all recovery of wages 
and other monetary claims; the recovery of penalties; compliance orders; and breach of 
contract actions. 
 
A significant proportion of the work undertaken by the Tribunal was the provision of 
mediation services. A 1999 study indicated that „over 70%‟ of all personal grievance 
cases brought before the Tribunal were resolved in mediation.
95
 
 
Pursuant to the Employment Contracts Act 1991, personal grievances could be settled in 
two ways before a mediator. First, the parties could agree to, and reach, a voluntary 
settlement or, alternatively, the parties could mutually give the mediator authority to 
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 Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 78. 
95
 I McAndrew, „Adjudication in the Employment Tribunal: Some Facts and Figures on Caseload and 
Representation‟ (1999) 24 NZJIR 365. 
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adjudicate.
96
 In the latter situation, the decision was final, binding and enforceable by the 
parties.
97
 If voluntary mediation failed, the applicant could refer the matter to a formal 
Employment Tribunal adjudication hearing.
98
 Any party could apply to the Employment 
Tribunal to have the matter referred to the Court;99 if the matter involved questions of 
urgency or significant legal issues, the Tribunal could order that the proceedings be heard 
in the Employment Court.100 If the Tribunal did not remove proceedings to the Court, the 
Court could hear the matter if special leave was granted by the Court. The Court could 
grant special leave for the matter to be heard under the same criteria that were used by the 
Tribunal, namely, significant legal issues or urgency.101 It was also possible, at first 
instance, to have a personal grievance or dispute resolved by adjudication. Mediation was 
not a prerequisite to adjudication.
102
 
 
Section 3 of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 gave the Employment Tribunal and the 
Employment Court exclusive jurisdiction to hear all disputes and personal grievances 
„founded on an employment contract‟. Within its specialist employment law jurisdiction, 
the Employment Court had authority to hear appeals from the Employment Tribunal.
103
 If 
dissatisfied with the decision of the Employment Court, appeal could be made to the 
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 Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 88(2). 
97
 Shaffer v Gisborne High School Board of Trustees [1995] 2 NZLR 288 (CA). 
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 Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 78. 
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 Ibid, s 94(1). 
100
 Ibid, s 94. 
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Court of Appeal on a question of law.
104
 In limited circumstances, the Court of Appeal 
could refer a case back to the Employment Court for reconsideration.
105
 
2.3.3 CATEGORIES OF PERSONAL GRIEVANCE UNDER THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS 
ACT 1991 
 
The Employment Contracts Act 1991 defined personal grievances in s 27(1). This 
definition was, for all practical purposes, identical to that contained in s 210 of the 
Labour Relations Act 1987. Section 27(1) provided: 
 For the purposes of this Act, „personal grievance‟ means any grievance that an employee may have 
against the employee‟s employer or former employer because of a claim- 
(a) That the employee has been unjustifiably dismissed; or 
(b) That the employee‟s employment, or one or more conditions thereof, is or are affected to 
the employee‟s disadvantage by some unjustifiable action by the employer (not being an 
action deriving solely from the interpretation, application, or operation, or disputed 
interpretation, application, or operation of any provision of any employment contract); or 
(c) That the employee has been discriminated against in the employee‟s employment; or 
(d) That the employee has been sexually harassed in the employee‟s employment; or 
(e) That the employee has been subject to duress in the employee‟s employment in relation to 
membership or non-membership of an employee‟s organisation. 
In practice, a personal grievance could encompass more than one ground, for instance, an 
unjustified dismissal claim might also comprise concurrent sexual harassment and 
discrimination claims.106 Alternatively, the Employment Tribunal may have found that the 
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105
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personal grievance was brought under the wrong head of grievance and found that a 
different type of personal grievance was established.
107
  
2.3.3(A) UNJUSTIFIABLE DISMISSAL 
 
Unjustifiable dismissal
108
 represented the most common ground of personal grievance.
109
 
To successfully bring this head of grievance a grievant had to initially establish that a 
dismissal had occurred.110 This involved establishing that an employment contract was in 
force111 and that an employer/employee relationship existed at the point of dismissal.
112
  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
sought. Nothing in these provisions restricted the number of grounds on which a personal grievance could 
have been taken. 
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 Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 34. 
108
 ILO Convention 158 defined „dismissal‟ as „the termination of employment at the initiative of the 
employer. This covers both actual and constructive dismissal, and dismissal either with or without notice.‟ 
Quoted in: Wellington Clerical Union v Greenwich [1983] ACJ 965.  
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 I McAndrew, „Adjudication in the Employment Tribunal: Some Facts and Figures on Caseload and 
Representation‟ (1999) 24(3) NZJIR 365. 
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of NZ Inc v Direct Mail Processes Ltd [1991] 2 ERNZ 645; Hodgkiss v Palmerston North City Council, 
unreported, WEC 46/96; Hawkes v DML Resources Ltd, unreported, AEC 73.97; J Hughes, P Roth, G 
Anderson, (eds) Personal Grievances (1999) 3.2. 
111
 Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 2 included in its definition of „employee‟ a person intending to work. 
See Canterbury Hotel Etc IUW v The Elms Motor Lodge Ltd [1989] 1 NZILR 958 where it was held that a 
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 For a person to be entitled to bring a personal grievance they had to prove that they were an employee at 
the time of the grievance: see TNT Express WorldWide Ltd v Cunningham [1993] 1 ERNZ 695; Muollo v 
Rotaru [1995] 2 ERNZ 414. It was also necessary to prove that the respondent named was the correct 
employer on the balance of probabilities: see Service Workers Union of Aotearoa v Chan [1991] 3 ERNZ 
15. For more detailed discussion on these points refer, to Mazengarb’s Employment Law 5th ed (2000) Part 
III, 27.5. 
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Where the termination of employment arose from the expiry or termination of a „fixed 
term‟ contract the situation was less clear.113 Simply allowing a fixed term contract to 
expire was not, of itself, a ground for taking a personal grievance alleging an unjustified 
dismissal.
114
 However, a continued or indefinitely extended employment relationship 
may have been established if the employee could bring evidence to show that the contract 
was a sham, had been varied so as to provide for an indefinite term, or that actions of the 
employer had genuinely created a legitimate expectation of renewal.115 In these 
circumstances, using the contract‟s expiry as a means of terminating the employment 
could be viewed as a dismissal capable of challenge.
116
 A forced or „constructive‟ 
dismissal, involving elements of „repudiatory‟ employer conduct that led to an 
„involuntary‟ resignation, could also found an action of unjustified dismissal.117 
 
Once the fact of dismissal and surrounding circumstances had been established, the 
employer had the evidential burden of proving that it was justified.
118
 Justification has 
two distinct but interrelated elements. First, there must have been substantive reasons, 
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 P Churchman, „Fixed Term Contracts‟ Employment Law Conference (1998: Wellington) 11–22; W C 
Hodge, „Employment Law‟ [1997] NZLR 531. 
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„Fixed Term Contracts in the Private Sector After Hagg‟ (1997) 3 ELB 41–60. 
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such as misconduct or an accumulation of misdemeanours by the employee serious 
enough to justify the dismissal. Second, the procedure used to dismiss the employee must 
have been demonstrably, procedurally fair.119 If both elements of justification could not 
be established, the employee may have had a valid personal grievance.
120
 The two 
elements of substantive and procedural unfairness were not always considered as separate 
entities but were interrelated.121 A fair and more appropriate test was considered by 
Goddard CJ to be what, under the particular circumstances, it was open to a fair and 
reasonable employer to do; this was suggested as a more useful approach than a legal 
distinction between substantive and procedural matters of fairness.122 The Court of 
Appeal decided that issues of substantive and procedural fairness could not be treated 
separately from each other.123 
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 See L Freyer, „Unjustifiable Dismissal: Procedural Fairness and the Employer‟ (1997) 22 NZJIR 143. 
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2.3.3(B) UNJUSTIFIABLE ACTION BY THE EMPLOYER RESULTING IN THE EMPLOYEE’S 
DISADVANTAGE 
 
Section 27(1)(b) of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 provided that, where an 
employee‟s employment,124 or one or more conditions thereof125 was altered to the 
employee‟s disadvantage126 by an unjustifiable action127 by the employer, the employee 
had access to a personal grievance action. If however, the action complained of was an 
action derived solely from the interpretation, application or operation of a contract or a 
disputed interpretation, application or operation of any provision of any employment 
contract, the party would have no access to a personal grievance.128  
 
In defining „unjustifiable action‟, the Employment Court indicated that no tests of general 
application could be taken from case law concerning the justification of employers 
actions. The Employment Tribunal and Employment Court approach was one of factual 
enquiry.
129
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 Northern Clerical Etc IUW v South Auckland Taxis Association [1987] ACJ 342, where it was held that 
the disadvantage had to relate to employment. 
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 The Court has interpreted this to mean that the employee must have been deprived of a benefit of 
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In Aoraki Corporation Ltd v McGavin,
130
 the Court of Appeal found that it was not 
legislatively clear whether, in a dismissal involving redundancy, issues of procedural 
fairness were better dealt with under the category of unjustifiable dismissal or as an 
unjustifiable action claim. In this case the Court held that there was no need to conclude 
the issue, as the test for justification was the same as that applicable in unjustifiable 
dismissal cases.  
 
In unjustified action cases the Employment Court held that the onus of proving 
justification rested with the employer.
131
 However, it was presumed that the employee 
must at least show that the action occurred and that disadvantage resulted.
132
 In regard to 
what constituted „disadvantage‟, the Court of Appeal decided that the concept was not 
restricted to material or financial loss.
133
 The Court of Appeal held that a final warning 
could constitute disadvantage, as it rendered the employee‟s employment less secure.134 
Loss of other conditions such as job satisfaction135 or status and self-esteem136 also 
founded disadvantage claims.  
                                                             
130
 [1998] 1 ERNZ 601 (Full Court). 
131
 Post Office Union (Inc) v Telecom (Wellington) Ltd [1989] 3 NZILR 527 and Northern Local 
Government Officers Union v Waitakere City Council [1991] 2 ERNZ 753. 
132
 J Hughes, P Roth, G Anderson (eds), Personal Grievances (1999) 7.5–7.6. Mazengarb’s Employment 
Law (1999) 27.61–27.62; P Bartlett, W C Hodge, P Muir, C Toogood, R Wilson, J Bull (eds), Employment 
Contracts (2002) EC27.11–EC27.11A. 
133
 Alliance Freezing Co (Southland) Ltd v NZ Amalgamated Engineering etc IUW [1989] 3 NZILR 785. 
134
 Ibid. 
135
 NZ Assn of Polytechnic Teachers Inc v Northland Polytechnic Council [1990] 2 NZILR 723. 
136
 Eric Woods Motor Cycles Ltd v NZ Distribution etc Union [1990] 3 NZLR 807; NZ (with exceptions) 
Shipwrights etc Union v GN Hale and Son Ltd [1991] 3 ERNZ 931; Northern Local Government Officers 
Union v Waitakere City Council [1990] 2 ERNZ 753. 
41 
 
The Employment Court indicated that non-promotion may also found a disadvantage 
claim if there was a clear, structured promotional framework in operation,137 an approach 
endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Victoria University of Wellington v Haddon.138 In this 
case, it was held that where reasonable opportunities arose for promotion, the employee 
could reasonably expect fair treatment.139  
 
One problem that employees could have faced under the unjustifiable action provisions 
was that the employee had an obligation to show that the disadvantage related directly to 
their employment or one or more conditions of employment. This was interpreted to 
mean that there must be a breach of contractual obligation or contractual entitlement,140 
which was restricted to the „on the job‟ situations.141 For example, withdrawal of staff 
travel concessionary benefits was held not to represent a contractual right and did not 
relate to the contractual conditions of employment.142  
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 Victoria University of Wellington v Haddon [1996] 1 ERNZ 139; Principal of Auckland College of 
Education v Hagg [1996] 1 ERNZ 150. 
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 Leitman v Air NZ Ltd [1989] 3 NZILR 434. See P Bartlett, W C Hodge, P Muir, C Toogood, R Wilson, J 
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2.3.3(C) DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 
 
Section 28(1) of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 provided an employee with a 
personal grievance action for discrimination if the employer offered different terms or 
conditions of employment or dismissed the employee on the grounds of race; colour; 
ethnic or national origin;143 sex;144 marital status;145 religious or ethical belief, or age;146 or 
by reason of the employee‟s involvement in an employees‟ organisation.147 The Human 
Rights Act 1993 s 21 extended the definition of discrimination to include disability, 
political opinion, family and employment status, and sexual orientation.148 However, 
these extended definitions of discrimination were not included in the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991.149  
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way that each word gives colour to the meaning of the other‟: King-Ansell v Police [1979] 2 NZLR 531 
(CA); Race Relations Conciliator v Marshall [1993] 2 ERNZ 290. 
144
 There was discrimination on the basis of sex if the relevant person would have received the same 
treatment as a person of the opposite sex, but for their own sex: Trilford v Car Haulaways Ltd [1996] 2 
ERNZ 351. See also I Adzoxrnu, „Indirect Discrimination in Employment‟ [1997] NZLJ 216. 
145
 This included married or separated partners and de facto partners living together in the nature of 
marriage: Proceedings Commissioner v NZ Post Ltd, unreported, EOT 3/91. Human Rights Act 1993 
defines marital status as: single; married; married but separated; party to a marriage now dissolved; 
widowed; or living in a relationship in the nature of marriage.  
146
 Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 28(3): for the purposes of this section, age, ethnic or national origins 
and ethical belief had the meanings given to them by the Human Rights Act 1993. See Review Publishing 
Co Ltd v Walker [1996] 2 ERNZ 407 for an example of age discrimination. 
147
 Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 28(2) contained an extended definition of when an employee was 
deemed to have been involved in the activities of an employees‟ organisation. See Tranz Rail Ltd v Rail 
and Maritime Transport Union (inc), unreported, 3 May 1999, CA 149/97. This decision provided a 
detailed analysis of s 28(1) Employment Contracts Act 1991. See also C Bourne and J Whitmore, Race and 
Sex Discrimination (2
nd
 ed) 1993; G Anderson, „The Employment Contracts Act: An Employer‟s Charter?‟ 
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Discrimination could either have been direct or indirect, although there was no statutory 
basis for this distinction in the Employment Contracts Act 1991.150 For example, a 
particular policy or activity may clearly be discriminatory in nature, such as an employer 
paying different rates of pay for men and women performing the same task; or 
discrimination may be indirect, where the action on the surface appears fair, but the 
underlying principle or policy is discriminatory in operation.151 
 
Unlike other types of personal grievance, actions based on discrimination shifted the 
burden of proof from the employer. In such cases, the employee had to establish the 
existence of discrimination. The standard of proof required was on the balance of 
probabilities.
152
  
2.3.3(D) SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
 
Section 29(1) of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 gave an employee access to a 
personal grievance action if the employer or a representative of their employer had 
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sexually harassed that employee in their employment.153 In Z v A Goddard CJ described 
sexual harassment as:  
poison[ing] the atmosphere in the workplace. It is wholly unacceptable and entirely devoid of any 
redeeming features. It follows that its occurrence can never be met with matters of justification, 
excuse or mitigation. It is an attack on the basic human right that all persons must be supposed to 
have to pursue their economic well being in conditions of freedom and dignity. Its victims are 
almost invariably women.
154
 
The Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 29(1)(a)–(b) provided that an employee was 
sexually harassed in that employee‟s employment155 if that employee‟s employer or a 
representative of that employer156 (a) made a request of that employee for sexual 
intercourse, sexual contact or other form of sexual activity which contained – (i) an 
implied or overt promise of preferential treatment in that employee‟s employment; or (ii) 
an implied or overt threat of detrimental treatment in that employee‟s employment; or 
(iii) an implied or overt threat about the present or future employment status of that 
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employee;157 or (b) by (i) the use of words (whether written or spoken) of a sexual 
nature;158 or (ii) physical behaviour of a sexual nature,159 – subjected the employee to 
behaviour which was unwelcome or offensive to that employee (whether or not that was 
conveyed to the employer or representative)160 and which was either repeated or of such a 
significant nature that it had a detrimental effect on that employee‟s employment, job 
performance or job satisfaction.161  
 
Section 35 of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 stated that evidence of a person‟s 
previous sexual experience was not to be taken into account in sexual harassment 
allegations. It did not state that such evidence could not be adduced, but maintained that 
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 Clear cases of physical sexual harassment are covered by this area: A v Foodstuffs (South Island) Ltd 
[1993] 1 ERNZ 81. However, less obvious types of sexual harassment are also included, for example 
repeated touching, rubbing, or body contact: Managh v Crawford [1996] 2 ERNZ 392. 
160
 The Employment Tribunal held this called for a two stage test: first was that there needed to be an 
objective assessment of whether the words or behaviour were of a sexual nature and if so, then a subjective 
test should be applied as to whether the employee found the behaviour offensive. See A v Z [1992] 3 ERNZ 
501. 
161
 NID Distribution Workers IUW v AB Ltd [1988] NZILR 761. If behaviour occurred more than once it 
was deemed to have been repeated: L v M Ltd [1994] 1 ERNZ 123. If the employee ceased work as a result 
of the behaviour, this was deemed to be detrimental to the employee, see A v Z [1992] 3 ERNZ 501. The 
meaning of detriment was interpreted to extend beyond constructive dismissal situations and to extend to 
cases where psychological and emotional discomfort resulted, absence from work, distress, and other 
related reactions. Detriment was held to exist when the employee ceased work: Fulton v Chiat Day Mojo 
Ltd [1992] 2 ERNZ 38. For a discussion of the policy issues see C Bacchi and J Jose, „Dealing with Sexual 
Harassment: Persuade, Discipline or Punish?‟ (1994) 10 AJLS 1. 
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no account could have been taken of it.162 Further, s 36 of the Act provided that an 
employer was required to take action whether or not the person perpetrating the sexual 
harassment was a co-employee, customer or client, upon receipt of a complaint from the 
employee which could have been in writing.163  
 
In sexual harassment claims the onus of proof lay with the employee – the person making 
the allegation – to establish the facts alleged.164 The standard of proof applicable in these 
situations was the balance of probabilities consistent with the gravity of the acts 
complained of and the resulting consequences.165  
2.3.3(E) DURESS 
 
Duress in employment on the basis of the employee‟s membership or non-membership of 
an employees‟ organisation was defined in s 30 of the Employment Contracts Act 1991. 
Duress was defined as occurring in either of the following situations: where membership 
                                                             
162
 For a discussion on this topic see J Hughes, P Roth, G Anderson, (eds) Personal Grievances (1999) 
9.13. 
163
 It was indicated in Turk’s Poultry Farm v Adkins, unreported, WEC 21/95, that whilst the absence of a 
formal written complaint could be fatal to an employee‟s claim of sexual harassment, if an employer failed 
to respond adequately to an oral complaint of sexual harassment, the employer could then be held 
responsible for constructive dismissal. Section 36(2)(b) provided that an employer should take whatever 
steps were practicable to prevent any repetition of requests or behaviour outlined in Section 29. In theory, 
the employer could dismiss the employee responsible for sexual harassment, however s 40(1)(d) provided 
alternative remedies to dismissal of an offending employee including transfer, disciplinary or rehabilitative 
action; consequently there were other practicable steps to resolving the situation as well as dismissal. See B 
v NZ Amalgamated Engineering Union Inc [1992] 2 ERNZ 554.   
164
 G Anderson, „Sexual Harassment – standard of proof‟ (1993) 7 ELB 99. 
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 Managh (t/a Managh and Associates and Café Down Under Ltd) v Wallington [1998] 2 ERNZ 337 
(CA). See Mazengarb’s Employment Law (2000) 29.6; P Bartlett, W C Hodge, P Muir, C Toogood, R 
Wilson, J Bull (eds), Employment Contracts (1999) EC29.05; J Hughes, P Roth, G Anderson (eds) 
Personal Grievances (1999) 9.4. 
47 
 
or non-membership of an employees‟ organisation was made a condition by the employer 
of that employee‟s employment;166 or where an employer exerted on an employee undue 
influence,167 or an offer or threat of any monetary incentive, advantage or disadvantage 
with the intention168 of inducing169 the employee to act in a particular way in relation to 
their membership and participation in an employees‟ organisation.170 An employee may 
have had access to a personal grievance on the basis of duress when the principle of 
freedom of association contained in Part 1 of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 had 
been violated.171  
 
An employee alleging duress by his or her employer was entitled to take a personal 
grievance under section 27(1)(e) of the Employment Contracts Act 1991. It has been 
suggested that the approach used in duress claims should have been identical to that 
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 Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 30 (a) & (b). 
167
 Richardson J stated in Contractors Bonding Ltd v Snee [1992] 2 NZLR 157 that „undue influence‟ 
consisted of „the gaining of an unfair advantage by an unconscientious use of power by a stronger party 
against a weaker in the form of some unfair and improper conduct…‟. The meaning of undue influence had 
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Engine Drivers Etc IUW v Colortron Carpets Ltd [1989] 1 NZILR 171, as meaning some severity and 
importing „something towards coercion, something towards threats‟.  
168
 For an example of the limitations of intention in this context, see Parish v Capital Community 
Newspapers Ltd [1992] 2 ERNZ 302. This case significantly restricted the right of management employees‟ 
right of freedom of association as they had to bear in mind managerial loyalty. See G Anderson, „Right to 
strike – managerial employees‟ [1992] ILB 54 for a critique of this case. 
169
 Hodge v NZ Journalists IUW [1984] ACJ 625 held that inducement was less than compulsion or 
coercion and simply meant „to prevail upon‟.  
170
 Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 30 (c). See also P Cullen „Non-Unionist‟s Right to Personal 
Grievance Procedure Upheld‟ (1990) NZBB 53–54; P Roth, „The Legal Future of Employee 
Representation‟, (1997) 22 NZJIR 96; G Anderson, „The Employment Contracts Act: An Employer‟s 
Charter?‟ (1991) 16 NZJIR 147; and J Hughes, „Protecting the Job Delegate‟ (1979) 4 OLR 380. 
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 J Hughes, P Roth, G Anderson, (eds) Personal Grievances (1999) 10.3; P Bartlett, W C Hodge, P Muir, 
C Toogood, R Wilson, J Bull (eds), Employment Contracts (2002) EC30.05. 
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which applied in discrimination cases, particularly with reference to the burden and 
standard of proof.172 
2.4 PERSONAL GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE 
 
The Employment Contracts Act 1991 made significant changes to personal grievance 
procedures. For the first time, all employees covered by employment contracts, 
irrespective of union membership, had access to the personal grievance machinery.
173
 
The mediation function was retained as part of a new Employment Tribunal structure, but 
a more formal process for adjudicating personal grievances, disputes and other 
employment matters was established.
174
 
2.4.1 LEGISLATIVE REQUIREMENTS ON LODGING A PERSONAL GRIEVANCE 
 
The legislative requirements for employees wishing to lodge a personal grievance were 
specified in the First Schedule to the Employment Contracts Act 1991. The Act provided 
that personal grievance procedures must be included in all employment contracts. If they 
were not included, the applicable procedure was deemed identical to the procedure 
                                                             
172
 See J Hughes, P Roth, G Anderson, (eds) Personal Grievances (1999) 10.2–10.7; Mazengarb’s 
Employment Law (1999) 30–30.3; P Bartlett, W C Hodge, P Muir, C Toogood, R Wilson, J Bull (eds), 
Employment Contracts (2002) EC30.04–EC30.05 for a discussion of duress. 
173
 Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 33(1). Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 2 defined a „collective 
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employees‟. „Individual employment contract‟ means „an employment contract that is binding on only one 
employer and one employee‟. 
174
 Employment Contracts Act 1991, ss 76–79. See also N Taylor „Alternative Grievance Procedures‟ 
(1998) 4 ELB 61–84. 
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outlined in the First Schedule of the Employment Contracts Act 1991.
175
 The First 
Schedule provided standard clauses in relation to procedure for settlement of personal 
grievances.
176
 The provisions read as follows: 
1. Settlement of personal grievance: A personal grievance of any employee bound by this 
contract shall be settled in accordance with the procedure set out in clauses... to... of this contract.  
2. Submission of grievance to employer: Any employee who considers that he or she has 
grounds for a personal grievance may submit the grievance to the employer or a representative of 
the employer. 
3. Time within which personal grievance must be submitted:  
(1) The grievance shall be submitted within the period of 90 days beginning with the date 
on which the action alleged to amount to a personal grievance has occurred or has come 
to the notice of the employee, whichever is the later, so as to enable the employer to 
remedy the grievance rapidly and as near as possible to the point of origin. 
(2) If the grievance is not submitted within the period prescribed by sub clause (1) of this 
clause, the employer shall not be obliged to consider the employee‟s grievance, unless the 
Tribunal grants the employee leave to submit the personal grievance after the expiration 
of that period. If the Tribunal grants leave or if the employer consents to the personal 
grievance being submitted after the expiration of that period, the employer and employee 
shall be required to comply with the provisions below. 
 
4. Employee’s written statement: if the grievance is not settled in discussions between the 
employee and the employer, the employee shall promptly give to the employer a written statement 
setting out-  
 (a) The nature of the grievance; and  
 (b) The facts giving rise to the grievance; and  
 (c) The remedy sought. 
 
5. Employer’s response: If the employer is not prepared to grant the remedy sought, and the 
parties have not otherwise settled the grievance, the employer shall as soon as possible, but in any 
event, not later than the 14th day after the day on which the employer receives the employee‟s 
written statement, give to the employee a written response setting out- 
 (a) The employer's view of the facts; and 
 (b) The reasons why the employer is not prepared to grant the remedy sought. 
 
6. Written statements waived: Where the employee and the employer agree in writing to waive 
the requirement for an exchange of written statements, that agreement shall not in any way affect 
the further application of this procedure. 
Power to refer personal grievance to Tribunal-if: 
                                                             
175
 Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 32. 
176
 For discussion on alternative procedures, see below Section 2.4.6. 
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 (a) The employee is not satisfied with the employer‟s written response; or 
(b) The employer fails to provide, within 14 days after the day on which the employer 
receives the employee's written statement, a written response; or 
(c) The employer and employee have agreed to waive the requirement for an exchange of 
written statements and the employee is not satisfied with the employer's response to the 
grievance, the employee may refer the grievance to the Tribunal in the prescribed 
manner. 
 
Role of Tribunal: the Tribunal shall, as soon as practicable, where appropriate, (a) provide 
mediation assistance to the parties; and (b) if necessary, proceed to adjudicate on the grievance 
and, in doing so, shall consider – 
 (i) The employee‟s written statement (if any); and 
 (ii) The employer‟s written response (if any); and 
 (iii) Any evidence or submissions given by or on behalf of the parties; and 
 (iv) Such other matters as the Tribunal thinks fit. 
 
The Employment Tribunal Regulations 1991 provided further requirements for the 
lodging of personal grievances.
177
 The next section of this chapter will consider key 
elements in the personal grievance procedure. 
2.4.1(A) ‘SUBMISSION’ OF THE PERSONAL GRIEVANCE  
 
Whether or not there had been a „submission‟ of a personal grievance to the employer 
depended on the facts in each case. Case law indicated the term „submit‟ was to be 
interpreted in a „liberal‟ manner.178 However, the Employment Court has held that where 
an employee‟s representative contacted the employer to request reinstatement within the 
90-day time limit, this did not constitute submission of a grievance.179 Finnigan J, in 
                                                             
177
 See below Section 2.4.1(a)  
178
 NZ Harbour Workers Union v Auckland Harbour Board [1991] 2 ERNZ 200, 213. See also P Roth, 
„The Grievance Procedure‟ in J Hughes, P Roth, G Anderson (eds), Personal Grievances, (May 1996) 2.7 
for a discussion on the meaning of „submission‟. 
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 McCarthy v Lydiard Shoe Company Ltd, unreported, Finnigan J, 25 November 1994, AEC 70/94. 
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McCarthy v Lydiard Shoe Company Ltd also gave the following view of the term 
„submission‟:180  
So little is required. Yet, I do not think that any reasonable consideration of the evidence can yield 
a confident finding that, within 90 days of the dismissal, the employer was or ought to have been 
aware that [the employee] felt a sense of grievance. I am prepared to hold that it had been made 
aware within that period that he was upset and unhappy about the loss of his job and wanted it 
back. There must… be some positive indication to the employer… that the employee has a 
“grievance” in terms of s 27 of the Act. To be made aware that a former employee has been 
shaken by his dismissal and wants his job back is not necessarily to know that the employee has a 
grievance about his dismissal, which he wants remedied. 
The Employment Court also stated that „submit‟ meant, „to present for consideration or 
decision‟.181 Further, the requesting in writing of the reasons for a dismissal182 did not in 
itself constitute a submission of a personal grievance.
183
 For the purposes of s 33(2) of the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991
184
 the totality of communications could constitute the 
submission of a personal grievance.
185
  
 
The Employment Court in Goodall v Marigny (NZ) Limited also considered whether 
there had been a proper submission of a personal grievance.
186
 Here, Travis J outlined 
what constituted submission of a personal grievance. He suggested that in determining 
whether submission had occurred, the correct test was „whether to an objective observer 
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 Ibid. 
181
 Winstone Wallboards Ltd v Samate [1993] 1 ERNZ 503, 511. 
182
 Pursuant to Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 38. 
183
 Houston v Barker (t/a Salon Gaynor) [1992] 3 ERNZ 469. 
184
 This Section required all employees wishing to submit a personal grievance to the employer to do so 
within 90 days of the grievance arising.  
185
 Liumaihetau v Altherm East Auckland Ltd [1994] 1 ERNZ 958. 
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 Unreported, Travis J, 11 August 2000, AEC 131/99. 
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the communication was sufficient… to enable the employer to remedy the grievance, or 
for the parties to settle it in discussions‟.187 
2.4.1(B) IDENTIFICATION OF EMPLOYER 
 
A significant issue for employees submitting a personal grievance was to correctly 
identify the actual employer as the relevant legal respondent.
188
 The burden of proving 
the identity of the employer rested with the employee.
189
 An inaccurate citing of an 
employer could sometimes be resolved by instigating a „joinder‟ of the correct 
employer.
190
 If the personal grievance was lodged incorrectly with a third party due to an 
employer action, equity and good conscience could have required the employer to be 
stopped from a claim that the submission was made outside the 90-day time limit.
191
  
 
If there was a legitimate change of employer, it was essential to identify the correct 
respondent.
192
 An existing employment contract did not automatically transfer to a new 
employer.
193
 A change of employer had to be established by the creation of a new 
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 Goodall v Marigny (NZ) Limited, unreported, Travis J, 11 August 2000, AEC 131/99, 10. 
188
 J Hughes, P Roth, G Anderson (eds), Personal Grievances (1999) 2.8; Mazengarb’s Employment Law 
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employment contract or by the new employer agreeing to be bound by an existing 
contract.
194
 Consent of the employee to a transfer from one employer to another, could 
sometimes have been implied.
195
  
2.4.1(C) 90-DAY RULE 
 
The Employment Contracts Act 1991 required an employee, who alleged that she/he had 
a personal grievance, to notify the employer or the employer‟s representative no later 
than either 90 days after the alleged action occurred or when it came to the notice of the 
employee.
196
 In Robertson v IHC NZ Inc, it was held that the 90-day time period 
commenced when the employee „could reasonably have realised‟ that she/he had been 
unjustifiably dismissed.
197
   
 
Under previous legislation covering personal grievance procedures, including the 
Industrial Relations Act 1973 and the Labour Relations Act 1987, there was no specified 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(1999) III.14 P Bartlett, W C Hodge, P Muir, C Toogood, R Wilson, J Bull (eds), Employment Contracts 
(2002) EC32.05. 
194
 Mersey Docks & Harbour Board v Coggins & Griffith (Liverpool) Ltd [1947] AC 1, 15. See also Walker 
v Aiken [1993] 2 ERNZ 240 and Rasch v Wellington City Council [1994] 1 ERNZ 367. J Hughes, P Roth 
and G Anderson (eds), Personal Grievances (1999) 2.8; Mazengarb’s Employment Law (1999) III.14; P 
Bartlett, W C Hodge, P Muir, C Toogood, R Wilson, J Bull (eds), Employment Contracts (2002) EC32.05. 
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 Smith v Blandford Gee Cementation Co Ltd [1970] 3 All ER 154. 
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 Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 33(2). See also Employment Contracts Act 1991, sch 1, cl 3. 
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 Fiona Judith Robertson v IHC New Zealand Incorporated, unreported, Palmer J, 18 March 1999, CEC 
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time limit as to when a personal grievance had to be notified, except that it be submitted 
„as soon as practicable‟.198  
 
The purpose of the 90-day rule under the Employment Contracts Act 1991 was to ensure 
that personal grievances were dealt with as close to the point of origin and as quickly as 
possible.
199
 Palmer J, in Houston v Barker (t/a Salon Gaynor)
200
 made it clear that 
disadvantage or serious disadvantage could result if a case was delayed. In Neonakis v 
Greek Orthodox Community of Wellington & Suburbs (Inc),
201
 Travis J held that it was 
an essential element of the legislation to make sure that personal grievances were 
resolved promptly. The rationale was to ensure issues were dealt with in good time whilst 
still „fresh in the minds‟ of the parties.  
 
The matter of when a dismissal or other personal grievance occurred largely depended on 
the circumstances of the case. In a case of dismissal on notice, it was the date on which 
contractual employment ceased and not the date of giving notice.
202
 In a constructive 
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 Labour Relations Act 1987, sch 7, cl 2. 
199
See [1991] 524 NZPD 1437. However, the Act also permitted an application to be made after the 
expiration of the 90-day time period, if the parties agreed (s 33(3)), or if the Employment Tribunal was 
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33(4)). For further discussion on exceptional circumstances, see GFW Agri-Products Ltd v Gibson [1995] 2 
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Finnigan J. 
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202
 NZ Seamens Union V Gearbulk Shipping (NZ) Ltd [1989] 2 NZILR 270, 282. This contrasts with the 
decision in Robertson v IHC NZ Inc, unreported, Palmer J, 18 March 1999, CEC 55/98 where dismissal 
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dismissal, the same principles regarding the commencement of the 90-day period 
applied.
203
 In cases of summary dismissal without notice, the 90-day time period ran from 
the date the employment relationship terminated.
204
 Where payment had been made to the 
employee in lieu of notice, but the intention was to dismiss the employee immediately, 
the 90-day period commenced on the last day the employee worked.
205
 In Poverty Bay 
Electric Power Board v Atkinson,
206
 it was held that, as the employee was given the 
opportunity of working through a notice period, dismissal would be effective from the 
expiry period of the notice. Consequently, this was not a true „summary‟ dismissal. 
 
Sections 33(3) and (4) and the First Schedule of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 all 
outline various circumstances where the lodgement of a personal grievance was 
permissible after the expiry of the 90-day limit.   
 
Section 33(3) provided that where the employer did not consent to the personal grievance 
being submitted after 90 days, the employee could apply to the Employment Tribunal for 
leave to make an application out of time. Subsection (4) of the same section provided that 
where an application was made under subsection (3), the Tribunal was required to be 
satisfied that exceptional circumstances existed. For the rule to be set aside and for leave 
                                                             
203
 Charlton v Colonial Homes Ltd, unreported, Colgan J, 12 August 1994, CEC 29/94.  
204
 GFW Agri-Products v Gibson [1994] 2 ERNZ 309, 315.  
205
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206
 [1992] 3 ERNZ 413. 
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to be granted, „an applicant must have shown exceptional circumstances having a 
causative effect upon the delay in submitting the grievance‟.207  
 
Poor legal advice,
208
 negligence,209 or illness of the employee‟s representative,210 were all 
held to constitute exceptional circumstances excusing delay in submitting a personal 
grievance to the employer. In MacDonald v Health Technology Ltd,
211
 Travis J indicated 
„exceptional circumstances‟ should be given a liberal interpretation. He said that 
„exceptional‟ meant exceptional in the particular case and not necessarily a generally held 
view of what exceptional circumstances are. However, this approach was later overruled 
by the Court of Appeal in GFW Agri-Products Ltd v Gibson,
212
 where it was held that the 
exceptional circumstances provision could not be established by adopting principles of 
equity and good conscience.
213
 The Court of Appeal indicated the legislative rules should 
be applied very strictly, and that the burden of establishing exceptional circumstances be 
a heavy one.214  
 
The Court of Appeal later applied the „strict‟ approach in Wilkins & Field v Fortune,215 
where it was held that the conduct of the parties, namely the employee‟s belief that a 
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212
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personal grievance had been submitted and the employer‟s failure to warn that the 
information provided was insufficient for the submission of personal grievance, did not 
amount to exceptional circumstances.  
 
The Employment Court had also indicated that post-90 day events might not constitute 
exceptional circumstances. In Rusk and Finch Ltd v Vanderwaal, Goddard CJ 
emphasised the need to establish a causal link between the circumstances, and the delay 
itself and further noted „few circumstances, however exceptional, are causative of a 
failure to submit a grievance in time‟.216 
 
In a personal grievance alleging an unjustified action, the disadvantage had to be 
„prospective‟, and it was not always necessary for the action to be implemented before 
the personal grievance was lodged. If for example, an employee was given notice that a 
dismissal will occur, the employee could take an unjustified action personal grievance 
before the employment relationship terminated.
217
   
 
If the conduct complained of comprised a series of events, the 90-day period ran from the 
most recent incident, rather than when the behaviour complained of first occurred.218 In 
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217
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Minister of Education v Bailey,
219
 a distinction was made between disadvantaging acts 
and the consequences of the actions complained of. A distinction was also made in this 
case between a disadvantaging act and continuing acts, which resulted in disadvantage.220 
In some cases, the cumulative effect of a series of events was in itself the action 
complained of.
221
  
2.4.1(D) STATEMENTS OF PARTIES 
 
If the employee‟s personal grievance was not resolved by discussion222 with the employer 
or their representative, the employee was required to promptly223 submit a written 
statement outlining the nature of the personal grievance, the facts that gave rise to the 
personal grievance, and the remedies sought to the employer.224 
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 Minister of Education v Bailey [1992] 1 ERNZ 948. 
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Failure to provide a written statement meant that if the provisions of the First Schedule 
were to be applied strictly, then the provisions of s 140 which gave the Employment 
Tribunal the right to amend or waive any defect of the proceedings would be inoperative, 
as the use of discretion to be flexible could not apply.225 In later cases, the Employment 
Tribunal took the stricter approach. However it was not intended that this should restrict 
the principal of flexibility and fairness.226 The Employment Court stated that the Tribunal 
should not be quick to deprive personal grievants of the chance to follow their claims 
purely on the basis of errors in the procedure used.227  
 
If the matter was not settled by discussion or the employer was unwilling to provide the 
remedies sought, the employer was obliged to provide the employee with a written 
response to the written statement of personal grievance within 14 days of receipt of the 
written statement of personal grievance.228 The employer‟s response should have 
contained the employer‟s view of the facts and the reasons why the employer was 
unwilling to provide the requested remedies.229 
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Wilful failure to comply with the requisite personal grievance procedure could result in 
an action for breach of the employment contract under s 52 of the Employment Contracts 
Act 1991
230
 or a compliance order.
231
 If the parties were then unable to settle the personal 
grievance, the employee could refer the matter to the Employment Tribunal.
232
 
2.4.1(E) APPLICATION TO THE EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL 
 
If the employee wished to pursue the personal grievance, it could be referred to the 
Employment Tribunal under Clause 7 of the First Schedule to the Employment Contracts 
Act 1991.233 An employee wishing to commence proceedings in a personal grievance had 
two options: they could either file an application for mediation assistance,234 or could file 
the relevant documentation for commencement of adjudication proceedings.235  
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The Employment Tribunal had the authority to both mediate and adjudicate in personal 
grievance actions. Regulation 6 of the Employment Tribunal Regulations 1991 required 
that the Tribunal provide the parties with notice of its decision to conduct mediation.236 
Even if mediation was requested at first instance, the Tribunal could decide to adjudicate 
the matter237 and the Tribunal Secretary provided the parties with written notice of its 
intention to adjudicate on the requisite form.238  
 
Regulation 10 also gave the Employment Tribunal authority to mediate in the first 
instance notwithstanding that the personal grievance had been referred for 
adjudication.
239
 In some cases, the parties could refuse mediation as, under the Act, 
mediation was not compulsory. In these cases the matter could be adjudicated at first 
instance.
240
  
2.4.2 MEDIATION 
 
Once the parties agreed to attend mediation, the detail of the procedure to be followed by 
a mediator was not included in either legislation or delegated legislation.241 The Chief of 
the Tribunal advised that the detail of how mediation was to be conducted was a matter to 
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be determined by the mediator involved.
242
 However, absolute privilege was attached to 
all statements made in the course of submitting a personal grievance.
243
  
 
A key function of the Employment Tribunal was to offer mediation assistance to enable 
parties to settle disputes voluntarily.244 Either party, under s 80 of the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991, could make an application for mediation assistance. Subsection (2) 
of the above section provided that if a party made application for adjudication, an officer 
of the Tribunal was in a position to determine whether or not mediation should be 
provided as a means of settling the issue. Subsection (3) provided that even if an officer 
of the Tribunal had not set down a matter for mediation and referred the matter to 
adjudication, a Tribunal member could decide that mediation should be offered. 
However, both parties were required to consent to mediation.245  
 
An employee was required, when submitting an application for adjudication, to state if it 
was possible for the matter to be settled by mediation.246 Likewise, the employer, in their 
notice of intention to defend, was required to state whether the matter could be resolved 
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by mediation.247 If parties later considered that mediation was a suitable option, the 
Tribunal was able to accommodate this request.248 Mediation was not required as a 
prerequisite to the case being adjudicated.249  
 
If the case was resolved by mediation, the settlement could be enforced if necessary by a 
compliance order.250 There was no right of appeal from a mediated agreement.251 If a party 
believed that there was a flaw in the settlement, the only remedy was a common law 
action under general contract law or by judicial review.252 
 
If the personal grievance was not resolved at mediation, the same Employment Tribunal 
member could not adjudicate the personal grievance, and a fresh adjudicator had to be 
appointed to hear the case.
253
 Members of the Employment Tribunal were appointed as 
either mediators, adjudicators or carried a dual warrant.254  
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Roth indicated that in contrast to adjudication, mediation was quicker, cheaper, less 
stressful, and more effective due to the voluntary nature of settlement.255 As mediation 
was held in private, the parties were protected from public disclosure of information.256 It 
was also suggested that even if a personal grievance was not resolved at mediation, the 
procedure itself was of value to the participants as it helped identify outstanding issues 
and concerns.257   
2.4.3 ADJUDICATION PROCEDURE 
 
2.4.3(A) STATEMENT OF CLAIM 
 
For the personal grievance procedure to proceed, the applicant was required to lodge with 
the Employment Tribunal a statement of claim under the Employment Tribunal 
Regulations 1991.258 The importance of the requirement to lodge a statement of claim was 
stated by Goddard CJ to be:
259
 
They are there to inform the opposite party of the nature of the case that will be advanced against 
him, her, or it, and also to inform the Tribunal of the nature of the case with some degree of 
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precision so that it will be able to follow it and to confine its consideration of the material to the 
matters signalled in advance by the parties as being relevant.  
It was possible to amend statements of claim; it was necessary that the amended 
statement of claim be accurately identified as such to avoid confusion.260 If an amendment 
was made close to the date of hearing, it was possible for the other party to seek an 
adjournment to facilitate consideration of the amended statement of claim. This could 
have caused problems in terms of costs and delay in the process.261 
2.4.3(B) STATEMENT OF DEFENCE 
 
Regulation 28 of the Employment Tribunal Regulations 1991 required an employer who 
intended to defend a claim of personal grievance to lodge an „intention to defend‟ form 
with the Employment Tribunal.262  
Regulation 29(1) of the Employment Tribunal Regulations 1991 provided that on 
application to the Tribunal by the applicant, the Tribunal could direct the respondent to 
lodge with the Tribunal a statement of defence.263 Normally, an employer was not 
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required to provide a written statement of defence; the provisions in clause 5 of the First 
Schedule to the Employment Contracts Act 1991 would have been accepted as a de facto 
statement of defence.264 
 
If the applicant was unclear as to the grounds on which the respondent intended to defend 
the statement of claim, then the Employment Tribunal could order that a statement of 
defence be submitted. For example, an employer may have failed to provide a written 
statement in response to a letter of personal grievance or reasons for dismissal.265 The 
Employment Tribunal Regulations detailed the information to be contained in a statement 
of defence should one have been required.266 An amended statement of defence was 
possible if it was in the interests of justice to permit it.267 If the respondent failed to 
provide a statement of defence when ordered to do so by the Employment Tribunal under 
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Regulation 29, the proceedings could only be defended by leave of the Employment 
Tribunal.268 
2.4.3(C) ADJUDICATION HEARING 
 
Irrespective of an application for mediation, the Employment Tribunal could notify the 
parties of its intention to adjudicate. Regulation 8 required the Secretary of the Tribunal 
to notify the parties of details of adjudication on the prescribed form on receipt of the 
appropriate fee and all relevant documentation.269 Regulation 9 provided detailed 
procedures on how personal grievances were to be referred to the Employment Tribunal 
for adjudication and outlined the relevant fee, statement of claim forms, and other 
relevant matters.270 
 
Section 88(7) of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 required that all adjudication 
procedures be recorded.271 Regulation 49(1) of the Employment Tribunal Regulations 
1991 provided for the manner in which adjudication hearings were to be conducted. 
Regulation 49 provided that: all evidence was to be heard under oath; each witness could 
give his or her evidence-in-chief by reading or confirming a written brief or statement of 
evidence; the Tribunal was to hear firstly the evidence of the applicant and all evidence 
they wished to adduce; the Tribunal then heard the evidence of the respondent and all 
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evidence they wished to adduce; if the Tribunal was satisfied that evidence presented by 
the respondent could not have reasonably been foreseen by the applicant, and if that 
evidence required a reply, the applicant was permitted to adduce evidence in rebuttal; 
parties could examine, cross-examine and re-examine witnesses; either party could sum 
up their case; and the Tribunal then considered the matter and dealt with it according to 
the appropriate legislation.272 The Tribunal member could intervene or vary the hearing 
procedure provided it was done in a fair manner.273 Likewise, the Employment Tribunal 
had authority to question witnesses, provided it did so in a fair and correct manner.274  
 
Goddard CJ in Davidson v Telecom Central Ltd 275 indicated adjudication must be fair, 
but must also be seen to be fair and that ultimately, the parties must determine the matters 
that the parties wish the Employment Tribunal to decide. Consequently, the adjudicators 
had to be detached to present a picture of even-handedness. The Chief Judge noted that 
adjudicators questioning witnesses to satisfy their curiosity as to their credibility, was not 
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acceptable. Such questions ought to have been dealt with by the cross-examiner, not the 
adjudicator.276  
 
The Employment Tribunal was required to give written reasons for its final decisions.277 
Travis J, in Smith v Armourguard Security Ltd 278 provided a list of propositions regarding 
the Tribunal‟s obligations. Sections 76(c) and 88(3) of the Employment Contracts Act 
1991 imposed an obligation on the Employment Tribunal to be fair, which Travis J 
believed made it essential for adjudicators to provide reasons for their decisions to avoid 
an accusation that a decision was arbitrary.279 The Employment Tribunal was obliged to 
indicate the evidence preferred when making its decision; failure to do so could lead to 
the unsuccessful party feeling aggrieved.280 Although Travis J pointed out it was not 
obligatory for adjudicators to provide reasons for their decisions on questions of 
credibility, it was desirable should the case be appealed, and to provide justification for 
the decision. Travis J also took the view that it was not an obligation of the Employment 
Tribunal to give reasons for its decisions when discussing irrelevant or peripheral factual 
matters.  
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2.4.3(D) COSTS 
 
Under section 98 of the Employment Contracts Act 1991, the Tribunal had the authority 
to make an order for the award of costs to any party by another party as was reasonable.281 
The Employment Tribunal had the function of determining the quantum of costs to be 
awarded. The overarching principle was that costs should follow the event complained of 
and be awarded in favour of the successful party.282 The principles to be applied in 
awarding costs were determined in Okeby v Computer Associates (NZ) Ltd [1994] 1 
ERNZ 613 where Goddard CJ suggested that a multiplier of 1.5 and 2 should be applied 
to the hearing time to ascertain the total time of professional participation. A checklist of 
factors to be applied in determining the quantum of costs was also stipulated in the same 
case; the checklist was derived from two previous cases that decided the issue.283 The 
checklist of factors to be considered was:284 
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1. The manner in which the case was conducted; 
2. The conduct of the parties at the hearing; 
3. The importance of the case to the parties; 
4. The time required for effective preparation; 
5. Whether arguments without substance were made or whether unnecessarily technical 
arguments were used; 
6. The actual costs incurred; 
7. A costs award should be on the basis of a contribution as opposed to an indemnity. 
 
Once a party to a personal grievance had raised the issue of costs, the Employment 
Tribunal had two options: firstly to hear issues raised on costs at the substantive hearing, 
or to reserve the issue of costs to a later hearing. The Tribunal could not decide issues on 
costs without first having heard the parties.285 If the Tribunal did not reserve costs in the 
substantive decision, it had no jurisdiction to hear any question of costs at a later date 
(functus officio).286 Failure to reserve costs was an appealable error of law: the 
Employment Court had the authority to refer the matter back to the Tribunal for further 
consideration.287  
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Goddard CJ acknowledged the possibility of awarding costs for executive time for staff 
members in addition to normal costs. In average sized companies a staff member would 
be able to organise another employee to undertake their work. However, this may not 
have been possible where the employer was small, hence the possible award of executive 
time.288 It was possible for a self represented party to be awarded costs for legal or 
professional advice sought which permitted them to represent themselves more 
effectively.289 It was consistent with the Employment Tribunal‟s function to operate in a 
manner of equity and good conscience that a wide view had to be taken of a litigant‟s 
expenses, including loss of income and expenses incurred.290 Under the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991, the Court also held that unions could still be compensated for time 
spent and any expenses incurred whilst representing their members.291 
 
In relation to mediation procedures, the general rule was that attendance costs for this 
process were not recoverable.292 It should however be noted that failure to participate in 
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the mediation process with an intention to resolve the situation could have had cost 
implications.293  
 
An offer of settlement by one party to the other prior to the actual hearing was called a 
Calderbank offer.294 If the party did not accept the offer and was subsequently successful 
in the hearing, but was awarded a lesser amount in compensation, the party who made the 
offer could bring this matter to the attention of the Employment Tribunal when costs 
were being awarded.295 In Ogilvy & Mather v Darroch 296 Goddard CJ stated:297  
Once the court has received evidence of the Calderbank offer it can take into account the fact of its 
making and non-acceptance in the course of the exercise of its discretion. [The effect of a 
Calderbank offer was] intended to induce the Court to exercise its discretion against granting the 
plaintiff any costs if it has recovered less by going to the Court than it could have by accepting the 
offer. 
 
a) Legal Aid 
If an unsuccessful party to a personal grievance was in receipt of legal aid, the costs 
awarded against that party were limited to the amount of the contribution required of 
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them by the Legal Services Board, unless exceptional circumstances existed.298 If a 
proportion of costs were not paid due to the operation of the provision in s 86(2) of the 
Legal Services Act 1991 the party could apply to the Legal Services Committee to have 
the balance of the costs met.299 Therefore the Employment Tribunal had to record the 
amount of costs that would have been awarded if liability had not been limited by the 
operation of s 86(2).300 If the legally aided party was successful, any costs awarded to that 
party would have been considered by the Legal Aid Committee in assessing the amount 
that the legally aided party was required to repay.301  
2.4.3(E) EVIDENCE AND LIMITATIONS ON APPEAL 
 
Section 95(4) of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 made it extremely difficult to 
introduce new evidence on appeal. It was only possible to introduce new evidence if the 
Employment Court was satisfied that the evidence could be relevant to the decision made 
by the Tribunal and there were either exceptional circumstances or the party could not, by 
the exercise of reasonable diligence, have placed the evidence before the Tribunal. This 
was a significant change from previous legislative provisions where appeals were heard 
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de novo.302 The Court of Appeal stated, that the Employment Court was „essentially an 
appellate Court in the true sense‟.303  
 
If there was an issue under s 95(4) of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 regarding the 
admissibility of new evidence, the Court of Appeal recommended that the Employment 
Court should „err on the side of liberality‟, particularly if the issue involved was likely to 
affect third parties not involved in litigation.304 However, the Employment Court 
distinguished the liberality principle and a „balancing‟ test imposed.305  
 
Further, Section 95(4)(b) of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 only applied to „issues, 
explanations, and facts‟, which had not been presented at the Tribunal. In Hill v Cantac 
Services,306 the Employment Court distinguished between new evidence of facts that had 
already been discussed at the Tribunal and new facts „per se‟.307 In this case, for example, 
admitting new evidence of a matter that had already been discussed at the Tribunal was 
held not to fall within the legislative provision.  
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However, Colgan J in Kissack v United Airlines Incorporated,308 distinguished Hill by 
indicating that the evidence which was attempted to be adduced on appeal could by 
reasonable diligence have been obtained prior to the Employment Tribunal hearing. The 
requirement of acting with „reasonable diligence‟ was said to depend on the facts of each 
case.309  
 
Examining s 95(4)(b)(ii)(B) of the Employment Contracts Act 1991, Goddard CJ in TNT 
Express Worldwide (NZ) Ltd v Cunningham,310 indicated that there was no real point in 
attempting to provide an exhaustive definition of „exceptional circumstances‟ and that 
exceptional circumstances should be determined in each individual case, thus avoiding 
„judicial exposition‟.311  
 
Appeal was possible from the Employment Court to the Court of Appeal in personal 
grievance cases only on the ground that the decision being appealed was „erroneous in 
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point of law‟;312 hence no appeal on facts was available except when no evidence had 
been presented.313  
2.4.4 REMEDIES 
 
Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 provided remedies to 
resolve personal grievances.314 Although the Act gave the Employment Tribunal 
discretion to award whichever remedies were appropriate, there were guidelines on the 
allocation of particular remedies.  
 
The Court of Appeal provided guidelines on factors to be considered by the Tribunal 
when granting reimbursement and compensation,315 although in doing so the Court of 
Appeal referred to cases decided under the Labour Relations Act 1987. The Court stated 
that, with the exception of the minimum amount contained in s 41(1) of the Act,316 the 
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amount to be awarded by the Tribunal for lost wages or compensation was discretionary. 
Cooke P indicated in Telecom South Ltd v Post Office Union, that:317  
In evolving their approach to the exercise of the discretion… the Employment Court must of course 
act judicially and on the basis of principle. Reasonable consistency is required; established patterns 
should not be departed from without good and enunciated reasons. 
On the amount of compensation to be awarded, Richardson J in the above case stated, „a 
just and reasonable award must reflect the circumstances and legitimate interests of both 
parties‟.318  
2.4.4(A) REIMBURSEMENT 
 
The principle involved in the award of reimbursement was to compensate an employee 
for lost remuneration as a result of the personal grievance. Section 41 provided for the 
payment of actual loss of remuneration or three months‟ wages, whichever was the 
lesser.319 Section 41 also provided that the Tribunal had the discretion to award either a 
greater or lesser amount depending on whether or not the employee was at fault.320  
 
In Trotter v Telecom 321 Goddard CJ discussed the relationship between Sections 40 and 
41 of the Employment Contracts Act 1991. Goddard argued that s 40 appeared to be 
stating that there was discretion whether to award reimbursement, however, he reasoned 
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that s 41 made it clear that the discretion should have been applied in the employee‟s 
favour. Goddard CJ took the view that while s 41 stated that there was discretion as to the 
amount to be awarded, there must have been good reason why the full amount of the loss 
incurred by the employee was not granted. Goddard CJ stated that the legislation 
provided a minimum to be awarded, and that the discretion related to whether or not the 
statutory minimum should have been exceeded.322 In determining whether or not the 
minimum should have been exceeded, Goddard CJ stated that the following process had 
to be followed: the first step was to determine whether or not the employee had a 
personal grievance; if they did, the second step was whether the employee had lost 
remuneration as a consequence of the personal grievance; the third step was to establish 
the amount of the loss; fourthly award reimbursement if it was equal to or less than three 
months ordinary time remuneration; fifthly, if as a result of the personal grievance the 
loss was more than the statutory minimum, it was then necessary to decide whether or not 
to award more as compensation to compensate for remuneration lost; sixth, it was then 
necessary to consider any proved contributory fault by the employee – if contributory 
fault was proved, it was then necessary to reduce the amount awarded in a just and 
equitable manner.323 
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In the first instance, the employee had to show that they had suffered loss. Under s 41 of 
the Act, loss included loss of remuneration in lieu of notice.324 Loss also included 
continuing loss if the employee failed to obtain alternative employment or if the 
employee had obtained new employment at a lower rate of pay than the job lost.325 Loss 
in some instances could include loss of other benefits, for example loss of use of a motor 
vehicle or telephone rental.326  
 
Reimbursement of any loss or benefit was dependent on the applicant proving loss of 
either remuneration or benefits. There was no authority to make an award of 
reimbursement for loss as a result of a personal grievance if no loss had been sustained.327 
It was held that it was normally safe to assume that the loss sustained was as the result of 
the personal grievance, unless such an assumption offended the general principles of 
common sense.328 The onus to make a link between the personal grievance and the loss 
rested with the employee, therefore the employee was obliged to attempt to mitigate the 
loss sustained by finding alternative employment.329  
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2.4.4(B) COMPENSATION 
 
Compensation was available to compensate an employee for losses other than lost 
wages.330 Section 40 of the Act stated that compensation was available for loss of dignity, 
humiliation, injury to feelings; and loss of any benefit.331  
a) Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 40(1)(c)(i): Humiliation, Loss of Dignity, 
and Injury to Feelings 
It was intended that the compensation provision for humiliation, loss of dignity, and 
injury to feelings found in Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 40(1)(c)(i) was to provide 
redress for the employer‟s actions toward the employee.332 Several principles were 
developed in applying this policy:  
1. Even if a personal grievance had been established, it was not automatic that an award for 
compensation would be granted;
333
  
2. The relevant criterion applied when determining the amount of compensation to be awarded 
was the impact of the employer‟s actions on the employee. The award of compensation to an 
employee was not to be seen as a punishment of the employer.
334
 In relation to determining 
the impact of the employer‟s actions on the employee, the employee had to be taken as they 
were found;
335
 also any effect on the employee‟s whanau/family was not a relevant factor 
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when determining the award of compensation. However, the employee‟s knowledge of the 
effect on whanau/family was a legitimate component when assessing loss.
336
  
3. The actions of the employer must have caused the loss of dignity and injury to feelings of the 
employee.
337
  
4. The assessment of quantum was not a precise art but a process of applying the principles in 
like cases to achieve consistency.
338
 The quantum awarded was related to the employer and 
the circumstances in which the grievance took place; the most important consideration was 
the treatment of the employee in the circumstances leading to the grievance.
339
 
5. When deciding the amount to be awarded, it was necessary to take into account the amount of 
any other remedies awarded.
340
 
6. In deciding whether or not an award was favourable, the employer‟s ability to pay was taken 
into account.
341
 
7. If the employee contributed to the actions complained of, the quantum awarded could be 
reduced.
342
 
8. Unless there had been a legal error, the Court would not alter an award made by the 
Employment Tribunal, nor would the Court of Appeal disturb an award made by the 
Employment Court.
343
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b) Employment Contracts Act 1991 Section 40(1)(c)(ii): Loss of Benefit  
Loss of benefits appeared to have been limited to benefits contained and arising from the 
terms of the employment contract.344 It did not appear to have been extended to such 
items as the cost of securing alternative employment.345 It was stated by Richardson J in 
the Court of Appeal that the approach to be taken was similar to the concept of legitimate 
expectation to a future benefit to which the employee would have become entitled.346 
However, although it was stated that the Telecom case was clearly referring to benefits 
contained in the terms of the employment contract, it could have referred to benefits that 
were of a more discretionary nature.347 In general terms reimbursement for loss of benefit 
meant reimbursement of benefits to which the employee had already become entitled due 
to service with the employer.348 However, Richardson J stated that s 40(1)(ii) also related 
to potential service related benefits which the worker would reasonably be expected to 
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have obtained had they remained in the service with the same employer.349 It should be 
noted that compensation was not limited to those contained in s 40(1)(c) subparagraphs 
(i) and (ii) thus creating the expectancy of recovery for future benefits to which the 
employee would have become entitled.350 In NZ Meat Processors Union v Alliance 
Freezing Co (Southland) Ltd 351 Palmer J awarded compensation under s 40(1)(c)(ii) for 
„hidden‟ financial costs of losing the income to which the employees were entitled to 
under their contract of employment. 
2.4.4(C) REINSTATEMENT 
 
The Tribunal had the authority to order that an employee be reinstated either to their 
previous position or to a position that was no less advantageous.352 It was held by the 
Court of Appeal that it was for the Court to determine, based on fact, whether a position 
was less advantageous.353 In contrast to previous legislation reinstatement was no longer 
the primary remedy. The effect of this was that few employees were reinstated354 although 
judicial comment indicated that the ideal approach was towards job security.355 The 
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Labour Court had stressed that the economic necessity of retaining employment was a 
dominant factor, especially in times of high unemployment.356  
 
However, if granted a reinstatement order took effect immediately or on a date specified 
by the Court or Tribunal.357 On occasion the Court had decided that immediate 
reinstatement was inappropriate and it was necessary to provide time for the parties to 
assimilate the decision and for senior management to give instructions to staff on 
implementing the order.358 The order requiring reinstatement remained in force until the 
result of any subsequent appeal was known.359 Whether or not reinstatement was an 
appropriate remedy depended on the circumstances of the case, including the conduct of 
the employee.360  
 
Under s 42 of the Act, the respondent could apply for a stay of the process of 
reinstatement.361 Colgan J had stated that that there were five relevant issues to be taken 
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into account when considering whether or not a stay should be granted.362 Ultimately, the 
discretion was to be implemented in a manner which meant that, taking everything into 
account, the overall justice of the case was considered.363  
2.4.4(D) CONTRIBUTORY ACTIONS OF EMPLOYEE 
 
In awarding remedies, the Employment Tribunal was required to take into account the 
extent to which the actions of the employee contributed to the personal grievance.364 The 
contributory actions or behaviour envisaged to affect the award of compensation must 
have had a causal link to the act that resulted in the personal grievance.365 Roth indicated 
the use of the contributory fault provisions in the legislation was commonplace, with the 
result that in some cases employees were receiving little or no compensation.366  
 
Sections 40(2) and 41(3) required the Employment Tribunal to make reductions in 
compensation payable due to the contributory actions of the employee.367 In Paykel Ltd v 
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Ahlfeld Travis J established three steps that were to be followed when considering 
whether or not a reduction in compensation should be made:368  
1. The Tribunal had to determine that the employee had a personal grievance due to unjustifiable 
dismissal; 
2. When the unjustifiable dismissal was established the Tribunal was required to consider the 
extent to which the employee‟s actions contributed to the situation which gave rise to the 
personal grievance; The Tribunal had to give consideration to questions of causation when 
determining the extent to which the actions of the employee contributed to the situation which 
resulted in the dismissal; 
3. If contributory conduct was established, the Tribunal was obliged to reduce remedies that 
would otherwise have been awarded. The degree of culpability was only considered at this 
point and could have resulted in no remedies having been awarded at all. 
In Lavery v Wellington Area Health Board 369 Goddard CJ stated that there had to be a 
causal link between the conduct that equated to fault by the employee and the situation 
that gave rise to the personal grievance. Goddard then listed a series of factors that were 
to be taken into account when establishing the causal link, they were: 370 
(a) Applying common sense factors; 
(b) Remoteness of fault; 
(c) The likelihood, but for the fault, that the grievance would not have arisen; 
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(d) The blameworthiness of the parties and the relative importance of the grievant‟s acts in 
bringing about the situation.    
For the purposes of the Employment Contracts Act 1991, Goddard believed that to reduce 
recovery for re-imbursement or loss, the employee‟s conduct had to be at fault. Fault was 
a degree of blameworthiness that involved an identifiable course of conduct that could be 
said to be faulty when measured against the employee‟s duty to the employer.371  
2.4.4(E) INTERIM REINSTATEMENT 
 
Interim reinstatement was a possibility by way of an Employment Court injunction 
following the Employment Court‟s decision in X v Y Ltd & NZ Stock Exchange,372 a 
doctrine later confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Hobday v Timaru Girls High School 
Board of Trustees.373 The first test was whether there was a serious question to be tried; 
the second test was to weigh the balance of convenience between the parties (normally 
favouring the applicant); the third test was to assess the overall justice of the case.374 
When assessing the balance of convenience and overall justice factors the following 
factors were found to be relevant:  
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1. Whether there were other adequate remedies available to the applicant;375 
2. The early availability of a hearing on the substantive issue;376 
3. Whether the delay in obtaining a hearing was so great that it “will inevitably be seen in the 
Tribunal as a reason militating against reinstatement even if otherwise indicated”.377 
4. An assessment of the Plaintiff‟s Claim;378 
5. The nature of employment, ask whether the applicant‟s career path would be damaged;379 
6. The strength of the case for reinstatement;380 
7. Whether interim reinstatement favoured managerial practicality over maintaining the status 
quo and balance of convenience elements;
381
 
8. Any practical effect on other employees;382 
9. Whether the plaintiff delayed lodging the proceedings;383 
10.  Would granting reinstatement have been against public policy.384 
In Port of Wellington Ltd v Longwith, it was held that it was not necessary for the 
plaintiff to show that exceptional circumstances existed before an interim injunction 
could be granted.385  
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2.4.5 CHOICE OF PROCEDURES 
 
An employee had a choice of taking a sexual harassment claim or discrimination claim 
either as a personal grievance under the Employment Contracts Act 1991 or as a 
complaint under the Human Rights Act 1993.
386
 Although both the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991 and the Human Rights Act 1993 provided for complaints of 
discrimination, the definitions of discrimination varied between the two pieces of 
legislation.387 
 
Section 64 of the Human Rights Act 1993 stated: 388 
 Choice of Procedures: Where the circumstances giving rise to a complaint of sexual harassment 
or racial harassment under the Act are such that an employee may take one but not both of the 
following steps: 
(a) The employee may make, in relation to those circumstances, a complaint under this Act; 
or 
(b) The employee may invoke in relation to those circumstances, the procedures applicable 
under the Employment Contracts Act 1991 in relation to personal grievances under the 
relevant employment contract. 
The corresponding section in the Employment Contracts Act 1991 made it clear that once 
a complaint had been accepted by the Human Rights Commission the employee could not 
opt to invoke the personal grievance procedure.389 An employer action in breach of s 65 
of the Human Rights Act 1993 was capable of establishing a claim for a breach of an 
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implied term of trust, confidence, and fair dealing in an employment contract in the 
context of a personal grievance action.390  
 
Under the Employment Contracts Act 1991, it was essential that advocates, unions, and 
legal practitioners acquired detailed evidence of their client‟s case at an early stage to 
ensure that the correct procedure had been chosen. This could have caused considerable 
problems for applicants who, when notifying the employer of a problem, may not have 
decided on which procedure to follow – that was either to lodge a personal grievance or 
to make a complaint with the Human Rights Commission. It was possible that at an early 
stage, the employee may not have taken advice on which process was the most 
appropriate in the circumstances. 
 
Under the Human Rights Act 1993, the time at which the choice of procedure was made 
was clear. This was the date when the Complaints Division of the Human Rights 
Commission accepted the complaint for conciliation or investigation.
391
 However, the 
point when the personal grievance option was chosen under the Employment Contracts 
Act 1991 was less clear. In Williams v Air New Zealand,
392
 the High Court found that it 
would always be a matter of fact as to when the grievance procedure had been chosen.393 
In Williams, the employee‟s counsel wrote a letter to the employer, with reference to 
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clause 4 of the First Schedule to the Employment Contracts Act 1991, alleging that the 
plaintiff had suffered disadvantage as a result of unjustifiable action by the respondent; 
the personal grievance with the company was set out in detail by the appellant and 
concluded by seeking remedies under s 40 of the Employment Contracts Act 1991. 
Salmond J indicated that the First Schedule to the Employment Contracts Act 1991 was 
the procedure for resolving personal grievances. The making of a complaint to the 
employer was sufficient to indicate a choice of procedures according to Salmond J.394 In 
this case, it was also stated that an applicant need not go as far as paying the required fee 
and formally lodging a claim with either the Employment Tribunal or the Human Rights 
Commission to manifest a choice of procedure.395  
2.4.6 ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURES 
 
Alternative personal grievance procedures could be included in employment contracts, 
provided they were not inconsistent with those contained in the Employment Contracts 
Act 1991.
396
 Reasons why parties to employment contracts utilised an alternative 
procedure included the desire to avoid unnecessary delay, the desire for privacy, if 
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particular expertise relating to a specialist type of work was needed, or in some situations 
to avoid the formalities of the Employment Tribunal procedure or Court.
397
  
 
A major problem facing some employees under the Employment Contracts Act 1991 was 
the imposition of „take it or leave it‟ contracts, whereby employers dictated the terms and 
conditions to be contained in a contract.398 This effectively meant that some employees 
had no input into which personal grievance procedure was to apply.  
 
Any alternative personal grievance procedure had to be effective.
399
 An Industrial 
Relations Service study questioned the effectiveness of some alternative procedures.
400
 It 
found providing recourse to the Arbitration Acts of 1908 and 1996 was inconsistent with 
the appeal principles in the Employment Contracts Act 1991.
401
  
 
However, in Tutty v Blackmore it was stated that a comparison with the requirements of 
the First Schedule of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 was not necessary to test the 
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effectiveness of an alternative procedure, and that an alternative procedure would be 
effective if:
402
 
a) The process was fair, just, and adhered to the principles of natural justice; 
b) The decision contemplated was made on the merits of the case, and was not a capricious 
decision; 
c) The procedure was certain, efficient and just; 
d) The body arbitrating was low-level, specialist and informal, and able to provide speedy and 
fair resolution of differences; 
e) Employees were not prevented from using the procedure due to costs; 
f) The procedure provided appropriate services which facilitated the resolution of differences; 
g) The appropriateness of the procedure would depend on the circumstances and the parties‟ 
bargaining approaches. 
 
Tutty also suggested remedies available under alternative procedures should not be 
inconsistent with Part III of the Employment Contracts Act 1991. Provided there was no 
express prohibition on remedies available, an alternative procedure was deemed 
effective.403 
2.4.7 WRONGFUL DISMISSAL 
 
The Employment Contracts Act 1991 did not specifically exclude an employee from 
pursuing a common law claim for wrongful dismissal as an alternative to an unjustified 
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dismissal.404 It was an alternative option for employees who were dismissed, but the cost, 
length of time and lack of compensation involved, made the procedure prohibitive.405 It 
was also an option if the employee was outside the 90-day time limit. Employees could 
opt to use both processes, but double recovery was not permissible for the same 
complaint.406  
An employee dismissed without cause and without an appropriate period of notice, could 
have access to a claim for wrongful dismissal.
407
 However, where summary dismissal 
was justified, no notice was required. In cases of dismissal without notice and without 
cause, the compensation available would be the amount of money the employee would 
have received had the appropriate notice period been given.
408
 Payment in lieu of notice 
prevented an action for damages in wrongful dismissal cases.
409
 If the dismissal was 
summary in nature and there was insufficient cause for the dismissal, notice was 
necessary or payment had to be made in lieu.  
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An employee could take a dismissal claim without having to wait for the expiry of the 
notice period.
410
 An employee was not required to wait until the expiry date of their 
employment contract to lodge an action, as to do so could have indicated no loss.
411
  
 
In wrongful dismissal cases, the onus of proof was on the employee, not the employer, 
and actual misconduct or some other justification as opposed to reasonable suspicion 
after fair process, had to be evident.412 
 
In wrongful dismissal claims the quantum of damages did not include compensation for 
procedural irregularities, injury to feelings, and inability to find new employment.
413
 
However, in conjunction with a wrongful dismissal action, it was possible to recover for 
injury to feelings. These claims had to be brought under a general breach of contract 
action.
414
  
 
What was recoverable in wrongful dismissal actions was the amount of remuneration the 
employee would have earned during the notice period. This amount included all fringe 
benefits.
415
 Damages did not include any money paid to the employee at the time of 
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dismissal or the value to the employee of any remuneration that they could have earned 
had they taken steps to mitigate their loss.
416
 
 
In Air New Zealand Ltd v Raddock,
417
 the applicant had been dismissed and claimed 
breach of an implied term of trust, confidence and fair dealing in the dismissal process. 
Thomas J noted what has been traditionally known as „wrongful dismissal‟ is simply one 
particular example of the „generic breach of contract action‟.418 Therefore, an implied 
term could not be inconsistent with an express term of the contract and the majority in the 
Court of Appeal accordingly rejected Raddock‟s claim.419 The majority of the Court of 
Appeal held that an implied obligation of trust, confidence and fair dealing could not be 
implied into the terms of a contract that expressly allowed termination without cause and 
with one week‟s notice.420 Thomas J, in a strong dissenting judgment, indicated that the 
power to dismiss employees only exists alongside the obligation to adhere to the 
principles of procedural fairness.
421
 Thomas J further suggested that there was an implied 
obligation of trust, confidence and fair dealing, and in this case that obligation had been 
breached.422  
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The effect of Raddock on an action of breach of an implied term of fair treatment prior to 
dismissal was unclear.423 Raddock emphasised the difference between statutory and 
common-law provisions in relation to wrongful and unjustifiable dismissal claims and the 
need to comply with the 90-day time limit. Henry J found that the legislature had 
introduced the concept of justifiability in to the contractual rights of dismissal, however 
in this case the statutory principles did not apply as there was no attempt to invoke the 
statutory procedures within the correct timeframe, therefore the common law procedures 
for wrongful dismissal were the relevant matters to consider.424 
 
A feature of wrongful dismissal claims was that the wrongfully dismissed employees 
should attempt to mitigate loss.
425
 In such circumstances, the employee was expected to 
seek alternative employment, but only for such positions as she/he could reasonably be 
expected to accept, bearing in mind experience, standing and employment history.
426
 If a 
person was offered re-employment and they unreasonably rejected it, they were not then 
in a position to sue for wrongful dismissal.
427
 In all such cases, mitigation was a question 
of fact and the employer had the burden of proof in these circumstances.
428
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In summary, a wrongful dismissal cause of action was not usually relied upon due to the 
limitation on what could be recovered in damages. Re-instatement was not available,
429
 
there were lengthy delays, and the process could be stressful and expensive. For example, 
no mediation was available to resolve the issues quickly.
430
  
 
By contrast, an unjustifiable dismissal action under the personal grievance provisions in 
the Employment Contracts Act 1991 provided easier access, wider remedies, including 
possible reimbursement of wages lost, reinstatement, compensation for humiliation or 
loss of dignity and injury to feelings of the employee, and loss of benefit, whether 
monetary or not and, in sexual harassment cases, „recommendations‟ to the employer 
regarding the perpetrators.
431
   
2.5 EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL IN OPERATION 
  
In 1991, as noted earlier, Parliament accepted that recourse to the common law provided 
insufficient protection and was a cumbersome option.432 Consequently, specialist 
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institutions were retained, with the creation of an Employment Tribunal433 and the 
establishment of an Employment Court as a court of record.434  
 
The Employment Tribunal operated from three offices: Auckland, Wellington and 
Christchurch, and serviced Hamilton and Dunedin.
435
 The Hamilton and Dunedin areas 
became independent jurisdictional areas in 1996/97 and from that time operated from 
offices located in both centres.436 If personal grievances occurred outside main city-
centres, often employment tribunal adjudicators would travel to a regional centre to 
conduct personal grievances. For example, a problem which occurred on the West Coast 
of the South Island could have resulted in an employment tribunal adjudicator travelling 
to Greymouth to hear the case. Likewise a personal grievance arising in Nelson or 
Blenheim would result in an adjudicator travelling there to hear the case. This 
requirement for employment tribunal adjudicators to travel means that the findings in this 
research cover the whole of New Zealand, and are not limited to main cosmopolitan 
centres. In the final year of the Employment Contracts Act 1991, there was a total of 27 
adjudicators/mediators. All adjudicators had a warrant to both mediate and adjudicate. 
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However, if an Employment Tribunal member performed mediation in one particular 
case, they were not permitted to subsequently perform adjudication in the same case.
437
  
 
There were 13 Employment Tribunal members in Auckland, one in Hamilton, seven in 
Wellington, four in Christchurch and two in Dunedin.
438
 If a personal grievance occurred 
outside these districts, hearings could be held in other areas, for example, Timaru, 
Greymouth or Rotorua. 
 
A study by McAndrew found that over 40 percent of Employment Tribunal adjudications 
involved „substantive‟ issues. Most cases related to dismissals. In 64.3 percent of 
personal grievance claims, applicants obtained some positive result. He found only 57 
applicants represented themselves from a total of 2208. Consequently, the cost of 
representation was a significant issue.
439
  
 
The Department of Labour, in a December 1999 briefing to Ministers, indicated that it 
was anticipated that the optimal time for dispute resolution would be two to three months. 
However, the reality was that waiting times significantly exceeded this estimate. In 
regional areas, waiting times for resolution of personal grievances could be 8–16 months 
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for mediation, and 11–22 months for adjudication.440 McAndrew noted that officials 
contended that national reductions in waiting time could be expected, but not consistently 
across the country. Employment Tribunal members believed that the reason for the 
considerable waiting time was due to the backlog of personal grievances from previous 
legislation.
441
  
 
However, Employment Tribunal members suggested it would have been reasonable to 
expect that by 1999, the backlog of outstanding personal grievances created under 
previous legislation would have been resolved. They indicated the issue may have been 
one of funding for the Tribunal‟s services or due to an increased level of work resulting 
from increased jurisdiction.442  
 
Roth suggested the procedure was more accessible than prior to the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991, but resolution of personal grievance complaints was not as 
expeditious as the Minister of Labour had intended. He noted that it was not unusual for 
several years to pass between the occurrence of a personal grievance and its resolution.
443
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This was in stark contrast to the express intention of Parliament, when introducing the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991, to make the resolution of personal grievances, quick, 
easy and inexpensive444 and the legislative object of the Employment Tribunal to provide 
„a speedy, fair and just resolution of differences between the parties.‟445  
2.6 SUMMARY 
Chapter Two has identified the development of law in New Zealand in relation to 
personal grievances. It was necessary to outline the historical development of the 
legal framework in order to analyse the progression of the procedures and how they 
worked to determine whether adjudication or an alternative process is the most 
appropriate way to resolve personal grievances.  
 
The first law which established a conciliation and arbitration process for dealing with 
collective disputes was passed in 1894 by the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration 
Act.
446
 This legislation established industrial awards and agreements to protect the 
collective interests of employees and established a procedure for the creation and 
resolution of any disputes in relation to the negotiation and enforcement of awards 
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and agreements.
447
 The 1894 legislation remained in force largely intact until 1954, 
when a consolidated statue was passed.
448
 At this time, the only legal remedy 
available to dismissed employees was through the common law courts.  
 
The Industrial Relations Act 1973, for the first time, gave employees the right to take 
a personal grievance for unjustifiable dismissal without the necessity of accessing the 
common law courts.
449
  
 
 
The passage of the Labour Relations Act 1987 established a mediation service and 
created Grievance Committees with equal numbers of representatives from 
employers and employees in an attempt to resolve personal grievances. The act also 
stated that access to the personal grievance machinery was a benefit only available to 
union members.
450
 
 
 
Concurrently with the Industrial Relations Act 1973, employees in the state sector 
had their conditions of employment and personal grievance procedures catered for by 
the State Services Act 1962.
451
 However, the passage of the State Sector Act 1988 
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amalgamated both the private and public sector systems for resolution of personal 
grievances.
452
  
 
These processes stayed in force until the passage of the Employment Contracts Act 
1991 by the National Government. For the first time, this legislation gave access to 
personal grievances to all employees irrespective of union membership.
453
 This was 
an innovation strongly promoted by the National government of the day.
454
 
 
 
Personal grievances as defined in Section 27(1) of the Employment Contracts Act 
1991
455
 remained largely unchanged from the definition contained in the Labour 
Relations Act 1987. However, new institutions were established to assist with the 
resolution of personal grievances and different procedures were formulated. For 
example, there were tighter requirements for lodging a personal grievance and 
restrictions on the timeframe within which a personal grievance had to be lodged.
456
 
Mediation was an option for resolving personal grievances, however, this was no 
longer compulsory under the new Act.
457
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The procedure for lodging and responding to a claim of personal grievance was set 
out in the Employment Tribunal Regulations 1991.
458
 The process for lodging and 
amending claims of personal grievance was prescriptive and could only be amended 
by the adjudicator if a claim had been made under the wrong part of the 
legislation.
459
 On application by the parties, the Employment Tribunal could inform 
of its intention to adjudicate a personal grievance.
460
 Under Section 88(7) of the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991, the adjudication hearings were a court of record 
and details of the procedure were set out by Regulation 49(1) of the Employment 
Tribunal Regulations 1991.  
 
 
The hearing procedure itself contained in the Employment Tribunal Regulations 1991 
was formal in nature and quite complex in its operation. Together with its 
adjudication function, the Employment Tribunal had the authority to award costs 
against the losing party. Alternatively, the Tribunal could allow costs to lie where 
they fell. A further factor to be considered when evaluating costs was the potential 
impact of legal aid. For example, costs could not be awarded against a legally-aided 
client unless exceptional circumstances existed, which could have meant potential 
difficulties for a party whose case was found to be successful by the Employment 
Tribunal.
461
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If parties were dissatisfied with the outcome of a personal grievance, they had the 
right to appeal to the Employment Court but only on questions of law.
462
 
Significantly, it was not possible to introduce new evidence on appeal that had not 
been previously considered by the Employment Tribunal during adjudication.
463
   
The provision for the Employment Tribunal to award remedies in personal grievance 
cases was found in Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Employment Contracts Act 1991.
464
 
Notably, whilst reinstatement was available, it was no longer the primary remedy as 
had been the case under the Labour Relations Act 1987.
465
 A further consideration 
which had to be made by the Employment Tribunal when assessing remedies was the 
impact of contributory actions by the employee to the situation complained of.
466
  
Under some circumstances an employee had the choice of either taking a personal 
grievance under the Employment Contracts Act 1991 or, to make a complaint to the 
Human Rights Commission under the Human Rights Act 1993. The choice of 
procedure was only available under limited circumstances, for instance, complaints 
of sexual harassment or discrimination. However, claims of discrimination could also 
include dismissal as an employee may have been dismissed on discriminatory 
                                                             
462
 See n 312 and 313. 
463
 The introduction of new evidence on appeal was not possible under Section 95(4) of the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991. 
464
 The details of available remedies are detailed in n 314. 
465
 For further discussion on reinstatement see n 352 to 356 and accompanying text.  
466
 See n 364 and 365. 
108 
 
grounds.
467
 Once the employee had chosen which procedure to use, they were unable 
to revert to the other option.
468
  
 
When considering whether the retention of a specialist employment jurisdiction was 
desirable or reliance on the common law courts as an alternative, the National Party 
decided retaining the specialist jurisdiction was the more appropriate option.
469
 To 
determine whether or not the adjudication system worked, it was necessary to devise 
a structure for analysis encompassing the framework within which the system 
operated, the opinions of adjudicators, and the experiences of participants who used 
adjudication in 1997.  
 
How the personal grievance adjudication system and its availability developed is 
important to determine the issues which arose from the changes created by 
government. As the National Party had claimed that they wished to create an easy, 
cheap and fair process, it was necessary to examine whether this had been achieved 
through analysis of the following three factors: 
 
a) Coverage of the Personal Grievance Procedure 
With the passage of the Employment Contacts Act 1991, all employees were 
entitled to take a personal grievance on the grounds of unjustifiable dismissal or 
unjustified action by an employer. Prior to this legislation, only those employees 
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who had their terms of employment contained in an award or agreement had 
access to this process. All other employees were required to take such complaints 
to the common law courts. This also meant that for the first time, senior level 
employees had access to the same procedure as more junior staff members. 
Broadening access to the personal grievance procedure, could however, have 
caused problems with access to adjudication as a considerably larger number of 
employees for the first time had access to it. This could have resulted in 
substantial waiting times for claims to be heard and resolved.  
 
b) Representation 
For the first time, access to the personal grievance procedure was no longer 
restricted to union members unless exceptional circumstances existed, as had 
been the case under preceding legislation. Consequently, many employees chose 
not to be represented by a union, but instead to use the services of either counsel 
or an advocate. This could have created problems as employment law had 
previously not been considered by legal representatives to be lucrative. As a 
result, many new counsel and advocates began to practice in the employment law 
area with little knowledge or experience in the discipline.  
 
Those who chose to represent themselves were also likely to cause difficulties for 
the adjudication system. They were unlikely to have the necessary skills for 
presenting their own case, or, for examining or cross-examining witnesses. It was 
110 
 
therefore likely that adjudicators would have been called upon to assist self-
resented parties when required.  
 
c) The Adjudication Process 
The adjudication process was complex and formal. The hearing environment 
resembled a court room with evidence being presented, examined, and cross-
examined by the parties. While was some flexibility for adjudicators to amend 
this procedure to suit the circumstances of the case, this was infrequently utilised. 
There were often substantial delays in the allocation of hearing dates, and there 
were often delays in adjudication decisions being presented by adjudicators. 
These issues will be discussed and analysed in more detail later.  
 
My previous experience in working both as a union industrial officer and organiser 
and public service solicitor who was partly responsible for the drafting of the 
personal grievance procedure provided me with a fair level of insight into potential 
difficulties with the legislation and its implementation both from the perspective of 
employees and employers. The knowledge of these potential problems allowed me to 
analyze the difficulties generated by the structure of the legislation and the 
procedures contained in it. I was aware for instance, both from a legal perspective 
and from practical experience, that under the Labour Relations Act 1987 a relatively 
informal method existed for resolving personal grievances. It therefore appeared a 
massive jump in principle to create a formal adjudication system which resulted in 
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potential difficulties for parties to personal grievances. It does however need to be 
noted that mediation was an option for resolving personal grievances under the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991, but it must be emphasised that this was only 
voluntary, and there was serious potential for mediation to be used as a „fishing 
expedition‟ rather than a true attempt at dispute resolution.  
 
My background, experience and consequent strong political awareness of the debate 
between employers, employees and unions enhanced by the extensive propaganda 
published by representatives from both sides drove me to determine whether or not 
the employment tribunal adjudication system worked. Due to the formal structured 
nature of adjudication, a significant issue was to determine whether parties received 
adequate and affordable representation either through a union, employer‟s 
representative, or through counsel or advocate. Further significant issues related to 
the actual cost of taking a personal grievance, the adequacy of remedies granted and 
costs incurred if a personal grievance was established. These factors  assisted me in 
devising the most suitable research questions to be considered in this thesis, as 
explained in the following chapters. 
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C h a p t e r  3  
THE EFFECT OF ADJUDICATION UNDER THE 
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS ACT 1991 ON ACCESS TO 
JUSTICE AND RELATED ISSUES 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The whole question of access to justice is particularly significant to the topics considered 
in this thesis as it relates to issues including representation and its cost, the nature of the 
procedure itself, relevant costs involved and whether the adjudication process is 
comprehensible to parties using it, as specified in the thesis questions.  
 
Chapter Three will identify the issues that impacted on resolving personal grievances 
under the Employment Contracts Act 1991, and discuss the affect of access to justice in the 
resolution of personal grievances. The findings will be analysed and compared with similar 
studies and academic commentary on the issues identified. 
 
Whilst considering the issues of natural justice it was important to take into account the 
views of adjudicators who were interviewed regarding the personal grievance process. 
Several adjudicators were from a legal services background and had considerable opinions 
on the issues relating to natural justice.
1
 
                                                             
1
 For details, see Chapters 6 and 8.1. 
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The most pertinent issues examined include costs, delay and matters of process; 
investigating the formality of proceedings and the impact of lawyers on a process 
legislatively intended to be informal. The general notion of access to justice is discussed in 
the context of the principle of natural justice, including fairness, the right to be heard and 
respond, the right to a neutral determination and the impact of formal cross-examination. 
In discussing access to justice, remedies and outcomes are also examined to determine 
whether or not they were a disincentive to bringing a personal grievance.  
 
Issues surrounding cost, delay and the process itself were found to frequently overlap. For 
example, cost may impact on the right to representation or indeed the possibility of taking 
a personal grievance at all. The further risk of bringing a personal grievance was found to 
be that costs may be awarded against the unsuccessful party or that despite a successful 
outcome they may be deemed to rest where they fall. 
 
It is observed that delay has an effect on cost and may directly affect access to justice. 
There were a number of explanations for the delays inherent in the process experienced by 
parties under the Employment Contracts Act 1991 including the procedural steps involved 
in lodging a personal grievance, hearing date allocation time lapse and eventual decision 
production. Formality imposed by Regulations was also found to have resulted in a 
litigation culture being imposed on what was intended to be a low-level, informal 
procedure. 
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3.2 ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
For a democratic society to function adequately the effective resolution of disputes is 
essential.
2
 The effectiveness of an adjudication system depends on an individual‟s ability 
to access it and to be able to use it easily for dispute resolution. Access to justice is a 
recurring theme commented upon by academics, organisations and individuals because of 
its importance to the rule of law and the rights of individuals to the protection of the law.
3
 
The precise meaning of access to justice may vary depending on the context in which it 
arises and the weight that different user groups give to different factors pertinent to their 
needs.  
 
In the employment context, the nature and importance of work, particularly in modern 
society, means that people often define themselves by their employment status. Access to 
justice when employment security is at risk is therefore very important. Ellen Dannin 
suggests „work is not just a private matter‟ but it affects all areas of our lives:4  
Our own jobs – or lack of them – give us our status, our friends, our enemies, our viewpoints, our 
opportunities, and our children‟s opportunities – or lack of them. Work provides structure and 
organizes our days, our weeks and our years… The content of the pay packet, what the job does to 
the human body and spirit, and the opportunities it creates or stifles – all these spill over into our 
environment. 
 
                                                             
2
 Sir Ivor Richardson, „The Courts and Access to Justice‟ (2000) 31 Victoria University of Wellington Law 
Review 163: „[T]he equal protection of the law and the due process of the law underpin the resolution of 
disputes between citizen and citizen, and citizen and the State. That is fundamental to the functioning of 
democracy.‟ See also, New Zealand Human Rights Commission, Access to Justice, Paper presented to the 
Royal Commission on Social Policy, 25 November 1987, 1; „It is not possible to attain a fair society if the 
citizens of that society are denied or otherwise restricted in their ability to obtain equal access to justice.‟ 
3
 Joanne Morris, Women‟s Access to Legal Services: Women‟s Access to Justice, He Putanga Mo Nga 
Wahine Ki Te Tika (1999) 1. See also, Access to the Law. A research and Discussion Paper, Department of 
Justice, Planning and Development Division, October 1981, Foreword; „The social health of a nation can be 
judged by the way it provides access to the law to enable people to exercise the rights that every citizen has.‟ 
4
 E J Dannin, „Confronting the Employment Contracts Act‟ (1997) 28 California Western International Law 
Journal 1, 2. 
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Losing a job may have an immediate or delayed impact, could result in a person dropping 
in social status and may affect the health and very existence of a person.
5
  
3.2.1 DEFINITION OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
Access to justice is defined as the provision by the State of timely, affordable, easily 
accessible and independent dispute resolution services, including access to appellate 
bodies and the provision of appropriate representation. Ideally, a justice system should be 
easily understood, participants should be treated fairly during a process and outcomes 
should be just and appropriate to the circumstances of each case. The principles required to 
implement this ideal are well set out by Lord Woolf in his report on access to justice.
6
 The 
report indicates that a civil justice system should: 
(a) be just in the results it delivers; 
(b) be fair in the way it treats its litigants; 
(c) offer appropriate procedures at a reasonable cost; 
(d) deal with cases with reasonable speed; 
(e) be understandable to those who use it; 
(f) be responsive to the needs of those who use it; 
(g) provide as much certainty as the nature of particular cases allows; and 
(h) be effective: adequately resourced and organised.  
 
A mental picture of what the ideal of access to justice would look like was provided by 
Joanne Morris in a study which utilises the metaphor of the justice system being like a 
public building to which all citizens should have access.
7
 The difficulty, according to 
Morris, is whether or not all citizens know where the building is and have access to it, the 
location of the entrance ways may not be common knowledge, and navigating the routes 
                                                             
5
 Ibid. For further discussion on the economic context of employment, see Gordon Anderson, „The Origins 
and Development of the Personal Grievance Jurisdiction in New Zealand‟ (1988) 13 NZJIR 257, 258. 
6
 Lord Woolf, Access to Justice: Final Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System (1996) 2. 
7
 Joanne Morris, Women‟s Access to Legal Services: Women‟s Access to Justice, He Putanga Mo Nga 
Wahine Ki Te Tika (1999) 1. 
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through the building to the relevant rooms may be near impossible.
8
 Morris further 
suggests: 
In terms of the metaphor, some New Zealanders cannot find or use the pathways to the public 
building which is the justice system. Some cannot afford the price of entry. Some find the corridors 
to the rooms they need to visit so cluttered as to be impassable. They are compelled to exit through 
the building‟s windows rather than its doors. Barriers such as these thwart the achievement of the 
justice system‟s purpose – to secure the protection of law and just outcomes for all. 
 
Morris‟ acknowledgement of outcomes as an important aspect of access to justice invites 
discussion of the wider legal process and the consequences for users. In contrast, other 
definitions tend to focus largely on access to the „front door‟ only or discuss access to 
justice without providing a specific or wider definition.  
 
While access to justice is not a principle enshrined in a New Zealand „constitution‟ as of 
distinct right, there are indirect legislative provisions referring to the issue.
9
 Many of these 
provisions are based on International Labour Organisation Conventions and other 
international documents to which New Zealand is a signatory. For example, Articles 8 and 
10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 provide the rights of individuals to 
„full equality to a fair and public hearing‟10 by an independent tribunal and „the right to an 
                                                             
8
 Ibid 2. 
9
 New Zealand does not have a formal written constitution, but constitutional principles are held in various 
pieces of New Zealand legislation, for example the New Zealand Constitution Act 1986, and also embodied 
in Parliamentary Conventions. This contrasts with Canada where access to justice is entrenched in the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 15(1); „Every individual is equal before and under the law and 
has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination based on race, 
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.‟ 
10
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, art 10; „Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing by 
an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal 
charge against him.‟ 
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effective remedy.‟11 Similarly, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
1976 contains several Articles addressing access to justice matters.
12
  
 
In general terms, international conventions and treaties do not have authority in New 
Zealand law unless contained in domestic legislation.
13
 However, the development of New 
Zealand law has shown that where international instruments have been ratified by the New 
Zealand government the courts have interpreted domestic legislation in accordance with 
the principles contained in such international instruments. Even without ratification the 
courts have found that the rights under discussion have been so fundamental that it would 
be inappropriate not to interpret the law „in accordance with generally accepted 
international rules and in accord with New Zealand‟s international obligations.‟14 
 
In an employment law context, International Labour Organisation Conventions contain 
provisions setting standards including provision for the rights of individuals where their 
employment has been terminated which are closely reflected in current New Zealand 
                                                             
11
 Ibid, art 8; „Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts 
violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.‟ 
12
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1976, art 2.3(a) provides for an „effective remedy‟; 
art 2.3(b) provides the right to competent judicial, administrative or legislative determination of such 
remedies. Art 14.1 provides: „All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination 
of any criminal charges against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be 
entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.‟ 
Art 26 provides: „All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the 
equal protection of the law.‟ 
13
 See Ashby v Minister of Immigration [1981] 1 NZLR 222; R v Secretary of State for Employment [1997] 2 
All ER 273. However, according to John Hughes, Paul Roth and Gordon Anderson (eds) Personal 
Grievances (2006) 3.44 „The Role of International Conventions‟, „some modification of this view has been 
suggested in relation to treaties establishing norms of international human rights.‟ See Tavita v Minister of 
Immigration [1994] 2 NZLR 257. 
14
 Tranz Rail Ltd v Rail & Maritime Transport Union (Inc) [1999] 1 ERNZ 460 (CA). See, John Hughes, 
Paul Roth and Gordon Anderson (eds) Personal Grievances (2006) 3.44 „The Role of International 
Conventions.‟ 
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personal grievance legislative provision.
15
 Although ILO Convention 158 has not been 
ratified, the New Zealand Court of Appeal has held that „the terms of, and decisions upon, 
international instruments dealing with fundamental rights‟ should be referred to „when 
interpreting the scope of those rights under our Bill of Rights Act and other relevant 
legislation.‟16 This approach was supported in the Employment Court by Chief Judge 
Goddard in Smith v Radio i Ltd;
17
 where he indicated that: „The state of employment law 
in New Zealand is capable of being influenced by international minimum standards, the 
inspiration for some of which came originally from this country.‟ Various aspects of ILO 
Conventions are now explicitly incorporated in the Employment Relations Act 2000.
18
 
 
On a wider front, the lack of an explicit constitutional basis for access to justice in New 
Zealand was criticised by B V Harris who believed that „the principle of equal access to 
justice warrants the status of a foundation constitutional principle‟, an opinion endorsed by 
Lord Diplock and others before him.
19
  
                                                             
15
 International Labour Organisation Convention 158, Article 8: „A worker who considers that his 
employment has been unjustifiably terminated shall be entitled to appeal against that termination to an 
impartial body, such as a court, labour tribunal, arbitration committee or arbitrator.‟ Convention 158, Article 
9(b) provides that the impartial body „shall be empowered to reach a conclusion on the reason for the 
termination having regard to the evidence provided by the parties and according to procedures provided for 
by national law and practice.‟ 
16
 Eketone v Alliance Textiles (NZ) Ltd [1993] 2 ERNZ 783 (CA) Gault J applying Ministry of Transport v 
Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260. 
17
 Smith v Radio i Ltd [1995] 1 ERNZ 281. 
18
 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 3 gives one of the objects of the Act as promoting the observance of the 
principles underlying ILO Conventions 87 and 98. Employment Relations Act 2000, s 66 reflects aspects of 
the Smith v Radio i Ltd decision and reasoning regarding fixed term employment. See, John Hughes, Paul 
Roth and Gordon Anderson (eds) Personal Grievances (2006), 3.44 „The Role of International Conventions.‟ 
19
 B V Harris, „Equal Access to Justice: A Constitutional Principle in Need of a Higher Profile‟ [1995] 
NZLRev 282 (emphasis in original). See Bremer v South India Shipping Corporation Ltd (1981) AC 909, 
917; Lord Diplock, „Every civilised system of government requires that the state should make available to all 
its citizens a means for the just and peaceful settlement of disputes… The means provided are courts of 
justice to which every citizen has a constitutional right of access.‟ Cited in Lord Woolf, Access to Justice: 
Interim Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System (June 1995).  See also B V Harris, „Equal 
Access to Justice: A Constitutional Principle in Need of a Higher Profile‟ [1995] New Zealand Law Review 
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Whilst as discussed above, there is no central constitutional document which provides for 
access to justice in New Zealand, the topic continues to be subject to debate. In general 
terms, there has been an increased awareness of the principle of access to justice within the 
legislative framework, where varying approaches have been taken to different legal 
processes. For example, s 4 of the Maori Language Act 1987 permitted the use of Maori 
language in courts, thus improving access to justice for some Maori, and the Children, 
Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989 created a greater opportunity for offenders 
and their victims to be involved in resolving their problems.
20
 There was also extensive 
discussion during the 1990s on the provision of legal aid. The reform of the Legal Services 
Act 1991 was undertaken in 1994, which had significant impact on the availability of legal 
aid assistance to parties in disputes.
21
 The importance of the availability of legal aid to 
facilitate access to justice is discussed in more detail in Chapter Eight.
22
  
 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 does not specifically contain a definition of 
access to justice but does provide for the prohibition of discrimination and „appear[s] to 
assume a right of access to the courts.‟23 In the Bill of Rights White Paper the Justice and 
Law Reform Select Committee commented that unless the Bill of Rights provided for 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
282, 285, who argues „the primacy of the principle of equal access to justice was recognized in Magna Carta 
1215: “To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay right or justice”.‟ 
20
 B V Harris, „Equal Access to Justice: A Constitutional Principle in Need of a Higher Profile‟ [1995] 
NZLRev 282, 285. Harris also cites the Resource Management Act 1991 where the legislature created 
statutory rights of appeal, giving statutory recognition to the principle of access to justice.  
21
 Review of the Legal Services Act 1991, Legal Services Board (1994). 
22
 See Chapter 8.2.3(a). 
23
 Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 21, sets out the prohibited grounds of discrimination. Discrimination in 
employment matters is covered in ss 22 and 23. See also B V Harris, „Equal Access to Justice: A 
Constitutional Principle in Need of a Higher Profile‟ [1995] NZLRev 282, 286. 
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guaranteed access to the courts it would be „irrelevant to the mass of people within this 
society who do not enjoy the “right of access to justice” at the present time.‟24 
 
Likewise, the Human Rights Act 1993 gave access to individuals complaining about 
discrimination to a mediation and investigation process conducted by the Human Rights 
Commission.
25
 An appeal right beyond this is available to the Complaints Review Tribunal 
and in some circumstances to the High Court.
26
  
 
Whilst individuals require access to justice to obtain and potentially enforce their legal 
rights, the State too has an interest in maintaining control over central functions and 
obligations which it is required to provide. In some circumstances the interests of the 
individual may be opposed to those of the State or may need to be balanced against public 
and fiscal interests. Harris commented that „[n]otwithstanding the attractiveness of the 
ideal of equal access to justice, the inevitable fiscal constraints on Government mean that it 
will only remain aspirational.‟27 
 
It is submitted that despite fiscal limitations, the Government is under an obligation to 
provide equitable access to the justice system. As Rosalie Abella J said in 1983:
28
 
                                                             
24
 Sir Ivor Richardson, „The Courts and Access to Justice‟ (2000) 31 Victoria University of Wellington Law 
Review 163, 164, citing the Justice and Law Reform Select Committee Interim Report of the Justice and Law 
Reform Select Committee: Inquiry into the White Paper, A Bill of Rights for New Zealand (1986). 
25
 Under s 5(g) Human Rights Act 1993 the Human Rights Commission also had the authority to investigate 
matters without an individual complaint: „The functions of the Commission shall be – (g) to inquire generally 
into any matter, including any enactment or law, or any practice, or any procedure, whether governmental or 
non-governmental, if it appears to the Commission that human rights are, or may be, infringed thereby.‟ 
26
 Human Rights Act 1993, s 83. 
27
 B V Harris, „Equal Access to Justice: A Constitutional Principle in Need of a Higher Profile‟ [1995] 
NZLR 282, 309. 
28
 Justice Rosalie Abella, 1983, cited in Joanne Morris, Women‟s Access to Legal Services: Women‟s Access 
to Justice, He Putanga Mo Nga Wahine Ki Te Tika (1999) 1, 107. 
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Anyone…who needs legal services should have access to them, regardless of financial, communication, 
or physical barriers. To deny access to legal services is to deny at the outset access to the law. To deny 
access to the law is to deny justice, and to deny justice to some is to threaten the integrity of all. 
 
Failure to provide access to the judicial process not only prevents differences from being 
resolved but it may also cause people to „unnecessarily suffer continuing injury, losses and 
disadvantage, or arbitrarily be denied a remedy for past injuries, losses and 
disadvantage‟.29 However, in a paper prepared by the New Zealand Human Rights 
Commission in 1987, the Commission states that although legal remedies were in theory 
available to all, there were often practical difficulties placed in the way of those who most 
needed assistance.
30
  
 
Access to any dispute resolution process should be complete. This should include access to 
any appellate court to rectify any errors in the law made by the lower court, to ensure any 
legal interpretation is correct
31
 and that any compensation awarded is adequate in the 
circumstances.
32
 Access at appellate level is particularly affected by legal funding issues, 
including legal aid remuneration levels.
33
 A survey of legal practitioners in 1997 showed 
that there was marked dissatisfaction with legal aid rates for senior practitioners and with 
                                                             
29
 B V Harris, „Equal Access to Justice: A Constitutional Principle in Need of a Higher Profile‟ [1995] 
NZLR 282, 284. 
30
 New Zealand Human Rights Commission, Access to Justice, Paper presented to the Royal Commission on 
Social Policy, 25 November 1987, 11. 
31
 Sir Ivor Richardson argues that „access‟ is usually seen as access to the lower courts, but the „ability to 
access appellate courts may be equally important… an appeal court is able to correct errors made in the 
lower courts. This function is directly concerned with doing justice to litigants as it ensures that the 
determination of their rights in the court below was made upon a correct understanding of the law.‟ Appellate 
courts also fulfil an important function in the development of the law. See Sir Ivor Richardson, „The Courts 
and Access to Justice‟ (2000) 31 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 163, 164. 
32
 Although the level of compensation does not directly affect access to justice it could act as a disincentive 
to parties who may have legitimate grounds for a personal grievance if levels are too low or the potential of 
costs awarded against the party would negate the compensation award. 
33
 Gabrielle Maxwell, Paula Shepherd and Alison Morris, Legal Aid Remuneration: Practitioners‟ Views, A 
Report to the Legal Services Board, Institute of Criminology (August 1997) 5. 
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guideline fees for appeals and preparation time.
34
 This could have resulted in a 
disincentive for senior practitioners to act in legal aid cases and reduced the likelihood of 
taking cases to appeal. 
 
Complete access also means access to representation to ensure guidance through what may 
be a complex legal process. Sir Ivor Richardson identified that access to justice was not 
restricted to accessing the courts but included having assistance to find your way through 
the court system.
35
 Access to the court represents only the first stage in accessing justice. A 
person will also need assistance to present their case in the most effective manner and put 
forward the best arguments and rebuttal evidence. Effective representation for both parties 
should go some way towards ensuring equality of access. Parties also at the outset need 
advice on whether or not they have a legitimate claim and what process is available for 
optimum dispute resolution.
36
  
 
Some of the access to justice barriers that exist include fear of and discomfort with the 
judicial process itself and the overall cost of bringing a claim. The potential of losing a 
case and having costs awarded against you are also significant disincentives to taking 
action.
37
 A further barrier to accessing justice is cultural alienation. The court environment 
is for some a formal, intimidating atmosphere which many people find „austere and 
                                                             
34
 Ibid. 
35
 Sir Ivor Richardson, „The Courts and Access to Justice‟ (2000) 31 Victoria University of Wellington Law 
Review 163, 169: „The ability to access justice depends not only on the operation of the courts, but also on 
the ability to be represented before them.‟ 
36
 B V Harris, „Equal Access to Justice: A Constitutional Principle in Need of a Higher Profile‟ [1995] New 
Zealand Law Review 282, 284. „Access to the courts is in large part dependent upon access to quality legal 
advice and services. Lawyers and the courts act in tandem to resolve legal disputes. Legal advice is often 
needed, for example, to initiate proceedings in the courts, to ensure the facts and law relevant to a claim or 
defence are put before the court in the best possible way, and to facilitate settlement where this is 
appropriate.‟ 
37
 For discussion on costs and their effect on access to justice see Chapter 8.2.3. See also Chapter 6.4.7. 
124 
 
threatening‟38 and which many non-European users find uncomfortable and potentially 
alienating.
39
 Harris has identified further groups who experience discrimination in using 
the legal system, including women, poor people, and other ethnic minorities.
40
 People with 
disabilities are also a group who experience difficulties using and functioning in the legal 
system and are currently seeking to make the whole court process more accessible.
41
  
 
New Zealand is comprised of diverse population groups many of whom experience 
considerable economic and social problems. While these problems are not caused by the 
New Zealand justice system, it is the mechanism they often use to attempt a resolution of 
their differences.
42
 The aforementioned groups may need extra help in accessing the 
system given that they are „already disadvantaged in social and economic terms.‟43 For 
example, in a study on Women‟s Access to Legal Services, Joanne Morris described the 
problems which women experience in using the justice system. Morris also acknowledged 
that women from minority cultures would experience double disadvantage.
44
 She stated 
that women described the process as „mysterious and daunting‟45 with the procedure being 
                                                             
38
 B V Harris, „Equal Access to Justice: A Constitutional Principle in Need of a Higher Profile‟ [1995] New 
Zealand Law Review 282, 294; „The court environment is austere and threatening to the unfamiliar. This is 
particularly so for the young, the unworldly, and those who do not identify with New Zealand‟s dominant 
European culture.‟ See also, Te Whiainga I Te Tika; In Search of Justice,  Report of the Advisory Committee 
on Legal Services, Department of Justice (1986) 51; „Courts can be seen as negative, dehumanising, 
intimidating, inefficient, overloaded, culturally alien and insensitive, and designed to meet the needs of those 
in the legal industry instead of the consumers. Court processes should be dramatically restructured to meet 
the needs of the consumers and foster community participation.‟ 
39
 B V Harris, „Equal Access to Justice: A Constitutional Principle in Need of a Higher Profile‟ [1995] NZL 
Rev 282, 294–295; „Few aspects of contemporary New Zealand life mirror so closely the English model.‟ 
Harris says that by allowing the use of the Maori language in court proceedings under s4 Maori Language 
Act 1987, Parliament „has indirectly acknowledged the principle that the justice system should be attuned to 
the culture of its users.‟ 
40
 Ibid 305. 
41
 Personal experience of the author: Assembly of People with Disabilities, Annual General Meeting, 
November 2005. 
42
 Joanne Morris, Women‟s Access to Legal Services: Women‟s Access to Justice, He Putanga Mo Nga 
Wahine Ki Te Tika (1999) 6. 
43
 Ibid. 
44
 Ibid 33. 
45
 Ibid. 
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formal, complex and not part of their everyday existence.
46
 Women were also critical of 
what they described as the dominant „male culture‟ of the justice system including the 
predominance of male lawyers and judges. Women therefore generally believed they 
would be disadvantaged in their dealings with both lawyers and the justice system.
47
  
 
Under the Labour Relations Act 1987 special personal grievance procedures were 
established for employees who took a complaint of sexual harassment against their 
employer or a co-worker.
48
 These procedures permitted a mediator to take more of an 
inquisitorial role. The complainant and respondent would be heard individually by the 
mediator. Complainants could have their support organisation with them, and usually did, 
but it was never necessary for the harassed worker to face the harasser.
49
   
 
Alternatively, the complainant could choose
50
 to take a complaint of discrimination on the 
grounds of gender to the Human Rights Commission under the Human Rights Commission 
                                                             
46
 Ibid. „Women emphasised as well that while the justice system is largely remote from their everyday lives, 
the problems which lead to their need to interact with it are very often central to their lives. The most 
commonly mentioned problems were those relating to family relationships (especially relationship 
breakdowns), the care and protection of children, income and child support, violence against women, other 
criminal conduct by family members, and employment.‟ 
47
 Ibid 49. „Women knew that lawyers and, especially, senior lawyers and judges are mainly men. The 
message they took from this was that attitudes and practices within the legal profession are not conducive to 
women lawyers‟ advancement.‟ 
48
 Labour Relations Act 1987, s 221. Special procedures where sexual harassment alleged – Where a personal 
grievance involves allegations of sexual harassment: 
(a) Any grievance committee shall, if the worker so requires, consist of one person, being either: 
 (i) A person (who may be a mediator) mutually agreed on by the parties; or  
  (ii) If there is no such agreement, either a mediator or a person appointed by a mediator; and 
(b) The person or persons constituting the grievance committee may, before or after hearing the parties, 
conduct an investigation into the grounds of the personal grievance, but shall ensure that all parties 
have an opportunity to be heard regarding the findings of that investigation; and 
(c) Neither the grievance committee nor the Labour Court shall take into account any evidence of the 
worker‟s sexual experience or reputation; and 
(d) Subject to paragraphs (a) to (c) of this section, the procedure otherwise applicable in respect of that 
grievance shall apply. 
49
 Wendy Davis, A Feminist Perspective on Sexual Harassment in Employment Law in New Zealand, New 
Zealand Institute of Industrial Relations Research (1994). 
50
 Labour Relations Act 1987, s 226(1) (emphasis added); Where the circumstances giving rise to a personal 
grievance by a worker are also such that that worker would be entitled to make a complaint under the Human 
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Act 1977.
51
 The Commission did not at that time encourage a person to have the support of 
a union or other representative during an investigation. The impact of this was that an 
employee frequently felt vulnerable and unsupported when making a personal complaint to 
a stranger.
52
 A 1991 Ministry of Women‟s Affairs study indicated that most women 
subjected to sexual harassment preferred to utilise the Labour Relations Act 1987 personal 
grievance procedure.
53
   
 
Under the Employment Contracts Act 1991 it was still possible to take a personal 
grievance on the grounds of sexual harassment, however, the special procedures for 
hearing those complaints were removed.
54
 The then Minister of Women‟s Affairs, Jenny 
Shipley, requested that the Minister of Labour revise the Act and reintroduce the special 
procedure for sexual harassment cases. This request was refused.
55
 The alternative of a 
complaint under the Human Rights Commission Act 1977 and subsequently the Human 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Rights Commission Act 1977 or the Race Relations Act 1971, the worker may take one but not both of the 
following steps: 
(a)  The worker may invoke, in relation to those circumstances, the procedures applicable in relation to 
personal grievances under this Act or the relevant award or agreement:  
(b)  The worker may make, in relation to those circumstances, a complaint under the Human Rights 
Commission Act 1977 or the Race Relations Act 1971. 
51
 Human Rights Commission Act 1977, s 15. See John Hughes et al, Personal Grievances (2005) 9.1. 
Section 15 „prohibited employers from subjecting employees to any detriment “by reason of the sex… of that 
person.”‟ In H v E (1985) 5 NZAR 333 the Equal Opportunities Tribunal decided that sex discrimination 
resulting in disadvantage included sexual harassment. This case was applied in later cases. See Chapter 2.4.5 
and 2.4.6. 
52
 Wendy Davis, A Feminist Perspective on Sexual Harassment in Employment Law in New Zealand (New 
Zealand Institute of Industrial Relations Research, 1994).  
53
 Lesley Haines, Director, Policy for Chief Executive, Ministry of Women‟s Affairs, Briefing Paper for the 
Minister, Sexual Harassment Procedures – Employment Contracts Act, 14 August 1991, 1. For a summary of 
the issues surrounding sexual harassment in the workplace, see Wendy Davis, A Feminist Perspective on 
Sexual Harassment in Employment Law in New Zealand, New Zealand Institute of Industrial Relations 
Research (1994). This contains an extensive bibliography on the subject. See also John Hughes et al, 
Personal Grievances (2005), ch 9. 
54
 Employment Contracts Act 1991, Part III Personal Grievances, s 29 Sexual harassment. Section 26(e) 
explained that an application must choose between bringing a personal grievance under the Employment 
Contracts Act or making a complaint under the Human Rights Commission Act – later the Human Rights Act. 
55
 Lesley Haines, Director, Policy for Chief Executive, Ministry of Women‟s Affairs, Briefing Paper for the 
Minister, Sexual Harassment Procedures – Employment Contracts Act (14 August 1991) 1. Letter of 
Minister of Women‟s Affairs to Minister of Labour (26 October 1991).  
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Rights Act 1993 remained.
56
 This involved the Human Rights Commission Complaints 
Division either conciliating or investigating a complaint and the Commission determining 
the substance.
57
 However, it is submitted that there would have been some justification for 
women believing that their right to have special personal grievance procedures for dealing 
with sensitive matters in the most appropriate manner had been unjustifiably removed, thus 
restricting their access to arguably more effective and timely  justice options in these 
circumstances. 
 
Whilst access to justice needs to be complete, this does not suggest that there should be an 
open-ended entitlement to representation and unfettered access to the legal process.
58
 
Equal access to justice is a laudable ideal but there are competing interests between 
individual and party rights, those of the state and the balance of financial constraints on the 
Government.
59
 As fiscal limitations impact on the quantity of assistance available the 
question then arises as to what quality of services should be provided and in what 
circumstances, to satisfy the principle or notion of equitable access to justice.
60
 Harris has 
questioned whether reasonable access is enough or whether the obligation should be to 
provide the best possible access.
61
 Even if the state provided reasonable access to all 
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 Human Rights Act 1993, s 62. Section 75 sets out the functions of the Complaints Division of the Human 
Rights Commission under this Act. 
57
 Ibid, s 75. 
58
 Sir Ivor Richardson, „The Courts and Access to Justice‟ (2000) 31 Victoria University of Wellington Law 
Review 163, 167; „In Ashmore v Corporation of Lloyd‟s [1992] 1 WLR 446, 448, Lord Roskill commented 
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 B V Harris, „Equal Access to Justice: A Constitutional Principle in Need of a Higher Profile‟ [1995] New 
Zealand Law Review 282, 308. 
60
 Ibid. 
61
 Ibid. 
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people there would still remain those at the „top end‟ who would have access to the „best‟ 
resources because of their ability to fund a higher level of service themselves.
62
  
3.2.2 THE CONTEXT OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE ISSUES UNDER THE EMPLOYMENT 
CONTRACTS ACT 1991 
 
In the early 1980s the New Zealand economy was in a „perilous position‟.63 Changes in the 
traditional agricultural trading base resulting from Britain‟s entry into the European 
Economic Community, rampant inflation, and external crises such as the fallout from the 
1973 oil shock all impacted on New Zealand‟s economic development.64  
 
The 1980s was thus a period of significant economic deregulation under the Labour 
Government, which saw the removal of most state market regulation and trends 
„expanding the scope for market mechanisms to ensure efficient allocation of resources.‟65 
For example, the Public Service was restructured and in some parts corporatized along 
business lines and agricultural subsidies were removed.
66
 Despite these reforms, the New 
Zealand economy continued to perform poorly, which some parties blamed on the 
                                                             
62
 „State supported aid arises from the basic responsibility of the state to ensure justice for its citizens, and 
this responsibility is not truly fulfilled as long as any citizen is prevented by lack of means from having his 
grievances aired and determined fairly and adequately by the courts… Article 7 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights… requires that the balance of justice should not be loaded in favour of the man with 
means, the large corporation or the state itself.‟ Rt Hon J R Marshall, NZPD vol 363, 1969, 2680, cited in 
Joanne Morris, Women‟s Access to Legal Services: Women‟s Access to Justice, He Putanga Mo Nga Wahine 
Ki Te Tika (1999) 125.  
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 Nick Wailes, „Professor Richard Epstein and the New Zealand Employment Contracts Act: A Critique‟, 
(1997) 28 California Western International Law Journal 27, 28. 
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 Brian Easton, „The Commercialisation of the New Zealand Economy: From Think Big to Privatisation‟ in 
Brian Easton (ed), The Making of Rogernomics (1989) 114, 120.  
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 Nick Wailes, „Professor Richard Epstein and the New Zealand Employment Contracts Act: A Critique‟, 
(1997) 28 California Western International Law Journal 27, 29. See also Brian Easton, „The 
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Economy (1995). 
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business lines. 
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continued involvement of the state in the labour market.
67
 The New Zealand Employers‟ 
Federation and the New Zealand Business Roundtable, a lobby group advocating the 
interests of large private companies, believed that the reform process had not gone far 
enough and thus they waged a public campaign lobbying the Labour Government and the 
opposition National Party to go further and deregulate the employment market.
68
 
 
The Labour Government did not attempt to reform the labour market until the passage of 
the Labour Relations Act 1987. This was an attempt to increase the flexibility of the labour 
market but also to ensure that employment protections remained in force. For example, 
existing personal grievance rights for employees who claimed unjustifiable dismissal or 
disadvantage and the procedure and fundamental principles derived from extant case law, 
remained largely unchanged.
69
   
 
The Business Roundtable however, continued to lobby the Labour Government and from 
1990 the National Government, on the need for further labour market reform. Their 
arguments were largely based on theories promulgated by Professor Richard Epstein
70
 and 
an alternative employment model based on orthodox legal contractual theory and 
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 Nick Wailes, „Professor Richard Epstein and the New Zealand Employment Contracts Act: A Critique‟, 
(1997) 28 California Western International Law Journal 27, 30. 
68
 Ibid 31. He argues „the failure of the economic reforms introduced by Labour during the second half of the 
1980s could be largely attributed to the failure to reform the labor [sic] relations system.‟  
69
 Labour Relations Act 1987, s 216. See Gordon Anderson, „Interpreting the Employment Contracts Act: 
Are the Courts Undermining the Act?‟ (1997) 28 California Western International Law Journal 117, 118 and 
135. These procedures and principles also remained under the Employment Contracts Act 1991 despite new-
right arguments that they contravened the principles of „freedom on contract‟. „Unlike collective bargaining, 
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70
 Richard Epstein was at the time Professor of Law at the University of Chicago and wrote widely on legal 
subjects. He was a particular supporter of the principle of employment at will as he believed that both parties 
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when they chose. See, Nick Wailes, „Professor Richard Epstein and the New Zealand Employment Contracts 
Act: A Critique‟, (1997) 28 California Western International Law Journal 27; Ellen Dannin, „Confronting 
the Employment Contracts Act‟ (1997) 28 California Western International Law Journal 1, 5. 
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associated principles.
71
 On the basis of accepting the notion that freedom of contract and 
freedom of association would improve efficiency in the labour market, the National 
Government introduced the Employment Contracts Bill in December 1990 with very little 
prior consultation or involvement of interested groups. It was enacted in 1991 amidst 
strong opposition by members of the public and unions.
72
 Although Epstein‟s theories 
were reflected strongly in the Employment Contracts Act 1991, the Business Roundtable 
was unsuccessful in achieving one of Epstein‟s fundamental employment principles, that 
of employment „at will‟ with no personal grievance restriction, nor was the Business 
Roundtable successful in dispensing with the specialist employment institutions.
73
  
 
The successful introduction of the principles of freedom of association and freedom of 
contract reversed almost 100 years of employment law
74
 that had been protective of unions 
and unionisation.
75
 New Zealand‟s high rates of union membership (60–70 percent) 
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 See, for example, Margaret Wilson, Law Professor, University of Waikato, „Employment Court – Trends, 
Statistics, Legislative Update‟, Paper to Employment Law Conference, New Zealand Law Society, 
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the Employment Contracts Act 1991 on the New Zealand Labour Market‟, 21 September 1993, 5, 
Introduction, para 3.1. „Although there had been a number of significant changes in industrial legislation 
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dropped by more than 30 percent in the four and a half years after the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991 came into force.
76
 The ability of employees „to choose any 
representative or no representative‟ also meant that if they left the union they would be 
responsible for meeting the cost of representation themselves.
77
 For an employee on a low 
income this „choice‟ was of limited practical value78 and would in some cases significantly 
restrict access to justice.  
 
Access and other equity concerns had arisen relatively soon after the introduction of the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991 and continued to be voiced until 1998. In 1993 the 
Labour Select Committee undertook an inquiry into the effects of the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991 on the New Zealand labour market.
79
 An overwhelming concern for 
those using the Employment Tribunal was the significant delay experienced between filing 
a case and being allocated a hearing date.
80
 Some unions took an overarching view that the 
power balance had shifted in favour of employers and that long waiting times had a 
negative impact on equity and caused additional stress.
81
 Employment Tribunal members 
and union officials informed the inquiry of their view that the provision in section 76 of 
the Employment Contracts Act 1991 to provide „speedy resolution‟ of disputes was not 
being met.
82
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 Ibid. 
77
 Ibid. See also Chapter 7.4.1. 
78
 Ibid, gives an example of a submission written on the Employment Contracts Bill by a grocery store 
worker, who said, „Of course, it depends on who I can afford to hire, and as a family we struggle now, even 
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79
 See Labour Select Committee, „Report of the Labour Committee on the Inquiry into the Effects of the 
Employment Contracts act 1991 on the New Zealand Labour Market‟, September 1993.  
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 Ibid 39. 
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 Ibid. 
82
 Ibid 40. See below para 3.4.2 for detailed discussion on reasons for the delays. See also, Chapter 6.4.10.  
132 
 
One factor contributing to delay was the impact of the increased use of lawyers and 
advocates at hearings, which may also have contributed to complaints of increased 
legalism and formality in the Tribunal.
83
 The Employment Tribunal Regulations 
themselves also gave a perception of increased legalism and formality that was 
demonstrably at odds with the intention of the Act by imposed time limits and delays in 
the process.
84
 The lack of a de novo appeal in the Employment Court meant that all 
potential evidence and arguments had to be adduced and recorded at the Employment 
Tribunal, which protracted hearings.
85
 
 
The 1996 election resulted in a coalition between New Zealand First and National. As part 
of the Coalition Agreement a Statement on Industrial Relations was issued which included 
a commitment to review the operations of the Employment Tribunal and the Employment 
Court. The review proposed to determine whether parties were being denied access to 
justice because of delays, lack of resources, increased legalism, formality and lengthy 
waiting lists; particularly in the area of personal grievances.
86
 All these identified factors 
contributed to concerns about increased costs and the ability of parties to access the 
procedure.
87
 
 
The 1996 Coalition Government produced an Industrial Relations Package in an attempt 
to try and resolve some of the identified issues. The Package proposed amendments to the 
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 Labour Select Committee, „Report of the Labour Committee on the Inquiry into the Effects of the 
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 Ibid 42. See also, W F Birch, Minister of Finance, Speech to Wellington District Law Society, 7 June 
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chapter. 
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personal grievance provisions of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 to clarify 
probationary employment, contributory fault and the standard of conduct required by the 
employer when dismissing employees. It also proposed removing the available alternative 
common law „wrongful dismissal‟ option.88 To allay some concerns, a commitment was 
given to maintaining the specialist employment jurisdiction
89
 but questions of equitable 
access to justice were not directly dealt with in the Industrial Relations Package. The issue 
of adequate resourcing of the Employment Tribunal and Employment Court was also 
discussed. However, due to the Coalition Government losing power no fundamental 
changes arose.
90
 
 
 
3.2.3 ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PRINCIPLES AND INTENTIONS OF 
THE LABOUR RELATIONS ACT 1987 AND THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS ACT 1991  
 
The Labour Relations Act 1987 was designed, amongst other things, to „provide 
procedures for the orderly conduct of relations between workers and employers‟91 and it 
gave access to personal grievance procedures largely based upon union membership.
92
 The 
procedure for resolving personal grievances under the Labour Relations Act 1987 is 
outlined in Chapter Two.
93
 Ellen Dannin suggests that the intention of the Act was to 
create effective working relationships between employers, employees and unions.
94
 In 
                                                             
88
 Ibid 7–8. 
89
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court structures was intended to be carried out by the Minister of Justice. See, John Hughes, „The 
Employment Court after the Industrial Package‟, 24(1) NZJIR 21, 28. 
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practice this meant access to personal grievance procedures was restricted to union 
members who were covered by an award or agreement or whose work was covered by an 
award or agreement.
95
 Those outside this coverage or those who applied for exemption 
from compulsory union membership under an „unqualified preference‟ provision, could 
not access the personal grievance provisions and were required to take a common law 
action for wrongful dismissal.
96
 Access to justice was therefore limited depending on the 
employee‟s membership of a union.97 This limited coverage fell short of international 
standards, such as the ILO Conventions on the termination of employment which did not 
„seem to envisage protection for only limited groups of workers.‟98 However, in New 
Zealand access to the personal grievance procedure for unjustifiable dismissal is available 
from the first day of employment. In most other jurisdictions, claims for wrongful 
dismissal are not available to employees until they have completed a qualifying period of 
employment. For example, at the time in the United Kingdom an employee must have 
completed two years‟ service with the same employer.99  
 
Changes to the industrial relations court structure under the Labour Relations Act altered 
the function of courts in industrial relations matters principally by the creation of a 
specialist Labour Court, which became a court of record rather than one of conciliation and 
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arbitration.
100
 This change came about because of problems identified with the previous 
Industrial Relations Act 1973, in particular „delays in Court hearings and the alleged 
tendency for greater legalism and focus on technical detail.‟101 Despite this, Ryan and 
Walsh believed this new status actually resulted in greater formality and legality than 
under previous legislation.
102
 They suggested that the influence of „practical reality‟ on 
legal principles was reduced from that time.
103
  
 
The passage of the Employment Contracts Act in 1991 was an attempt to address some of 
the problems which existed under the Labour Relations Act 1987. In particular, the former 
sought to change the philosophical background to the employment relationship by placing 
more emphasis on the „purely‟ contractual relationship between employer and 
employee.
104
 These changes took place in the context of wider economic and social 
reforms „aimed at radical change in the welfare state.‟105 The Employment Contracts Act 
1991 was intended to broaden the principles of freedom of association and freedom of 
representation.
106
 However, as Dannin explained, the so called „even-handed‟ approach to 
selecting a representative of choice:
107
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 Labour Relations Act 1987, s 278. See Rose Ryan and Pat Walsh, „Common Law v Labour Law: the New 
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Journal of Labour Law 230, 234. 
103
 Ibid. „Thus, the changes made by the Labour Relations Act gave rise to a considerably more formal and 
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104
 Employment Contracts Act 1991, Preamble.  
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 Ellen J Dannin, Working Free: The Origins and Impact of New Zealand‟s Employment Contracts Act 
(1997) 106. This Economic and Social Initiative saw welfare benefits significantly reduced and punitive 
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 Max Bradford, MP, „The Future of the Employment Court and Tribunal: The Government View‟, Speech 
Notes to New Zealand Institute of Industrial Relations Research Seminar, 23 April 1993, 5. See also, Ellen J 
Dannin, Working Free: The Origins and Impact of New Zealand‟s Employment Contracts Act (1997) 267. 
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fail[ed] to appreciate and account for significant differences between employees and employers. 
Laws which apply equally but which fail to account for relevant differences may not be equal in 
impact or effect. Thus the ECA legislate[d] for equality while it ignore[d] background inequality. 
 
William Birch, the then Minister of Labour, in his Report Back speech to Parliament on 
the Employment Contracts Bill, said that the new institutional framework would „provide 
easy, quick and inexpensive access for all New Zealanders to pursue personal grievance 
procedures where necessary.‟108 The National Government‟s intention was that the system 
would be „more democratic and will be a vast improvement on the slow, selective and 
cumbersome procedures which they replace‟109 and would provide equitable access110 to 
„procedures and outcomes that are considered reasonable and fair by society as a 
whole.‟111 The ability for all employees, according to Minister Birch, regardless of union 
membership, to access the personal grievance machinery promised „a wider and more 
accessible process of personal grievances.‟112 Thus in theory and expressed government 
intent, the principles behind the Employment Contracts Act 1991 were said to provide 
access to justice for all employees as opposed to the limitations which had existed under 
the Labour Relations Act 1987 and preceding legislation.
113
   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
„The ECA even-handedly allows an employee or an employer to select a representative to perform any acts 
related to negotiating or enforcing employment contracts or prosecuting statutory violations.‟ 
107
 Ellen J Dannin, Working Free: The Origins and Impact of New Zealand‟s Employment Contracts Act 
(1997) 267. 
108
 W F Birch, Minister of Labour, „Report Back Speech: Employment Contracts Bill‟ (22 April 1991) 4. 
This objective was set out in Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 76, Part VI, Objects; „to establish… a low 
level, informal, specialist Employment Tribunal to provide speedy, fair and just resolution of differences 
between parties to employment contracts, it being recognised that in some cases mutual resolution is either 
inappropriate or impossible.‟  
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110
 Max Bradford, „Report of the Labour Committee on the Employment Contracts Bill‟ (April 1991) 
Appendix I, 1. 
111
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Notes to New Zealand Institute of Industrial Relations Research Seminar, 23 April 1993, 7. „No longer 
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jurisdictions. All were to have the same rights, and to have access to the same legal remedies.‟ 
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Prior to the passage of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 employees were generally 
represented by unions in personal grievance actions, either by union employees, or by 
counsel or advocates contracted by the unions. Employers may have been represented by 
employers‟ organisations or by contracted advocates or counsel. In practice, the 
involvement of lawyers had not been commonplace. The Employment Contracts Act 1991 
allowed employee and employer parties to choose the representation they wished.
114
 This, 
combined with the reduction in union membership and influence, meant that more legal 
counsel became involved in employment law matters.
115
 As a result, whilst there may have 
been a numerical increase in those able to access the process this did not necessarily 
translate into greater actual accessibility. As will be discussed in more detail later in this 
chapter, the fundamental problems associated with access to justice – cost, delay and 
process – continued. Despite the comments made earlier regarding the legal nature of 
procedures applying under the Labour Relations Act 1987, users of the personal grievance 
adjudication system under the Employment Contracts Act 1991 later fondly looked back on 
the relative informality of proceedings under the previous Act.
116
 Many adjudicators laid 
part of the responsibility for increased formality, legalism, cost and delay on the greater 
use of legal representation as well as the influence of the more formal Employment 
Tribunal Regulations 1991.
117
 Lorraine Skiffington saw the greater use of legal 
representatives as being a predictable result of the establishment of an employment 
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relationship based more on strict contractual principles.
118
 As union representation was 
used less frequently, employees had to find some other form of representation to protect 
their most valued asset, their employment status.
119
 It has been suggested that the 
prevailing economic circumstances including high unemployment and a depressed 
economy meant it was unlikely that employees would be satisfied with a „low-level‟ 
process to resolve employment problems.
120
         
3.3 NATURAL JUSTICE SUMMARISED 
3.3.1 INTRODUCTION  
Natural justice is a general public law principle which binds administrative bodies and 
decision makers and imposes a duty amongst other factors, to act fairly and to listen to 
both sides of any dispute.
121
 The absence of natural justice in any decision of an 
administrative authority may be grounds for an application for judicial review of that 
decision. Where natural justice is not imposed by statute „the justice of the common law 
will supply the omission of the legislature.‟122 The requirements of natural justice will vary 
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 Lorraine Skiffington, „The Employment Tribunal and Employment Court Three Years on…‟ (1994) 4 
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sides‟; Board of Education v Rice [1911] AC 179, 182, Lord Loreburn (HL). See Philip A Joseph, 
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nd
 ed, 2001) 847. 
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 Cooper v Wandsworth Board of Works (1863) 14 CB (NS) 180, 194, Byles J. See Philip A Joseph, 
Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2
nd
 ed, 2001) 847. 
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depending on the type of procedure involved, the nature of the decision being made and 
the body making the decision.
123
  
 
The principles or rules of natural justice have been developed over the centuries in the 
common law and relate to the conduct of processes which courts and tribunals use in their 
operation.
124
 For a period, the principles were given a very rigid conceptual application
125
 
but this narrow approach was abandoned following Ridge v Baldwin
126
 and Durayapph v 
Fernando,
127
 where Lord Upjohn indicated that the principles could be applied „upon the 
most general considerations.‟128 Originally only judicial or quasi-judicial decisions were 
subject to the principles of natural justice, however, the modern approach is that if rights or 
interests are affected a decision will be subject to natural justice principles.
129
 
 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 states that every person „has the right to the 
observance of the principles of natural justice by any tribunal or other public authority 
which has the power to make a determination in respect of that person‟s rights, obligations, 
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 Jeffs v NZ Dairy Production Marketing Board [1967] NZLR 1057 (PC) – natural justice may operate at 
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 See, for example, Lord Scarman in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] 
AC 374, 407 (HL) said that the Courts had extended „the requirements of natural justice, namely the duty to 
act fairly, so that it is required of a purely administrative act.‟ For a New Zealand example, see Stininato v 
Auckland Boxing Association Inc [1978] 1 NZLR 1 (CA). See GDS Taylor, Judicial Review (1991) 251–254.  
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or interests protected or recognised by law.‟130 The Bill of Rights Act has limited effect as 
it applies only to the three arms of government
131
 and it is subordinate legislation,
132
 
however, the rules of natural justice are so deeply entrenched in the common law that they 
have been held to apply in a wide range of circumstances.
133
  
 
The rules of natural justice apply in different ways to various aspects of this thesis. Natural 
justice was incorporated into the common law contract of employment by the 1985 Court 
of Appeal decision in Auckland Shop Employees IUW v Woolworths.
134
 Natural justice or 
procedural fairness was incorporated as a key element of an employer‟s disciplinary 
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 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 27(1). 
131
 Executive, legislature and judiciary. 
132
 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, ss 4, 5 and 6 limit the application of the Act in that other legislation 
may supersede it if they are inconsistent: 
4. Other enactments not affected – 
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broadly. In Simpson v Police (High Court, Hamilton, AP 58/91, 17 June 1993) 13, Hammond J said that 
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See Philip A Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2
nd
 ed, 2001) 848; Anne Boyd, 
Procedural Fairness in Performance Dismissals, NZ Council of Trade Unions, Occasional Papers on 
Employment Law, August 1997, 10, argues that the principles have acquired a significant constitutional 
status. 
134
 Auckland Shop Employees IUW v Woolworths (NZ) Ltd [1985] 2 NZLR 372 (CA). See Philip A Joseph, 
Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2
nd
 ed, 2001) 858. The Court of Appeal „established 
that it was an implied term of the employment contract that any inquiry into alleged employee dishonesty or 
incompetence must be conducted in a fair and reasonable manner.‟ See also, G D S Taylor, Judicial Review 
(1991) 270, para 13.21. „Courts in New Zealand… have not hesitated to apply the same principles… to 
offices and contracts of employment alike.‟ 
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enquiry by the Court‟s interpretation of „unjustified‟ dismissal in Auckland City Council v 
Hennessey.
135
 Later, as a statutory requirement it related to how the Employment Tribunal 
dealt with its cases and allowed judicial review of Employment Tribunal decisions on the 
grounds of procedural impropriety or bias.
136
  
 
3.3.2 PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE DEFINED 
 
There are two central tenets of natural justice which form the basis of the principles to be 
applied.
137
 Firstly, the audi alteram partem rule, that no person may be condemned 
unheard, means that all parties must have an opportunity to present their case and to be 
heard by the decision maker before any decision is reached.
138
 Secondly, the nemo judex in 
causa sua rule, or the rule against bias, that no person should be a judge in their own 
cause, means a neutral decision maker should determine the outcome.
139
 The application of 
these rules could mean, for example, that a decision may be substantively correct but may 
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 Auckland City Council v Hennessey [1982] ACJ 699 (CA). 
136
 Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 105, „Applications for review – (1) If any person wishes to apply for 
review under Part I of the Judicature Amendment Act 1972, or bring proceedings seeking writ or order of, or 
in the nature of mandamus, prohibition, or certiorari, or a declaration or injunction, in relation to the exercise, 
refusal to exercise, or proposed or purported exercise by –  
(a) the Tribunal; or 
(b) An officer of the Tribunal or the Court; or 
(c) An employer, or that employer‟s representative under this Act; or 
(d) An employee, or that employee‟s representative under this Act, – 
of a statutory power or statutory of decision (as defined by section 3 of the Judicature Amendment Act 1972) 
conferred by or under this Act or the State Sector Act 1988, the provisions of subsections (2) to (4) of this 
section shall apply.‟ Section 105(3) required that the right of appeal under this Act had to be exhausted 
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Court reviewed in the Court of Appeal. There could be no appeal from that decision – s131(4). 
137
 Described as the „two cardinal principles‟ by Brookers Employment Law, ER173.04.  
138
 „Hear the other side‟. Philip A Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2nd ed, 
2001) 860. See also, G D S Taylor, Judicial Review (1991) 276, para 13.30 and following. To deny the 
opportunity to make submissions can be a breach of natural justice. See for example, R v Secretary for the 
Home Department, ex p Doody [1994] 1 AC 531 (HL). See, G D S Taylor, Judicial Review: A New Zealand 
Perspective (Supplement to the First Edition, 1997). 
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 Philip A Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2
nd
 ed, 2001) 874. The rule 
against bias is „not concerned to uphold procedural fairness‟ but „requires general impartiality in decision 
making‟. A decision maker who is biased is disqualified from making a decision unless the bias is disclosed 
and the parties waive their right to object. Bias may be actual or apparent. See also, G D S Taylor, Judicial 
Review (1991) 286, para 13.46 and following. 
142 
 
be set aside for want of procedural fairness.
140
 Any distinction between the concept of 
natural justice and the concept of „fairness‟ no longer exists.141 In the words of Lord 
Morris:
142
 
Natural justice is but fairness writ large and juridically. It has been described as fair play in action. 
 
The New Zealand courts are prone to approach natural justice in a pragmatic way, using a 
balanced assessment according to the circumstances of the case rather than a legalistic and 
theoretical approach.
143
 It has been stated that the significance of the case to the parties 
concerned will be a major factor in the level of the requirement to observe the principles of 
natural justice:
144
 
The level of the requirement to observe the standards of natural justice must reflect the significance 
and consequences of the relevant decision to those affected by it. Where the decision-making body 
is effectively capable of denying someone their livelihood, then the requirements of natural justice 
will be of a high order. Where no such weighty matters turn on the decision, less stringent standards 
are appropriate.  
3.3.2(A) AUDI ALTERAM PARTEM – THE RIGHT TO A HEARING 
a) Notice  
The requirement to provide prior notice of a hearing incorporates three main factors. First, 
there must be notice of the time, date and place of the meeting itself. Second, adequate 
notice must be given of the issues to be decided, in sufficient detail for the receiving party 
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 Board of Education v Rice [1911] AC 179, 182 (HL) Loreburn LJ. The principles of natural justice 
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141
 See, G D S Taylor, Judicial Review (1991) 252–254, paras 13.02 and 13.03. „The terms “fairness” and 
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 Furnell v Whangarei High School Board [1973] 2 NZLR 705, 718. See, G D S Taylor, Judicial Review 
(1991) 252–254, paras 13.02 and 13.03. 
143
 Re Erebus Royal Commission [1981] 1 NZLR 614, Woodhouse, McMullin JJ. See also, Russell v Duke of 
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 Auckland Boxing Association v New Zealand Boxing Association [2001] NZAR 847, 859, Priestly J.  
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to be able to respond;
145
 including any allegations or charges made;
146
 and any potential 
outcomes or orders to be made.
147
 Finally, sufficient time must be provided for the parties 
to prepare a case in response with either written or oral submissions or both.
148
 This 
includes time to respond to any new information that may arise during a hearing including 
the need for an adjournment to allow adequate time to prepare a rebuttal.
149
  
b) Disclosure of relevant and probative evidence 
The decision maker is required to disclose all relevant evidence which they may rely upon. 
A failure to comply with this principle may be deemed to be a breach of natural justice.
150
 
This includes any information obtained from an outside body or expert whose knowledge 
or opinion may be relied on in the decision making.
151
 However, in some circumstances a 
strict disclosure requirement may be mitigated by the availability of a fair hearing, 
especially if it is found that the plaintiff already had knowledge of the relevant information 
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nd
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Philip A Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2
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prior to the hearing.
152
 Further, both parties must be given the opportunity to present 
evidence relevant to their case. Failure to allow such an opportunity may amount to a 
breach of natural justice.
153
 However, refusal to allow irrelevant evidence would not 
constitute a breach.
154
 The onus of observing principles of natural justice may be heavier 
where the other party is unrepresented or has no legal counsel.
155
 The application of these 
rules will vary according to the nature and context of each case.
156
  
The decision maker must make their decision based on relevant evidence which has been 
placed before them. There must be a factual foundation
157
 for the decision but the weight 
given to the facts is a matter for the decision maker to determine.
158
 
c) Warning of a potential adverse finding 
A decision maker has a duty to warn a party if it is likely that the result of the hearing will 
be an adverse finding against them, particularly if it may result in negative findings about 
the reputation or credibility of the party or affect their property or livelihood.
159
 Procedural 
fairness requires that the other party be able to take appropriate advice and have the ability 
to respond to the seriousness of the consequences.
160
 If, during the hearing, it is obvious to 
the parties that credibility is in issue, the duty may not arise.
161
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 Travis Holdings Ltd v Christchurch City Council [1993] 3 NZLR 32, 47–48. See also Philip A Joseph, 
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158
 Ibid. See also Philip A Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2
nd
 ed, 2001) 869. 
159
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d) Representation 
The rules of natural justice do not give a general right to representation in all situations.
162
 
An exception in the employment context is situations involving young vulnerable 
workers.
163
 However, representation is seen as promoting access to justice, as 
representatives ideally possess skills in presenting their clients‟ cases, examining and 
cross-examining witnesses and presenting legal arguments in a persuasive manner.
164
 
However, it is possible to surmise that the use of representatives and adherence to a formal 
legal process increases legalism and formality and may lead to increased costs.
165
 In 
general, tribunals and administrative bodies have the discretion as to whether or not to 
permit representation,
166
 unless specifically excluded by statute.
167
 Failure to exercise such 
discretion to allow representation or exercising it unfairly may be grounds for a judicial 
review or grounds of procedural unfairness in an employment context.
168
 In determining 
whether or not to permit representation an authority should consider, among other things, 
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 ed, 2001) 864; GDS Taylor, 
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Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2
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the seriousness of the issue,
169
 potential consequences, and the ability of parties to present 
their own case.
170
 The courts have said that in circumstances where a person‟s livelihood 
or reputation may be affected, there should be a general right to representation.
171
 
e) Cross-examination 
There is a general right to cross-examine witnesses in the ordinary courts.
172
 For 
administrative bodies, the general principle relating to the conduct of oral hearings with 
witnesses is that a right of cross-examination is implied.
173
 In the case of any tribunal 
which sets its own procedure it is likely that a refusal to permit cross-examination would 
be seen to breach natural justice
174
 and a subsequent decision may be invalidated.
175
 
Administrative authorities are not generally subject to the same rules of evidence that 
apply to the courts.
176
 If cross-examination is not permitted the opposing party is unable to 
test the validity of, for example, hearsay evidence.
177
 In particular, natural justice will 
generally require cross-examination to be allowed where livelihood is at stake or 
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credibility and reputation could be at issue.
178
 An investigative authority cannot be cross-
examined on its inquiries before making its decision.
179
  
f) Reasons 
Natural justice requires that reasons be given for any decisions made.
180
 The omission or 
refusal to give reasons for a decision runs the risk of giving the impression that the 
decision had no sound foundation and may have been arbitrary.
181
 Providing reasons 
ensures that parties can see that their issues have been listened to and considered and that a 
decision has been reached by applying the law to the facts.
182
 Further, if parties are 
dissatisfied with how the decision has been made, the reasons will provide the basis for 
any appeal and ensure an appellate body can identify the basis on which the original 
decision was made.
 183
 
3.3.2(B) A FAIR AND NEUTRAL DETERMINATION – THE RULE AGAINST BIAS 
 
The rules of natural justice require that a decision maker must act fairly and without bias. 
This provision ensures that justice will not only be done but also be seen to be done, to 
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maintain public confidence in administrative processes and the justice system.
184
 The rule 
requires the decision maker to be impartial when making decisions about parties or their 
issues. If the decision maker has a conflict of interest or bias towards a particular result or 
party, this must be declared and the decision maker will be disqualified from hearing the 
case unless both parties give their consent to proceed regardless.
185
 
 
Where the decision maker has a direct financial interest in the decision being made they 
will automatically be disqualified from hearing the case.
186
 This is termed presumptive 
bias. Apparent bias occurs when the decision maker has „a personal or professional 
relationship to a party or witness, or a prejudice against or preference towards a particular 
result, or a predisposition leading to a predetermination of the issue(s).‟187 The test to 
determine apparent bias was established in the Auckland Casino case, where it was held 
that it was necessary to ask if a real danger or real possibility of bias existed.
188
 
 
The rule against bias will apply differently depending on the circumstances. For example 
the rule will be applied more stringently to a member of the judiciary than to a member of 
an administrative panel.
189
 Further, the courts have acknowledged that some decision 
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 R v Sussex Justices; Ex p McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256, 256, Lord Hewart – „[J]ustice should not only be 
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Law Review 142. See Philip A Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2
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874 and following. See, G D S Taylor, Judicial Review (1991) 287 and G D S Taylor, Judicial Review: A 
New Zealand Perspective (1997) 95. 
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 Philip A Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2
nd
 ed, 2001) 874. 
186
 Anderton v Auckland City Council [1978] 1 NZLR 657, 680. A pecuniary interest raises „an irrebuttable 
presumption of disqualification.‟ See also, NZI Financial Corp Ltd v NZ Kiwifruit Authority [1986] 1 NZLR 
159, 164. See Philip A Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2
nd
 ed, 2001) 876.  
187
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 ed, 2001) 875. 
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 ed, 2001) 879. 
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 Re Royal Commission on Thomas Case [1982] 1 NZLR 252, 277 where the commissioner was not 
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nd
 ed, 2001) 880. 
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makers will inevitably have preconceived ideas and policy principles which form part of 
their decision making process on policy and its application.
190
 The tests to determine 
apparent bias are based on what the reasonable observer would see as bias in the 
circumstances.
191
  
3.3.3 NATURAL JUSTICE IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 
 
The application of the principles of natural justice in employment law will vary 
considerably depending on the context of the enquiry. Natural justice operates in 
employment law on two levels. Initially, at the workplace level it imposes a duty on the 
employer to act in a procedurally fair manner when dealing with employment related 
matters, in particular in disciplinary investigations and dismissals.
192
 This is particularly 
relevant to this thesis, as a lack of procedural fairness is often the reason for a personal 
grievance having arisen in the first place.
193
  
 
At the second level or more formal stage of proceedings, natural justice entitles both 
parties to a fair and independent hearing from an unbiased Tribunal or Employment Court. 
Further, either the Employment Court or Court of Appeal had the ability to review the 
decisions and processes of the lower body to ensure that all parties had been treated fairly 
and had the opportunity to be heard and respond appropriately to the matters at issue.
194
 
 
                                                             
190
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Historically in employment law, a valid dismissal under common law only required 
„reasonable notice and wages in lieu.‟195 However, union members obtained additional 
statutory protection from unjustified dismissal from 1973 under the Industrial Relations 
Act 1973.
196
 As case law developed, the rules of natural justice were implied to be deemed 
part of all employment contracts after the 1985 Court of Appeal decision in Auckland Shop 
Employees IUW v Woolworths
197
 and full coverage of all employees regardless of union 
membership was extended by statute under the Employment Contracts Act 1991 and the 
Employment Relations Act 2000.  
 
Despite attempts during the 1990s to dispense with an emphasis on procedural fairness it is 
clear that the courts will continue to adhere to these principles. Although the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991 introduced changes to the employment institutions and some changes 
to the procedure for resolving personal grievances, there was no statutory alteration to the 
interpretation of the principles relating to procedural fairness established by the courts 
under previous legislation.
198
 As noted by the Labour Select Committee:
199
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196
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[t]he requirements of procedural fairness in dismissal cases… are simply a translation of the 
principles of natural justice into the employment setting. The explicit overruling of these 
requirements [would remove] what are regarded, in New Zealand and internationally, as basic 
employment rights. 
 
3.3.3(A) NATURAL JUSTICE IN AN EMPLOYER’S ENQUIRY 
 
In most situations, any decisions that an employer intends to make which will negatively 
affect an employee‟s employment must be conducted in a procedurally fair manner. The 
minimum requirements of procedural fairness in the context of alleged misconduct were 
set out in NZ Food Processing Union v Unilever NZ Ltd
200
 as: notice to the employee of 
the specific allegations complained of and the likely consequences if proved correct;
201
 a 
real opportunity for the employee to answer and/or mitigate the allegations;
202
 and 
unbiased consideration of the employee‟s explanation, that is not pre-determined and is 
free from irrelevancies.
203
 The procedural fairness requirements will generally be most 
stringently applied in cases of misconduct because of the potentially serious consequences, 
however, in other cases such as redundancy,
204
 poor performance,
205
 sickness
206
 and 
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152 
 
abandonment of employment,
207
 the requirements of procedural fairness may vary. While 
the more adversarial procedure required in misconduct cases may be unsuitable in these 
cases, procedural fairness would still require an unbiased approach to the facts, an open 
mind when making a decision, and a flexible approach to possible consequences.
208
 
Factors such as the size of the employer‟s business and resources available are also of 
some relevance to the requirement of strictly adhering to procedural fairness.
209
   
 
The courts have made it clear that an employer‟s obligation to adhere to the principles of 
natural justice would not necessarily be as strictly enforced in an employer‟s enquiry as 
they would have been in the Tribunal or a Court hearing. The overarching approach was to 
ensure that the employer conducted a full and proper investigation and that it was fair.
210
 
This did not mean that in some circumstances an employer could not dismiss an employee 
„on the spot‟, however,  they would have run the risk that if they had conducted a proper 
inquiry they would have found that instant dismissal may not have been the most 
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ERNZ 693 (CA). See, Hughes et al, (eds) Personal Grievances (2005) para 4.10. 
208
 Hughes et al, (eds) Personal Grievances (2005) para 4.3. 
209
 Ibid. 
210
 Airline Stewards and Hostesses (NZ) IUW v Air New Zealand Ltd [1990] 3 NZLR 549 (CA). Hughes et 
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appropriate remedy. In a leading New Zealand Court of Appeal authority Justice Bisson 
has suggested that:
211
  
In some situations the facts are so clear that instant dismissal is justified. In other situations an 
explanation by the employee may not be fully satisfactory but sufficient to require further 
consideration and possibly some investigation… An employer could not justify the dismissal of any 
employee if he had closed his eyes to available evidence or not given the employee an opportunity 
to be heard in his or her own defence. 
 
However, without a proper investigation it is difficult for an employer to show that it had a 
reasonably held belief that sufficiently serious misconduct had occurred which justified the 
employee‟s dismissal or as Bisson J indicates:212 
What are reasonable grounds for a belief of misconduct must depend on the facts of each case. But 
at the time when the employer dismissed the employee the employer must have had either clear 
evidence upon which any reasonable employer could safely rely or have carried out reasonable 
enquiries which left him on the balance of probabilities with grounds for believing as he did believe 
that the employee was at fault. 
 
The requirement to hold an investigation did not mean the employer had to meet the same 
standard as a court, but the inquiry must have been independent
213
 and according to Justice 
Bisson have taken into account relevant evidence available at the time of the dismissal:
214
 
Obviously, the employer who has a business to run cannot be expected to conduct a formal hearing 
in the nature of a trial but equally obviously the employer has not made reasonable inquiries if the 
employee has not had sufficient opportunity to answer the employer‟s complaint. 
 
An employer‟s process was not required to be perfect in every detail215 but must have been 
seen to be fair in the circumstances of the case.
216
 Cooke J has said:
217
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…we think that the position has probably been reached in New Zealand where there are few, if any, 
relationships of employment, public or private, to which the requirements of fairness have no 
application whatever. Very clear statutory or contractual language would be necessary to exclude 
this elementary notion. 
 
The individual principles of natural justice applied to an employer‟s enquiry depending on 
the nature of the allegations made and, should they be proved accurate, the possible 
outcome for the employee. Prior notice of a disciplinary meeting was not always required 
if the employee was already aware of the complaints made.
218
 However, where the 
employee was not aware of the complaints or where the allegations or possible outcomes 
were serious, prior notice of the meeting and its possible outcome would generally be 
required.
219
 Such notice had to contain sufficient detail of the allegations made and the 
evidence the employer intended to rely on to provide the employee with a real opportunity 
to respond.
220
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Under s 59 of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 employees were entitled to be 
represented by the person of their choice in the Tribunal or Court.
221
 This section did not 
expressly dictate an entitlement to employee representation at disciplinary meetings. 
However, accepted practice, and the courts‟ recommendations, meant that union 
representation, at least, was advisable in those circumstances.
222
 Procedural unfairness was 
more likely to be found where a young or inexperienced worker was unrepresented,
223
 or 
where a request for representation was denied.
224
 The Employment Tribunal Regulations 
1991 provided the right to cross-examination in the Tribunal but in the employer‟s enquiry 
this may not always have been appropriate or practicable.
225
 However, it is submitted that 
an employee who faced serious allegations should have been entitled to test the strength of 
the allegations made and the credibility of the parties making them. A failure to allow this 
would arguably have been a breach of natural justice by the employer. 
 
The courts have held that an employer who has dismissed an employee must give the 
employee reasons for the dismissal at the time of the actual dismissal.
226
 Failure to provide 
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reasons may have been found procedurally unfair.
227
 If reasons were not given the 
employee could not be certain of the grounds the employer took into account and whether 
irrelevant factors may have been counted without the employee being given the 
opportunity to respond.
228
 
 
The rule against bias required the employer to listen to the employee‟s explanation with an 
open mind and make enquiries in an independent way where possible.
229
 When making a 
decision the employer must have acted in an unbiased way and not have pre-determined 
the outcome of any investigation.
230
 Predetermination of an outcome is a form of apparent 
bias.
231
 The courts have recognised, however, that in most cases it would be impossible for 
an employer not to have formed some opinion about one of their employees before any 
enquiry.
232
 Expectations of open-mindedness were therefore not as stringent in an 
employee enquiry as would, for example, be required in a court setting.
233
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Employees were generally to be treated consistently in circumstances where situations 
giving rise to disciplinary actions were similar.
234
 On the face of it, disparity of treatment 
appears to provide evidence of bias; however, in some circumstances an employer may 
have had good reason for treating employees differently. For example, an untrained 
employee who may have been unaware that their actions amounted to misconduct may be 
treated differently from a senior employee who ought to have known the consequences of 
their actions.
235
 
 
The emphasis on procedural fairness and its relationship with substantive justification has 
been the subject of much debate. Employer groups took the view that too much emphasis 
was placed on procedural fairness and the lack of consideration pertaining to contributory 
fault by the employee did not adequately redress the perceived imbalance against the 
employer created by a strict procedural fairness requirement.
236
 However, it has been well 
established in case law that procedural fairness is fundamental to the structure and well-
being of an employment relationship based on mutual trust and confidence.
237
 Despite 
arguments to the contrary by employers the Courts have often reiterated that procedural 
fairness is a right which must be adhered to. Goddard CJ has summarised the issue as:
238
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It is well recognised that a personal grievance of unjustified dismissal or other action can be 
established where there has been a failure of procedure. As this Court has held many times, it is 
wrong to say that such a failure is merely procedural for procedure is power and, in some cases, a 
deprivation of procedural rights is effectively deprivation of all rights. It is well to bear in mind that 
in a free and democratic society some of the most important rights that we possess are procedural in 
nature. Thus it is not at all surprising to see that the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 recognises 
and affirms electoral rights, and the right to minimum standards of criminal procedure and to 
justice, all of which are procedural in character. The minimum procedural requirements as laid 
down in the cases are not as rigorous as what is required of the State in conducting criminal 
prosecutions because it is recognised that an employer is entitled also to have regard to the 
employer‟s interest when conducting disciplinary processes. However, in doing so, the employer is 
required to observe elementary standards of fair process… 
 
While procedural fairness and substantive fairness may be distinguished for the purposes 
of distinct analysis, the courts have held that „there is no sharp dichotomy‟ between the 
two.
239
 
3.3.3(B) NATURAL JUSTICE IN THE EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL AND EMPLOYMENT COURT  
 
Under the Employment Contracts Act 1991 the Employment Tribunal and the Employment 
Court exercised their jurisdiction „as in equity and good conscience‟ as they saw fit.240 
Further, one of the objects of the Act was to facilitate „mutual resolution‟ of differences by 
providing „speedy, fair and just resolution of differences between parties to employment 
contracts.‟241 Section 88 of the Act required the Employment Tribunal to „act fairly‟.242 
The emphasis on legislative fairness and the case law developed under the Employment 
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Contracts Act 1991 showed that the principles of natural justice equally applied in the 
Employment Tribunal and Employment Court.
243
 
 
The equity and good conscience provision, in particular, appeared to give the Employment 
Tribunal and Employment Court more flexibility in decision making than the other civil 
courts. They were able to interpret legislation in a manner that they considered fair in the 
circumstances, provided the interpretation was not specifically inconsistent with either the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991, any other Act or any applicable employment contract. In 
the Talley Fisheries case Goddard CJ said that „highly technical grounds‟ had developed 
under the Labour Relations Act 1987 and that:
244
 
Now that these chains have been broken, it is quite plain that, wherever possible, technicalities must 
be put to one side and both the Court and the Tribunal exercising their respective jurisdictions must 
recognise that the duty which they are required to discharge is a duty to do substantial justice to the 
parties according to the real equities and merits of the cases before them. 
 
He went on to say that „equity and good conscience imports a broader view of justice and 
fairness than is comprehended by the mere enforcement of rights.‟245 An equity and good 
conscience jurisdiction was considered „unique to the employment relationship‟.246 This 
was interpreted by the courts to mean that the employment jurisdiction was not subject to 
the same constraints and technicalities as the ordinary courts.
247
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 United Food & Chemical Workers Union of NZ v Talley [1992] 1 ERNZ 756, 769. See, Hodder et al, 
Review of the Institutions and the Employment Contracts Act 1991 – The Meaning of “Unjustified 
Dismissal” (November 1997) 5; Walter Grills, „Dispute Resolution in the Employment Tribunal, Part Two: 
Adjudication‟ (1993) 18(1) Journal of Industrial Relations 84, 92–3. 
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 United Food & Chemical Workers Union of NZ v Talley [1992] 1 ERNZ 756, 769. 
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 Hodder et al, Review of the Institutions and the Employment Contracts Act 1991 – The Meaning of 
“Unjustified Dismissal” (November 1997) 5.  
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 Wellington Road Transport Union of Workers v Fletcher Construction Company Limited (1983) ERNZ 
Sel Cas 11, 14. This case was decided under the Labour Relations Act 1987 which contained the same equity 
and good conscience provision. See Hodder et al, Review of the Institutions and the Employment Contracts 
Act 1991 – The Meaning of “Unjustified Dismissal” (November 1997) 6.  
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[R]ecourse to technical language or the analogy of rules developed in conventional Courts will not 
always be particularly helpful. 
 
Despite the intention in these provisions that the Employment Tribunal would operate in a 
manner that was „more concerned with the fairness of the case, than a pedantic adherence 
to legal arguments and rules‟,248 the findings of this research and of that conducted by 
other commentators was not wholly consistent with that intention.
249
 Many of these 
commentators have said that one reason for this disparity was the complex legal process 
which developed and the increased use of legal representation, which resulted in time 
delays and increased costs.
250
 Further, while mediation assistance was encouraged, it was 
not compulsory, which meant that an opportunity to resolve personal grievances at a low-
level, low cost stage in proceedings might be lost.
251
 However mediation also had the 
potential to create further litigation over the later admissibility of evidence presented at 
mediation.
252
 
 
The above issues illustrated the tension between the Objects of the Employment Contracts 
Act 1991 and the reality of applying the legislation and the regulations to the personal 
grievance process. The Objects sections of any legislation are designed to „set the scene‟ 
and give the philosophical context of an act. Provisions in an act and any regulations made 
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 Hodder et al, Review of the Institutions and the Employment Contracts Act 1991 – The Meaning of 
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 See Chapter 8.1 for full discussion of these topics. See also, Chapters 5.4.8, 6.4.10, and 7.5.8 for findings 
on the effects of delay. 
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 Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 80, Mediation assistance. 
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 See, for example, Gray v Nelson Methodist Presbyterian Hospital Chaplaincy Committee [1995] 1 ERNZ 
672; and Turner v Wech (unreported, Employment Court, Auckland, Palmer J (AC93/98) 3 December 1998), 
although it should be noted that this latter case concerned a private mediation.  
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under it should be read in light of the Objects provisions. However, in the case of the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991, the operational sections of the Act were not always 
consistent with the principles set out in its Objects sections. They tended to be prescriptive 
and constrained the process used by the Employment Tribunal or Court when determining 
personal grievances. For example, the right to cross-examination
253
 and the right to 
representation
254
 were prescribed by legislation.
 This created a tension with the Tribunal‟s 
right, under s 88 Employment Contracts Act 1991, to set its own process, as s 88 was 
subject to other sections of the Act and any regulations made under it.
255
 The flexibility to 
alter procedure could be seen as part of natural justice, as it allowed the Employment 
Tribunal to adjust their process to accommodate such things as cultural differences or to 
assist self-represented parties.
256
 However, this freedom was clearly limited. Hughes
257
 
suggests that „formality and legalism [were] inevitable aspects of a Tribunal which [sat] 
under formal rules to hear adversarial cases brought by legally represented parties.‟ The 
90-day rule and procedural steps for lodging claims created technical obstacles for 
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 Employment Tribunal Regulations 1991, reg 49(f) – „The parties may examine, cross-examine, and re-
examine witnesses.‟ 
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 Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 59 Representation – (1) Where any Act to which this section applies 
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 See Harris BV, „Equal Access to Justice: A Constitutional Principle in Need of a Higher Profile‟ [1995] 
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claimants. The restriction on appeals to the Employment Court also meant that the 
Employment Tribunal heard more legal argument, increasing the level of formality.
258
 
 
Similarly, the equity and good conscience jurisdiction was restrained by the same 
requirement to exercise the discretion in a manner consistent with the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991, any other Act, or the relevant collective employment contract.
259
 As a 
result, the equity and good conscience jurisdiction was most often applied only in the 
award of appropriate remedies
260
 and its potential to facilitate greater access to justice was 
arguably unfulfilled. 
 
As was the case in the general courts and in an employer‟s enquiry, the principles of 
natural justice required that the Employment Tribunal and Court gave written reasons for 
their decisions. Judge Travis held in Smith v Armourguard Security
261
 that there was no 
general obligation to provide full reasons but the failure to do so might have jeopardised 
any appeal. This was supported by the statutory obligation to be fair and „may make it 
virtually essential to give reasons so that the decision cannot be regarded as arbitrary.‟262 
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Regulation 48 of the Employment Tribunal Regulations 1991 required the Employment 
Tribunal to give written reasons for its final decisions in all adjudication hearings.  
 
As well as appeal, parties dissatisfied with an Employment Tribunal or Employment Court 
decision were able to seek judicial review in the Employment Court or Court of Appeal.
263
 
3.4 SUMMARY 
 
This chapter has outlined the principles of access to justice and defined its component 
parts. Issues have also been discussed in relation to the potential links between access to 
the personal grievance adjudication procedure and whether they conflict with the 
principles of natural justice. Following chapters will discuss in some detail whether the 
personal grievance adjudication process complied with natural justice principles. Three 
different methods will be used in this thesis to determine whether the principles of natural 
justice have been complied with and whether the intentions of the government of the day 
had been met. Chapter Four will outline the methodology used to examine the whole 
process of adjudication and its impact on users.  
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 Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 105. See, for example, Bartlett v Lawson Williams Ltd (Unreported, 
Employment Court, Auckland, Finnigan J, 9 May 1997, AEC 42/97). 
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C h a p t e r  4  
METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION   
4.1.1 OVERVIEW 
 
This chapter looks at the methodology used to collect and analyse data, and the reasons 
why these methods were used to gather information. Data collection was divided into 
three sections:  
 Analysis of all 1997 personal grievance and related cost decisions was 
conducted by the creation of a database which recorded all adjudicated 
decisions for that year;  
 Interviews with the Employment Tribunal adjudicators were conducted to 
determine what their experiences had been and to ascertain their opinions 
regarding the adjudication process and its effectiveness in resolving personal 
grievances; and 
 To determine the effectiveness of the adjudication system, a survey of 
participants in 150 personal grievance cases, which were heard by the 
Employment Tribunal in 1997, was conducted.  
This chapter is structured according to these three methods of investigation, and outlines 
the methodology used. This addresses the thesis questions; to investigate the experiences 
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of participants using the personal grievance adjudication procedure, and to identify the 
effective features and negative aspects of the process.
1
 
 
As sociological methodology was new to me, I decided that a seminar should be held 
with those who possessed expertise in this area. A seminar was organised with Dr V. 
Nilakant, an expert qualitative researcher, and others from the Management Department, 
University of Canterbury. Dr Nilakant assured me that the methodology I intended to use 
was appropriate. However, he warned that there was a danger that the research could get 
out of control, and that it would be necessary to keep a tight rein on the scope of the 
investigation. Dr Nilakant‟s advice was followed by restricting the data gathering to one 
year; 1997, and restricting the topics being studied to personal grievances that were 
adjudicated under the Employment Contracts Act 1991. The reason why 1997 was 
decided as a representative year is discussed in 4.1.3 below. 
4.1.2 METHODS USED TO COLLECT DATA   
 
As I wanted to examine the experiences of people using the Employment Tribunal under 
the Employment Contracts Act 1991, it was necessary to take a flexible approach that 
involved seeking information from different sources;
2
 that is, decisions of the 
Employment Tribunal, interviews with adjudicators, and surveys of participants in 
personal grievances.  
Legal decisions and the issues that arose from them were considered, but the collection of 
data relating to the opinions of users of the system and the operation of the Employment 
Tribunal involved a more sociological approach. Thus, due to the nature of the 
                                                             
1
 For discussion on the thesis questions, see Chapter 1.1 Introduction. 
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information being studied, this thesis used both quantitative and qualitative research 
methods. Quantitative study of the data from Employment Tribunal decisions involves 
enquiring into a social or human problem by studying relationships between numeric 
variables.
3
 This generally uses a representative sample that can be generalised and 
applied to a parent population, in this case an entire year was studied rather than a 
random sample.
4
 This supports a broader perception of the Tribunal‟s decisions as a 
whole.
5
  
 
In contrast, qualitative research methods involve examining a social or human problem, 
taking a holistic approach based on recording the words and reporting the views of 
participants, conducted in a natural setting.
6
 Qualitative research therefore involves 
collecting richly detailed information from participants and using the detailed information 
collected to support and develop theories. Qualitative methods are used as a way of 
extrapolating findings or responses in relation to the theory being tested.
7
 The detailed 
interviews with Employment Tribunal adjudicators are thus an example of qualitative 
research. The qualitative analysis was used to determine what people‟s experiences had 
been. For example, adjudicators‟ opinions were being sought to identify their ideas for 
future dispute resolution procedures. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
2
 J Morris OBE, Women’s Access to Legal Services Law Commission (June 1999); K Macdonald and C 
Tipton, „Using Documents‟ in N Gilbert (ed) Researching Social Life (1993) 199. 
3
 J Creswell, Research Design (1994) 2. 
4
 J Brannen, „Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches: An Overview‟ in J Brennan (ed) Mixing 
Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Research (1995) 8. 
5
 J Creswell, Research Design (1994) 117. 
6
 Ibid 2. 
7
 J Brannen, „Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches: An Overview‟ in J Brennan (ed) Mixing 
Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Research (1995) 9.  
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Previous research undertaken in New Zealand in this area has been largely quantitative, 
and has not focussed on the perceptions of participants.
8
 My intention was to make the 
data „speak‟, that is, to concentrate on the experiences and recollections of individuals. 
Thus, people‟s perceptions of the system and the appropriateness of adjudication in 
personal grievances was an important goal of the data gathering process. Whether 
applicants and respondents were satisfied, both with the process itself and its outcome, 
were questions that had not previously been asked of participants.
9
 Also, whether or not 
counsel and advocates thought adjudication worked and how it could be improved and 
whether or not parties were satisfied with the standard of representation they received 
were significant questions to ask. Determining whether self-representatives believed that 
the process had worked for them and whether or not the adjudicators had assisted them 
adequately during the process was a question that had not previously been asked. This is 
important because it could affect access issues.  
 
Research conducted in Britain by Jill Earnshaw, under British employment legislation, 
looked at their Industrial Tribunal system.
10
 Earnshaw‟s work and examining how it had 
been conducted assisted with the development and utilisation of the system that I used. 
Earnshaw examined Industrial Tribunal Decisions, interview case studies and an analysis 
of company documentation.
11
 Earnshaw, however, concentrated on specific industries 
(hotels and catering, transport, and engineering) whereas I wished to examine personal 
                                                             
8
 R Harbridge, „Bargaining in the Employment Contracts Act: An Overview‟ in R Harbridge (ed) 
Employment Contracts” New Zealand Experiences (1993); I McAndrew, „Adjudication in the Employment 
Tribunal: Some Facts and Figures on Caseload and Representation‟ (1999) 24 NZJIR 365; Department of 
Labour, Industrial Relations Service, Survey of Labour Market Adjustment Under the Employment 
Contracts Act (August 1997).   
9
 Ibid.  
10
 J Earnshaw, J Goodman, R Harrison, M Marchington, Industrial Tribunals, Workplace Disciplinary 
Procedures and Employment Practice, Department of Trade and Industry, Employment Relations Research 
Series No. 2 (1998). 
11
 Ibid 9. 
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grievance decisions across all areas and to interview Employment Tribunal Members to 
ascertain their views. Telephone discussions with Jill Earnshaw helped to consolidate in 
my mind the approach which I had chosen to follow. 
 
Earlier researchers in Britain experienced major difficulties in accessing adjudicators 
taking part in the system.
12
 In contrast, I found the Employment Tribunal Chief and 
Members were very willing to make themselves available to participate in the research 
project. Although decisions made during mediation are privileged, as provided in the 
legislation, I had ready access to cases decided at adjudication as they were reported in 
the New Zealand Employment Tribunal Decisions.
13
 
 
I thought I would have some difficulty in setting aside my own prior assumptions about 
the adjudication process. As I had worked both for a union, and in the Public Service 
drafting employment legislation, I had very strong preconceived ideas on what was an 
appropriate method to resolve personal grievances. However, I found that I could quite 
easily set my own ideas aside when required. During the interview process with 
adjudicators my previous experience on both sides had a positive effect and enabled me 
to discuss the topics at issue easily. This first followed the analysis of the Tribunal‟s 
decisions for 1997.  
4.2.2 WHY ONE YEAR WAS SELECTED 
 
The reason one year was chosen as a representative sample was based on cost, financial 
constraints, allocation of resources, and time. As there were a considerable number of 
personal grievances which were adjudicated during the operation of the Employment 
                                                             
12
 L Dickens, M Jones, B Weekes, M Hart, Dismissed (1985). 
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Contracts Act 1991, it was impracticable study all personal grievances which had 
occurred since 1991. It was therefore more reasonable to study what had occurred during 
one year of adjudication decisions. In 1997 there were 656 decisions of the Employment 
Tribunal, 407 of which were personal grievances.
14
 By that year, all personal grievances 
that had arisen under the Labour Relations Act 1987 had been resolved. Any later year 
may have meant that the newer cases had not been decided due to the backlog of hearings 
of cases; consequently only personal grievances occurring during the operation of the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991 were considered. My research commenced prior to the 
passage of the Employment Relations Act 2000. In fact many of the cases taken in 1998 
were not resolved at the commencement of the Employment Relations Act 2000, and were 
subsequently resolved by the Employment Relations Authority, which had different 
functions. 
4.2 CASE ANALYSIS OF ALL PERSONAL GRIEVANCE AND 
RELATED COST DECISIONS ADJUDICATED IN 1997 
4.2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
To determine whether or not the adjudication system worked for those who participated 
in personal grievances in 1997, it was necessary to consider the range of parties involved 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
13
 Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 37. 
14
 Figures were obtained from Department of Labour Annual reports on the number of personal grievances 
which occurred during various years during which the Employment Contracts Act 1991 was in operation. 
The financial year for Government departments ends on 30 June so all figures for years obtained relate to 
the year ending 30 June. In 1993, the Employment Tribunal adjudicated 544 cases, 366 of which were 
personal grievances. In 1994, the Employment Tribunal heard 776 cases, 576 of which were personal 
grievances. In 1995 the Employment Tribunal heard 676 cases, 510 of which were personal grievances. In 
1996 the Employment Tribunal heard 617 cases, 442 of which were personal grievances. In 1997, the 
Employment Tribunal heard 580 cases, 404 of which were personal grievances. In 1998 the Employment 
Tribunal heard 815 cases, 470 of which were personal grievances. In 1999 the Employment Tribunal heard 
873 cases, 517 of which were personal grievances. In 2000 the Employment Tribunal heard 998 cases, 603 
of which were personal grievances. Since 1998 the figures obtained from the Department of Labour Annual 
Reports do not differentiate between substantive hearings and decisions on costs. The 407 personal 
 171 
in personal grievances: their gender, location, type of occupation, nature of representation 
and remedies sought and granted. To assist with answering the research questions by 
interpreting the information contained in decided personal grievance decisions a database 
which examined all the relevant decisions of that year was established.  
 
My previous background as a union advocate and public service manager and solicitor 
helped me to determine what some of the issues were for participants in personal 
grievances. For example, I was aware that for female applicants the issues raised would 
be different from males, and the cost involved for both genders could have a huge impact 
on whether or not a case was taken in the first place. Many employees were scared of the 
legal process, even to the extent of not wishing to take a personal grievance under the old 
Labour Relations Act 1987. Consequently, when a more formal adjudication process was 
introduced under the Employment Contracts Act 1991, it was more likely that employees 
would have been reluctant to bring a claim due to the nature of the procedure itself and 
potential costs incurred. My experience in the public service through involvement with 
drafting the Employment Contracts Act 1991, personal grievance decisions, and ongoing 
contact with union officials and representatives ensured that my familiarity of the 
political and access issues remained current. I was very aware, both from lobbyists and 
from the writing of professionals of the day, what many of the issues in reaction to the 
Employment Contacts Act 1991 were. These factors helped me to determine what 
information was pertinent to obtain from the cases. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
grievance and related costs decisions recorded on my database relate to the year of decisions recorded in 
Employment Tribunal reports.  
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4.2.2 METHOD 
4.2.2 (A) MICROSOFT ACCESS DATABASE 1 
 
The Microsoft Access database programme was used to record all the Employment 
Tribunal personal grievance and related costs decisions of 1997. Access was chosen as it 
was compatible with Zoom text, a programme for enlarging print that I used. Further, 
Access can be used for the production of statistical information derived from the 
database. I originally devised twenty-six data categories for each case. The data 
categories were later refined to ensure that appropriate information could be collected.
15
  
 
The first issue with creating the database was to determine what factors I wished to 
highlight from each decision. Of particular interest, for example, were the types of 
occupations that may have tended to reappear; the question being whether particular 
types of workers employed in certain occupations were likely to reappear as grievants. It 
is possible that particular industries were more susceptible to personal grievances being 
taken against them either due to the nature of the industry or industrial relations practices 
within either the company or industry.  
 
There were problems with establishing the database. The computer company that helped 
set up the database, Pulse Data International, was familiar with using the Access 
programme, but only in relation to using it for the collection of marketing and sales data. 
As I am a person with a significant vision impairment, problems arose when it was 
discovered that Access was not capable of working effectively with my talking computer 
programme, JAWS. This therefore meant relying on visual display, which caused 
practical difficulties with the layout and volume of information; moving data around the 
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database was not an easy task. During the Christmas period, when the Law Department‟s 
computer system was being altered, approximately 110 case entries with all the 
component details were lost from the database and required re-entering, a time 
consuming process as it meant rereading all 110 cases and re-entering the relevant 
information from them. This was a good lesson in the need to back up all important data 
and documents! As I experienced many practical problems with Access due to the 
manner in which the information was presented on the screen, I required constant help 
with entering the information on to the database, a process that caused considerable 
personal irritation. Information presented in narrow columns can be very difficult to 
discern for a person with a vision disability. Although the new version of JAWS will 
speak out the information on the screen, it is very hard to follow as it is unable to read 
across the screen in a meaningful manner. This therefore meant relying on a research 
worker to assist with this process which caused some personal anxiety to me as I am not 
comfortable having to rely on others for assistance. Further assistance was required to 
transfer data into the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) for further 
statistical analysis of key relationships.   
 
There were further difficulties related to reading the actual decisions. The Employment 
Tribunal produced no template for adjudicators on how to write decisions. Consequently, 
decisions were written differently depending on which adjudicator had written them. The 
Chief of the Tribunal‟s view of this was that adjudicators occupied senior positions and 
should all be capable of writing their decisions in a clear manner without a template.
16
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 See Appendix 1. 
16
 Personal correspondence with Alistair Dumbleton, Chief of the Employment Tribunal, 31 October 2004. 
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4.2.3 ANALYSIS 
 
The reason for conducting the analysis of cases was to attempt to determine which factors 
affected the procedure of cases and their outcomes. It was significant to analyse what 
type of employee took a personal grievance, their occupation, gender, what area they 
lived in, how they were represented and the consequent outcome of the case. Another 
factor which may have affected the nature of the claim and how much was sought and 
granted could have depended on the type of representation provided. The impact of costs 
sought and granted could likewise have influenced the rationality of claims made. Further 
questions to consider related to the types of occupational class that employees belonged 
to; who had more propensity to take a personal grievance?  
 
The questions asked from the analysis of cases in 1997 arose from the nature of the 
research topic itself and had direct links between access to justice, affordability and ease 
of process of adjudication. The questions also arose from my personal experience of 
adjudication itself and from issues raised generally by participants on both sides of the 
personal grievance resolution process.  
4.2.3 (A) TABLES 
 
Due to the large scope of these variables, the most illustrative way of recording 
information was by using tables. To understand what might influence the outcome for 
each case, it was necessary to construct a series of questions which focussed on 
component variables in each decision. In order to the do this, the following categories 
were constructed to derive the most useful information from each decision: type of 
personal grievance, location, gender of parties, type of representation, remedies sought 
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and granted, costs sought and granted, availability of legal aid, delay and other procedural 
issues.  
Within this framework, a further distinction was made between types of employees. To 
illustrate this distinction, the method of categorising employees was that used by the New 
Zealand census.
17
 As a result of questions asked from each decision it was possible to 
determine which class of employee took more personal grievances, where they came 
from, what their representation was and outcomes obtained. Individually, the factors 
listed above may have had little or some impact on the outcome of a personal grievance, 
however, linkages made between the variable factors was of more significance. These 
relationships are outlined in the tables of Chapter Five. For example, did a professional 
public service female union member have more likelihood of obtaining a satisfactory 
remedy than a general male worker employee from Auckland? If it could not be said that 
all female employees were more likely to succeed than all male employees, was there a 
combination of other factors which impacted on the outcome of the personal grievance.  
 
Note that due to sample size and nature of the information collected, figures in all tables 
have been rounded, therefore in some instances figures may not necessarily total 100 
percent. In some instances there may also be missing data which was not recorded in 
personal grievance decisions. For this reason total sample size is not always 407. In cases 
where the sample size does not total 407 for a significant reason, this is discussed in the 
accompanying text. In order to gain the maximum statistical understanding of the tables 
in Chapter Five a statistician was consulted who indicated that significance testing and 
regression analysis contributed little to the analysis of the data as while some results 
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could be generalized to larger populations i.e., of significance less than .05, few of the 
relationships had strong correlations i.e., the value of Somer‟s d was often close to zero – 
a relationship of less than .3 would be considered weak.  
4.3 INTERVIEWS WITH EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL 
ADJUDICATORS 
 
4.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This section outlines how the process of interviewing Employment Tribunal adjudicators 
was devised, and considers the issues involved with establishing an appropriate list of 
questions for interviewees. Adjudicators were asked whether they thought that the system 
under which the Employment Tribunal operated was appropriate and fair, and if not, what 
would a suitable alternative be? Much criticism was made by researchers on the 
procedures contained in the Employment Contracts Act 1991, but the views of 
adjudicators have never been sought, although some of them have written on the topic in 
various articles.
18
 
 
Although sociological approaches to narratives in interviews are becoming more 
common, this was not the focus of this PhD as answers to specific questions were also 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
17
 However, the NZ census classifications cross-cut industry, so there are important sectoral groups not 
revealed by this categorization; for example the health sector. For those who are interested in particular 
sectors, refer to Appendix IX where tables with this analysis are presented.  
18
 W R C Gardiner, „The Employment Tribunal: A Report From The Trenches‟ (1998); I McAndrew, 
„Adjudication in the Employment Tribunal: Some Facts and Figures on Caseload and Representation‟ 
(1999) 24 NZJIR 365. 
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being sought. There was therefore to some extent a cross-over between qualitative and 
quantitative research methods.
19
  
 
The interviews were conducted in early 2001. Although the passing of five years (since 
1997) could possibly have had an impact on the accuracy of the responses through 
selective recollection, the purpose of the interviews was not to inquire into an individual 
case but to understand more about the process of decision making. It is important to note 
that the personal grievance procedure remained operational until 2000. General attitudes 
and impressions of those who had experienced the adjudication process were sought, 
either as applicant, respondent, representative or adjudicator. What was most valued was 
their perceptions of the adjudication process itself, which remained in operational until 
after 2000 to deal with the backlog of personal grievance claims.
20
 It was therefore 
reasonable to assume that due to the substantial backlog of personal grievance claims 
under the old legislation, many of the adjudicators interviewed would still be using the 
old system. It was explained to those who used the system in their professional capacity 
that any survey or interview sought their generalized views of the system and not their 
perceptions of individual cases. When considering how to analyse the data from 
participants in the personal grievance process and where they fitted into the operation of 
personal grievances, the approach by Marc Galanter was considered. In respect of the 
parties as „one shotters‟, in the terms of Galanter, the engagement with the tribunal 
system was more likely than not to have been a significant event in the participants‟ lives 
and in consequence their impressions of the system are unlikely to have significantly 
                                                             
19
 This is explained in more detail below in 4.3.2. 
20
 Section 249 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 stated that it would remain in operation until all 
personal grievance decisions lodged under the old legislation had been heard by the Employment 
Tribunal.  
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diminished.
21
 The procedural familiarity of repeat participants compensates for loss of 
detail over time. Research into the nature of memory indicates that all people will 
remember less detail over time and the details they remember will relate to what they 
think was important during the period since the initial event – memories that are 
rehearsed and stay relevant to key interests will be retained. This makes the data harder to 
analyse and conclusions are speculative rather than identifying systematic differences 
within the groups.
22
 The use of cases from 1997 was merely a sampling device to ensure 
a manageable amount of data was collected within the limited of a PhD thesis. Data from 
the 1997 cases could not be linked to comments by adjudicators or participants in the 
survey for reasons of confidentiality. 
4.3.1(A) CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
I considered that it was essential that adjudicators could trust me. If they did not, they 
would be unwilling to participate openly and provide the sort of information I was 
seeking. Adjudicators were open and happy to talk on an anonymous basis; it was 
therefore necessary for me to assure them that confidentiality would be maintained. I did 
this in writing, but also at the time of the interviews. Many adjudicators showed some 
concern that comments they made would not be linked to them personally. One reason 
why adjudicators sought assurance about confidentiality related to previous research that 
they had participated in. Previous comments made by particular adjudicators, they stated, 
had been included in papers and linked to particular adjudicators. A further concern was 
that comments previously made had been revealed at a conference and linked to 
                                                             
21
 Marc Galanter, „Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of Legal Change‟ (1974) 
9 Law & Society Review 95–160.  
22
 B A Misztal, Theories of Social Remembering (2003), 53. 
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particular individuals. I reassured adjudicators that I would not link comments to a 
particular person.  
4.3.1(B) CREDIBILITY 
 
I felt happy about people asking questions regarding the research itself. I was able to 
discuss how I had devised the study and what I would do with the information they 
provided. I also explained that the interviews themselves were raising new issues that I 
would like to research further in the future. Many adjudicators felt happy about 
discussing with me what other areas they thought were worth researching and how to 
develop the current study further. 
 
My experience working for a union and working for the Public Service provided me with 
some credibility. I knew adjudicators from a union background as I had worked with 
them; likewise, I had also met many of the adjudicators who had an employer-based 
background in my work in the public service. As many of the adjudicators were former 
lawyers, my experience as a lawyer in the Public Service lent credibility to the study.  
 
The study also gained credibility by discussions between adjudicators. Those who had 
been interviewed passed on the news to future interviewees. The support I had from the 
Chief of the Employment Tribunal also provided my work with credibility. Alistair 
Dumbleton, the Chief of the Tribunal, sent letters to all adjudicators supporting the 
research and encouraging them to participate in it. This therefore opened the door to 
ensuring that adjudicators would be willing to take part in the process. However, it should 
be stated here, that one adjudicator was not willing to participate in the interview process. 
That adjudicator advised that the process had taken too long and that now they were a 
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member of the new Employment Relations Authority. As a result, the adjudicator did not 
want to look back to their time with the Employment Tribunal. I was also able to 
determine through discussions with that adjudicator that a further reason why they were 
not enthusiastic about participating was due to information being revealed after 
participation in previous research. 
4.3.2 METHOD 
 
The nature of the thesis questions and the issues which arose from them largely 
determined the methodological approach adopted. When holding discussions with 
adjudicators, it was anticipated from personal experience of discussions with individuals 
and from political knowledge of the issues concerned that adjudicators would feel happier 
if they were given the opportunity to talk freely, and hence a more qualitative approach 
was taken to the interviews to allow for this, and for the maximum amount of information 
to be obtained. However, some of the questions which needed to be asked to determine 
the amount of, for example, time spent on administrative matters, were short and very 
straightforward. It was possible to illustrate the responses to such questions most 
effectively using tables. This combination of qualitative and quantitative methods has 
already been discussed by experts in the area and shows that a mixture of methods may 
illustrate more accurately the true nature of a situation which includes a variety of 
participants and a range of data to be examined.
23
 As Elliott explains: 
…it is not necessarily the case that qualitative material will be interpreted and presented in a 
textual form and conversely that quantitative material will be analysed solely using statistical 
techniques… This means there is already some blurring at the boundaries between the two clusters 
of techniques… In practice, researchers rarely make explicit the philosophy that lies behind the 
methods they choose and this is particularly true of those who adopt a quantitative approach. 
Rather, decisions about the techniques that will be adopted to answer a particular research question 
are more likely to be a product of the researcher‟s own expertise and a notion of the appropriate 
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way of gaining relevant evidence or data about a particular substantive question.
24
 (emphasis in 
original). 
4.3.2 (A) HOW THE QUESTIONS WERE FORMULATED 
 
The questions were formulated from the information that was contained on the database. 
Issues began to appear from the information that had been collected, including the 
standard of representation, the level of compensation awarded and costs. Chapter Two 
also provided ideas for formulating questions, particularly in relation to the political 
development of the system.  
 
Adjudicators‟ opinions had not previously been obtained in research conducted by 
others.
25
 I was therefore very curious to find out what adjudicators‟ views of the process 
were, whether it worked, and if not what would be an appropriate alternative.  
 
The questions were divided into five categories: process, types of action, parties, 
representation, and costs. The adjudication process itself was considered a significant 
area about which to ask questions as the nature of the procedure could have proved to be 
a barrier to accessing the system. Bearing in mind the political rhetoric that occurred 
during the passage of the Employment Contracts Bill, whether the legislation had fulfilled 
the political aspirations of its proponents had to be examined.
26
 It was also useful to try 
and determine whether or not the process contained in the Act actually worked for all 
parties. I was interested in the effects the type of action or the occupation and background 
of the applicant or respondent had on the attitude and manner in which adjudicators 
operated. I wanted to know whether or not the manner in which the parties operated 
affected how cases were heard, and what adjudicators‟ attitudes were towards the parties. 
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For example, was there a perceived power imbalance between the parties and if so, how 
was this remedied? It was possible that the occupation of an applicant or respondent 
could have affected how the adjudicator conducted the proceedings.  
 
Adjudicators may also have had varying perceptions over the expertise of representatives. 
For example, were counsel more skilled in presentation style and content than advocates? 
The presentation standard may have affected the attitude of the adjudicator. I investigated 
whether the cost involved in bringing a personal grievance was a barrier to taking a case. 
The costs included representation costs, lodging fees, time, and possible costs awarded 
against the unsuccessful party. The level of potential costs could act as a barrier to 
applicants taking a claim of personal grievance. Which issues adjudicators took into 
account when awarding costs were relevant questions. It was important to determine what 
approach was being taken and whether or not adjudicators were following case law or 
applying their own interpretation as to how the legal position should be interpreted.  
 
In the case of self-representatives, I wanted to know whether adjudicators thought it was 
fair that self-represented parties could not claim for the cost of their time, whereas 
executive time can be awarded to parties who are represented by in-house representatives.  
 
In cases where a party brought a case without much merit and was subsequently 
penalised by costs being awarded against them, was this seen as restricting access to 
justice on the whim of the adjudicator, or was the award of costs in this type of case 
determined solely by the application of legal principles? Likewise, frivolous and trivial 
cases could have proved a barrier for some parties. That is, a case could have been 
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thrown out by an adjudicator who decided that the case was frivolous or trivial without 
understanding the significance of particular issues to the individual parties involved. 
Consequently, as the adjudicator considered the case to be either frivolous or trivial, an 
independent adjudicator may never have heard the case and some parties may have felt 
that they had been denied access to justice.  
 
A further issue was whether those being assisted by legal aid were treated differently to 
other parties either prior to or during the adjudication hearing. Were there cases where 
adjudicators had awarded costs against a legally aided person due to exceptional 
circumstances? Adjudicators were asked whether they thought that this was a fair 
principle, and if not, what an appropriate alternative would be.  
4.3.2(B) TRIAL INTERVIEW 
 
A trial interview was conducted to ensure that the right types of questions were 
formulated and asked, and to confirm the responses obtained covered the areas of interest. 
The questions here were divided into five broad areas: process, types of action, parties, 
representation, and costs. The trial interview questions are attached as Appendix 2. In the 
process section, the questions were designed to discover how adjudicators themselves 
viewed the procedure and whether or not it was effective. The second block of questions 
related to the types of action being heard and whether or not this had a direct effect on the 
adjudicator hearing the case. The third block of questions related to the parties 
themselves, who they were, what their occupation was, their gender and so on, to 
determine whether or not these factors had an effect on how parties were viewed by 
adjudicators. The fourth block of questions related to representation, whether or not the 
parties were represented, who by, or if they were self-represented whether this had an 
effect on how the adjudicator conducted the proceedings and viewed the substance of the 
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case. The fifth block of questions related to costs, the first series of questions relating to 
whether or not the cost of bringing a personal grievance was a barrier to justice. The 
questions then focussed on the award of costs against parties to a personal grievance and 
discussed the impact which legal aid would have had in these cases. 
  
After determining the questions to ask, a trial interview was conducted with one of the 
Christchurch adjudicators. The adjudicator in question was very helpful, open and willing 
to participate in the trial. After the interview, the questions were reformulated; some 
deleted, and additions and amendments made to achieve greater clarity and precision.
27
 
When the main bulk of adjudicators were interviewed, I re-interviewed the person who 
had participated in the trial to ask any amended questions.  
4.3.2(C) HOW THE INTERVIEWS WERE ORGANISED    
 
The Chief of the Employment Tribunal supplied a list of all adjudicators/mediators 
holding a dual warrant, who decided cases in 1997. An initial letter, together with the 
study proposal was forwarded to all adjudicators inviting them to participate in the 
research. Unfortunately, some adjudicators could not be reached as they had already left 
New Zealand to work in Australia. Follow-up letters were sent to all adjudicators in New 
Zealand attempting to establish interview times. This process was largely unproductive as 
few adjudicators responded to the letters. 
 
Telephone contact was then made with all three Employment Tribunal offices in an 
attempt to set up interview times. Office staff were sometimes unhelpful as they stated 
that they were not in a position to set dates and times as the adjudicators might be taking 
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part in hearings. It was therefore often necessary to talk to the adjudicators directly to 
give them a choice of times and to avoid the setting of interview slots at times when a 
hearing was taking place.  
 
Copies of the questions were forwarded to adjudicators prior to the interview taking 
place. As there were a significant number of questions, some of which required some 
detailed consideration, it was essential to enable participants to prepare for the interviews 
and to allow them to answer the questions comprehensively.  
 
It was possible for me to set up interviews in Auckland and Wellington over a four-day 
period in each location. In Christchurch, I conducted the interviews at the Christchurch 
Employment Tribunal Office, and one adjudicator came to my office to be interviewed. 
There were some complications involved with the Dunedin interviews. Dates and times 
were established, however, close to the interview times, their secretary rang to advise that 
the two adjudicators had been required to attend a conference at the interview time. It was 
therefore necessary to conduct telephone interviews with the Dunedin adjudicators. A 
telephone interview was also conducted with one of the Wellington adjudicators. On the 
date of the prearranged interview, it was necessary for the adjudicator to attend an 
emergency mediation, consequently, the interview had to be rearranged. In this instance 
the interview progressed smoothly as the adjudicator had previously prepared written 
responses. However, there was a complication with one of the telephone interviews 
where the conversation was taped by attaching a microphone to the telephone. As there 
was a computer turned on in my office, this created strong interference making it 
impossible to clearly hear the adjudicator‟s comments. Consequently, the telephone 
interview had to be repeated. Luckily, the adjudicator in question did not object to this 
process and the second running of the interview passed very smoothly. 
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News of what had happened with telephone interviews, and how things had progressed in 
other areas was passed on between adjudicators throughout the country. Consequently, I 
found that when I travelled to a new location, adjudicators who I had not met before 
knew quite a lot about me and the progress of the interviews. Adjudicators were very 
friendly and helpful and what had occurred in previous interviews appeared to encourage 
adjudicators to participate freely. 
 
In all locations, the interviews were conducted in small interview or meeting rooms. In 
one location, a suggestion was made that the interviews take place in an open plan office. 
As the interviews were being taped, this would not have been a suitable option. As a 
result, interviews were either conducted in the office of the adjudicator, or in a meeting 
room that had previously been organised by the office staff. Surroundings were always 
comfortable and relaxed, with cups of tea, coffee and biscuits being provided, which 
assisted with encouraging the participants to feel at ease and respond to questions freely. 
On one occasion a maintenance worker had to conduct work in the office we had been 
meeting in; it was therefore necessary to shift to another office.  
4.3.2(D) TAPING OF INTERVIEWS 
 
All interviews, whether conducted face to face or by telephone, were taped. It was 
considered that as the adjudicators were accustomed to having their hearings taped, there 
would be no objections to this process; it would be easier for the participants to forget 
that taping was taking place and speak freely.  
 
As I am a person with a significant vision impairment, the alternative to taping would 
have been to take a lap top computer to the interviews. As the computer has a large print 
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display, this could have been disruptive to the progress of the interview and may have 
caused participants to hesitate to watch what was being written. A further complication 
could have been a restriction on the speed and coherence of the interview. It was likely 
that adjudicators would speak more slowly, despite my fast typing speed, to ensure that I 
was keeping up with their comments.  
 
I offered to return the tapes to adjudicators once they had been transcribed, however no 
one took up that offer. I assured all adjudicators that the tapes would not be broadcast or 
passed to any other person, except the person who was transcribing the tapes.  
 
Transcription of the tapes was a time consuming process. One adjudicator normally used 
one ninety-minute tape. However, in two instances the adjudicators used more than one 
tape. Each tape took many hours to transcribe and some adjudicators were more difficult 
to transcribe than others. Those who stuck to the format of the questions were easier, but 
sometimes, they jumped back to previous questions, and included material that had not 
been covered in the questions. The transcription was carried out partly by myself, and by 
two research assistants, one of whom had a keen interest in the topic. 
 
I did not discourage interviewees from deviating from the questions and often it was 
necessary to bring them back to the topic later on. I considered their experiences and 
perspectives on varying employment and legal issues to be of value, and therefore I 
participated in discussions with them on matters that the interviewees raised even though 
these matters had not been included in the list of questions. I did not discourage 
interviewees from straying from the particular question in hand, provided they eventually 
answered what had been asked. This additional, opportunistic information was of great 
value and is one of the advantages of face-to-face interview methods.  
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In addition to the interviews, two adjudicators provided written answers to the questions, 
and one also forwarded a written response by email. Most adjudicators had prepared their 
responses and had taken considerable time to fully consider their answers. Adjudicators 
were generally very open in their approach to me and one actually stated that the process 
was therapeutic. Adjudicators were pleased that somebody was interested in their opinion 
and happy that somebody was taking the trouble to seek their views.  
4.3.3 ANALYSIS 
4.4.3 (A) NUD*IST 
 
When the information had been gathered, I decided to use the NUD*IST programme to 
assist with analysing the data collected. NUD*IST is an acronym for „Non-numerical 
Unstructured Data Indexing, Searching and Theorising‟ and was created by QSR 
International.
28
 This system was developed at La Trobe University in Melbourne, for 
interactive, qualitative analysis. By coding key words or phrases, this system allows 
qualitative data to be content analysed. 
 
Due to past experience in the area of analysing large amounts of detailed information, 
Co-supervisor Dr Ramzi Addison suggested that NUD*IST would be the most 
appropriate tool to categorise and analyse the data. An alternative programme which was 
considered for data analysis was ATLAS/TI. This programme had similar qualities to 
NUD*IST, however it was discovered that ATLAS/TI was not appropriate for the task 
required. 
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Using NUD*IST was a challenge. Neither my Research Assistant nor I had any previous 
experience of using NUD*IST or any similar type of programme. Dr Addison had 
experience in this respect and he was able to provide initial information on how the 
programme worked. There was a tutorial programme provided with NUD*IST which did 
provide some assistance at the outset. It was difficult to determine exactly how NUD*IST 
operated but trial and error provided some answers and ideas on how to use NUD*IST 
more effectively. The difficulties I experienced when attempting to use NUD*IST related 
to how the information was presented on the screen. As with Access this caused major 
problems with JAWS, which had difficulty reading the data. Zoom Text, the enlarging 
programme, simply did not work with NUD*IST, and the whole system shut down. It 
was therefore necessary for me to attempt to build a picture in my head of what was on 
the screen as I didn‟t have any real access to what was there. The difficulties for my 
research assistant related to the tutorial not being terribly explicit. It was difficult to 
determine what was meant and basically the learning process was a series of attempts to 
use the system. The research assistant who dealt with NUD*IST was very aware that 
computer expertise was not her main strength. She took the view that there were many 
tasks that it was necessary for us to perform manually which it may have been possible to 
achieve in a more efficient way. However, the information provided with the programme 
was not explicit enough for inexperienced users and the research assistant concerned did 
not have that degree of expertise in using this type of computer programme. Her strengths 
lay more in the legal research, analysis and editing areas.  
 
One of the first tasks was to import all the information from the interviews with 
Employment Tribunal adjudicators into NUD*IST and build up an index tree. It was a 
considerable task importing the information from the interviews into the tree and 
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breaking it down into particular categories. The interviews themselves had five categories 
of questions that were then further subdivided into their individual questions. For 
example all the answers from all adjudicators to Category 1 which related to process were 
all grouped together. Hence all the individual answers to question 1.1 comprised one 
branch of the tree. This process was used for all five categories of questions and the 
answers to all questions were grouped together.  
 
One major difficulty using NUD*IST was that we did not really know how to use the 
coding system effectively. Lots of the information was therefore added in manually on 
the computer rather than utilising automatic coding techniques. It is likely that automatic 
coding techniques would have been a quicker and more effective method of undertaking 
this task but unfortunately we were unfamiliar with their use. However, although there 
were some difficulties using NUD*IST, useful information was collated. Illustrative 
quotes were grouped together for use in various chapters and information which may 
have been qualitative in nature, in some instances data was presented in quantitative 
format. For example many adjudicators made the same statements and answers to 
qualitative questions and these were counted and presented as percentages.  
4.4 SURVEYS OF PARTICIPANTS IN PERSONAL GRIEVANCES 
4.4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
It was decided to survey the participants and their representatives in 150 personal 
grievances adjudicated in 1997.  
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4.4.2 SURVEY SAMPLE 
 
It was decided to survey 150 cases, a representative sample of 407 personal grievance 
decisions. Of 407 cases, the percentage of decisions in each region was determined. The 
Tribunal‟s jurisdiction was divided into four regions: Auckland, Hamilton, Wellington, 
and Christchurch. However, the Tribunal also had an office and conducted hearings in 
Dunedin. On some occasions, hearings were held in areas where the Tribunal had no 
offices, for example, Gisborne and Greymouth. Of the 407 personal grievances, 45 
percent were heard in Auckland, 23 percent in Christchurch, 20 percent in Wellington, 
nine percent in Hamilton, and three percent in Dunedin. To survey, for example, the 
participants in 50 personal grievances in each of the three areas of jurisdiction would not 
have been representative. Therefore, the sample of 150 personal grievances translated 
into 67 cases to be surveyed from Auckland; 14 from Hamilton; 30 from Wellington; 34 
from Christchurch; and five from Dunedin.  
 
The survey forms were divided into categories: employer, employee, representatives for 
both parties, and self-representatives. Different questions were devised for all parties, as 
it was important to obtain the varying perceptions of the effectiveness of the system.
29
 
 
The selection process initially involved identifying the parties from every second 
personal grievance case from the database, in each geographical area, and surveying all 
participants. It was decided to survey the participants in every second case as this 
involved surveying a representative sample of the total number of parties to personal 
grievances. Further, although the School of Law University of Canterbury agreed to 
cover the cost of forwarding the information to the participants selected, however the cost 
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of surveying the participants in all 407 cases would have been prohibitive. A further 
constraint was the clerical time that would have been involved in locating the participants 
in all personal grievances from 1997. Already, the clerical cost involved in locating the 
participants in 150 personal grievances was substantial. The initial system devised proved 
to be unsatisfactory, as in many instances it was not possible to locate a sufficient number 
of participants. In cases where either the Applicant or Respondent could not be traced, it 
was decided to survey parties from the next case on the database. In Christchurch and 
Wellington parties frequently had to be identified from all cases as there was an 
insufficient number of participants to survey using the previous formula. In particular, it 
proved most difficult to find a sufficient number of representatives to survey. In 
Christchurch and Wellington there were not enough numbers of advocates, union 
advocates and counsel to be surveyed. In Christchurch the surveyable number of 
representatives was short of seven representatives and three short in Wellington. This 
problem was primarily a result of a shortage of employment law specialists; many 
representatives appear in more than one case. Although the number of representatives 
was slightly below what was ideal, it nevertheless represented the true nature of 
representation factors in the geographical area concerned. 
 
Locating the addresses and the correct identity of participants proved to be expensive in 
clerical time. In almost all cases, at least four parties had to be located. They were: 
applicant, respondent, two representatives and self-representatives. In locating the parties, 
the sources utilised were: online telephone directory;
30
 yellow pages;
31
 online UBD 
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Business Directory;
32
 Companies Office website;
33
 Legal Services Directory;
34
 and the 
Electoral Roll.
35
 
 
However, in some instances the sources used, whilst providing names and addresses and 
in the case of the Electoral roll occupation of individuals, were inadequate to locate the 
precise person required. For example, in Hamilton there were 12 E Jones, most of whom 
had retired. It was therefore almost impossible to locate the correct E Jones without 
having to correspond with all 12 E Jones, a time consuming, expensive, and logistically 
difficult process. If there were a few people with the same initials, name, and similar type 
of occupation, contact was made with all individuals with the same name. It was a strong 
possibility that the correct party would have been located. In one case, the incorrect 
person had been surveyed. However, the person was interested in the topic and still 
wanted to take part in the survey. As their personal grievance had occurred after 1997 it 
was not possible to include their comments.   
 
Further difficulties occurred in locating the correct participants including: people not 
listing their number in the telephone book; people moving either around the country or 
overseas; and companies ceasing to trade.  
  
The survey was conducted by post, as to interview the number of participants involved 
would have been an enormous task. All parties in 150 cases were contacted, as well as 
their representatives. Those being surveyed were sent pre-paid envelopes to encourage 
them to reply. This survey was primarily quantitative in nature as it was asking specific 
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short-answer questions of the parties which were related to their own views and 
experiences of using the personal grievance system. Some of the survey questions, 
however, did ask for opinions, which encouraged more detailed responses.
36
 Response 
rates were variable, with only representatives returning enough questionnaires for firm 
conclusions to be drawn and further statistical analysis was inappropriate. 
4.4.3 ANALYSIS 
4.4.3 (A) MICROSOFT ACCESS DATABASE 2 
 
 
A second database was established to record and collate the results from the survey of 
participants in personal grievances. Creating the new database was a swift learning 
experience for myself and for my research assistant, as at the time there was little 
information available in either the Law Library, or any other University Libraries, on the 
creation of a database like this using Microsoft Access. Establishment of the new 
database was therefore a series of trial and error experiments. When the information on 
Microsoft Access did become available the creation of the new system moved more 
smoothly. 
Ultimately, all the information collected on the survey response forms was recorded on to 
four new databases, initially using the questions from the survey forms and then 
exploring the issues that arose. The smaller databases related to each group of 
participants: employer; employee; representatives; and self-representatives.  
 
While Microsoft Access is very useful for deriving statistical data there were some 
difficulties when attempting to measure responses to questions that were more qualitative 
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in nature. As far as possible these responses were divided into similar groups and to some 
extent statistical data obtained. It was decided, however, that comments which 
individuals made were very significant, they brought the survey to life and made it 
possible to examine peoples‟ experiences and what they thought of the adjudication 
process. These comments were recorded and collated on Access and where possible 
responses that contained similar comments or views were grouped together. Quotes from 
individual survey participants will be used in Chapter Seven to illustrate conclusions 
drawn from survey information. Since one of the aims of this survey was to give “lay” 
participants in the process an opportunity to present their perspectives on the data this has 
been reported in full in spite of the limitations to conclusions created by the low response 
rates.  
 
4.5 SUMMARY 
 
Information was acquired from different sources and using different methods of 
collection. This is an example of triangulation, where different methods are used to study 
the same object of enquiry, or more than one method of data collection is used.
37
 This 
process of triangulation enhances the validity of findings and meant that the data was 
being examined from a variety of angles
38
 allowing varying attitudes to be included in the 
data collection and reasons for consistencies and inconsistencies in experiences across 
groups to be examined.
39
 Exploratory topics of study such as this are suitable for using 
more than one method of investigation. Different types of information were being sought 
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from all parties taking part in the process leading to differences in method depending on 
the source of the information and whether it required one word answers or ticking an 
appropriate box, or was more exploratory and required the respondent to express an 
opinion. The sequential process (secondary data analysis preceded the interactive data 
collection) shaped the whole: some of the original intentions were unable to be met 
because of technical problems such as limitations of the files analysed or by the response 
rates to the sampling strategy. The combination of both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches was therefore a mechanism to provide an overall picture of the adjudication 
process from different angles and perspectives but the sheer size and complexity of the 
data collection and analysis meant that some of the strategies by which problems could be 
solved were not available.
40
  
 
This overview of the study methodology has stated how the data collection was 
organised, the creation of the database that involved the recording of all personal 
grievance and related costs decisions of 1997, interviews with Employment Tribunal 
Adjudicators, and surveys of the participants in 150 personal grievances adjudicated in 
1997. The chapter then examined the methods used to collect data and detailed the 
process involved with the establishment of the database, the interviews with Employment 
Tribunal Adjudicators, and surveys of participants in personal grievances. The chapter 
has therefore detailed the procedures used and hurdles that arose during the collection of 
data. Although some of these hurdles, such as obtaining high response rates on the survey 
of 150 participants in personal grievance decisions to the Tribunal, have limited the 
analysis of some of the data collected the data is available to guide further research. 
Missing data in the 407 cases from 1997 limited analysis but collecting data from a far 
                                                             
40
 A Bryman, „Quantitative and Qualitative Research: Further Reflections on Their Integration‟ in J 
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smaller range of variables from more than one year may improve the ability to examine 
relationships between some of the variables of interest over time. Breaking data 
collection down into specific questions for the adjudicators based on the case data and 
previous research and experience proved acceptable to people with legal backgrounds. 
This was more manageable than designing and analyzing semi-structured interviews. 
Some of the analysis features of NUD*IST were virtually impossible to use for someone 
without full vision. Use of tables gave continuity across the chapters and supported the 
qualitative analysis in Chapter Six. In retrospect, it became clearer that these problems 
have limited the extent to which it has been possible to realize some of the advantages of 
triangulation of data sources. However, the thesis was designed to be exploratory in the 
main with the results used to develop theory rather than test hypotheses. The aim was to 
build theory which, if necessary, could be statistically tested by a person with greater 
understanding of statistical methods and this has been achieved. 
 
Following chapters will examine conclusions drawn from the original database, details of 
interviews with Employment Tribunal adjudicators and their views on the operation of 
the Employment Tribunal adjudication system and findings from surveys. What an ideal 
system would be will also be discussed in later chapters.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Brannen (ed) Mixing Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Research (1995) 60. 
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C h a p t e r 5 
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL PERSONAL GRIEVANCE 
DECISIONS FOR 1997 
 
5.1 OVERVIEW 
 
Chapter Five examines objective data extracted from all 407 Employment Tribunal 
personal grievance and related costs decisions heard in 1997.
1
 The chapter describes the 
database that was constructed to record this information and discusses relevant factors 
arising from the information gained, conclusions that may be drawn, and identifies 
potential problem areas for participants who used the personal grievance procedure. 
Where appropriate, it has also been useful to include quotes and information obtained 
from interviews with Employment Tribunal Members. While Chapter Six examines the 
interviews and related issues in depth, in some circumstances adjudicator‟s comments 
have assisted with interpreting the information contained in this chapter. 
5.2 VALUE OF COLLECTING OBJECTIVE DATA 
 
One of the main aims of establishing an objective database was to determine the profile 
of participants and their experience of the personal grievance adjudication system. It was 
anticipated that it would be possible to draw conclusions about aspects of the procedure 
                                                             
1
 In the year ending 30 June 1997, the Employment Tribunal received 5,402 applications. From those, 
3,202 mediations were scheduled, 587 adjudications were scheduled and 400 adjudications were serviced. 
In the year ending 30 June 1998, the Employment Tribunal received 5,332 applications, and of those 3,107 
mediations were scheduled and 492 adjudications were serviced. Department of Labour, Annual Reports. 
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itself and whether or not it worked depending on the types of applicants who used it, their 
occupation, whether or not they were represented, and the remedies sought and granted. It 
was anticipated that the database would be able to illustrate a series of patterns and trends 
regarding aspects of the procedure and its participants, and consequently determine 
whether particular factors had an impact on the outcomes of cases. The factors involved 
in cases that could have had an impact on outcomes included: gender of parties, 
occupation of applicant representation, delay, the hearing process itself, remedies and 
costs. Objective data from the employment tribunal adjudication decisions helped to 
illustrate whether the Government‟s objectives in creating the Employment Tribunal had 
been achieved, which were to make the resolution of personal grievances quick, easy, and 
inexpensive.
2
 
5.3 NATURE OF OBJECTIVE INFORMATION    
 
This research examines three questions in relation to personal grievances. Firstly, what 
were peoples‟ experiences of using the adjudication system, secondly, did adjudication 
work for participants and thirdly whether the procedure has the potential to benefit not 
only policy makers, but all participants in the personal grievance adjudication system. To 
investigate these questions it was first necessary to determine what information would be 
of specific value from each decision. A list of factors I hoped to gain specific information 
on included: 
 
                                                             
2
 [1991] 524 NZPD 1437. 
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General information about personal grievances, including the: 
 total number of personal grievance and related costs decisions heard in 1997; 
 total number of personal grievance and related costs decisions heard in each 
region; 
 total number of claims for each different cause of action; 
 total number of claims for each different cause of action within each regional 
jurisdiction; 
 number of claims where an alternative cause of action was listed; and 
 whether or not mediation occurred. 
 
Time factors, including the: 
 average wait from an event precipitating a personal grievance to a hearing; 
 average wait from an event precipitating a personal grievance to a hearing by 
region; 
 average length of a hearing; and 
 delay in receiving an adjudicator‟s decision. 
 
Information relating to parties, including the: 
 number of applicants/respondents; 
 gender of applicants and respondents; 
 number of group applications; 
 occupational classification of applicants;  
 type of employer; individual, company, public service department, crown 
entity, education or health sector, local government; and 
 number of applicants legally aided. 
 
Representation, including the: 
 number of applicants and respondents represented; 
 variety of representation used by applicants; e.g. counsel, advocate, union 
representation, self representative; and 
 number of different types of representation used by respondents; e.g. counsel, 
advocate, employers organisation, self representative. 
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Adjudicators, including the: 
 number of personal grievance and related costs decisions heard by each 
adjudicator; 
 possible correlation between the gender of an adjudicator and the decisions 
made/remedies granted; and 
 possible correlation between the background of an adjudicator and the 
decisions made/remedies granted. 
 
Results of personal grievances, including the: 
 success or otherwise of outcomes; 
 average monetary remedies awarded; 
 average monetary remedies awarded by region; 
 average costs for the applicant/respondent; and 
 number of reinstatements. 
 
Before the above listed factors could accurately be analysed, it was necessary to establish 
a comprehensive database to categorise information contained in the adjudicated cases 
under the following headings:  
 reference number 
 additional reference number 
 jurisdiction 
 cause of action  
 additional cause of action 
 applicant 
 gender of applicant 
 respondent 
 gender of respondent 
 adjudicator 
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 date personal grievance occurred 
 date of hearing 
 length of hearing 
 date of decision 
 type of representative of applicant 
 type of representative of respondent 
 type of decision 
 did mediation occur 
 remedies sought 
 remedies granted 
 amended cause of action 
 appeal sought 
 applicant costs and disbursements sought 
 respondent costs and disbursements sought 
 applicant costs and disbursements awarded 
 respondent costs and disbursements awarded 
 procedural issues 
 
As there was no set format on what type of information was to be recorded in an 
adjudicator‟s decision, it was often difficult to locate specific data.3 For example, the 
details of the heads of grievance, remedies sought and granted, and mitigating factors 
were often dispersed throughout a decision in no apparent order. For this reason, as 
discussed below, many of the tables do not represent a total of 407 cases simply because 
the relevant data was not specified in the records of the cases. In these instances, the 
tables represent as many cases as it was possible to ascertain data from.  
                                                             
3
 Personal Correspondence with Chief of the Employment Tribunal, Alastair Dumbleton, 31 October 2004. 
Dumbleton stated that „there was no format or template for writing decisions. It was all ad lib, individual 
stream of consciousness technique‟. 
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5.4 DATABASE FINDINGS 
 
5.4.1 GENERAL INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM DECISIONS  
 
The following section contains some information obtained from general questions 
included in the database of all Employment Tribunal decisions for 1997.  
Table 5.1: Number of Personal Grievances and Working Population in 19964 
 Auckland Hamilton Wellington Christchurch Dunedin Total 
Number of Personal 
Grievances 
167  
(41%) 
34  
(8%) 
81  
(20%) 
112  
(28%) 
13  
(3%) 
407 
(100%) 
Working 
Population in 1996 
488,331  
(43%) 
155,463  
(14%) 
197,148  
(17%) 
219,564  
(19%) 
84,228  
(7%) 
1,144,734 
(100%) 
 
 
Table 5.1 shows the highest number of personal grievances occurred in the Auckland 
registry district. However, it needs to be noted that Auckland is a significantly larger city 
than those in other jurisdictions with a higher number of employees and employers; 
consequently a higher number of personal grievances was likely.
5
 Figures obtained in the 
1996 Census show that the number of personal grievances occurring in each centre 
reflected the working population base.
6
 The proportionally higher number of personal 
grievances in Christchurch may have been due to the nature of the workforce in the 
                                                             
4
 From 1996 Census statistics, see http://www2.stats.govt.nz/domino/external/pasfull/pasfull.nsf/0/ 
4c2567ef00247c6acc256b 6b0078645b/$FILE/ALLTABLS.xls 
5
 For discussion on employment tribunal adjudication jurisdictional areas, see Chapter 2.5, para 2. Also see 
W R C Gardiner, The Employment Tribunal (A Report From the Trenches) 13 May 1998, 4, where it was 
stated that Auckland Registry catered for cases from Taupo north and dealt with 50 percent of the 
workload, Wellington Tribunal Registry which took in Nelson bore 28 percent of the workload, and the 
Christchurch/Dunedin Registry dealt with 22 percent of the workload. These figures effectively reflected 
the population base of the various geographical areas.  
6
 See Tables by region: http://www.stats.govt.nz/domino/external/web/ExtraPages.nsf/htmldocs/ Standard+ 
Regional+Tables+Census+1996+-+Map. 
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Canterbury region.
7
 The predominant types of employees in Canterbury were trades and 
service and sales. At this time, those two occupational classes were still fairly highly 
organised and were perhaps more likely to take a personal grievance. Also, the 
Canterbury Adjudication Service had a high frequency of hearings and determining the 
results of personal grievances.
8
  
Table 5.2: Cause of Action by Jurisdiction 
Cause of Action Auckland Hamilton Wellington Christchurch Dunedin Total 
Unjustifiable 
Dismissal 
139 
(47%) 
32 
(11%) 
44 
(15%) 
71 
(24%) 
11 
(4%) 
297 
(100%) 
Unjustifiable 
Constructive 
Dismissal 
10 
(30%) 
2 
(6%) 
9 
(27%) 
11 
(33%) 
1 
(3%) 
33 
(100%) 
Unjustifiable 
Action 
2 
(10%) 
0 
(0%) 
8 
(38%) 
10 
(48%) 
1 
(5%) 
21 
(100%) 
Other
9
 
14 
(33%) 
0 
(0%) 
18 
(42%) 
11 
(26%) 
0 
(0%) 
43 
(100%) 
 
Total Cases
10
 165 34 79 103 13 394 
Significance: .000, Somers‟ D: .057 
Clearly, the most common cause of action during 1997 was direct unjustifiable dismissal. 
In contrast, there were a significantly smaller number of constructive dismissals. 
Although constructive dismissals are recorded as dismissals, they stem from an 
                                                             
7
 See Table 5.5 below. 
8
 See Table 5.1 above.  
9
 „Other‟ includes: Procedural fairness; parental leave; strike out proceedings; costs; out of time and 
multiple causes of action. These categories represented a small number of applicants; it was therefore more 
expedient to group them into one category of „other‟.  
10
 The total numbers of these personal grievances, and those throughout this chapter, do not add up to the 
same totals as Table 5.1 for a number of reasons: in this case some personal grievances may have several 
different causes of action, so are not included in this table. Also in some instances the cause of action was 
unclear, or undefined.  
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employer‟s repudiatory action that left the employee believing that he or she had no 
alternative than to resignation.
11
 The reason that there were fewer constructive dismissals 
may have been because such claims are more difficult to establish. In constructive 
dismissal cases, the grievant bears the additional evidential burden of proving that an 
actual dismissal took place and such cases are notoriously difficult for applicants.
12
  
5.4.2 INFORMATION RELATING TO PARTIES 
 
Tables 5.3 to 5.8 contain general information regarding the parties to personal grievance 
proceedings and their occupational class. Factors to consider included the gender of 
personal grievants, the type of employment applicants were engaged in, and whether or 
not any employment category was more predominant. Previous research has indicated the 
types of industries where personal grievances tended to predominate.
13
 However, the 
nature of the employment that parties were engaged in has not previously been 
examined.
14
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
11
 See Chapter 2, n 113 and accompanying text. 
12
 See Mazengarb’s Employment Law (5th ed, 2000) Part III.19 and ch 2, para.3.3.1 above for brief 
discussion on the shifting burden of proof. The elements that an employee had to show for claims of 
constructive dismissal were outlined in Auckland Shop Employees Union v Woolworths (NZ) Ltd [1985] 2 
NZLR 372, where the Court of Appeal held that constructive dismissal could mean, but was not restricted 
to, three different types of action by an employer. These were: where the employer gives an employee a 
choice between resigning or being dismissed; where an employer has followed a course of conduct 
deliberately intending to coerce the employee into resigning; or where a breach of duty by the employer 
leads the employee to resign.  
13
 Ian McAndrew, „Determinations of the Employment Relations Authority‟ (2002) 27(3) New Zealand 
Journal of Industrial Relations, 323, 328-9. Industrial Relations Service, Survey of Labour Market 
Adjustment Under the Employment Contracts Act, August 1997, 79. 
14
 See Table 5.8 and related text. 
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Table 5.3: Gender of Applicant taking a Personal Grievance 
Gender Percentage of Personal 
Grievants 
Number of Personal 
Grievances 
Percentage of Working 
Population
15
 
Male 64% 260 55% 
Female 33% 133 45% 
Both
16
 3% 14 – 
Total 100% 407 100% 
 
Table 5.3 shows that male applicants significantly outnumber females. The reasons for 
this generally reflect the proportion of males to females in the working population, but 
any further reasons for this disparity will be discussed below with Table 5.6.  
Table 5.4: Gender and Type of Respondent 
Gender / Type of Respondent Percentage of Grievants Total Grievants 
Male 8% 33 
Female 2% 7 
Both 4% 16 
Company 76% 311 
Government 4% 16 
Other
17
 6% 24 
Total 100% 407 
 
Similarly to Table 5.3, Table 5.4 shows that there were more male respondents than 
females and the vast majority of respondents were companies. Ninety-two percent of 
personal grievances had individual applicants who took personal grievances against their 
employers. Out of a total of 407 personal grievances, 375 of them were taken by 
individual employees against their employers. The small number remaining, 23 were 
taken by two employees against their employers, and four were taken by more than two. 
                                                             
15
 See n 23. 
16
 That is where there were both male and female applicants in the same case. 
17
 „Other‟ includes: Board; Incorporated Society; Local Government; Polytechnic; and Trust. 
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This shows that most personal grievances related only to an individual‟s case, as opposed 
to being variants on a class action.
18
  
5.4.3 NEW ZEALAND CENSUS CLASSIFICATIONS OF OCCUPATIONAL CLASS OF 
PERSONAL GRIEVANTS 
 
As the census contained definitions of occupational classes encompassing the whole 
working population, which types of employees were represented in the personal 
grievance statistics as a proportion of the working population indicated which types of 
employees were most prevalent in the personal grievance system. A comparison could 
then be made between the occupational classes contained in the working population and 
the proportion of types of employees who took personal grievances.
19
  
 
The categories used by the census strictly focussed on the occupation of the different 
categories of employee. As a result, this included classes of employee who were 
employed in the public, health, education and voluntary sector, as well as private sector 
employees. In terms of statistical analysis, if correlation of Somer‟s D was less than 0.3 
that indicates a very low relationship between the two variables. However, a very low 
                                                             
18
 For discussion on adjudicators‟ opinions regarding appropriateness of multiple applicant claims and class 
action, see Chapter 6. 
19
 The decision to classify occupational class by the census categorisation method was reached after 
considerable attempts to classify the data based on the system used by McAndrew. As it was not possible to 
make a direct comparison between analysis of Employment Tribunal statistics as originally classified and 
objective census information, the categories of occupational class have therefore been recoded in order that 
those comparisons could be made. For the original analysis, which recognised different occupational 
groups, see Appendix IX. The census categories can be compared with the NZSEI classifications, see 
Davis, P. Jenkin, G. Coope, P. New Zealand Socio-economic Index 1996: An update and revision of the 
New Zealand Socio-economic Index of Occupational Status, Statistics New Zealand, Wellington, New 
Zealand 2003. See also Chapter 4, n 17. These confirm that legislators, administrators and mangers as a 
group rank highly on socio-economic indicators and similarly to associate professionals, professionals rank 
highest overall, clerical workers rank ahead of sales and service workers but behind tradespeople. 
Operators and general workers rank lowest of all on socio-economic characteristics. 
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significance e.g., .05 or less, indicates that some degree of relationship exists between the 
results and trends in the wider population.  
 
In determining what type of employees used the adjudication procedure, it was important 
to discover which occupational class of employees appeared most frequently in personal 
grievance statistics. It was also relevant to examine whether in each jurisdictional area a 
particular occupational class of employees tended to predominate.  
Table 5.5: Occupational Class of Applicants 
NZ Census Categories of 
Occupational Class 
Auckland Christchurch Dunedin Hamilton Wellington Total 
Cases 
Legislators, 
Administrators and 
Managers 
17 
10% 
5 
5% 
0 
0% 
2 
6% 
12 
15% 
36 
9% 
Professionals 16 
10% 
14 
13% 
1 
8% 
3 
9% 
5 
6% 
39 
10% 
Technicians and associate 
professionals 
33 
20% 
9 
8% 
4 
31% 
6 
18% 
5 
6% 
57 
14% 
Clerical Workers 13 
8% 
2 
2% 
0 
0% 
1 
3% 
8 
10% 
24 
6% 
Service and Sales 
workers 
43 
26% 
28 
5% 
3 
23% 
7 
21% 
21 
26% 
102 
25% 
Agriculture and Fishery 
workers 
6 
4% 
10 
9% 
3 
23% 
5 
15% 
5 
6% 
29 
7% 
Trades workers 15 
9% 
16 
14% 
0 
0% 
1 
3% 
4 
4% 
36 
9% 
Plant and machine 
operators and assemblers 
12 
7% 
13 
12% 
0 
0% 
6 
18% 
10 
13% 
41 
10% 
Elementary occupations 8 
5% 
4 
4% 
0 
0% 
3 
9% 
5 
5% 
20 
5% 
Unspecified 4 
2% 
11 
10% 
2 
15% 
0 
0% 
7 
9% 
24 
6% 
Total 167 
100% 
112 
100% 
13 
100% 
34 
100% 
81 
100% 
407 
100% 
Significance: .483, Somer‟s D: .025 
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Table 5.5 shows the type of work which applicants were engaged in, rather than the 
industry in which they were employed. Previous research focussed on the latter, while 
this research was interested in the former. This shift in emphasis enabled consideration of 
whether the occupation of the applicant had an effect on the outcome of the personal 
grievance, both in terms of success rate and level of remedies awarded.
20
  
 
Research was also undertaken by the Labour Department in 1997, which examined 
through surveys how the labour market was functioning under the Employment Contracts 
Act 1991.
21
 The Labour Department largely focussed on bargaining and how the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991 affected outcomes, as opposed to personal grievances. 
However, consideration was given in that survey to the broad types of industries where 
employees worked, rather than the types of occupation they were employed in. Industries 
were categorised as; primary industries, secondary industries, distribution industries and 
service industries.
22
 The value of the Labour Department research related to industrial 
practice and the effects of different industries on employees. Thus, the issues that they 
were considering had a slightly different focus to the research conducted in this study.
23
 
The primary focus of this thesis is, in general terms, access to justice in the personal 
grievance arena and what participants‟ experiences were in using the adjudication system. 
                                                             
20
 Examined further in Tables 5.19 and 5.20.  
21
 Department of Labour, Survey of Labour Market Adjustment Under the Employment Contracts Act, 
Industrial Relations Service, August 1997. 
22
 Ibid 62. Primary industries included: agriculture; forestry; fisheries; and mining. Secondary industries 
included manufacture and construction. Distribution industries included: electricity; gas; water; transport; 
and storage. Service industries included: communication; wholesale trade; retail trade; accommodation; 
café; rent; finance; insurance; property; business; government; administration; defence; education; 
health/community services; cultural/recreation services; and personal/other. 
23
 Ibid 64. This table determined where various industries sourced their information. See this survey for the 
Department of Labour categorisation of various industries. The focus was on the industry, not the type of 
employment of individual employees. 
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It was therefore fundamental to focus on the actual occupational backgrounds of 
participants, as opposed to the general industry they were employed in. This allows 
examination of the nature of work undertaken by applicants, affording an insight into 
whether their occupational background affected the outcome of using the process and 
their experiences of it. 
Table 5.6: Occupational Class and Gender of Applicant  
Gender of Applicant/ Occupational Class Female Male Both Total 
Legislators, Administers and Managers 6 
5% 
27 
10% 
3 
21% 
36 
9% 
Professionals 14 
11% 
25 
10% 
0 
0% 
39 
10% 
Technicians and associate professionals 20 
15% 
36 
14% 
1 
7% 
57 
14% 
Clerical Workers 23 
17% 
1 
0% 
0 
0% 
24 
6% 
Service and Sales workers 47 
35% 
53 
20% 
2 
14% 
102 
25% 
Agriculture and Fishery workers 4 
3% 
21 
8% 
4 
29% 
29 
7% 
Trades workers 0 
0% 
33 
13% 
3 
14% 
36 
9% 
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 3 
2% 
37 
14% 
1 
0% 
41 
10% 
Elementary occupations 5 
4% 
14 
5% 
0 
0% 
19 
5% 
Unspecified Occupation 11 
8% 
13 
5% 
0 
0% 
24 
6% 
Total 133 
100% 
260 
100% 
14 
100% 
407 
100% 
Significance: .004, Somer‟s D: .089 
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As shown in Table 5.6, the majority of applicants taking personal grievances were male. 
This is disproportionate to the male/female ratio in the workforce, potentially showing a 
tendency for male employees to adopt a more litigious approach.
24
 This is mere 
speculation; however, Table 5.6 still reveals some interesting statistics relating to gender 
and occupational class. In the clerical and sales and service occupational classes, 
proportionally more females than males took a personal grievance. This is not unexpected 
given that females outnumbered males in these occupational classes and it could be 
expected that their work experiences would differ.
25
 Gender bias was observed by Wendy 
Davis in sexual harassment cases, where she found that awards of compensation under s 
40(1)(c)(i) for men dismissed for sexual harassment tended to be higher than those paid 
to women who were sexually harassed.
26
 
 
Conversely, in the Legislators, Administers and Managers group, males exceeded female 
applicants. This was an important statistic, as it could have had an impact on levels of 
compensation between males and females, as Legislators, Administers and Managers 
                                                             
24
 Fifty-five percent of the general workforce was male, while 64 percent of personal grievances in 1997 
were taken by males. See: 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/domino/external/pasfull/pasfull.nsf/7cf46ae26dcb6800cc256a62000a2248/4c2567
ef00247c6acc256b6b007863cb?OpenDocument and Table 5.3 above. 
25
 According to Census information gathered in 1996, one-quarter of all females employed occupied 
clerical positions, while this was the occupational group for only 5.2 percent of males. See 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/domino/external/pasfull/pasfull.nsf/7cf46ae26dcb6800cc256a62000a2248/4c2567
ef00247c6acc256b6b007863cb?OpenDocument . For more detailed discussion on the types of occupational 
classes women are employed in, see Caroline Morris, „An Investigation into Gender Bias in the 
Employment Institutions‟ (1996) 21, NZJIR 67, 75 and Wendy Davis, A Feminist Perspective on Sexual 
harassment in Employment Law in New Zealand, New Zealand Institute of Industrial Relations Research 
(1994)  41. 
26
 Wendy Davis, A Feminist Perspective on Sexual harassment in Employment Law in New Zealand, New 
Zealand Institute of Industrial Relations Research (1994)  41. 
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may have been awarded higher levels of compensation. This is discussed later in this 
chapter in relation to compensation.
27
  
 
In an analysis of the gender composition of the workforce, it is important to consider the 
gender balance in the public and private sectors.
28
 In the public sector, the gender balance 
of grievants was more equal, while in the voluntary sector females outnumbered males 
though numbers are too small to analyse reliably. Research into the composition of the 
workforce in the public service from 1997 to 2000 by the State Services Commission 
showed that women comprised 54 percent of public service employees, compared to 45 
percent in the general labour force.
29
 The research also found that women occupied 30 
percent of senior management roles in the public service and 17 percent of chief 
executive positions. Surveys completed in 2000 by the State Services Commission show 
that women occupied 50 percent of professional positions in the public service, 40 
percent of management positions and 77 percent of clerical positions.
30
 This shows that 
there was more equity in the public sector than in the private sector in terms of positions 
occupied by women.
31
 
 
                                                             
27
 See 5.4.6(b) 
28
 For further discussion, see Appendix IX. 
29
 State Services Commission, „Equal Employment Opportunities Progress in the Public Service as at 30 
June 1997‟ and „Equal Employment Opportunities Progress in the Public Service as at 30 June 1998‟. See 
http://www.ssc.govt.nz/upload/downloadable_files/EEO_Progress_97.pdf and 
 http://www.ssc.govt.nz/upload/downloadable_files/eeopr98.pdf  . 
30
 State Services Commission, „State Services Commission Human Resource Capability Survey of Public 
Service Departments and Selected State Sector Organisations as at 30 June 2000‟. See 
http://www.ssc.govt.nz/upload/downloadable_files/hrc_survey_2000.pdf. This was the first time that a 
breakdown of Public Service employees by occupation was done. This was confirmed by Jude Bleach, 
Senior Advisor for the State Services Commission by telephone on 2 November 2004. 
31
 Public service includes public service departments and ministries, while the public sector category used 
in this research includes crown entities, agencies and state owned enterprises. See Appendix IX. 
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Table 5.7: Types of Personal Grievance per Occupational Class32 
 Cause of Action  
Total Occupation 
using NZ 
Census 
categories 
Unjustifiable 
Dismissal 
Unjustifiable 
Constructive 
Dismissal 
Unjustifiable 
Action 
Other 
Legislators, 
Administrators 
and Managers 
29 
81% 
1 
3% 
3 
8% 
3 
8% 
36 
100% 
Professionals 31 
80% 
1 
3% 
2 
5% 
5 
13% 
39 
100% 
Technicians, 
associate 
professionals 
41 
72% 
6 
11% 
5 
9% 
5 
9% 
57 
100% 
Clerical 
workers 
16 
67% 
4 
17% 
1 
4% 
3 
13% 
24 
100% 
Farm workers 24 
83% 
1 
3% 
1 
3% 
3 
10% 
29 
100% 
Trades workers 25 
71% 
7 
20% 
1 
3% 
2 
6% 
35 
100% 
Plant and 
machine 
operators and 
assemblers 
33 
83% 
1 
3% 
2 
5% 
4 
10% 
40 
100% 
Elementary 
occupations 
14 
74% 
3 
16% 
1 
5% 
1 
5% 
19 
100% 
Total 213 
76% 
24 
9% 
16 
6% 
26 
9% 
279
33
 
100% 
Significance: .032, Somer‟s D: -.065 
The findings in Table 5.7 show the total number of personal grievances nationally for 
each head of grievance and within each occupational class. Direct unjustifiable dismissal 
was the most common personal grievance in all occupational classes, followed by 
unjustifiable constructive dismissal and then unjustifiable action. Table 5.7 also shows 
that there were very few constructive dismissal claims by the Legislators, Administers, 
                                                             
32
 For further discussion see Appendix IX.  
33
 Similar to n 11, Cause of Action was often unspecified in the case data, hence the low total. 
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and Managers, and Professional occupational classes but numbers are so low no 
conclusions can be drawn. There is no obvious explanation for this, but it could have 
been because professional employees tend to experience less difficulty finding alternative 
work because of qualifications and skills. Another possibility was that the additional 
evidential burden of proof for claims of unjustified constructive dismissal, discussed 
earlier, was too difficult for an employee to meet.
34
 Public sector claims were more likely 
to include constructive dismissal and other less common personal grievances but again 
low numbers limit analysis. 
Table 5.8: Occupational Class of Personal Grievances compared to occupational 
class of the 1996 working population 
Occupational Class by NZ 
Census Classifications 
Frequency 
Percent of Personal 
Grievances 
Percent of 1996 
Working Population 
Legislators, Administrators, 
Managers 
36 8.8 % 4.8 % 
Professionals 39 9.6 % 8.9 % 
Technicians and Associate 
professionals 
60 14.7 % 9.0 % 
Clerical workers 24 5.9 % 17.3 % 
Service and Sales Workers 102 25.0 % 25.7 % 
Agriculture, fishing and forestry 
workers 
25 6.1 % 9.6 % 
Trades workers 36 8.8 % 2.3 % 
Plant and machine operators 
and assemblers 
41 10.1 % 4.0 % 
Elementary occupations 20 4.9 % 11.0 % 
Unspecified Occupation 24 5.9% 6.8 % 
Total 407 99.8% 99.4 % 
                                                             
34
 The elements that an employee had to show for claims of constructive dismissal were outlined in 
Auckland Shop Employees Union v Woolworths (NZ) Ltd [1985] 2 NZLR 372. See above n 12 for an 
outline of what the Court of Appeal held. 
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Table 5.8 shows each occupational class as a percentage of the 1996 working population 
according to the New Zealand census classifications. It then shows the percentage of 
these occupational classes who took personal grievances in 1997.
35
 The small sample size 
consisting of applicants who took personal grievances is due to the relatively small 
number of personal grievance claims that had to be resolved by adjudication. Most 
personal grievance claims were resolved in mediation with a very small proportion 
requiring adjudication.
36
 The size of the group as a whole was very small, therefore minor 
differences in the percentage of people who took personal grievances compared to their 
representation in the total occupational class group in the censes were insignificant. In 
this study, any difference of less than five percent was considered to be due to random 
error and problems in ability to code as discussed below, rather than any significant 
trends.    
 
Legislators, administrators and managers comprised 4.8 percent of the working 
population and represented 8.8 percent of people who took personal grievances. 
Generally this group would have been more aware of their legal rights, and would have 
been more likely to articulate them in a comprehensive manner. Whilst in many 
circumstances they would have had limited access to union representation, they would 
have been more likely to have been able to purchase those services more comfortably. 
However, the small distinction in percentages makes it difficult to draw significant 
conclusions from the data which may be due to random error. The definition of this 
                                                             
35
 See http://www2.stats.govt.nz/domino/external/pasfull/pasfull.nsf/0/4c2567ef00247c6acc 
256b6b0078645b/$FILE/ALLTABLS.xls. 
36
 See Chapter 2.3.2. 
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census group was not always clear as it included such occupations as „Special Interest 
Organisation Administrators‟. Furthermore, the magnitude of the enterprise of a personal 
grievant was often unspecified. It was therefore difficult to accurately categorise the 
occupational class of the employee. For example, a case specifying „shop manager‟ or 
„retail manager‟ may have represented an employee managing one enterprise or chain of 
enterprises. This could have indicated that the management position was not corporate in 
nature, but was management of a small enterprise.  
 
Professionals comprised similar percentages of the working population, and those who 
took personal grievances. This category of employee was the most straightforward to 
categorise due to the clarity of description of the positions analysed, and the singular 
nature of the positions meant they were less likely to overlap.  
 
Technicians and associate professionals made up a significant percentage of the working 
population, 9 percent. In the study population, this group comprised a wide variety of 
occupations including pilots, managers/receptionists and radio announcers, who took 14.7 
percent of personal grievances. The reason for the higher uptake may have been due to 
the generally high level of educational achievement, awareness of legal rights, 
availability of union representation and ability to financially sustain a claim if union 
representation was unavailable. It is less likely that this diverse occupational class was 
more exploited than other less qualified classes of employees. However, the diversity of 
the nature of the group, together with the high level of qualifications achieved could 
imply that these types of employees were less willing to tolerate inappropriate treatment 
by their employers.  
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Although Clerical staff comprised 17.3 percent of the working population in 1996, they 
took a proportionally lower percentage of personal grievance actions, 5.9 percent. The 
reasons for this may have been due to the nature of their employment circumstances, 
gender of applicants, and general lack of accessible representation.
37
 Representation for 
this group may have appeared too expensive, difficult to organise and intimidating. Often 
clerical workers would have been in sole charge positions, which made employees feel 
vulnerable. Clerical workers who took personal grievances as far as adjudication tended 
to work for smaller private sector organisations, and this combined with the nature of 
their work could have made them more susceptible to mistreatment. Those who were 
defined as clerical worker by the census categorisation covered a wide range of positions. 
Some employees would have been highly skilled, whereas others would have received 
basic training. Those with higher qualifications may have been more likely to take a 
personal grievance, however, this may not necessarily be the case because they would 
have been more likely to be able to obtain alternative work more quickly. Lack of support 
from other employees and intimidation by employers and co-workers may provide the 
reason why clerical workers were less likely to take a personal grievance.
38
 Further, if 
clerical workers were employed in the State Sector, they had little access to 
representation unless they chose to appoint a legal representative. On the other hand, 
Public Service clerical workers did have access to effective union membership and the 
process which they undertook to resolve personal grievances meant that it was often 
                                                             
37
 Wendy Davis, A Feminist Perspective on Sexual harassment in Employment Law in New Zealand, New 
Zealand Institute of Industrial Relations Research (1994) 41. 
38
 Personal experience from working in the Union Movement 1985–1988. Further understanding from 
working as a solicitor in the public service, in particular the Ministry of Women‟s Affairs as a Legal 
Advisor 1991–1994.  
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unnecessary for them to follow the formal process of dispute resolution.
39
 Alternatively 
they may have been satisfied with their employment circumstances, or the figures may 
have been the result of random error because of their small numbers and diverse 
circumstances. 
 
Service and Sales staff represented 25.7 percent of the workforce and accounted for 25 
percent of personal grievance claims. My experience with the issues surrounding 
employment conditions for Service and Sales staff indicates that the employment 
environment for this group of employees was not always harmonious, and also indicates 
that they had strong representation. The union which represents this group of workers 
remains a strong and active organisation. However, retail staff do not generally enjoy 
generous employment contracts and there is no higher percentage of personal grievance.  
 
Agriculture, fishing and forestry workers represented a significant group of employees. 
They appeared to have been slightly less willing to take personal grievance actions 
against their employer, 6.1 percent versus 9.6 percent of the working population. This 
may have been due to the nature of their employment, the potential closeness of their 
relationship to their employer, geographical spread, and non-unionisation of the 
workforce. Alternatively, they may have been happy in their work, or it may be due to 
random error. The most problematic area of this group was where agricultural workers 
were described as managers as it was difficult to determine the nature of the work and 
                                                             
39
 http://www.psa.org.nz/Campaigns/Partnership_for_Quality.aspx.  
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therefore where it should be classified. The size of the enterprise in this instance may also 
have been a significant issue which was difficult to determine from the data provided.  
 
Whilst tradespeople comprised a small percentage of the workforce, they were slightly 
more likely to pursue a personal grievance. They were more likely to be organised, 
represented by unions and aware of their rights. Of note, it is likely that due to the decline 
in manufacturing and similar industries in New Zealand from the mid 90‟s, the proportion 
of employees who were tradespeople is declining as a percentage of the working 
population. In general, there was no difficulty with classifying this group of employees.  
 
Surprisingly, Plant and Machine Operators only comprised 4.0 percent of the 1996 
working population. However, they did constitute a slightly larger proportion of 
employees who were willing to take personal grievances against their employer. This 
could have been due to the then National governments‟ intentions to de-unionize the New 
Zealand work force, which may have resulted in employees taking a more militant 
approach against their employers in provocative circumstances. Further, it is more likely 
that this occupational class of employees was, at the time, more unionised, and therefore 
had access to free/relatively cheap representation.
40
  
 
Elementary workers comprised 11 percent of the working population in the relevant year, 
a percent slightly higher than the proportion of grievances. General perceptions might be 
that this group of employees would be more militant, however, the reality could have 
                                                             
40
 See P Walsh and R Ryan, „The Making of the Employment Contracts Act‟ in R Harbridge (ed), 
Employment Contracts: New Zealand Experiences, (1993). 
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been that this group was less organised and may have been adversely affected by the then 
government‟s intentions to de-unionize the workforce. Most of New Zealand‟s working 
population was employed in smaller workplaces and may have had more limited access 
to union membership and therefore support in taking personal grievances. It may still be 
the case that employees belonging to the Elementary workers category were more 
exploited but did not have the knowledge or financial ability to challenge the actions of 
their employer. Furthermore, if a less skilled employee took a personal grievance against 
their employer, as well as losing their income and incurring more financial hardship, they 
would experience further financial difficulties as if a new employment was found, this 
could reduce their ability to obtain higher levels of compensation.  
 
Although it could be argued that it appears unusual that groups of employees who were 
the most exploited and had the lowest socio-economic status were less likely to take a 
personal grievance against their employer, this is not necessarily the case as over seventy 
percent of personal grievance claims were resolved at mediation, making it unnecessary 
for them to be formally adjudicated.
41
 It is possible to conclude that highly paid 
professional employees were much more likely to take a personal grievance as they 
would have been more inclined to be aware of their rights and to fight to maintain their 
professional positions, or alternatively if this was not possible to obtain a higher rate of 
compensation than what may have been possible to achieve at mediation. As higher paid 
employees were more likely to be aware of their rights and what the possibilities were 
they may have been more likely to fight on as a matter of principle and to have the 
                                                             
41
 See Chapter 2.4.  
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financial resources to do so. In contrast to the approach of high socio-economic status 
grievants, clerical and blue collar workers may have been less likely to take a case as far 
as adjudication due to the cost, necessity to find alternative employment quickly, delay 
and accessible representation.  
Table 5.9: Combined Occupational Classes and Gender of Applicants Compared 
with Census42 
Combined NZ Census Occupational Classes   Female Male 
Professional, Administration, Assoc professional  Census  
1997 data 
34% 
33% 
34% 
36% 
Clerical, Sales and Service workers Census  
1997 data 
44% 
57% 
13% 
22% 
Farm and Trades workers, Operators and labourers Census  
1997 data 
22% 
10% 
52% 
43% 
Total  122 247 
 
1997 Data, Total Females = 122, Total males =247
43
 
 
Table 5.9 represents the census classifications of occupational class by gender from this 
study in comparison with the 1996 census figures. By combining similar occupational 
groups according to the categories in the census which show the greatest differentiation 
in terms of gender distribution, this further helps to provide a more tangible distinction 
between the genders of employees taking personal grievances
44
 in specified occupational 
groups. The combination of occupational classes was due to the very small number of 
employees who took personal grievances as far as adjudication in 1997. The table shows 
the percentage of males and females who took personal grievances in the combined 
                                                             
42
 As only a very small percentage of all employees who took personal grievances represented both genders 
in one personal grievance, it was decided that this figure was too small to be representative, so has not been 
included in the calculation of percentages.  
43
 In the remaining 26 cases, gender of applicants was not specified in the case data. 
44
 See Table 5.7 for a detailed breakdown of employees who took particular types of personal grievance.  
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occupational groups of Professional, Administration and Associate professional was very 
similar and this applied to both the census and the study data. For clerical and sales and 
service workers the differences by gender were greater in the study than in the census 
figures. The highest number of female employees who took personal grievances occupied 
the Clerical and Service and Sales occupational class. The opposite pattern held for the 
blue collar occupations. 
5.4.4 REPRESENTATION 
 
The type of representation utilised by parties to a personal grievance was an important 
issue to consider in this analysis because it may have altered the final outcome of 
personal grievance claims, in terms of success, satisfaction and cost.
45
 Different types of 
representation may have had an impact on various aspects of the personal grievance 
procedure and on the experiences of parties going through the adjudication process.
46
 
 
Table 5.10 (below) shows the type of representation chosen by applicants and 
respondents. Advocates are representatives who were not listed in the Legal Services 
Directory for 1997, which meant that they did not hold a legal practice certificate 
although they may have had legal qualifications.
47
 Advocates may also have been union 
officials or human resource practitioners but this information was not often contained in 
the Employment Tribunal decisions. Counsel were barristers and solicitors listed as 
                                                             
45
 For a discussion on these aspects, and parties‟ experiences of representation see Chapter 7.4.3. 
46
 For further discussion on party representation and choice of representatives see Chapter 7.4.1. 
47
 Legal Services Directory 1997. The Legal Services Directory was a compendium of all barristers and 
solicitors who held a practicing certificate for that year. It also identified their place of work for that year. 
There was no such similar directory for advocates who were not required to be legally qualified although 
many did have legal qualifications but did not practise as barristers or solicitors. 
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holding practicing certificates in the Legal Services Directory for that year.
48
 Self-
representatives were either applicants or respondents who chose to represent themselves.  
 
Not included in Table 5.10 are the 35 employers who chose not to appear in personal 
grievance proceedings and who therefore did not have any representation. Why 
employers chose not to appear is a matter of conjecture: they may have considered that 
the employee‟s case carried no weight and they therefore chose not to bother appearing or 
paying a representative to present their case. This could not be addressed in Chapter 
Seven because of the low response rate to the survey by employers.  Equally, employers 
may have decided not to defend a futile case. Indeed, the results show that if an employer 
chose not to appear, they had significantly less likelihood of success.
49
 This may have 
been simply due to their arguments not being heard or assessed, or could have been a 
result of adjudicators taking a negative view of employers who chose not to appear at the 
hearing.
50
 Again, another plausible explanation is that an employer who regarded their 
case as being weak found little point in appearing before the Tribunal. 
Table 5.10: Party Representation 
 Advocate Counsel Self-rep Other
51
 Total 
Applicant 169 
(42%) 
219 
(54%) 
13 
(3%) 
4 
(1%) 
405 
(100%) 
Respondent 104 
(28%) 
245 
(66%) 
22 
(6%) 
1 
(0%) 
372 
(100%) 
                                                             
48
 Ibid. This can be compared with previous research which presented a large unknown category in relation 
to representation. For example, I McAndrew, „Adjudication in the Employment Tribunal: Some facts and 
Figures on Caseload and Representation‟ (1999) 24 NZJIR 365. 
49
 See Tables 5.19 and 5.20. 
50
 For contrast, see Chapter 6.6.7 for adjudicators‟ views on reappearing parties. 
51
 „Other‟ includes Advocate/Counsel and Self-represented/Advocate, which meant that the party either 
used two types of representative, or may have changed representatives. „Other‟ also includes „No 
Appearance Required‟. 
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Table 5.10 shows that both applicants and respondents chose to be represented by counsel 
more frequently than by advocates or by representing themselves. Generally, this would 
have been a more expensive option than being represented by a union as union 
membership fees typically provided for representation.
52
 In surveys of employees who 
took personal grievances in 1997, the most common method of choosing a representative 
by non union employees was by having a personal contact, followed by selecting 
representation from the phone-book or by using their usual lawyer.
53
 Adjudicators had 
mixed views regarding the standard of representation between the different representation 
groups. However, the interviews with adjudicators made it clear that they did not all 
believe that legal counsel were the best representation group.
54
 
 
It is not clear from this database how many counsel or advocates were union employees. 
This was simply because the decisions of the Tribunal, whilst identifying the names of 
representatives, did not always indicate whether they were counsel or advocate, nor did it 
specify whether representatives were union employees or where their place of work 
was.
55
 The Legal Services Directory did, however, identify barristers and solicitors but 
did not identify advocates or where their place of employment was. 
 
                                                             
52
 Telephone discussion with Ross Wilson, President of the New Zealand Council of Trade Unions, 30 May 
2005. He advised that State Unions such as the PPTA and NZEI had in their constitutions the requirement 
to provide legal representation for their members. However, Private Sector Unions provided representation 
on the merits of each case. 
53
 For a discussion on these survey answers see Chapter 7.4.1, Tables 7.1 and 7.2. 
54
 For further discussion on adjudicators‟ views on representation, see Chapter 6.7. 
55
 See above n 3 and corresponding text. It should be noted that the results of survey questions in Chapter 
7.4.1 show that of those surveyed, 25 percent of employees were represented by unions. In comparison, the 
level of trade union membership at the time was 33 percent of the workforce as outlined in Survey of 
Labour Market Adjustment Under the Employment Contracts Act (August 1997) Department of Labour. 
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Table 5.10 shows that there were a high number of parties opting for representation. The 
fact that many participants opted for legal counsel could be considered quite surprising as 
many complaints about the provisions, particularly from parties to personal grievances, 
related to the legalistic nature of the process itself.
56
 Equally, applicants may have 
believed that the nature of the process itself required appropriate legal representation. 
Indeed, the requirements for lodging personal grievances in the Employment Contracts 
Act 1991 and Regulations were fairly strict and legalistic.
57
 The legal requirements and 
the formal adjudication procedure itself meant that for many parties it was to their 
advantage to obtain legal representation or the services of a union, which may have had 
the resources to obtain representation by counsel or to represent its members. A further 
view could be that as union membership decreased as a result of the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991, it was likely that fewer applicants would be represented by union 
representatives.
58
  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
56
 See Chapter 7.5 for discussion on descriptions of the adjudication process. 
57
 See Chapter 2.4.1 for comment on this. See also Employment Contracts Act 1991 Part III and First 
Schedule and Employment Tribunal Regulations 1991.  
58
 W R C Gardiner, The Employment Tribunal (A Report from The Trenches) 13 May 1998, 5.  It should 
also be noted that Department of Labour survey showed in 1997 that under the Employment Contracts Act,  
33 percent of employees were Union members (Department of Labour, Industrial Relations Service, Survey 
of Labour Market Adjustment Under the Employment Contracts Act (August 1997) 18–19. See also R 
Harbridge and K Hince, „The Employment Contracts Act: An Interim Assessment‟ (1994) 19 NZJIR 235.  
Although these figures show a decline in membership and the EC environment may have entailed a 
reduction in the number of cases that unions were involved in, the figures from the applicant surveys still 
shows that unions topped the list as providers of representative services at 29 percent of the providers. This 
is a marked reduction from what would have been the case in the Labour Relations Act so it would be in 
line with Gardener‟s survey above.  
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5.4.5 ADJUDICATORS 
 
In the Auckland Employment Tribunal Registry, there were a significantly higher number 
of personal grievances.
59
 This gave rise to the question; did the caseload of adjudicators 
vary between centres, and if so, did this affect the adjudication process?   
Table 5.11: Number of Adjudicators in each Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction Auckland Hamilton Wellington Christchurch Dunedin Total 
Number of 
Adjudicators 
14 
34% 
11 
27% 
10 
24% 
4 
10% 
2 
5% 
41 
100% 
Proportion 
of the 
working 
population 
 
43% 
 
14% 
 
17% 
 
19% 
 
7% 
 
100% 
 
 
Table 5.11 shows that the Auckland Tribunal Registry had the most adjudicators although 
not as many as would be expected given its high proportion of the working population.
60
 
The Christchurch and Dunedin offices covered a larger geographical area, being the 
whole of the South Island except Nelson, but had only six adjudicators.
61
 All Tribunal 
Registries covered a large geographical area; it is likely that size of geographical area did 
not determine the number of adjudicators employed.
62
 It is also clear that population did 
not affect the number of adjudicators employed in a particular registry as Christchurch 
had the second largest population and the second lowest number of adjudicators.
63
 As 
noted by Ralph Gardiner, the number of adjudicators in each area was intended to 
                                                             
59
 See Table 5.1 above. 
60
 Employment Tribunal Regulations 1991, reg 2(1) and sch 1 established the areas served by Offices of the 
Tribunal. As noted above, the Employment Tribunal operated from 3 offices: Auckland, Wellington, and 
Christchurch. Each area was defined in the First Schedule in terms of territorial authority districts.  
61
 W R C Gardiner, The Employment Tribunal (A Report from The Trenches) 13 May 1998, 4. 
62
 Ibid. 
63
 See Table 5.1 for details of working population. 
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represent the percentage of the workload distributed in each registry. Fifty percent of the 
workload for the Employment Tribunal was heard in the Auckland Tribunal Registry, 28 
percent in the Wellington Registry and 22 percent in the Christchurch/Dunedin 
Registry.
64
 Intuitively, it follows that individual adjudicators should have carried an 
equivalent caseload in each jurisdiction. The reality of this is shown in Table 5.12 below 
(note that some adjudicators sat in more than one place): 
Table 5.12: Average Annual Caseload of Adjudicators for the Year 1997 
Jurisdiction Auckland Hamilton Wellington Christchurch Dunedin Average of 
all 
Registries  
Average 
number of cases 
12 3 7 28 7 11 
Number of 
Adjudicators 
Sitting 
 
14 
 
11 
 
10 
 
4 
 
2 
 
8 
Significance: .529, Eta: .099 
Table 5.12 shows the average number of personal grievances that adjudicators heard 
within each centre in 1997. As can be seen from this table, the average caseload was 
varied; this difference reflected the number of adjudicators in each jurisdiction. Thus, 
while Ralph Gardiner noted that 50 percent of the workload of the Employment Tribunal 
was distributed in the Auckland Registry, this was distributed between a proportionately 
larger number of adjudicators than in Christchurch.
65
  
 
When adjudicators were asked what their view of their comparative caseload was, their 
responses did not wholly reflect the findings in Table 5.12. For example, five out of the 
nine Auckland adjudicators believed that they had a high caseload in comparison to other 
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 Ibid. 
65
 As shown in Table 5.11. 
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adjudicators.
66
 However, as Table 5.12 shows the average caseload of adjudicators, it 
therefore does not reflect any particular individual adjudicator‟s caseload. Further, this 
table does not take into account other factors that contribute to caseload such as the 
length or complexity of hearings; a point returned to below. In contrast to the Auckland 
adjudicators, no adjudicators in either Wellington or Dunedin believed that their caseload 
was high compared to other adjudicators.
67
 This reinforces the data in Table 5.12, which 
shows that Wellington and Dunedin adjudicators had a lower average caseload than 
adjudicators in Auckland and Christchurch. All adjudicators in Christchurch reflected 
reality in expressing their belief that they had heavy workloads.  
 
It may have been that more cases were resolved at mediation in the jurisdictional areas 
with lower caseloads.
68
 The Employment Contracts Act 1991 provided for the 
appointment of Members of the Employment Tribunal who were adjudicators, mediators, 
or both.
69
 All Members interviewed from 1997 held dual warrants to adjudicate and 
mediate.
70
 From 30 June 1996 to the 30 June 1997, 5,424 applications to the Employment 
Tribunal were received, 3,202 mediations were scheduled and 400 adjudications were 
serviced.
71
 From 30 June 1997 to 30 June 1998, 5,332 applications to the Employment 
Tribunal were received, 3,107 mediations were scheduled and 492 adjudications were 
                                                             
66
 See Chapter 6.4.9, Table 6.4 and accompanying text. 
67
 Ibid. 
68
 From the year ending 30 June 1997, 5,424 applications to the Employment Tribunal were made, and of 
those, 3,202 mediations were scheduled. From the year ending 30 June 1998, 5,332 applications were made 
and 3,107 mediations were scheduled. New Zealand Department of Labour, Annual Reports. 
69
 Employment Contracts Act, s 81 (b), (c) and (d). 
70
 Personal Correspondence with Chief of the Employment Tribunal, Alistair Dumbleton, 16 July 1998. 
71
 Labour Department, Annual Report ending 30 June 1997, 36. 
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serviced.
72
 It is not clear from these figures how many of those applications related to 
personal grievance claims and how many were disputes or other forms of action. The 
figures do make it clear, however, that there were many more mediations scheduled than 
adjudications, which may have contributed to adjudicators‟ perceptions that they had a 
high caseload. 
 
One Wellington adjudicator stated that in Wellington they did equally as many 
mediations as adjudication hearings. In comparison, a number of Auckland adjudicators 
indicated that they had agreed to have three days set down for adjudication hearings a 
week, and then they would have a week of mediation, dealing with two cases a day for 
five days a week. In Christchurch the situation was different again, with one full-time 
mediator and no set formula for distributing the caseload or hearing adjudications. 
Adjudicators in Christchurch therefore advised the administration staff what they wanted 
to do each week depending on their workload. The fact that Christchurch had one full-
time mediator may have contributed to other members having a higher adjudication 
caseload, as mediated cases were not included in the database. A number of adjudicators 
from different centres said that they would swap adjudication and mediation between 
members depending on what work they preferred to do. Consequently some members had 
a higher adjudication workload and some had a higher mediation workload.  
 
Table 5.12 shows that Christchurch had a significantly higher average caseload than any 
other jurisdiction. This may have been because fewer cases were resolved at mediation, 
                                                             
72
 Ibid. 
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or because parties refused to attend mediation. It could also have been that adjudicators in 
Christchurch were deciding cases more promptly, consequently hearing more personal 
grievances, which in this table translates into a higher caseload. An alternative possibility 
was simply that Christchurch was significantly short of Tribunal Members, given that it 
had the second largest population base of all New Zealand cities.  
 
Although Christchurch adjudicators had a higher caseload than those in Auckland, this 
could not be attributed to the length of hearings, as in both centres the average length of 
hearing was 1.48 days.
73
 If the hearings were of longer duration in Auckland, this would 
have explained the disparity between the average caseloads of adjudicators in Auckland 
and Christchurch, as it would not have been possible for adjudicators to decide as many 
cases. However, although there was no distinction in the length of hearing between 
Auckland and Christchurch, there was a significant difference between the two centres in 
the delay between the date of hearing and the date of decision.
74
 The average delay 
between hearing and date of decision in Auckland was 73.12 days, while in Christchurch 
the delay was 39.39 days.
75
 This was despite one Auckland adjudicator stating: 
I give more decisions orally on the day of the hearing than any other Tribunal Member. I‟ve done 
that in nearly 50 percent of all cases I‟ve heard since starting in the Tribunal.76 
 
The difference in delay between the date of hearing and date of decision explains the 
difference in average caseload between Christchurch and Auckland, with decisions in 
                                                             
73
 See Table 5.38 regarding average length of hearings in each centre. 
74
 See Table 5.40 regarding the length of delay between the date of hearing and date of decision in each of 
the centres. 
75
 Ibid. 
76
 See Chapter 6.4.9. 
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Auckland taking longer to be issued. Thus, not only were adjudicators deciding fewer 
cases annually per adjudicator in Auckland than they were in Christchurch, they were 
also taking a longer time to issue those decisions. It follows that adjudicators in 
Christchurch were working more efficiently, issuing their decisions more quickly, and 
enabling a larger number of cases to be heard and decided. 
 
In Dunedin there were only 13 personal grievances, as shown in Table 5.1, and only two 
adjudicators as shown in Table 5.11 above. Thus, the workload per adjudicator was 6.5 
adjudicated hearings in 1997. Likewise, in Hamilton, although there were more personal 
grievances (34),
77
 the caseload was divided between 11 adjudicators,
78
 consequently 
reducing the average caseload per adjudicator, explaining why Hamilton adjudicators had 
an average caseload of only 3. In Wellington there were 81 personal grievances 
adjudicated in 1997 and 10 adjudicators,
79
 with the average caseload being 7.4 per 
adjudicator which accords with the workload being split fairly evenly between the 10 
adjudicators. As Wellington also adopted a case-management approach, this may explain 
why the average caseload for adjudicators in Wellington was lower than in the 
Christchurch and Auckland jurisdictions.
80
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 See Table 5.1 above. 
78
 See Table 5.11 above. 
79
 See Tables 5.1 and 5.11 above. 
80
 The case-management approach involved adjudicators discussing basic elements of the case with the 
parties and their representatives prior to formal adjudication to iron out any possible procedural issues. For 
Wellington adjudicators‟ comments on the case-management approach, see Ch 6.4.9. 
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5.4.6  RESULTS OF PERSONAL GRIEVANCES 
 
This research examined whether or not the personal grievance system worked for all 
participants, by investigating the outcomes from all personal grievances adjudicated in 
1997. Success could have been measured subjectively using the opinions of participants 
in surveys.
81
 Or in contrast, the data obtained from the database is objective information 
about what actually occurred in adjudication. This chapter measures the success of 
personal grievances from the objective data obtained from the decisions in 1997. 
 
It was decided to measure the success or otherwise of the personal grievance in three 
categories: wholly successful; partly successful; and unsuccessful. The wholly successful 
category meant that the applicant received everything they had claimed. This included 
cases where amounts claimed were not specified but remedies were granted. Partly 
successful meant that the applicant had succeeded in being awarded part of what they had 
claimed. Thus, a party could have had some success without wholly winning the case.
82
 
For example, partly successful included the few cases where there was a personal 
grievance established but contributory fault amounted to 100 percent and no remedies 
were awarded.
83
 Thirdly, unsuccessful meant that the applicant had no personal grievance 
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 See Chapter 7.5.8. 
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 I McAndrew, „Adjudication in the Employment Tribunal: Some Facts and Figures on Dismissal for 
Misconduct‟ (2000) 25 NZJIR 303, 307. McAndrew‟s analysis did not distinguish between success and 
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due to contributory fault. McAndrew therefore defined a „win‟ as consisting of a decision by the 
Employment Tribunal that the employee had a personal grievance, and not as a result of the remedies 
awarded. In contrast, my analysis measured the success of the grievance, or „winning‟, as the finding that 
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reduction of remedies see below, 5.4.7(d). 
83
 See AT 208/97 and AT 333/97. 
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established and was awarded no remedies. It should be noted that on occasion it was very 
difficult to determine from the decisions whether a case had been wholly successful or 
partly successful, as the amounts claimed or awarded were not clearly specified in the 
decision.
84
  
Table 5.13: Applicants’ Success Rate 
 Wholly 
Successful 
Partially 
Successful 
Unsuccessful Total 
Auckland 12 
7% 
81 
49% 
74 
44% 
167 
100% 
Hamilton 3 
9% 
15 
44% 
16 
47% 
34 
100% 
Wellington 4 
5% 
45 
57% 
30 
38% 
79 
100% 
Christchurch 11 
10% 
57 
50% 
44 
39% 
112 
100% 
Dunedin 1 
8% 
7 
58% 
4 
33% 
12 
100% 
Total 31 
8% 
205 
50% 
168 
41% 
 
404 
Significance: .857, Somer‟s D: .005 
Table 5.13 shows that nationally applicants had a 58 percent success rate. That is, there 
was some positive outcome from taking a personal grievance.
85
 On the other hand, 41 
percent of applicants were unsuccessful in their claims of personal grievance. In 
Wellington, the partial success rate was seven percent higher than the national average, 
but Wellington also had the lowest rate of total success. It is worth noting however, that 
the figures nationally were consistent with less than one in ten applicants receiving what 
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 See above n 3. 
85
 This finding is similar to other previous research. For example W R C Gardiner, The Employment 
Tribunal (A Report from The Trenches) 13 May 1998, 11-12, listed success rates for 1994 and 1995 as 63 
percent and 62 percent respectively. Ian McAndrew, above n 69, 308, found that the overall success rate 
from 1992 until 1999 was 61.5 percent. 
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they had claimed. This may have been due to applicants‟ unrealistic expectations or 
unrealistic claims as a result of advice received by representatives. This is discussed in 
relation to remedies below at 5.4.7. 
Table 5.14: Gender of Adjudicator as an Indicator of Applicant Success 
Gender Wholly Successful Partially Successful Unsuccessful Total 
Female 7 
6% 
54 
49% 
49 
45% 
110 
100% 
Male 24 
8% 
151 
51% 
119 
40% 
294 
100% 
Total 31 
7% 
205 
50% 
168 
42% 
404 
100% 
Significance: .702, Somer‟s D: .001 
Table 5.14 shows that there were insignificant differences between the rates of whole 
success, partial success and unsuccessful outcomes depending on the gender of the 
adjudicator. There were no female adjudicators in either Christchurch or Dunedin, one 
female adjudicator in Wellington and the rest located in Auckland. As seen in Table 4.13, 
unsuccessful rates were lower in Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin, where there 
were fewer or no female adjudicators but the relationship between gender and outcome 
may not be influencing this figure.  
 
Gender and success were linked by McAndrew, Dowling and Woodward when 
considering applicants dismissed for performance reasons. They found that regardless of 
the gender of the applicant, male adjudicators were more likely to have found for the 
applicant than female adjudicators, although the differences were not substantial.
86
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 Ian McAndrew, Dermott, J Dowling and Sean Woodward, „Gender Patterns in the New Zealand 
Employment Tribunal: Some Notes on Theory and Research‟ (1997) 22 NZJIR, 277, 298. McAndrew, 
Dowling and Woodward qualified their findings by saying that their findings relied on a number of 
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Further research by McAndrew and Beck confirmed this, establishing that personal 
grievant success rates under male adjudicators were 60 percent and under female 
adjudicators it was 51 percent.
87
   
Table 5.15: Gender of Applicant and Applicant Success 
 Wholly 
Successful 
Partially 
Successful 
Unsuccessful Total 
Female 18 
14% 
67 
50% 
47 
35% 
132 
33% 
Male 13 
5% 
130 
50% 
115 
44% 
258 
64% 
Both male and 
female 
– 8 
57% 
6 
42% 
14 
3% 
Total 
 
8% 
31 
51% 
205 
42% 
168 
100% 
404 
Significance: .369, Somer‟s D: .007 
Table 5.15 shows that there was very little distinction between partial success rates of 
females and males. However, there was a higher rate of whole success where the 
applicant was a female. Research by McAndrew and Beck found that female applicants 
had a 60 percent rate of success as opposed to male applicants who had a 56 percent rate 
of success. However, as discussed above, the definition of “success” was different in 
McAndrew and Beck‟s research.88 Although female applicants sought and were granted 
less compensation than males, what they received in compensation was proportionately 
higher than that received by male applicants.
89
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
untested assumptions including: the cases in the sample all had equal merit; an equal likelihood to mediate 
rather than adjudicate; representation type; reason for dismissal and so on. 
87
 These results were taken from cases adjudicated in the last 18 months of the operation of the 
Employment Tribunal to 30 September 2000. Kathryn Beck and Ian McAndrew, „Decisions and Damages: 
An Analysis of Adjudication Outcomes in the Employment Tribunal and the Employment Relations 
Authority‟, (2002) New Zealand Law Society Employment Law Conference, 211, 217. It should be noted 
that McAndrew and Beck‟s definition of „success‟ was different to that used in this research – see above n 
81. 
88
 Ibid 217. See above n 70. 
89
 See Table 5.27 below. 
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Another issue that may have affected the outcome of adjudication was the career 
background of the adjudicator. Table 5.15 shows the career background of adjudicators 
and whether specific backgrounds had any particular effect on the success or otherwise of 
personal grievances which they decided.  
Table 5.16: Background of Adjudicators as an Indicator of Applicant Success 
Degree of success Whole Success Partial Success Unsuccessful Total Cases 
Academic and Employer
90
 0 % 71% 29% 7 
Academic and Union
91
 8% 46% 46% 13 
Private Practice
92
 9% 43% 49% 70 
Public Sector
93
 9% 52% 39% 106 
Public Sector and Employer
94
 9% 49% 42% 43 
Public Sector and Union
95
 5% 51% 44% 39 
Private Sector
96
 5% 56% 39% 39 
Private and Public Sectors
97
 0% 58% 42% 19 
Union
98
 12% 53% 35% 34 
Union, Private and Public 
99
 8% 54% 39% 26 
Union and Private Sector
100
 0% 38% 63% 8 
Total 6% 
31  
52% 
205 
43% 
168 
100% 
404 
Significance: .479, Somer‟s D: 0.12 
                                                             
90
 „Academic and Employer‟ meant that the person had worked for a tertiary institution as well as an 
employer‟s organisation. 
91
 „Academic and Union‟ meant that the person had worked for a tertiary institution as well as an 
employee‟s organisation. 
92
 „Private Practice‟ meant that the person had worked in private legal practice. 
93
 „Public Sector‟ meant that the person had worked in a public service, crown entity or state agency. 
94
 „Public Sector and Employer‟ meant that the person had worked for public service, crown entity or state 
agency as well as an Employer‟s organisation. 
95
 „Public Sector and Union‟ meant that the person had worked for a public service, crown entity or state 
agency, and an employee‟s organisation. 
96
 „Private Sector‟ meant that the person had worked in a private sector company or organisation. 
97
 „Private Sector and Public Sector‟ meant that the person had worked for a private sector company or 
organisation as well as a public service, crown entity or state agency. 
98
 „Union‟ meant that the person had worked for an employee‟s organisation. 
99
 „Union, Private and Public Sectors‟ meant that the person had worked for an employee‟s organisation, a 
private sector company or organisation, and a public service, crown entity or state agency. 
100
 „Union and Private Sector‟ meant that the person had worked for an employee‟s union as well as a 
private sector company or organisation. 
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Two results immediately stand out from Table 5.16: adjudicators with an Academic and 
Employer background had a higher rate of granting some success than all other 
adjudicators at the other end of the scale, adjudicators with a Union and Private Sector 
background gave more decisions that were unsuccessful for the applicant than all other 
adjudicators. However, adjudicators with these two backgrounds represented a small 
proportion of the total number of cases decided (seven and eight respectively). It is 
therefore unclear how much weight to give these results.  
 
Excluding these results shows a general consistency of success rates for applicants. Table 
5.16 shows fluctuations between the adjudicators with a Private Practice background, 
with an approximately 49 percent rate of unsuccessful claims and those adjudicators with 
a Union background with a lower level of unsuccessful claims at approximately 35 
percent. Also, Table 5.16 shows that if adjudicators came from a purely Union 
background, there was a slightly higher likelihood that an applicant would have been 
wholly successful. Again, it is difficult to draw any clear conclusions from the table as to 
whether the adjudicators‟ background affected applicant success, as the results are 
generally similar and do not appear to confirm that prior employment background is a 
significant factor.   
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Table 5.17: Cause of Action and Applicant Success 
Cause of Action 
Wholly 
Successful 
Partially 
Successful 
Unsuccessful Total 
Unjustifiable 
Dismissal 
22 
7% 
160 
54% 
114 
39% 
296 
100% 
Unjustifiable 
Constructive 
Dismissal 
2 
6% 
14 
46% 
17 
49% 
33 
100% 
Unjustifiable 
Action 
1 
5% 
12 
52% 
8 
43% 
21 
100% 
Other 
6 
11% 
19 
37% 
29 
52% 
54 
100% 
Total 
31 
7% 
205 
46% 
168 
46% 
404 
100% 
Significance: .143, Somer‟s D: .015 
Table 5.17 shows that the lowest success rate was in the category of „other‟. This could 
be for several reasons: „other‟ includes a multitude of different types of personal 
grievances, which were decided as separate applications by the Employment Tribunal, 
and were therefore counted separately. This included out of time applications, costs 
decisions, strike out proceedings, parental leave complaints, procedural fairness, as well 
as personal grievances which were a combination of causes of action such as unjustifiable 
dismissal procedural fairness, and unjustified action unjustifiable dismissal. Table 5.17 
shows that unjustifiable dismissal cases had the highest rate of success. This is consistent 
with research conducted by Tony Couch in 1998.
101
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 T Couch, „Statistics and Comment‟ in New Zealand Law Society Employment Law Conference 1998 
119, 122. 
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Table 5.18: Occupational Class and Success rate of Applicant 
Occupational Classes (combined) Successful 
Partially 
Successful 
Unsuccessful Total 
Professional, Administration and 
associate professional 
7% 
7 
48% 
51 
45% 
48 
100% 
106 
Clerical service and sales 
workers 
8% 
11 
54% 
76 
39% 
55 
100% 
142 
Farm and trades workers 
7% 
4 
38% 
21 
55% 
31 
100% 
56 
Operators and labourers 
4% 
3 
65% 
51 
32% 
25 
100% 
79 
Total 
7% 
25 
52% 
199 
42% 
159 
100% 
383
102
 
Significance: .186, Somer‟s D: -.070 
Table 5.18 illustrates the lower level of success achieved by farm and trades workers, 
followed by white collar workers such as professionals and managers. Lower status 
workers, clerical, sales and service and operators/general labourers were more successful. 
Further analysis shows if the employee worked in the public, health or educational 
categories, there was a lower rate of applicant success compared to employees in other 
occupational classes. This differs to McAndrew‟s research, which notes that between 
1992 and 1997 over 70 percent of personal grievances taken by managers were 
successful.
103
 McAndrew speculated that the reasons for the higher rate of success for 
managers may have been due to them obtaining more effective representation, having 
better claims, or being less willing to settle at mediation if they had meritorious claims.
104
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 For the cases not included in this table, the data was unspecified as to applicant success. 
103
 I McAndrew, „Adjudication in the Employment Tribunal: Some Facts and Figure on Caseload and 
Representation‟ (1999) 24 NZJIR 365, 372–3.  
104
 Ibid 373. 
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Other possibilities why managers were more successful could have included that 
managers had a better working knowledge of the system; there were higher stakes at issue 
with respect to levels of remedies claimed; and they may have been more articulate and 
thus able to present their case more effectively. When managers were separated from 
professionals in the 1997 cases it was inconclusive as to why managers enjoyed a higher 
rate of success. Generally, managers appeared to go against trends in the data. For 
example, managers were generally represented by counsel (26 out of 37 managers were 
represented by counsel), yet were more successful than the figures in Table 5.20, which 
shows that advocates were generally more successful than counsel. Similarly, Table 5.15 
above shows that female applicants were very little more successful than males; however, 
30 out of 37 of management positions in this analysis were male. 
Table 5.19: Applicant Representation and Applicant Success 
  Wholly 
Successful 
Partially 
Successful 
Unsuccessful Total 
Advocate  14 
8% 
95 
57% 
58 
35% 
167 
Counsel  15 
7% 
101 
46% 
102 
47% 
218 
Self-represented  2 
15% 
8 
62% 
3 
23% 
13 
Total 31 
8% 
204 
51% 
163 
41% 
 
398 
Significance: .944, Somer‟s D: .014 
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Table 5.20: Respondent Representation and Applicant Success 
 Wholly 
Successful 
Partially 
Successful 
Unsuccessful Total 
Advocate  8 
8% 
53 
53% 
40 
40% 
104 
Counsel 17 
7% 
104 
42% 
124 
51% 
245 
Self-
represented 
1 
5% 
18 
82% 
3 
14% 
22 
No 
Appearance 
by respondent 
5 
14% 
30 
86% 
0 
0% 
35 
Total 31 
8% 
205 
51% 
168 
41% 
 
403 
Approx sig.: .184, Value: .080 
 
Tables 5.19 and 5.20 look at applicant success rates and show that self-represented 
applicants were more likely to be partially successful and wholly successful than those 
represented by advocates or counsel. In contrast, McAndrew found that self-represented 
applicants had only a 49 percent rate of success.
105
 However, in determining the outcome 
of a personal grievance McAndrew considered „success‟ in terms of „winning‟ or 
„losing‟.106 As discussed above, success in my analysis was measured as remedies sought 
and granted by the Employment Tribunal. It is possible that self-representatives had a 
higher rate of success as personal grievances taken by advocates and counsel may have 
been more complex in nature. As with the manager success rate, there is little correlation 
in this analysis between self-representation and other factors that might have affected the 
rate of success. 
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 Ibid 374–5. McAndrew used a larger sample of cases, from 1992-97. Further research by McAndrew 
and Beck found that self-represented applicants had only a 40 percent rate of success in comparison to 
represented applicants who had a 59 percent rate of success. See above n 81. 
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 See above n 81. Also note that McAndrew‟s classification of „success‟ did not include where a personal 
grievance was found but no remedies were awarded.  
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In the 35 cases where the respondent did not appear, the applicant had a partly successful 
or wholly successful outcome in every case. This may have been because the respondent 
had made no formal response to the personal grievance and therefore the Employment 
Tribunal had no basis on which to assume the respondent‟s case. Section 100 of the 
Employment Contracts Act provided that in the event that a party did not appear at 
adjudication, the Employment Tribunal could proceed as if that party had appeared.
107
 
This meant that the Employment Tribunal could still hear and decide the personal 
grievance as if the absent party had attended but they would only be deciding on the 
evidence presented by one side.  
 
If either party was represented by an advocate, the applicant had a better partial success 
and whole success rate than if represented by counsel. This could have been because 
advocates worked full time in the employment area and counsel may have had limited or 
little experience in the employment jurisdiction. Prior to the Employment Contracts Act 
1991, counsel were less likely to be involved in employment matters as under the Labour 
Relations Act 1987 unions and employer organisations represented parties to personal 
grievances.
108
 It is not possible to make a direct comparison between the number of 
counsel operating under the Labour Relations Act 1987 and the Employment Contracts 
Act 1991 because under the Labour Relations Act, proceedings before a Grievance 
Committee or the Court were absolutely privileged and the information is not 
                                                             
107
 Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 100 states: „if, without good cause shown, any party to adjudication 
proceedings before the Tribunal fails to attend or be represented, the Tribunal may act as fully in the matter 
before it as if that party had duly attended or been represented.‟ 
108
 Labour Relations Act 1987, sch 7. 
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available.
109
 However, there was increased legal interest in employment law after the 
enactment of the Employment Contracts Act 2000, which is evidenced by the 
establishment of the Employment Law Institute,
110
 more frequent employment law 
conferences,
111
 and the availability of legal aid for adjudication hearings.
112
 Additionally, 
the Employment Contracts Act made personal grievances available to non-union members 
for the first time, who would in general have chosen to be represented by counsel or 
advocates.
113
  
 
In contrast, McAndrew found that if applicants were represented by counsel, the rate of 
success was higher than if they had been represented by advocates.
114
 However, as stated 
above, McAndrew‟s different measure of success should be taken into account, as well as 
that his surveys were conducted over a longer timeframe. McAndrew also noted that the 
difference in outcomes between representation by advocates and that by counsel was not 
significant.
115
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 Labour Relations Act 1987, s 224. 
110
 Employment Law Institute was established in 1997 by employment law specialists as a result of the 
increasing demand for legal representation in employment cases (telephone discussion with Secretary of the 
Employment Law Institute, 7 July 2005). 
111
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5.4.7 REMEDIES 
 
All 1997 personal grievance decisions were examined to determine the type and amount 
of remedies sought by the applicant and granted by the Employment Tribunal.
116
 The 
most common remedies sought were recovery of wages lost (RWL) under s 41(1), which 
was compensation for lost remuneration as a result of the personal grievance, and 
compensation under s 40(1)(c)(i) for humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings.
117
 
It was therefore most useful to focus on these awards as a measure of the success of the 
outcome of cases.
118
 This was also a useful mechanism to measure the expectation and 
therefore the proposed outcome for applicants. Loss of benefits, arrears of wages, 
redundancy pay, recovery of wages, holiday pay, penalty for breach of contract and 
penalties in general were not considered in this analysis. This was because they 
comprised such a small proportion of remedies sought and granted and it was often 
difficult to determine the amounts sought under these headings as they were not always 
specified in the Employment Tribunal decisions. Further, remedies such as arrears of 
wages, redundancy pay, and holiday pay were not specific remedies for personal 
grievances. 
                                                             
116
 Recovery of Wages Lost (RWL) was the reimbursement to the employee of the sum equal to the whole 
or any part of the wages or other money lost by the employee as a result of the grievance. Compensation 
(Comp) was for humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to the feelings of the employee. Costs (C) was for 
the reasonable costs incurred by either party. See Employment Contracts Act 1991, ss 40 and 108. It should 
be noted that these were not the only remedies available under the Employment Contracts Act but were the 
most prevalent remedies sought. 
117
 For a definition and discussion of recovery of wages lost, see ch 2.4.4(a); reimbursement. 
118
 Cf reinstatement was sought in only 16 cases, granted only in five cases. See Table 5.31 below and 
accompanying text. 
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5.4.7(A) RECOVERY OF WAGES LOST 
 
It was not always possible to record specific remedies amounts claimed and awarded as 
these amounts were not always specified in the decision.
119
 However, it was sometimes 
possible to work out the amount of recovery of wages lost sought if the relevant time 
period was specified and the rate of pay was given. The figures below illustrate the 
legitimacy of criticisms of the amounts claimed and awarded.
120
 Thus, employers 
perceived that remedies awarded were overly generous while those same awards rarely 
matched employee expectations.  
Table 5.21: Average Recovery of Wages Lost by Jurisdiction 
 Auckland Hamilton Wellington Christchurch Dunedin National 
Average 
Recovery of 
Wages Lost 
Sought 
$20,412.19 
87 
$21,052.05 
17 
$18,934.12 
33 
$15,005.25 
44 
$8,358.91 
5 
$18,605.36 
186 
Recovery of 
Wages Lost 
Granted 
$4,635.25 
95 
$5,551.09 
16 
$4,018.81 
36 
$1,986.65 
49 
$3,193.00 
5 
$3,916.19 
201 
RWL Sought Significance: .889, Eta: .079 RWL Granted Significance: .266, Eta: .162 
 
 
In all jurisdictions, it can be seen that there was a substantial difference between 
Recovery of Wages Lost sought and granted. This could lend weight to the perception 
that employees may have been making claims for Recovery of Wages Lost that were 
outside of the scope of the Employment Tribunal under section 41(1) of the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991. The disparity between Recovery of Wages Lost sought and granted 
                                                             
119
 See above n 3 and accompanying text. 
120
 P Stapp, „The Employment Tribunal in 1998‟ in New Zealand Law Society Employment Law Conference 
1998 137, 146. See also the dissenting judgment of Thomas J in Aoraki Corporation v McGavin [1998] 3 
NZLR 276 (CA). 
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may have been due to some applicants making claims for a future period beyond what the 
Employment Tribunal would award. This was confirmed by adjudicators who stated that 
there was a clear formula in the legislation for the calculation of Recovery of Wages 
Lost.
121
 However, there was potential overlap between claims for Recovery of Wages 
Lost, which was able to look into future earnings, and compensation, with some 
applicants attempting to claim either Recovery of Wages Lost under the compensation 
heading or compensation under the Recovery of Wages Lost heading. In Christchurch, 
the disparity between Recovery of Wages Lost sought and granted was the most marked. 
In Auckland and Hamilton, the actual amount claimed was higher than in other areas. On 
initial examination it was thought that this may have been because pay rates were higher 
in those northern geographical districts. However, data obtained from the 1996 Census 
shows that in reality both the median income and the number of people earning over 
$40,000 was higher in Wellington, as evidenced by Tables 5.22 and 5.23 below.
122
 
Table 5.22: Median Personal Income by Geographical Area from 1996 Census 
Information 
 Male Female 
Auckland Region $24,401 $13,715 
Waikato Region
123
 $21,620 $12,347 
Wellington Region $25,480 $14,359 
Canterbury Region $21,418 $12,022 
Otago Region
124
 $19,216 $11,247 
                                                             
121
 Employment Contracts Act 1991, ss 40(1) (a) & 41(1) (b). Also see ch 6.4.12. 
122
 See 1996 Census at:  
http://www.stats.govt.nz/domino/external/web/ExtraPages.nsf/htmldocs/Standard+Regional+Tables+Censu
s+1996+-+Map. It should be noted that in the information gathered in the 1996 Census, „personal income‟ 
included not only salary and wages, but investment income, superannuation, pensions and annuities, ACC, 
NZ Superannuation, benefits, other Government funded benefits, and student allowance. 
123
 The Waikato region includes Hamilton. 
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Table 5.23: Percentage of People with a Personal Income over $40,000 by 
Geographical Area from the 1996 Census Data 
Region Percentage of People with a Personal Income 
over $40,000 
Auckland Region 14.1% 
Waikato Region 11.5% 
Wellington Region 16.3% 
Canterbury Region 9.8% 
Otago Region 8.4% 
 
Another possible reason for the disparity between Recovery of Wages Lost sought and 
granted may have been due to the contributory fault of the applicant resulting in a 
reduction of Recovery of Wages Lost awarded. However, reduction of Recovery of 
Wages Lost due to contributory fault was only applied in seven percent of the 407 cases 
in 1997. Consequently, it does not seem to be a major factor in the reduction of Recovery 
of Wages Lost granted.
125
 
5.4.6(B) COMPENSATION 
 
Table 5.24: Average Compensation for Humiliation, Loss of Dignity and Injury to 
Feelings 
 Auckland Hamilton Wellington Christchurch Dunedin National 
Average 
Compensation 
Sought 
N 
$23,604 
 
101 
$22,190 
 
21 
$20,575 
 
43 
$20,460 
 
62 
$17,688 
 
8 
$21,892 
 
235 
Compensation 
Granted 
N 
$3,560 
 
116 
$3,381 
 
26 
$3,274 
 
48 
$2,831 
 
64 
$4,438 
 
8 
$3,339 
 
262 
Comp Sought Significance: .843, Eta: .078 Comp Granted Significance: .811, Eta: .078 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
124
 The Otago region includes Dunedin. 
125
 For further discussion on contributory fault, see para 5.4.7 below. 
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Of all remedies available, compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to 
feelings was perhaps the most useful measure of the outcome of personal grievances.
126
 
The award of compensation was almost universally claimed by applicants and was 
arguably the remedy over which Employment Tribunal adjudicators had the most 
discretion.
127
 Again there is a substantial disparity between amounts sought and 
granted.
128
 This again reflects the notion that some applicants had unrealistic expectations 
of the level of remedies available. Gardiner stated, „applicants [often] arrive at our 
hearings so pumped up with expectation that little short of a howitzer will reach them as 
they float about somewhere above cloud nine‟.129 Auckland applicants sought higher 
amounts of compensation than applicants in other centres, which is interesting given that 
information from the 1996 Census shows that the average level of personal income was 
higher in Wellington.
130
 Adjudicators were divided over whether wage and salary levels 
should be taken into account when determining levels of compensation to be awarded.
131
 
One adjudicator stated that „[y]ou can have the same set of facts, get six different 
                                                             
126
 Compensation under this head was awarded under the Employment Contracts Act, s 40(1)(c)(i). 
Compensation could also be awarded for the loss of any benefit: s 40(1)(c)(ii). In this research, 
„compensation‟ refers to compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings as defined by 
Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 40(1)(c)(i), unless otherwise stated.  
127
 I McAndrew, „Adjudication in the Employment Tribunal: Some Facts and Figures on Caseload and 
Representation‟ (1999) 24 NZJIR 365, 370. 
128
 See the dissenting judgment of Thomas J in Aoraki Corporation Ltd v McGavin, Court of Appeal, 15 
May 1998, (CA2/97), where he states that „while I would reduce the Employment Court‟s award of 
$50,000 for Mr McGavin‟s humiliation and distress, I would not reduce it to the sum of $15,000 as 
provided in the main judgment. To my mind, an amount in the order of $25,000 to $30,000 would be an 
appropriate award.‟ 
129
 See Gardiner, above n 4, 12. 
130
 See above Tables 5.22 and 5.23 and accompanying text. 
131
 For a discussion on factors taken into account by adjudicators when awarding compensation, see ch 6. It 
should also be noted that compensation for lost benefits would also have been affected when considering 
wage or salary levels.  
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adjudicators, six different judges, you‟d probably get six different answers‟.132 In Trotter 
v Telecom Corp of NZ Ltd, the assessment of quantum was described as not being a 
precise art, but a process of applying the principles in like cases to achieve consistency.
133
 
However, when asked what their attitude was to the direction of the Employment Court 
as to remedies, adjudicators‟ responses were varied. One adjudicator stated that „I ignored 
them. They‟re so bloody inconsistent in that Court. For two or three years they‟ll be 
thumping one way of approach, then they completely back-track‟.134  
 
The greatest disparity between compensation sought and granted was in Christchurch, 
while the smallest disparity was in Dunedin. Dunedin also had the highest average 
compensation granted but it is possible that this was due to substantial awards being 
included in the Dunedin analysis, which skewed the figures. The analysis conducted was 
based on an average of compensation sought and granted. This can be compared to 
previous research, which showed that 60 percent of awards for compensation were less 
than $5000 and 95 percent were below $10,000.
135
 However, such research does not 
highlight the gap between applicants‟ expectations and results. Table 4.25 below shows 
awards made by the Employment Court and Employment Tribunal during 1997:
136
 
                                                             
132
 See 6.4.12(c). 
133
 [1993] 2 ERNZ 659. See also ch 2.4.4(b). 
134
 See ch 6.4.12. 
135
 See McAndrew, above n 81, 309, who looked at compensation awards between 1992 and 1999; 
Gardiner, above n 5, 13, who looked at compensation awards in 1997; and Couch, above n 100, 125, who 
looked at compensation awards between 1991 and 1998. 
136
 These figures are taken from Gardiner, above n 5, 12–13. 
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Table 5.25: Compensation Awards Ordered by the Employment Court and the 
Employment Tribunal as Collated by the Employment Institutions Information 
Centre 
Amount of Award Number of Awards Cumulative percentage 
$1-999 6 3% 
$1,000 – 1,999 14 10% 
$2,000 – 2,999 39 28% 
$3,000 – 3,999 33 44% 
$4,000 – 4,999 29 58% 
$5,000 - 5,999 22 68% 
$6,000 – 6,999 17 77% 
$7,000 – 7,999 13 83% 
$8,000 – 8,999 10 88% 
$9,000 – 9,999 2 89% 
$10,000 – 10,999 10 93% 
$12,000 1 94% 
$12,500 2 95% 
$15,000 6 98% 
$20,000 1 98% 
$30,000 1 99% 
$35,000 2 99% 
$50,000 1 100% 
Total 209  
 
The figures in Table 5.25 include awards for compensation made by the Employment 
Court as well as the Employment Tribunal, while Table 5.24 only includes awards in the 
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Employment Tribunal. As can be seen from Table 5.25, most compensation awards from 
the Employment Court and the Employment Tribunal were below $6,000. In comparison, 
the average award of compensation across all centres contained in Table 5.24 was 
between $2,800 and $4,500. As the information contained in Table 5.24 refers to average 
awards, in comparison to the actual number of awards of each amount in Table 5.25, the 
results are not directly comparable but clearly small awards make up the majority. 
Similarly, Lorraine Skiffington conducted research on compensation awarded under s 
40(1)(c) of the Employment Contracts Act 1991, and found that:
137
 
[w]hile there was a range of amounts awarded depending on the individual merits of each claim, 
the Employment Tribunal awarded an average of $3878 in compensation . . . under s 40(1)(c) of 
the EC Act. The Employment Court awarded an average of $10,000. Combining these figures for 
the Employment Tribunal and the Employment Court, indicates an overall average level of 
compensation of approximately $6935 per grievant. Comparing findings of this research with 
those of B Boon . . . unjustifiably dismissed employees are arguably worse off in terms of the 
compensation they receive under the EC Act than they were under previous legislation. 
 
It can also be seen from Table 5.24 that the national average amount of compensation 
sought was $21,892.40, and awards above $20,000 were very rare, with only 5 being 
awarded in 1997. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
137
 Lorraine Skiffington, „What is a Job Worth?‟ (1994) Employment Law Bulletin, 74. In a survey of 
Compensation awarded under the Labour Relations Act 1987, Bronwyn Boon found that the overall 
average payment of compensation in the 82 percent of successful cases which had compensation as a 
component was $8,134, while the overall average for workers who had not been reinstated was $7,149. 
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Table 5.26: Average Compensation by Occupational Class138  
Occupational Class (combined) Average 
Compensation 
Sought 
Average 
Compensation 
Granted 
Percentage 
Professional, 
Administration and 
Clerical 
Mean $29,632 $3,869 13% 
N 83 95  
Service and Sales workers Mean $17,710 $3,031 17% 
N 76 86  
Farmers and trades 
workers 
Mean $20,420 $3,685 18% 
N 41 41  
Operators and labourers Mean $14,757 $2,205 15% 
N 33 38  
Total Mean $22,015 $3,320 15% 
N 233 260  
Sig.: .000 
Eta: .277 
Sig.: .221 
Eta: .130 
 
 
 
Table 5.26 shows that the professional, administration and clerical classes were awarded 
higher levels of compensation than other occupational classes though they were awarded 
a lower proportion of what they sought. Although compensation was not linked to income 
in the same way as recovery of wages lost, this suggests that the differing levels of 
remuneration affected the levels of compensation sought and granted. Other factors 
which may have affected the levels of compensation awarded and that may have been 
tied to the management and professional classes were length of service and occupational 
status.
139
 For example, a manager may have been with a company longer, may have 
progressed up the managerial ladder and may occupy a more senior position.
140
 
                                                             
138
 For this table with the original coding, see Appendix IX.  
139
 For further discussion on potential factors that affected the success of managers, see Table 5.18 above 
and related text. 
140
 See Ch 2, n 335 and 342, and accompanying text, where the Court held that when awarding levels of 
compensation, factors to be taken into account included that the employee had to be taken as they were 
found, and the employer‟s ability to pay. 
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McAndrew‟s research also lends weight to this speculation and further suggests that this 
would affect gender patterns of awards of compensation.
141
  
 
It has also been shown that the Employment Court awarded higher levels of 
compensation to employees who occupied managerial or administrative positions, 
averaging $14,000, while those awarded to trades-people averaged $2,000.
142
 However, 
the Employment Court has warned against taking an occupation based approach to 
awarding compensation. In Otumarama Private Hospital Ltd v Bell,
143
 the Employment 
Court stated that „there is . . . no warrant for treating low paid employees and women as 
having less tender feelings than their male counterparts in more lucrative positions.‟ This 
was also confirmed by Shaw J in Martin v Park and Clarke Ltd,
144
 where she stated that, 
„[i]t is difficult to discern a rational explanation for distinguishing the degrees of hurt and 
humiliation experienced by people by reason of their seniority‟. Shaw J went on in a later 
case to criticise stereotypical attitudes that those who hold higher office have further to 
fall and suffer greater hurt and that those in low paid positions feel less emotional harm at 
the loss of their employment.
145
 This illustrates the view expressed earlier by one 
adjudicator that the Employment Court‟s approach to levels of compensation was 
inconsistent, making it difficult to follow. 
 
                                                             
141
 See McAndrew, above n 81, 373. 
142
 J Hughes, P Roth, G Anderson (eds) Personal Grievances (1999) 11, 17. 
143
 [1995] 2 ERNZ 491. 
144
 Employment Court, Wellington WC35/00, 5 July 2000, Goddard CJ. 
145
 Charta Packaging Ltd v Howard (Employment Court, Wellington WC20/01, 17 May 2001, Judge 
Shaw). 
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Another factor discussed by the courts was the ability of an employer to pay out 
substantial levels of compensation. While the Employment Court was reluctant to take 
this into account, it is worth noting that there was no express provision in the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991 for employers experiencing financial difficulty to pay 
compensation by way of instalments. In Performance Plus Fertilisers Ltd v Slakos, 
Goddard CJ stated that:
146
 
if an employer wishes to have its ability to pay taken into account, it needs to adduce some 
concrete evidence on the subject…there must be some good reason other than mere sympathy for 
the employer to warrant a reduction of, or deduction from, the award otherwise called for in the 
name of compensation. 
 
The Employment Court also held that it would be capricious if the law gave a mechanism 
to impoverished employers to treat employees badly, in contrast with affluent employers 
who were required to treat their staff well.
147
 In contrast to what the Employment Court 
stated in relation to the award of compensation and ability to pay, they still tended to 
award higher levels of compensation to managerial applicants who were employed by 
large employers who had the ability to pay higher sums of compensation.
148
 Although 
this research does not discuss the size of a business, it does show that applicants from the 
managerial class of employees received higher levels of compensation.
149
 Adjudicators 
also stated in interviews that when determining rates of compensation they took into 
                                                             
146
 Unreported, WEC 61/95. See also J Hughes, P Roth, G Anderson (eds) Personal Grievances (1999) 
11.34. 
147
 Sparkes v Parkway College Board of Trustees [1991] 2 ERNZ 851. See also J Hughes, P Roth, G 
Anderson (eds) Personal Grievances (1999) 11.34. 
148
 See J Hughes, P Roth, G Anderson (eds) Personal Grievances (1999) 11.17 and 11.34, where it was 
stated that most of the substantial awards have been made against Government departments, tertiary 
institutions and large corporations. 
149
 See Table 5.26 above. 
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account the ability of an employer to pay. It is possible to make the assumption that state 
sector employees may have been in a stronger position as ability to pay was not likely to 
have been a significant issue for state sector employers. 
Table 5.27: Compensation and gender of applicant 
 Female Male 
Compensation Sought 
N 
$15,704 
71 
$23,724 
157 
Compensation Granted 
N 
Percentage 
$2,863 
86 
18% 
$3,450 
169 
15% 
RWL Sought Significance: .006, Eta: .181 RWL Granted Significance: .317, Eta: .063 
 
Female applicants sought and were granted lower levels of compensation, supporting 
McAndrew‟s conjecture, discussed above, that because higher compensation figures were 
awarded to managers this would affect gender patterns of compensation because most 
employees in managerial positions were male. This is shown in Table 5.6, which 
illustrates that there were 88 male managers or professional or associate professional 
applicants compared to 40 female managers or professionals.
150
 Findings almost certainly 
reflect the lower wage levels of women in the New Zealand workforce, which are evident 
in Table 5.22. When adjudicators were asked whether they took gender into account 
when calculating awards of compensation, 14 said no, two said not consciously, while 
two said they would in certain circumstances.
151
 One adjudicator stated, „well not so 
much gender, but if a person was a sole income earner or were supporting their children 
or whatever, those sorts of things could affect it‟. 
                                                             
150
 See commentary at Table 5.6 above. 
151
 See Ch 6, Table 6.5. 
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Another factor that may have affected the levels of compensation awarded was the type 
of representation for both parties to a personal grievance.  
Table 5.28: Representative Type (Applicant) and Compensation Sought and 
Granted 
Representative 
(Applicant) 
Average Compensation 
Sought 
Average Compensation 
Granted 
Percentage 
Advocate 
 N 
$19,914 
108 
$3,191 
116 
16% 
Counsel 
N 
$23,736 
121 
$3,357 
138 
14% 
Self-Representative 
N 
$12,400 
5 
$4,771 
7 
38% 
Comp Sought Significance: .282, Eta: .104 Comp Granted Significance: .677, Eta: .055 
 
 
Table 5.28 shows that applicants who were represented by counsel sought the highest 
levels of compensation; those who represented themselves sought the least; and those 
represented by advocates were somewhere in between. A significant point was that 
applicants represented by counsel sought almost twice the amount of compensation on 
average than those who were self-represented. However, it is perhaps surprising to 
observe from Table 5.28 that those applicants who were granted the highest levels of 
compensation on average were those who represented themselves (38% of what they 
sought). This contrasts with findings from Ian McAndrew and Kathryn Beck who 
examined decisions and damages in the Employment Tribunal and the Employment 
Relations Authority.
152
 They found that if employees represented themselves, they had a 
                                                             
152
 K Beck and I McAndrew, „Decisions and Damages: An Analysis of Adjudication Outcomes in the 
Employment Tribunal and the Employment Relations Authority‟, paper presented to the NZLS 
Employment Law Conference, November 2002, 211. 
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lower rate of success than if they were represented by counsel or advocates.
153
 A possible 
reason for the difference may have been that the research by McAndrew and Beck 
examined all adjudicated decisions over a longer period by the Employment Tribunal and 
was not limited to personal grievances over one year.
154
 Interviews with adjudicators 
revealed that they tended to take a more relaxed and informal approach to self-
represented parties. It is possible, although a tenuous supposition, to assume that some of 
the legal requirements were relaxed, which may have resulted in more substantial 
compensation awards for self-represented parties. 
 
Research conducted by Ian McAndrew over the period 1992 to 1997 inclusive found that 
applicants represented by counsel were more likely to receive awards of compensation 
over $10,000 than applicants who employed other types of representatives or who 
represented themselves. McAndrew also found that applicants who chose to represent 
themselves were more likely than represented applicants to receive no compensation.
155
 
This contrasts with the present study and Table 5.28, which shows that self-represented 
applicants received higher levels of compensation on average than represented applicants. 
It should be acknowledged that McAndrew‟s research took place over a six year period 
and over a significantly larger database, whereas this research only focussed on one year, 
1997, which may have explained the differential. A further difference between the two 
pieces of research was that McAndrew‟s work considered actual levels of compensation 
                                                             
153
 Ibid 218. As with McAndrew, above n 81, success was measured in terms of a finding of a personal 
grievance and did not take into account remedies sought and granted. 
154
 Ibid. McAndrew and Beck considered decisions from the last 18 months of the Tribunal to 30 
September 2000. See Table 5.19 above and related text, which shows that in 1997 there were only 13 
personal grievances where parties chose to represent themselves. 
155
 I McAndrew, „Adjudication in the Employment Tribunal: Some Facts and Figures on Caseload and 
Representation‟ (1999) 24 NZJIR 365, 375. 
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granted and this research focussed on average levels of compensation over different 
representational categories. 
 
Further research into awards of compensation made by the Employment Relations 
Authority by Ian McAndrew and Kathryn Beck showed that:
156
  
[s]uccessful grievants represented by lawyers were distinguished from all others, with those 
represented by lawyers averaging compensation awards of $6,580 and those with any other 
representation, including self-representation, averaging compensation at the markedly lower level 
of $3,447.  
One of the reasons for the difference in findings between this research and the above 
statement from the research of McAndrew and Beck may have been that their research 
covered a transitional period where the Authority had jurisdiction under both the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991, and the Employment Relations Act 2000. However, the 
statement above specifically related to awards of compensation under the Employment 
Relations Act 2000.  
 
The type of representation chosen by respondents could also have an impact on 
compensation granted to the applicant, as illustrated in Table 5.29. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
156
 K Beck and I McAndrew, „Decisions and Damages: An Analysis of Adjudication Outcomes in the 
Employment Tribunal and the Employment Relations Authority‟, paper presented to the NZLS 
Employment Law Conference, November 2002, 230. See also J Hughes, P Roth, G Anderson (eds) 
Personal Grievances (1999) 11.17. 
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Table 5.29: Representative Type (Respondent) and Compensation Granted to 
Applicant 
Representative 
(Respondent)  
Average 
Compensation Sought 
Average Compensation 
Granted to Applicant 
Percentage 
Advocate 
N 
$18,066 
61 
$3,151 
69 
17% 
Counsel 
N 
$24,735 
26 
$2,482 
31 
10% 
Self-Representative 
N 
$8,813 
16 
$2,928 
16 
33% 
Comp Sought Significance: .012, Eta: .215 Comp Granted Significance: .000, Eta: .388 
 
 
Table 5.29 shows that if the respondent was represented by counsel, the applicant 
received the least compensation on average. This could be due to counsel being able to 
adduce more sophisticated legal arguments against the applicant‟s case or could have 
been the result of good tactical judgment by counsel. This is consistent with previous 
research undertaken by Ian McAndrew who found that if respondents were represented 
by counsel the applicant was more likely to receive no compensation. However, although 
there was a large difference in the percentage of compensation sought and awarded to 
applicants between respondents represented by counsel and self-represented 
respondents.
157
 In contrast, McAndrew found that if the respondent was self-represented, 
the applicant was least likely to receive an award of compensation over $5,000.
158
 
                                                             
157
 I McAndrew, „Adjudication in the Employment Tribunal: Some Facts and Figures on Caseload and 
Representation‟ (1999) 24 NZJIR 365, 375. See also I McAndrew and K Beck, „Decisions and Damages – 
Are They Predictable?‟ (2002) New Zealand Law Society Employment Law Conference, 209, 218. 
158
 Ibid. See also Tables 5.19 and 5.20, which illustrate representation and applicant success. 
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Table 5.30: Cause of action and remedies 
 Unjustifiable 
Dismissal 
Unjustifiable 
Constructive 
Dismissal 
Unjustifiable 
Action 
Other Statistics 
Recovery Wages 
Lost Sought 
N 
$19,238 
 
160 
$8,507 
 
19 
$11,280 
 
3 
$46,746 
 
4 
Sign .25 
Eta .149 
Recovery Wages 
Lost Granted 
N 
$4,275 
 
171 
$1,921 
 
22 
$1,458 
 
4 
$2,001 
 
4 
Sign.43 
Eta .118 
Compensation 
Sought 
N 
$22,107 
 
194 
$16,109 $26,409 $27,857 Sign .43 
Eta .109 
Compensation 
Granted 
N 
$3,514 
 
215 
$2,517 
 
24 
$2,723 
 
15 
$2,250 
 
8 
Sign .6 
Eta .085 
Total Sought 
N 
$45,281 
234 
$21,936 
25 
$36,711 
16 
$15,552 
38 
Sign.21 
Eta .12 
Total Granted 
N 
$6,954 
276 
$3,937 
30 
$3,814 
20 
$2,429 
41 
Sign .04 
Eta .153 
 
There were variations in outcome between the three different causes of action, illustrated 
in Table 5.30 above. Unjustifiable dismissal cases produced the highest amounts claimed 
for recovery of wages lost
159
 and the highest total remedies sought. Generally, applicants 
in unjustifiable dismissal cases sought and were granted the highest remedies. Employees 
bringing unjustifiable dismissal claims probably claimed or were entitled to a higher level 
of recovery of wages lost as their source of income had disappeared with the dismissal. 
Thus, employees were seeking both redress for loss of income due to the dismissal, loss 
of earnings between the date of dismissal and date of hearing, and loss of future earnings. 
Claims for compensation were highest for unjustifiable action. However, compensation 
awarded was higher on average for claims of unjustifiable dismissal, which suggests 
there was more weight given to humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings in cases 
where an employee had been dismissed. Cases of unjustifiable action did not necessarily 
                                                             
159
 This excludes „Other‟ where there were only four claims for RWL, with one substantial claim. 
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result in the applicant losing employment, whereas unjustifiable dismissal cases resulted 
in loss of employment and therefore loss of income. 
 
The majority of personal grievance cases decided under the Employment Contracts Act 
1991 were for unjustifiable dismissal (75 percent of all personal grievances that the 
Employment Tribunal determined in 1997).
160
 Under the previous Labour Relations Act 
1987, reinstatement was the primary remedy in unjustifiable dismissal cases.
161
 Under s 
228 of the Labour Relations Act 1987, if the Grievance Committee or Labour Court 
found that the worker did have a personal grievance then, wherever practicable, 
reinstatement had to be awarded under s 227(a). In contrast, under the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991 reinstatement was no longer the primary remedy but was one of a 
number of possible remedies available to be awarded by the Employment Tribunal.
162
 
Where the Employment Tribunal or the Employment Court determined that an employee 
had a personal grievance they may have awarded reinstatement. Therefore, the 
Employment Tribunal had discretion as to whether to order reinstatement if an 
unjustifiable dismissal had been proved. As reinstatement was no longer a primary 
                                                             
160
 See Table 5.2 above. 
161
 Labour Relations Act 1987, s 228 stated that: reimbursement was to be a primary remedy – (1) Where 
(a) the remedies sought by or on behalf of a worker in respect of a personal grievance include reinstatement 
(as described in section 227(a) of this Act); and (b) it is determined that the worker did have a personal 
grievance – the Grievance Committee or the Labour Court shall, whether or not it provides for any of the 
other remedies provided for in s 227 of the Act, provide, wherever practicable, for reinstatement in 
accordance with section 227(a) of this Act. 
162
 Employment Contracts Act, s 40 stated that: remedies – (1) where the Tribunal or the Court determines 
that an employee has a personal grievance it may, in settling the grievance, provide for any one or more of 
the following remedies: 
…(b) reinstatement of the employee in the employee‟s former position or the placement of the employee in 
a position no less advantageous to the employee….  
In England reinstatement was the primary remedy in cases of unfair dismissal, and if this was not 
appropriate re-engagement (i.e., reappointment to a comparable position with the same or associated 
employer) was an alternative remedy, as was compensation. See the Employment Protection Act 1976 
(UK). 
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remedy in unjustifiable dismissal claims under the Employment Contracts Act 1991, it 
was interesting to determine how many employees still sought and were awarded 
reinstatement.  
5.4.7(B) REINSTATEMENT 
 
Table 5.31: Reinstatement Sought and Granted 
 Reinstatements 
Reinstatement Sought 16 
Reinstatement Granted 5 
Total Number of Unjustifiable Dismissals
163
 337 
 
Table 5.31 shows of a significant total of unjustifiable dismissal claims, only a small 
proportion sought reinstatement. Out of the fraction seeking this remedy, only five 
reinstatements were granted. This may have been for a variety of reasons such as 
applicants believing that reinstatement was not a viable option depending on the 
circumstances of the dismissal and the nature or context of the work environment.
164
 
Further, dismissed employees had a duty to mitigate their loss by seeking alternative 
employment.
165
 It may also have been that some of those who sought reinstatement were 
using this potential remedy as a tactic to encourage the employer to settle the claim with 
higher compensation. The latter view was held by some adjudicators who took into 
                                                             
163
 In this table, unjustifiable dismissal includes claims of constructive dismissal, unjustifiable 
dismissal/constructive dismissal, unjustifiable dismissal/procedural fairness, unjustifiable 
dismissal/unjustifiable action and unjustifiable dismissal. 
164
 For adjudicator comments on reinstatement see Chapter 6.4.12(a). For comments from parties and their 
representatives on remedies sought and granted see Chapter 7.5.8 and 7.6.3. 
165
 General Motors Ltd v Lilomaiava [1997] ICJ 109. See also Schollum v Andrew, unreported, AEC 45/96. 
In Edwards v Society of Graphical and Allied Trades [1970] 1 All ER 905, 910, Buckley J stated that a 
dismissed employee must diligently try to find other similar employment „of a kind which he can 
reasonably be expected to accept having regard to his standing, experience and his personal history‟. See 
Chapter 2.4.4(a). See also Mazengarb’s Employment Law (NZ) ERA 128.4. 
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account whether the claim for reinstatement was real, or simply a tactic when 
determining whether to order reinstatement.
166
 Another potential reason why employees 
eschewed reinstatement was the possibility of delay in a personal grievance being heard 
and the outcome being determined. Whether there was a significant delay in hearing 
claims for reinstatement could have depended on whether the Employment Tribunal gave 
priority to personal grievances that involved claims for reinstatement. Alastair 
Dumbleton, Chief of the Employment Tribunal for the duration of its existence, 
indicated:
167
 
As an exercise of discretion rather than firm policy the tribunal in some cases did bump some 
reinstatement cases up the queue to give them an earlier hearing. Obviously we would look at the 
merits of each case taking into account factors such as a recent dismissal and no delay by applicant 
in applying; genuineness of wish to be reinstated; and realistic chance of reinstatement if dismissal 
was later found to be unjustified. Sometimes the Court told us to give priority where they had 
ordered interim reinstatement. It was reasonably rare though for this to happen. 
 
Whilst reinstatement was no longer the primary remedy for dismissed employees under 
the Employment Contracts Act 1991, it was still a remedy which was available, which 
few employees sought. This may have been due to the delay in receiving a hearing date, 
or could have been due to reinstatement not being an appropriate remedy under the 
circumstances. Alternatively, as employees were obliged to mitigate their loss, suitable 
alternative employment may have been found.  
                                                             
166
 For a discussion of adjudicators‟ views of reinstatement and what they took into account when 
determining whether or not to order it, see Chapter 6.4.12(a). 
167
 Personal Correspondence between Linda Beck and Alastair Dumbleton, re Prioritisation of 
Reinstatement Claims in the Employment Tribunal, 17 September 2004. This was also confirmed by 
personal correspondence with Deborah Downie, Secretary of the Employment Tribunal, 27 September 
2004.  
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5.4.7(C) TOTAL REMEDIES 
 
Table 5.32: Total Average Remedies168 
 Auckland Hamilton Wellington Christchurch Dunedin Total 
Average 
Total 
Sought 
N 
$41,922 
 
122 
$52,301 
 
28 
$31,258 
 
59 
$39,133 
 
94 
$22,084 
 
10 
$39,369 
 
313 
Total 
Granted 
N 
$6,768 
 
141 
$7,118 
 
28 
$6,146 
 
60 
$4,338 
 
96 
$6,723 
 
10 
$6,031 
 
335 
Remedies sought Significance: .83, Eta: .069 Remedies granted Significance: .231, Eta: .13 
The above table shows that the average amount of remedies sought in Hamilton was 
higher than in any other jurisdiction. Statistically, this was because there were fewer 
cases heard in Hamilton, and three significantly higher than average claims skewed the 
figures. The figures also show that overall there was a substantial disparity between 
remedies sought and granted. There could have been several reasons for this disparity. It 
may have been due to:  
 representatives submitting unrealistically large claims;  
 unrealistic expectations of employees which may have been enhanced by 
representatives; 
 the nature of the claim or the facts of the case;  
 value judgments of the adjudicators and their differing backgrounds; 
 adjudicators adopting a compromise solution between the differing interests of 
both parties; 
 contributory fault; and 
 mitigation. 
 
                                                             
168
 Total average remedies comprised of all remedies sought and granted in adjudication, including 
compensation, recovery of wages, recovery of wages lost, holiday pay, loss of benefit etc. It should be 
noted that detailed figures of remedies sought and granted were not always stated and therefore the 
information available only reflects what details are provided in the decisions.  
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It was a strong possibility that the nature of a personal grievance taken could have had an 
impact on the remedies granted. For example, a clear-cut unjustifiable dismissal may 
have led to a more substantial remedy.
169
  
Table 5.33: Percentage Awarded by Individual Adjudicators 
 Total Sought Total Granted Percentage awarded 
Adj 1 
N 
$56,089.19 $3,725.80 7% 
Adj 2 
N 
$23,499.00 $5,209.00 22% 
Adj 3 
N 
$34,396.08 $8,077.26 23% 
Adj 4 
N 
$33,013.76 $4,273.72 13% 
Adj 5 
N 
$57,332.58 $9,719.52 17% 
Adj 6 
N 
$10,846.13 $2,615.25 24% 
Adj 7 
N 
$24,732.07 $5,043.67 20% 
Adj 8 
N 
$34,250.87 $4,318.35 13% 
 
Table 5.33 shows that the adjudicator determining the outcome of the personal grievance 
could have had an impact on the outcome of the case in terms of financial settlements. To 
determine this, only adjudicators who adjudicated more than 12 cases were considered to 
ensure confidentiality was taken into account. To illustrate the variation between 
adjudicators, Table 5.33 shows the total amounts granted as a percentage of the total 
sought. Interestingly, the adjudicator who was asked by applicants for the second highest 
amount in total remedies, awarded the lowest proportion of all adjudicators – awarding 
only seven percent of the total remedies sought. Conversely, the adjudicator who was 
asked by applicants for the second lowest of total remedies, awarded the highest 
                                                             
169
 For adjudicators‟ approaches to remedies, see Chapter 6.4.12. 
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percentage of claims – 24 percent of what was sought.170 Again, it is possible that a 
reason for the variation in remedies granted by different adjudicators related to the 
amount of contributory fault attributed to the applicant.
171
 
 
The adjudicator who awarded the least percentage of total remedies sought believed that 
you could have more than 50 percent contributory fault, and in an interview stated:  
I must admit I‟m sceptical of some of the court decisions…which say that 50% is a very high 
measure of contribution, because that means the employee is equally culpable as the employer, 
and such awards should be rare. I‟ve gone over 50% because I think the practical reality is that 
sometimes employees probably deserved to be dismissed for their conduct but the employer has 
made some mistake along the way which has led to a rather lucky finding of unjustifiable 
dismissal. 
 
This comment clearly illustrates that in certain circumstances this adjudicator was 
prepared to reduce remedies awarded substantially and on occasion more than 50 percent, 
which could explain why there is such a disparity between remedies sought and granted 
for this particular adjudicator. Similarly, the adjudicator who awarded the second lowest 
percentage of remedies sought also believed that there could be more than 50 percent 
reduction in remedies granted as a result of contributory fault. 
I was in private practice before ACC came in and I‟ve still got the old habit of 25% chunks so it‟s 
25, 50, 75, 100, and I‟ve always been quite liberal in seeing contribution, despite what the Chief 
Judge has said in different cases. 
 
Arguably, the approach taken by this adjudicator could have resulted in some financial 
disadvantage to the applicant, as 25 percent blocks is an arbitrary measure. While this 
adjudicator may have found this to be a very useful measure of contributory fault, it may 
                                                             
170
 Couch notes that (with respect to costs) while individual adjudicators are consistent, there was wide 
variation between adjudicators. See Couch, above n 100, 135. 
171
 For a discussion of how contributory fault could affect remedies granted, see para 5.4.7 
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not have taken into account all aspects of contribution nor been sensitive to subtle 
differences.
172
 This approach contrasts with the principles set out by the Court, where 
remedies affected by the contributory fault of the employee should have been reduced in 
an equitable manner.
173
 
 
Adjudicators were also asked in interviews how their approach to awarding remedies was 
affected by a perception that unreasonable remedies were being sought. Both of the 
adjudicators above took a negative view of unrealistic claims, with one stating that such 
remedies simply would not be awarded, and the other stating that it probably 
unconsciously biased adjudicators against the applicant as they might wonder what their 
motives were.
174
 
 
As Table 5.33 included all remedies sought and granted, another possible reason for the 
disparity could have been that some applicants, when seeking recovery of wages lost, 
may have claimed a higher rate of recovery than three months and adjudicators were 
reluctant to use their discretion to grant recovery of wages lost beyond three months.
175
  
5.4.7(D) THE EFFECT OF CONTRIBUTORY FAULT ON REMEDIES 
 
Contributory fault has not been included as a specific category in the database because it 
was too difficult to measure, as it was not always clear from the decisions what amount 
had been attributed to contributory fault and consequently reduced from the awarded 
                                                             
172
 For a more detailed discussion of adjudicators‟ views on awarding remedies see Chapter 6.4.12. 
173
 See Chapter 2.4.4(d). 
174
 Ibid. 
175
 For a discussion of this see para 5.4.6(a) and Chapter 6.4.12(b). 
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remedies.
176
 It is important to note, however, that contributory fault was relevant to all 
potential remedies and not just to recovery of wages lost.
177
 In Ark Aviation Ltd v 
Newton, the Court of Appeal stated that:
178
 
[a] contract of employment is a special relationship under which workers and employers have 
mutual obligations of confidence, trust and fair dealing…An employee guilty of a fundamental 
breach of those contractual obligations arguably cannot be said under s40(1) to have lost wages or 
other money or any benefit, or under s 41(1)(b) to have lost remuneration, as a result of a personal 
grievance. If that is so, no obligation to order reimbursement arises at all. Nor would reinstatement 
or compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity or injury to feelings, both of which are 
discretionary remedies, be appropriate.  
 
The Court also held that:
179
 
 
[w]hile it is not strictly in issue in the present case we should make it clear that we do not rule out 
the possibility that in some situations misconduct of an employee only discovered after a dismissal 
may be so egregious as to require the discretion to provide for a remedy under s 40(2) not to be 
exercised at all in favour of the employee whose grievance has been established. We have in mind 
deliberate and serious misconduct by an employee, which significantly affects the employer, and 
which amounts to a serious abuse of the trust and confidence that underpins the relationship. 
 
This means that in some circumstances although a personal grievance may have been 
proved, the employee‟s conduct may have been so damaging to the relationship of trust 
and confidence between the parties, that the employee was not entitled to receive 
compensation under the Employment Contracts Act 1991.
180
 This is so, even where the 
damaging conduct occurred separately from the incident(s) that resulted in a legitimate 
                                                             
176
 See above n 3 and accompanying text. 
177
 For a discussion on contributory fault, see Chapter 2.4.4(d). 
178
 [2002] 2 NZLR 145, 156 per Gault, Blanchard, and McGrath JJ. The practice of making „nil awards‟ 
was an already established practice in the Employment Court in cases where the contributory conduct of 
the employee warranted such a reduction of remedies despite a personal grievance having been established. 
See Finsec v Australian Mutual Provident Society [1992] 1 ERNZ 280; COMPASS Union of NZ Inc v 
Foodstuffs (Auckland) Ltd [1992] 3 ERNZ 16; Finau v Carter Holt Building Supplies [1993] 2 ERNZ 971. 
See also M Hawkesby, „A Pyrrhic Victory‟ [1998] ELB 67. 
179
 Ark Aviation Ltd v Newton [2002] 2 NZLR 145, 155. 
180
 In Bishop v Cambridge Cosmopolitan Club Inc, unreported, 26 November 1996, AEC 78/96, Travis J 
affirmed this approach by commenting that in this case, the actions of the employee „justified a finding that 
the appellant was totally responsible for the situation that led to his dismissal.‟ 
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personal grievance. Gordon Anderson commented that the Court of Appeal was moving 
toward a stance that there would be no personal grievance or that remedies would be 
reduced to nil where – following a post-dismissal investigation – an employer could 
prove a breach of contract which if known at the time would have justified the 
dismissal.
181
 Interviews with adjudicators revealed that in relation to contributory fault, 
they took different approaches and disagreed in a number of areas, including the 
directions of the Court and whether they should be followed.
182
 In particular, adjudicators 
disagreed as to whether you could have more than 50 percent contributory fault. This 
contrasts with the decisions discussed above, where the Court established that remedies 
could be reduced by 100 percent. 
5.4.8 COSTS 
 
Under s 98 of the Employment Contracts Act 1991, the Employment Tribunal had the 
discretion to make an order for the award of reasonable costs to any party.
183
 Determining 
the level of costs sought from and granted by the Employment Tribunal represented a 
measure of whether there was an access barrier for employees wishing to take a personal 
grievance. For instance, it may have been that the ultimate cost of taking a personal 
grievance was prohibitive in cases where parties were required to meet all or part of the 
costs associated with it. Thus, the significant costs such as lodging fees, witness 
expenses, and costs of representation could have had a negative financial impact on the 
applicant, even if successful in establishing a personal grievance. For example, the 
                                                             
181
 G Anderson, Recent Case Comment, „EC Act, ss 40 and 41 – Personal Grievance – Reduction of 
Remedies – Ark Aviation v Newton‟ [2001] 7 ELB 133.  
182
 See Chapters 2.4.4(d) and 6.4.12(e) for further discussion on contributory fault.  
183
 For a discussion of this discretion see Chapter 2.4.3(d). 
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Employment Tribunal may have ordered costs to lie where they fell so that the employee 
may still have been burdened with legal costs.
184
 It was also possible that unsuccessful 
employees may have had costs awarded against them.  
Table 5.34: Average costs sought and granted 
 Auckland Hamilton Wellington Christchurch Dunedin Total 
Average 
Costs 
Sought 
N 
$2,885 
 
22 
$8,098 
 
6 
$5,126 
 
26 
$4,695 
 
42 
$4,717 
 
6 
$4,616 
 
102 
Costs 
Granted 
N 
$1,080 
 
27 
$2,539 
 
7 
$1,984 
 
28 
$2,517 
 
49 
$1,783 
 
6 
$2,021 
 
117 
Percentage 37% 31% 39% 53% 38% - 
Costs sought Significance: .258, Eta: .23 Costs granted Significance: .759, Eta .128 
It should be noted that of all the Hamilton cases reported, only six recorded costs awards. 
In addition, one of the claims made in Hamilton was significantly larger than the national 
average; hence the costs statistic for this jurisdiction was inflated. This table shows that 
generally, costs granted were less than half of the amount of costs sought. In Binnie v 
Pacific Health Limited the Court of Appeal held that in determining the level of costs to 
be awarded against the respondent, a general starting point was 66 percent contribution to 
costs or two-thirds.
185
 Assuming the costs sought by applicants in Table 4.34 were an 
accurate representation of the costs incurred by employees, the cost of taking a personal 
grievance could have been seen as substantial from the perspective of a dismissed 
employee.
186
 This was further exacerbated by the court practice of awarding significantly 
less than the costs claimed. 
 
                                                             
184
 As noted above, parties were partly successful if they were not awarded all of what they sought. This 
included costs sought and granted. 
185
 Binnie v Pacific Health Ltd [2002] 1 ERNZ 438, per Keith, Tipping and Glazebrook JJ. 
186
 See Chapter 6.5.8 for a discussion of employee responses to the cost of lodging a personal grievance. 
 274 
Adjudicators were asked whether they took the following factors into account when 
awarding costs: 
 how the case was conducted;  
 how the parties acted;  
 the significance of the case to the parties;  
 preparation time;  
 arguments lacking substance;  
 legalistic/technical arguments; and  
 actual costs.  
 
Adjudicators‟ responses were varied as to what weight they gave to these factors or 
whether they took them into account at all. However, all adjudicators agreed that if any 
factor extended the hearing time unnecessarily, they would take it into account when 
awarding costs.
187
 
Table 5.35: Length of Hearing and Average Costs Sought and Granted  
Length of Hearing (days) Costs Sought Costs Granted Percentage 
0.5 
N 
$4,527 
3 
$1,083 
3 
24% 
1 
N 
$2,576 
43 
$984 
59 
38% 
2 
N 
$6,199 
16 
$2,602 
16 
42% 
3 
N 
$7,453 
5 
$2,197 
6 
29% 
Costs sought significance: .000, Eta: .549                   Costs granted significance: .000, Eta: .525  
  
                                                             
187
 For a more detailed discussion of adjudicators‟ views on costs, see Chapter 6.8. 
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Table 5.35 shows the average costs sought by applicants in the differing lengths of 
hearings.188 The table shows that in hearings lasting half a day, applicants sought and 
were granted proportionately higher costs than in hearings lasting one day. This was 
likely a result of few hearings lasting half a day, skewing the results. In adjudications that 
lasted two days average costs sought were $6,199, while in adjudications lasting three 
days, average costs sought were $7,453. However, the average costs awarded for hearings 
of two days exceeded those awarded for hearings of three days. Small numbers may have 
affected these results. The data collected is incomplete as not all decisions of the 
Employment Tribunal have fully recorded costs sought and granted.
189
 Therefore, a 
significant amount of weight cannot be given to the above data as the sample was not 
large. 
                                                             
188
 In this Table and Table 5.36 below, „No. of cases‟ refers to the number of cases where costs information 
was available from the decisions. 
189
 See above n 3 and accompanying text. 
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Table 5.36: Occupational Class of Applicant and Average Costs Sought and 
Granted190   
Occupational Class (combined) Costs sought Costs granted Percentage 
Professional, 
Administration and 
Clerical workers 
Mean $6586.03 $3738.64 57% 
N 25 29  
Service and sales workers Mean $3273.42 $1256.30 38% 
N 29 30  
Farmers and trades 
workers 
Mean $5126.86 $1819.31 35% 
N 21 26  
Operators and labourers Mean $3254.75 $1249.16 38% 
N 16 18  
Total Mean $4607.91 $2096.08 45% 
N 91 103  
Sig: .328 
Eta: .320 
Sig: .478 
Eta: .274 
 
 
Table 5.36 shows the occupational class of applicants and the average costs sought by 
applicants and granted by the Employment Tribunal. Again, this table has limited value 
as in many instances the detail of costs sought and granted was not included in either the 
substantive decisions or costs decisions. As a result, this means that little weight can be 
given to the above averages as the information obtainable from the database was limited 
and therefore the averages may not give an entirely accurate picture of applicant costs 
sought and granted. In addition, in some occupational classes there is no information as to 
applicant costs sought and granted. In the professional category there was no information 
as to costs sought, but some limited information as to costs granted was available.  
 
                                                             
190
 For the average costs sought and granted based on original classifications of occupational classes, see 
Appendix IX. 
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Further, it may be possible to infer that personal grievances involving management and 
management/general classes were more complex and therefore attracted higher levels of 
costs sought and granted than other occupational classes.
191
 
5.4.8(A) AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL AID 
 
For personal grievances brought under the Employment Contracts Act 1991, legal aid was 
available to parties depending on their financial circumstances.
192
 If an unsuccessful party 
to a personal grievance was in receipt of legal aid, the costs awarded against that party 
were limited to the amount of the contribution required of them by the Legal Services 
Board, unless exceptional circumstances existed.
193
 Legal aid was available for the 
adjudication process and appeals to the Employment Court, and also extended to the 
mediation process offered by the Employment Tribunal.
194
 Legal aid was not readily 
available under the previous Labour Relations Act 1987 as the process was generally 
confined to union members.
195
 Applicants bringing personal grievances were therefore 
usually represented by unions and no legal costs would have been incurred. However, 
union members could have opted to engage the services of private legal representation; 
alternatively, it may have been that employees were exempt from union membership and 
thus incurred their own legal costs.
196
 
                                                             
191
 See Table 5.18 above and accompanying text. 
192
 Legal Services Act 1991, ss 28–31. For discussion on the merits of the Legal Aid system see B V Harris, 
„Equal Access to Justice: A Constitutional Principle in Need of a Higher Profile‟, [1995] NZL Rev 282, 
302-4. See also Chapter 8.2.3(a).  
193
 Legal Services Act 1991, s 86(2). For a discussion of this see Chapter 2.4.3(d), and for a discussion of 
adjudicators‟ views on the exceptional circumstances rule, see Chapter 6.8.13. 
194
 Legal Services Act 1991, s 19; Employment Contracts Act 1991, ss 78 & 79. 
195
 Labour Relations Act 1987, sch 7, cl 2, 3 & 4. 
196
 Labour Relations Act 1987, ss 82–3. Union members could apply for exemption from union 
membership on the grounds of genuine objections to becoming or remaining a union member. See Chapter 
6.8 for adjudicator‟s comments relating to legal aid and costs. 
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Under s 28 of the Legal Services Act 1991, an applicant could be eligible for legal aid if 
their disposable income for the 12 months immediately preceding the personal grievance 
did not exceed that stipulated by the District Sub-committee of the Legal Services Board 
and the applicant did not have disposable capital such that it appeared they could proceed 
without legal aid.
197
 Disposable capital was the total assets of an applicant after any debts 
secured against those assets and the following interests were deducted: interest in a home; 
interest in a motor vehicle used principally as that person‟s means of transport for 
domestic purposes; value in chattels; contingent liabilities which may mature in the next 
six months; actual debts; and amount prescribed for dependent children, spouse or other 
relatives.  
 
Interest in a home, a motor vehicle or chattels could also be taken into account if in the 
opinion of the District Sub-committee it would be inequitable not to include those assets. 
The above criteria restricted eligibility for legal aid. This therefore could have presented 
an issue of access to the personal grievance adjudication process for many potential 
applicants who may have been ineligible for legal aid. A further restriction was the fact 
that the resources of spouses and parents could be taken into account in determining 
eligibility. This meant that even if an applicant had insufficient resources and may have 
qualified for legal aid, the resources of their partner and family might have barred access 
to legal representation, regardless of the type or quality of relationship with the spouse or 
parents. 
                                                             
197
 Legal Services Act 1991, ss 28 and 29. 
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The database of all Employment Tribunal decisions from 1997 established as part of this 
research contained limited information about applicants who had received legal aid. This 
was due to the fact that decisions did not always clearly identify whether applicants were 
in receipt of legal aid.
198
 A tiny proportion of decisions did identify legal aid recipients 
but the number was so small that this cannot be seen as a representative sample nor could 
it be accurately analysed in comparison with other research.
199
 
5.4.9  TIME FACTORS 
 
A potential concern for those using the personal grievance system was the time delay 
between a personal grievance arising and the hearing of the case, and then the delay in 
the decision being provided by the adjudicator. This delay was contrary to the expressed 
purpose of the legislative provision.
200
 
Table 5.37: Average Wait from Event Precipitating Personal Grievance to Hearing 
(Months) 
Jurisdiction Auckland Hamilton Wellington Christchurch Dunedin Total 
Time in 
months 
16.98 15.91 17.15 15.04 15.41 16.43 
N 150 31 51 82 12 326 
Significance: .418, Eta: .098 
Table 5.37 shows the time lapse until the hearing was considerable. In comparison, in the 
Industrial Tribunal in England, the majority of applications (31 percent) took more than 
                                                             
198
 See above n 3 and accompanying text. 
199
 It was only possible to determine from the decisions that legal aid was granted in five cases.  
200
 See above n 2. 
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eight weeks and less than three months from application to hearing.
201
 Only three percent 
of applications took more than six months and less than nine months to reach a 
hearing.
202
 The distinction between the two systems was significant. This may have been 
because there was a backlog of personal grievances for the Employment Tribunal that 
occurred under the Labour Relations Act 1987.
203
  
 
Reinstatement may not, therefore, have been a practical remedy. If the applicant had 
sought reinstatement, by the time the hearing was conducted, let alone the decision made, 
it was often impractical for reinstatement to be granted as the position in question may 
have already been filled by a new employee. The Employment Court has commented that 
caution was essential when considering the practicalities of immediate reinstatement, 
particularly where the employee had been out of work for a considerable length of time, 
or where the position was a specialist one where there were a limited number of 
employees.
204
 The Employment Court was concerned that a smooth transition of 
reinstatement should occur, for both the employee and the employer. As discussed above, 
on occasion the Employment Tribunal did give priority to cases where reinstatement was 
a remedy sought. However, this did not occur frequently.
205
  
                                                             
201
 Linda Dickens, Michael Jones, Brian Weekes and Moira Hart, Dismissed: A Study of Unfair Dismissal 
and the Industrial Tribunal System, (1985) 201. 
202
 Ibid. 
203
 See Chapter 2.5. It should also be noted that eligibility to take a claim for unfair dismissal was limited to 
employees who had been employed for one year‟s continuous service (or for two years if there were less 
than 20 workers employed); that the employee was not past retirement age (which was 60 for women and 
65 for men); and the definition of dismissal did not include where an employer terminated a contract, did 
not renew a fixed term contract, or constructive dismissal. See Linda Dickens, Michael Jones, Brian 
Weekes and Moira Hart, Dismissed: A Study of Unfair Dismissal and the Industrial Tribunal System, 
(1985) 19. 
204
 Port of Tauranga Ltd v Youard [1999] 2 ERNZ 553, 562. 
205
 See above n 167 and accompanying text. 
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Further, if an applicant was in serious financial difficulty and was dependant on receiving 
wages lost, the delay could have caused unnecessary hardship. A significant stress for 
applicants was simply that the issue was not being resolved.
206
 If the personal grievance 
complained of was of a sensitive nature, for example sexual harassment, the delay was 
less than ideal.
207
  
 
An additional issue for employees could have been that if they successfully obtained new 
employment, their compensation may have been reduced.
208
 Alternatively, it may not 
have been possible for an employee to obtain further employment as Employment 
Tribunal hearings and decisions were publicly accessible and the fact that they had taken 
a personal grievance was a matter of public record that sometimes attracted media 
attention. A potential issue for respondent employers with prolonged delay from the date 
the personal grievance occurred to the date of the hearing was the potential for high 
awards for lost wages up until the date of hearing. This could have been exacerbated if an 
employer had chosen to employ someone to fill the position and was therefore 
responsible for the payment of two employees for the same period of time. Adjudicators 
gave varied reasons as to why they believed delays occurred.
209
 
 
 
                                                             
206
 For a discussion of responses from employees regarding the question of delays and the cost of taking a 
personal grievance, see Chapter 7.5.8. 
207
 See Chapter 6.4.10 for discussion on the impacts of delay. 
208
 It should be noted that employees were required to mitigate their loss by trying to find alternative 
employment, „… of a kind which he can reasonably be expected to accept, having regard to his standing, 
his experience and his personal history.‟ Edwards v S.O.G.A.T. [1970] 1 All ER 905, 911, per Buckley J. 
For a useful summary of case-law, see Schollum v Andrew, unreported, AEC 45/96. See also Personal 
Grievances, paragraph 11.13A. 
209
 See Chapter 6.4.10 for discussion on the issue of delays. 
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Table 5.38: Average Length of Hearing (Days) 
Jurisdiction Auckland Hamilton Wellington Christchurch Dunedin Average 
Length 
Length in 
Days 
N 
1.48 
 
160 
1.29 
 
31 
2.20 
 
58 
1.48 
 
91 
2 
 
12 
1.60 
 
352 
Significance: .001, Eta: .237 
 
The length of the hearing may have been a significant issue for parties, especially in 
regards to the resulting representation cost if a hearing was protracted. In comparison to 
Table 5.38 above, 61 percent of applicants surveyed in England said that their hearing in 
the Industrial Tribunal took half a day or less, while 29 percent said that their hearing 
took between half a day and one day.
210
 Only eight percent said that their hearing took 
between one and a half and two days, while only three percent said that the hearing took 
more than two days.
211
 It can be seen that hearings in the New Zealand Employment 
Tribunal were generally longer on average than those in the English Industrial Tribunal. 
In the Industrial Tribunal, if a case was not completed within a day, long delays could 
have resulted between the day of hearing and the later continued hearing.
212
 This was 
because the Industrial Tribunal used part-time chairpersons and lay members on an ad 
hoc basis, which meant that it may have been difficult for members to find a mutually 
acceptable date to reconvene.
213
 Potential difficulties with reconvening may have been a 
positive incentive for the Industrial Tribunal to resolve the case within a day.  
 
                                                             
210
 Linda Dickens, Michael Jones, Brian Weekes and Moira Hart, Dismissed: A Study of Unfair Dismissal 
and the Industrial Tribunal System, (1985) 205. 
211
 Ibid. 
212
 Ibid. 
213
 Ibid. 
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Hearings in Wellington were on average the longest, although the disparities were not 
significant. It is possible that Wellington had slightly longer hearings because of the case 
management system used there, where a significant number of personal grievance claims 
were resolved without the necessity for adjudication to occur at all or for preliminary 
matters to have been resolved prior to adjudication.
214
 It was therefore possible that the 
remaining material being heard at adjudication in Wellington was more complex in 
nature and thus took more time. Another possibility was that as most public sector cases 
were adjudicated in Wellington and their content may have been more complicated, this 
resulted in prolonged hearings.
215
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
214
 See Chapter 5.4.9, where case management is discussed in relation to caseload. 
215
 Fifty-seven percent of all public sector grievances were heard in Wellington. See Table 5.11 above. 
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Table 5.39: Occupational Class and Length of Hearing 
NZ Census categorisation of Occupational Class Average Length of 
hearing (days) 
Frequency 
Legislators, Administrators and Managers 1.85 31 
Professionals 1.94 31 
Technicians and associate professionals 1.62 50 
Clerical workers 1.52 23 
Sales and Service workers 1.41 86 
Farm workers 1.81 27 
Trades workers 1.52 33 
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 1.82 37 
Elementary occupations 1.00 17 
Total 1.61 335 
Significance: .175, Eta: .185 
 
Table 5.39 shows that personal grievances taken by professional employees tended to last 
the longest, and would therefore use up most representative time, and therefore cost 
more. Further to this, personal grievances brought by public sector employees took the 
longest lasting an average of 2.64 days. Hearings for those employed in the voluntary 
sector and health sector also took longer, with average hearing times of 2.50 and 2.43 
days respectively. One reason for the extended hearing times in these areas of personal 
grievances may have been the complexities of the cases. For example, a public sector 
personal grievance may have had extraneous circumstances to consider under the State 
Sector Act 1988 in addition to obligations under the Employment Contracts Act 1991.
216
  
                                                             
216
 Based on the data in Table I, Appendix IX. 
 285 
Another possible financial issue for applicants wishing to take a personal grievance was 
the cost of representation. As determined in NZ Airline Pilots Assn v Registrar of 
Unions
217
 a general „rule of thumb‟ regarding the cost of preparation time was that 
preparation for litigation is approximately twice to threefold the time spent in court.
218
 In 
the absence of accurate information as to the actual time reasonably expended in 
preparation, that „rule of thumb‟ was the only reliable indicator. Therefore, the disparities 
between length of hearing in each centre could have affected the preparation time and 
hence the cost of representation, as the longer the hearing, the greater the preparation 
time and consequently the higher the assumed cost. Given that there was a significant gap 
between costs sought and granted,
219
 the „rule of thumb‟ used may have been 
disadvantageous to those whose actual costs were significantly higher but could not be 
shown. Therefore, if a representative needed to take more time depending on the nature 
and complexity of the case, the application of the general „rule of thumb‟ could have 
resulted in insufficient costs being awarded and the party bearing the extra cost.
220
  
 
 
A possible issue for employers was the cost of their absence from their place of work 
during hearing time. If employers had to pay for representation as well as appear at the 
                                                             
217
 [1989] 2 NZILR 550. 
218
 NZ Airline Pilots Assn v Registrar of Unions [1989] 2 NZILR 550, 551-552, and Okeby v Computer 
Associates (NZ) Ltd [1994] 1 ERNZ 613. In Airline Pilots and in Reid v Fire Service Commission [1995] 2 
ERNZ 38, Goddard CJ identified other factors to be considered in awarding costs, including the complexity 
of the case, the length of the hearing and preparation time. See also G Anderson, B Banks, J Hughes, K 
Johnston, M Leggat, and P Roth (eds) Employment Law Guide 4
th
 Edition (1998) 832–836. 
219
 See Table 5.34 above. 
220
 However, see above n 217, which notes that in awarding costs other factors such as the complexity of 
the case, the length of the hearing and preparation time could also be considered at the discretion of the 
court. 
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hearing this could have resulted in increased costs both to themselves and possibly to 
their business. Therefore, length of hearing was also a significant issue for employers. 
 
Table 5.40: Average Time Lapse Between Hearing and Decision (Days) 
Jurisdiction Auckland Hamilton Wellington Christchurch Dunedin Total 
Average 
Days 
N 
73.12 
159 
64.45 
31 
52.93 
74 
39.39 
94 
131.54 
13 
61.87 
371 
Significance: .001, Eta: .228 
Table 5.40 shows the average time lapse between the date of hearing and the date of the 
decision in each jurisdictional centre. Whilst Dunedin shows the longest time lapse, it 
should be noted that five of the thirteen Dunedin cases were very protracted. Of note is 
the fact that the Christchurch jurisdiction had the highest caseload per adjudicator but the 
shortest average delay in the decision being issued.
221
 The Auckland jurisdiction had the 
highest number of cases and adjudicators but had the longest delay (apart from Dunedin) 
in decisions being issued. Again, this could have had unnecessary adverse effects on the 
parties involved. If the personal grievance had been an unjustifiable dismissal claim, the 
applicant may have been unable to obtain any further employment and the financial 
consequences in the intervening period may have been significant. There may have been 
a real need for compensation to be made available at an early opportunity. Delay in the 
decision could have caused further financial problems regarding the cost of 
representation: if costs had not been awarded at an early stage it may have been that some 
representatives placed pressure on clients to meet costs. If an applicant had sought 
reinstatement as a remedy and there was a significant delay in the decision being issued, 
                                                             
221
 See Table 5.11 above. 
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this could have resulted in three possible consequences: financial hardship for the 
applicant; the position they were seeking reinstatement to may subsequently have been 
filled; and after a lengthy delay it may have become difficult to re-establish a working 
relationship with the employer.
222
  
 
Delay in the decision could also have caused considerable uncertainty for both parties as 
to the outcome of the personal grievance. The employee may have had financial interests 
in the personal grievance being settled early as well as an emotional interest, while the 
employer would have experienced uncertainty over the possible organisation of the 
workplace, possible emotional consequences, and concern as to the financial implications 
for their business. 
 
As mentioned above, it can be seen that Christchurch had the highest average caseload 
annually and the shortest average delay between the hearing and the date of decision.
223
 
These two findings are consistent as a shorter delay between the date of hearing and date 
of decision may have resulted in the potential for more personal grievances to be heard 
thus resulting in a higher caseload. The shorter average delay in Christchurch may have 
been due to the type of occupational classes the parties came from, which could have 
reduced the complexity of the cases being heard there. As shown in Table 5.5, 
Christchurch adjudicators heard proportionately fewer white collar claims than Auckland 
                                                             
222
 See above Table 5.37, n 202 and related text for a discussion on the practicalities of immediate 
reinstatement. Interim reinstatement was also a potential remedy: see X & Y Ltd v NZ Stock Exchange 
[1992] 1 ERNZ 863 and Chapter 2.4.4(e). 
223
 See Table 5.12 above and related text. 
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and Wellington, where the delay was longer in decisions being produced.
224
 Hearings in 
Christchurch also took less time than those in Wellington and Dunedin, which may be 
indicative of the nature of the claims and consequently the time taken in hearing cases.
225
  
Table 5.41: Representation and Average Wait from Grievance to Hearing (Months) 
 Advocate Counsel Self-rep No Appearance 
Applicant 16.86 16.30 11.87 -- 
Respondent 16.08 16.40 18.11 15.51 
 
Table 5.41 shows that the quickest way for an applicant to expedite a personal grievance 
was to represent themselves, although this was not the case for self-represented 
respondents. An employee who chose to be represented would often have to wait for the 
advocate/counsel to take action on their behalf, whereas applicants representing 
themselves may not have experienced such delays.
226
 Another contributing factor to the 
longer delay for those applicants who were represented was the availability of 
representatives.
227
 Some adjudicators took the view that the delays experienced by 
represented parties could be due to protracted correspondence between representatives as 
well as contingency representatives
228
 delaying the process to increase their fees.
229
 
 
                                                             
224
 See Table 5.5 above. 
225
 See Table 5.38 above. 
226
 See Chapters 6.4.10 and 7.5.6 for discussion on time factors. The same thing was found in the Industrial 
Tribunal in England, that when a person was self-represented they experienced less delay than if they had 
specialist representation. See Linda Dickens, Michael Jones, Brian Weekes and Moira Hart, Dismissed: A 
Study of Unfair Dismissal and the Industrial Tribunal System, (1985) 201. 
227
 See Chapter 6.4.10. 
228
 Contingency representatives were those who were paid depending on the outcome of the decision, for 
example „no win, no fee‟, as opposed to representatives who would charge possibly by hourly rate, a charge 
for a particular type and length of a job, or take a percentage of remedies awarded. 
229
 See Chapter 6.4.10. 
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The most significant delay between the incident causing the personal grievance to the 
hearing date was for self-represented respondents. The delay for self-represented 
respondents was on average significantly higher than for self-represented applicants. 
There may have been several reasons for this disparity, which could have included the 
unwillingness of respondents to address a personal grievance in the hope that the 
applicant would abandon the personal grievance, or it could have been that it took a self-
represented respondent longer to prepare a response to a personal grievance. This was 
especially so in dismissal cases where the onus was on the respondent to justify their 
actions.
230
 One adjudicator thought that this onus meant that respondents had a harder 
task in defending their actions.
231
 However, it is evident from Table 4.41 that whether 
either party was represented by advocate or counsel made little difference to the delays 
experienced from personal grievance to hearing. 
Table 5.42: Representation and Time Lapse from Hearing to Decision (Days) 
 Advocate Counsel Self-represented 
Applicant 65.92 60.57 29.08 
Respondent 66.07 69.55 24.24 
 
Table 5.42 shows that where parties represented themselves, the time lapse was 
significantly shorter from the date of hearing to the date of decision. This may have been 
due to counsel and advocates advancing more complex legal arguments. Alternatively, 
parties may have chosen to represent themselves where the issues were more 
                                                             
230
 See Wellington Road Transport IUW v Fletcher Construction Ltd [1983] ACJ 653, Auckland City 
Council v Hennessy [1982] ACJ 699 98 and Nelson Air Ltd v NZALPA [1994] 2 ERNZ 665, 668, which all 
discuss the onus of proof on the respondent employer. 
231
 See Chapter 6.4.10 for adjudicator views on time lapse. 
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straightforward, offsetting the need for professional representation. Using advocates 
rather than counsel as representatives was linked to a longer average time lapse for the 
applicant and slightly shorter for the respondent. Again, this may have been due to the 
complexity of the cases themselves or the legalistic potential of counsel. 
5.5 SUMMARY 
 
The data collated and discussed in this chapter has assisted with answering two major 
questions that are the focus of this research: examining the experiences of participants 
using the adjudication system and whether or not the process worked for those 
participants. As can be seen, a number of factors influenced the outcomes and systemic 
efficiency. In addition, analysis of the 1997 case data raised a number of questions that I 
put to Employment Tribunal adjudicators including: the affect of party gender, 
background of adjudicators, hearing location as a variable indicator of outcomes, the 
wide disparity between remedies sought and remedies granted and the restraint pressure 
of Employment Court and Court of Appeal precedent decisions on the level adjudicators 
set remedies at. These are discussed in more depth in Chapter Six, along with the impact 
of delay in setting up hearings and eventual release of decisions. A further factor 
discussed at some length was the rarity of applicants seeking reinstatement, which in 
Chapter Six adjudicators suggested was an option that was often impractical. 
 
The location of the applicant could have caused difficulties if there was not an 
adjudicator based in that area. In that case it would have been necessary either for the 
adjudicator to travel or for the personal grievance to be held in one of the main 
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jurisdictional centres with consequential travel expenses for parties and witnesses. In 
terms of access to justice, the locality of Employment Tribunal hearing facilities 
sometimes caused significant problems including financial constraints.
232
 It was also 
found that location of hearings was related to delay in hearings and production of 
decisions as discussed in Chapter Six. Auckland and Wellington exhibited more delay in 
hearings and there were also locational variations in remedies granted including level of 
compensation, quantum of wage recovery actions and cost awards. The impact of the 
small number of cases in Hamilton and Dunedin makes it difficult to come to clear 
conclusions. 
 
The workload of adjudicators was also likely to be a matter that had an impact on their 
availability to hear and resolve personal grievances. Those with a significantly higher 
workload, it would be assumed, would have taken longer to hear personal grievances and 
produce decisions. However, objective data obtained while conducting this research 
regarding the workload of adjudicators has shown that those carrying the heaviest 
workload often had the shortest hearing times and shortest delays in producing decisions. 
Consequently, the heavier workload carried by adjudicators did not necessarily delay 
proceedings.  
 
The background and gender of adjudicators was also analysed to determine whether this 
had an impact on personal grievance procedure and outcomes. The previous employment 
background of adjudicators had little impact on the outcome of personal grievances but if 
                                                             
232
 For further discussion on this topic, see Chapter 3.  
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an adjudicator came from a purely union background, there was a slightly higher 
likelihood that the applicant would be wholly successful, although the numbers involved 
were small and this might not hold in a larger study. It was also found that the gender of 
the adjudicator had little impact on the outcomes of personal grievances, although if a 
male adjudicator heard the personal grievance there was a slightly higher likelihood of a 
successful outcome. The background of adjudicators did not impact upon their caseload 
distribution. 
 
The gender of parties was an issue with males being more likely to pursue personal 
grievances but conversely female success rate was slightly higher. Males sought higher 
remedies yet females obtained a higher proportion of remedies sought. 
 
If personal grievances are examined in relation to occupation, the largest single group 
was made up of employees who occupied positions in the Service and Sales occupational 
class (25%), which included retail and personal service workers. However, the 
categorisation of employees using the census data indicated that there was less likelihood 
of success when employees occupied the Farm and Trade or Professional, Administration 
and managerial class. The occupational class of employees taking personal grievances did 
not make a significant difference to the outcome of a personal grievance. This is evident 
in the similarities between the percentages of individual occupational classes who took 
personal grievances compared to the percent of the working population which they 
represented in census data. Clerical employees were an exception to this trend as they 
tended to be more vulnerable. Some variables in outcomes of compensation and costs 
awarded were apparent by occupational class. For example, professional, administration 
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and clerical groups obtained better proportional cost outcomes; having sought much more 
than other groups these employees received a lesser proportion of compensation that they 
sought. 
 
The occupational class that had the highest rate of success was the private sector, while 
public sector employees experienced the lowest rate of success. This shows that the 
occupational class of applicants could have impacted upon the outcome of personal 
grievance claims, however the number of identifiable public sector applicants is small 
and the finding cannot be generalised.  
 
Data from the personal grievance decisions in 1997 showed that direct unjustifiable 
dismissal claims were the most frequent type of personal grievance adjudicated, followed 
by unjustifiable constructive dismissal and then unjustified action. Unjustifiable dismissal 
claims had the highest rate of success, followed closely by unjustified action claims. 
Unjustifiable constructive dismissal claims had a slightly lower rate of success, which 
may have been due to the additional evidential burden of proof on applicants in those 
types of personal grievances.
233
 However, due to the small cell sizes of data it was only 
possible to make a meaningful comparison between direct unjustifiable dismissal claims 
and all other categories of personal grievances. 
 
The nature of representation each party chose could have had an impact both on costs and 
the success or otherwise of the outcome. Self-represented applicants tended to fare better 
and applicants represented by advocates obtained higher success rates than those 
                                                             
233
 See above n 12 and accompanying text. 
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represented by counsel. Conversely, if the respondent was represented by counsel, the 
applicant had a lower rate of success and if the respondent was self-represented the 
applicant had a substantially higher rate of success particularly when the respondent did 
not attend a hearing. One reason for self-represented applicants having a higher success 
rate was due to possible assistance from adjudicators and a more lenient approach being 
taken to strict legal process. Adjudicators‟ approach to self-representatives and 
representatives in general is explored more in Chapter Six.  
 
The cost of pursuing a personal grievance, which may escalate with no greater return as 
hearings are prolonged, was a factor. Hearing length was influenced by occupation 
variables with administration, professional-associate professionals tending to be involved 
in lengthier hearings. A disparity between remedies sought and granted was also 
significant. It is suggested from the information that the wide disparity between remedies 
sought and granted and costs sought and granted constituted a disincentive or barrier to 
applicants utilising the personal grievance system. This further relates to the availability 
of representation and the costs involved in bringing a personal grievance, which in turn 
may have denied a significant number of applicants access to the personal grievance 
procedure.
234
  
 
A potentially significant issue with the Employment Tribunal for participants in personal 
grievances was the delay between the personal grievance and the hearing, and between 
the hearing and the decision.
235
 Objective data obtained from the decisions showed that 
                                                             
234
 This issue is discussed in more detail in Chapters Three and Seven.  
235
 See Chapter 7.5.6 and 7.5.8 for a discussion of participants‟ views on delays in the system. 
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delays in both categories were substantial. There were various elements that may have 
contributed to the delays including location of the hearing, workload of adjudicators, 
complexity of cases and issues of representation. The research therefore showed that 
delays in the process were a significant problem for participants. Another factor was the 
variation in the distribution of adjudicator numbers per centre and consequent higher 
caseload pressures where fewer adjudicators were located.  
 
Clearly, the Government‟s objectives of making the system quick, easy, and inexpensive 
were not met. The process itself and adjudicator‟s views on whether adjudication was an 
appropriate method to resolve personal grievances and what a suitable alternative could 
have been will be discussed in Chapter Six. 
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C  h  a  p  t  e  r  6  
INTERVIEWS WITH EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL 
ADJUDICATORS 
 
6.1 OVERVIEW 
 
In determining whether or not the personal grievance adjudication system was 
effective in terms of meeting its statutory objectives it was decided to interview 
Employment Tribunal Adjudicators to ascertain whether they thought the system 
worked and what their experiences were using the process. The statutory objectives 
were: that all employment contracts must contain an effective procedure for the 
settlement of personal grievances; that personal grievances were to be distinguished 
from disputes by their subject matter and not by the number of employees involved; 
that a deliberate lack of co-operation on the part of any person would not be allowed 
to frustrate the application of a personal grievances procedure; further, the remedy for 
a proven personal grievance was determined in each case by the circumstances of the 
case; the personal grievance was an alternative to, and was not in addition to, any 
right to make a complaint under the Human Rights Commission Act 1977 or the Race 
Relations Act 1971.
1
 As this thesis examines personal grievances that were 
adjudicated in 1997, only Employment Tribunal adjudicators who were adjudicating 
in that year were interviewed.
2
 Of the 27 adjudicators who were operating in the 
Tribunal for that year, 21 were available and agreed to be interviewed. Five 
adjudicators were not available for interview, either due to retirement or emigration; 
one adjudicator did not agree to be interviewed due to previous negative experiences 
                                                             
1
 Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 26. 
2
 See Chapter 4.1.2 for a discussion on why 1997 was chosen as a representative year. 
 301 
from participating in research, and felt that they had moved forward from their days 
with the Employment Tribunal.
3
 Of the six unavailable adjudicators, one from 
Christchurch had retired, one from Hamilton was unavailable at the time, and of the 
four from Auckland; one refused to be interviewed due to concerns over 
confidentiality that arose from an earlier misuse of confidence, and three others were 
unavailable. From the twenty-one interviews I conducted, two were unusable because 
of poor tape recording. One of these unusable interviews was repeated. The 
adjudicator involved in the other unusable interview was from Auckland and was 
unavailable for re-interview. 
 
The Employment Tribunal had four jurisdictional areas: Auckland, Hamilton, 
Wellington and Christchurch. Auckland Tribunal adjudicators operated in both the 
Auckland and Hamilton jurisdictions,
4
 and under the Christchurch jurisdiction two 
adjudicators operated from Dunedin. The interviews for this thesis were conducted in 
person in Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch. Those adjudicators working from 
Dunedin were interviewed by telephone, as on the date interviews were scheduled 
adjudicators were required to participate in a conference at short notice. One 
Wellington adjudicator was unable to attend an interview in person due to the need for 
their skills at an emergency mediation, and was therefore also interviewed by 
telephone.
5
 Some Employment Tribunal adjudicators have now been appointed to the 
Employment Relations Authority; some have been employed by the Mediation 
                                                             
3
 See Chapter 4.3.1. 
4
 W R C Gardiner, The Employment Tribunal (A Report from the Trenches) 13 May 1998, 4. 
5
 For a discussion on how interviews were organised, see Chapter 4.3. 
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Service; some are now private mediators/consultants; and others have entered private 
legal practice.
6
 
 
The interviews were conducted in early 2001 and the surveys were conducted in mid 
2002. Although the passing of time could possibly have had an impact on the 
accuracy of the responses through selective recollection, in respect of an inquiry into 
an individual case, this was not the focus of the interview or the thesis. The general 
attitudes and impressions of those who had experienced the adjudication process 
either as applicant, respondent, representative or adjudicator were sought. It was 
explained to those who used the system in their professional capacity that any survey 
or interview sought their generalized views of the system and not their perceptions of 
a particular case. In respect of the parties as „one shotters‟, in the terms of Mr. 
Galanter, the engagement with the tribunal system is more likely than not to have 
been a significant event in the participants‟ lives and in consequence, their 
impressions of the system are unlikely to have significantly diminished.
7
 It is to be 
remembered that the thesis sought to obtain the views of „X‟ numbers of advocates, 
parties, and adjudicators so that any recollection flaws are recollection flaws of the 
parties as a group and therefore likely to be self cancelling. The use of specific cases 
from 1997 was merely a methodological device aimed at limiting the number of 
responses that the thesis would need to deal with, and at the same time ensuring that 
there was a large enough population from which to draw meaningful samples of 
settled cases. 
                                                             
6
 This information was obtained from personal knowledge of the employment adjudicators, telephone 
discussions with the Employment Relations Authority and previous Employment Tribunal members 
and email contact with Employment Tribunal adjudicators. 
7
 Mark Galanter „Why the „Haves‟ Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of Legal Change‟ 
(1974) 9 Law & Society Review 95–160.  
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This chapter details interviews with adjudicators and discusses various findings drawn 
from the research within this group. These findings include both common themes and 
contrasting opinions; they also identify particular problem areas, elements of the 
process that worked, and ideas for future alternatives for effective resolution of 
personal grievances. 
 
The use of tables, which appear to present qualitative data in a quantitative form, was 
carried out as it was often the clearest way to present a range of answers and there 
was little or no doubt from the responses as to what the responses were. 
 
Tapes of interviews with Employment Tribunal Adjudicators were retained in the 
office of the author in the School of Law, University of Canterbury. Tapes, electronic 
versions and paper transcriptions of interviews have subsequently been moved to the 
author‟s residence. 
6.2 VALUE OF INTERVIEWING ADJUDICATORS  
 
One of the best ways of determining whether a process worked effectively was to seek 
the views of those who worked within that system. Within the boundaries of legal 
requirements, adjudicators themselves had control over the hearings and therefore 
considerable impact on whether the hearing process was effective. They could also 
have had an influence on the effectiveness of representation, depending on whether 
they were prepared to assist inexperienced or incompetent representatives, or parties 
who chose to represent themselves. Adjudicators were, to a certain extent, able to 
influence how the hearings were conducted and in consequence the prevailing 
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atmosphere of the Tribunal.
8
 This influence could have affected the process by 
making it less, or more, intimidating for the participating parties, or by taking into 
account any special requirements the parties may have had. Although adjudicators 
were not responsible for any delays between the date of the personal grievance and 
the date of the hearing, some responsibility for any delays that occurred between the 
date of hearing and the date of decision being produced may have been attributable to 
this professional group; it must be noted that any delay of this nature may well have 
been influenced by other factors such as the workload of the adjudicators. These 
factors have been discussed in more detail below.
9
 As a result of their position and in 
particular for the reasons just laid out, the opinions of adjudicators were of value in 
determining whether the personal grievance procedure was both effective in respect 
of, and sensitive to, the participants‟ needs. Further, there exists a distinct possibility 
that the attitudes and perceptions of adjudicators could have had either a positive or 
negative impact on the process and therefore the parties‟ experience of it. Also worthy 
of investigation, was whether the attitudes of adjudicators towards the adjudication 
process had changed either during their tenure or in hindsight. 
 
Although previous researchers in New Zealand have examined and analysed 
outcomes of the personal grievance and bargaining processes, no previous research 
has been done by interviewing Tribunal Adjudicators and seeking their views on 
whether the system worked.
10
 As the primary focus of the thesis was to examine 
                                                             
8
 See Employment Tribunal Regulations 1991, r 49, for details on how the Tribunal was usually to 
proceed. Also see Chapter 2.4.3(c) for discussions on the case law affecting hearing procedures and the 
influencing of Tribunal procedures. 
9
 See Chapter 6.4.10 for discussion on reasons for time lapses. 
10
 See, for example, McAndrew I, „Adjudication in the Employment Tribunal: Some Facts and Figures 
on Dismissal for Misconduct‟ (2000) 25 NZJIR 303; Gardiner R, „Personal Grievance Mediation in the 
Employment Tribunal‟ (1993) 18 NZIL 342; Harbridge R and Hince K, „The Employment Contracts 
Act: An Interim Assessment‟ (1994) 19 NZJIL 235. In comparison views of Industrial Tribunal 
 305 
peoples‟ experiences using the personal grievance adjudication system, it was thought 
essential to consider the views and experiences of all participants. Therefore, it was 
necessary to seek input from adjudicators and not just from parties and 
representatives. 
6.3 QUESTIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL 
ADJUDICATORS 
 
Questions for interviews were divided into five separate categories: process; types of 
action; parties; representation; and costs.
11
 The questions were devised from issues 
that arose from information obtained from the database,
12
 as well as background 
information discussed in Chapter Two.
13
 
6.3.1 PROCESS 
 
The first category, process, relates to the adjudication procedure. This category was 
intended to discern whether the process itself was effective, what the attitudes of 
adjudicators were towards it, and whether adjudicators believed that the procedure 
met statutory intentions.
14
 Unknown to the author at the time of devising the interview 
questions, some of the questions in this category related to administrative procedure 
and as such were matters that were usually dealt with by administration staff rather 
than adjudicators. Consequently, adjudicators were unable to answer questions of this 
type. One purpose of the enquiry was to determine whether administrative matters 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Members (both chairpersons and lay members) in England were sought by postal questionnaire, but 
interviews with members were not conducted, although interviews were conducted with applicants and 
respondents. See L Dickens, M Jones, B Weekes and M Hart, Dismissed: A Study of Unfair Dismissal 
and the Industrial Tribunal System (1985) 26. 
11
 See Appendix IV. 
12
 See Chapter 4.4. 
13
 See Chapter 2.2. 
14
 See Appendix IV, Process. 
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occupied a significant proportion of an adjudicators‟ time. Of further interest, as noted 
earlier in the introduction to this chapter, in this process category were issues relating 
to workload and whether this contributed to delays in the procedure. 
6.3.2 TYPES OF PERSONAL GRIEVANCES 
 
The second category dealt with types of personal grievances. This included whether 
the type of personal grievance affected the adjudicators‟ hearing of the case, whether 
they took a more sensitive approach to sexual harassment claims, and whether 
adjudicators would make recommendations in an attempt to ensure employers were 
proactive in improving practices and attitudes toward sexual harassment. 
6.3.3 PARTIES 
 
The third category of questions related to parties, and whether certain characteristics 
of parties affected the adjudicators‟ approach. Possible characteristics that might have 
affected adjudicators‟ attitudes were: occupation, gender, social status, ethnicity and 
disability. Other issues that were of interest in relation to parties were a possible 
power imbalance between employer and employee, instances where there were 
multiple applicants, and frequent appearances by particular parties.
15
 
6.3.4 REPRESENTATION 
 
Questions about representation were the fourth category. These questions related to 
varying standards of representation, what the attitudes of adjudicators were to poor 
representation and if representation assisted, how it did so. Adjudicators were also 
asked about the standard of self-representation and whether they made special 
attempts to assist parties who represented themselves. Ideas were sought from 
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 See Appendix IV, Parties. 
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adjudicators as to how the standard of representation could have been improved. 
Whether poor presentation standards affected adjudicators‟ attitudes to claims, or a 
party‟s defence, was also investigated.16 
6.3.5 COSTS 
 
An important consideration in assessing access to the personal grievance process was 
the cost of bringing a claim. Therefore, the fifth category of questions related to costs. 
In this instance, costs
17
 could have included the cost of lodging a personal grievance, 
the parties‟ own representation costs, and costs that may have been awarded against 
the parties. Adjudicators were asked what factors they took into account when 
awarding costs and how they determined whether expenses claimed were necessarily 
and reasonably incurred. To determine whether costs were prohibitive, adjudicators 
were also asked about legal aid and the principle that self-representatives could not 
claim for the cost of their time.
18
 Other issues raised were: claims without merit, 
executive time (which meant the time of a staff member employed to undertake this 
sort of representation) for example an in house counsel, frivolous and trivial claims, 
and out of time applications. Adjudicators were also asked a general question as to 
whether or not they believed that the level of costs incurred in bringing a personal 
grievance was a barrier to accessing the procedure.  
6.3.6 GENERAL OPINION 
 
Finally, adjudicators were asked whether they had any general comments to make 
regarding the Employment Tribunal and its procedure. Some of the responses to this 
question actually related to earlier questions in the interview. If this was the case the 
                                                             
16
 See Appendix IV, Representation. 
17
 Employment Contracts Act, s 98 stated that the Employment Tribunal had the authority to award 
costs. 
18
 See Appendix 1, Costs. 
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answers have been transferred back as a response to the relevant question and 
comments which have been of a general nature have been left at the end of the survey 
as originally intended. The responses to some questions relate to the establishment of 
the Employment Relations Authority in 2000
19
 and are therefore discussed in Chapter 
Eight. 
6.4 CATEGORY 1: PROCESS 
 
6.4.1 NATURE OF THE ADJUDICATION PROCESS 
 
One of the main issues relating to the operation of the Employment Tribunal was the 
process itself. Did it facilitate the goal of the legislation to introduce a system that was 
quick, cheap, easy and straightforward? It was decided to examine the adjudicators‟ 
views on the actual process to glean from them whether they perceived that the 
intentions of the legislation had been met or whether procedural deficiencies defeated 
those goals. During the time in which the Employment Tribunal was operating much 
criticism relating to the nature of the procedure that the Tribunal was using occurred, 
the emphasis being that the process was itself a barrier to access.
20
 One issue was 
whether the procedure itself intimidated parties who wished to use the personal 
grievance process. In some instances, adjudication was the only available option to 
employees seeking to resolve personal grievances, as mediation was not compulsory 
under the Employment Contracts Act 1991.
21
 In other words, one party may have 
wished a personal grievance to be resolved in a less formal mediation framework but 
                                                             
19
 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 156. 
20
 See G Anderson, „There Must be a Better Way: Alternative Dispute Resolution‟ (1997) 2 ELB 2; P 
Roth, „The Grievance Procedure‟ in J Hughes, P Roth, G Anderson (eds) Personal Grievances (1999) 
2.16. 
21
 Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 78. 
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the other party was not obliged to agree to or participate in mediation, thus leaving 
adjudication as the only available method of resolution.  
 
Adjudicators were asked to describe the personal grievance adjudication process, and 
whether they considered it was formal, informal or legalistic.
22
 Of the 21 adjudicators 
interviewed, 11 thought that the adjudication process was formal, while one thought it 
was informal. Seven adjudicators thought that the process was somewhere in between 
formal and informal, depending on what you were comparing the process to, such as 
the formal process operating in the Employment Court or the less formal conciliation 
process under the Labour Relations Act 1987.
23
 One adjudicator thought that the 
increased formality came hand in hand with the expanded jurisdiction of the personal 
grievance mechanism, and one adjudicator‟s response was not recorded due to 
technical difficulties.
24
  
 
Of the 20 responses received from adjudicators, four specifically stated that the 
process was more formal than it should have been. This was due to such factors as the 
influence of lawyers, court procedure and direction, and the wording of the 
legislation. 
 
                                                             
22
 In B Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage (2
nd
 ed, 1995) legalistic was defined as „a rather 
contemptuous term meaning “formalistic; exalting the important of formulated rules in any department 
of action.”‟ In R Ryan and P Walsh, „Common Law v Labour Law: The New Zealand Debate‟ (1993) 
Australian Journal of Labour Law 230,246, it was argued that informal meant, amongst other things, 
less reliance on formal procedures and a more investigative approach with less reliance on lawyers and 
a reduction in the cost of representation. Whilst not defining legalism per se, this discussion focussed 
on the meaning of informal, which to some extent is almost the opposite approach to that of legalism.  
23
 Part IX of the Labour Relations Act 1987. See Chapter 2.2.2. 
24
 See Chapter 4.3.2(d). 
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Twelve adjudicators mentioned that the adjudication process was legalistic. Of those 
12 adjudicators, eight had also stated that the process was formal, while four had said 
it was between formal and informal. 
 
Adjudicators commented on the formality of the Employment Tribunal as follows: 
The processes were good, but not sufficiently resourced so speediness was defeated and the 
Court imposed excessive rules so informality suffered. 
The Employment Court and representatives made the process too legalistic and often 
representatives were not available. The statutory objectives were defeated by the Employment 
Court. If you “upped” the resources for the Tribunal you would have had a system that worked 
as well as the Employment Relations Authority or the Mediation Service. There was nothing 
wrong with the system as it was designed. The Tribunal could have taken a more 
interventionist role like the Employment Relations Authority if it were not overly legalistic 
with supervisory judgments from the Court. 
The Tribunal should have had more direct involvement in administration. The Tribunal would 
have worked better if not tied up by Employment Court rules, regulations and procedures. The 
legalistic approach and overly academic approach to Employment Law has affected the way in 
which the Employment Tribunal was both perceived and how it worked. 
 
The intentions of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 were that the process be „quick, 
informal and inexpensive.‟25 Adjudicators were asked whether they believed that 
these intentions had been met. They responded as follows: 
Table 6.1: Have the Intentions of the ECA Been Met? 
Adjudicator Response Result (N=20) 
Yes 0 
No 15 
Not Entirely 5 
 
The views of one adjudicator were not recorded due to technical problems, and are 
not included in the majority of the following tables. However, Table 6.1 shows that 
three-quarters of the adjudicators thought that the intentions of the Employment 
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 [1991] 524 NZPD 1437. 
 311 
Contracts Act 1991 had not been met, whilst the remainder believed that the 
Government‟s intentions had been partially met. No adjudicator took the view that the 
principles of speediness, informality and affordability, which were intended by the 
Government, had been entirely met.
26
 One commentator suggested that the personal 
grievance procedure itself was more accessible than prior to the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991,
27
 but resolution of personal grievance complaints was not as 
expeditious as the Minister of Labour had intended at the time the Bill was 
introduced.
28
 
 
Adjudicators commented on this question as follows: 
The Tribunal did not meet statutory objectives – it was not quick easy or inexpensive. The 
Employment Court was to blame because it set standards too high and moulded the Tribunal 
in its own image. The Court made the Tribunal too legalistic and Tribunal adjudicators did not 
resist enough. 
Although the procedures seemed reasonably rigid, it still had enough flexibility for people to 
be treated fairly. The [Employment Relations Authority] is not operating much differently 
from the Tribunal. 
The Court treated the Tribunal like any other Tribunal when legislation dictated that it was to 
be quick, informal and inexpensive. The Tribunal came to be dominated by the legal 
profession. If the Tribunal had been brave enough to embrace the approach taken by the 
Mediation Service and Conciliation Service, which the ERA is now reverting to, it would have 
been a more effective body. The Court had a group of excessive legalists within the Tribunal 
[who] were responsible for the Tribunal being compromised by delays. 
Some of the operation matters became too formalised. The Court administered/managed the 
Tribunal by way of review and not appeal. The Court created legal complexity that surrounded 
the process.  Procedures on filing were too legalistic, there were mechanisms for raising fees 
for law firms and it became too slow which was a resourcing issue.   
 
 
                                                             
26
 For a discussion of the principles behind the Employment Contracts Act 1991, the development of 
the Employment Tribunal Procedure and the Legislative intentions, see Chapter 2.3.1. 
27
 P Roth, in J Hughes, P Roth, G Anderson (eds) Personal Grievances (1999) 2.16. 
28
 (1991) 514 NZPD 1437. W F Birch, Report Back Speech Notes – Press Release, 22 April 1991. See 
Chapter 2.3.1. 
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6.4.2 ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS 
 
Questions 1.3 to 1.7 were of an administrative nature, for example, incorrect 
documents being filed, insufficient information in statements, non completion of 
forms and instances where adjudicators were required to make a direction for a 
statement of defence to be filed. It had not been clear where the responsibility lay in 
dealing with incorrect documents, incorrect statements of claim, intention to defend 
and direction as to statement of defence matters. The reason for asking these 
administrative questions was that they contained an element of legal obligation and it 
was unclear whether adjudicators or administrative staff had responsibility to ensure 
they were met. It may have been that adjudicator‟s time was being used unnecessarily 
in resolving these matters and may have resulted in delays in the process.  
 
On answering these questions, most adjudicators advised that they should be 
addressed to administration staff, as this was generally their responsibility. It was 
therefore not necessary to discuss these matters with administrative staff, as the 
answers to the specific questions were not the issue – the issue was how much of 
adjudicators‟ time was being absorbed in conducting these functions.29  
6.4.3 WITNESSES 
 
Another factor that had the potential to affect the use of time and therefore the cost of 
the adjudication hearing was whether either party called insufficient or irrelevant 
witnesses. This situation may have arisen where either of the parties failed to call 
necessary witnesses, or called irrelevant witnesses. Under ss 96 and 126 of the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991, either party to a personal grievance could apply to 
                                                             
29
 For an outline of procedural requirements, see Chapter 2.4. 
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summons witnesses to give evidence before the Tribunal. All adjudicators interviewed 
had experience of insufficient and irrelevant witnesses being called in adjudication. 
Adjudicators made a number of general comments regarding the calling of 
insufficient and irrelevant witnesses including the following: 
I would say on a percentage basis more than 50 percent, no it would be higher than that, called 
either irrelevant witnesses or insufficient witnesses. But more irrelevant witnesses, and why 
was that? Because if they didn‟t get it all on record at that point, they couldn‟t introduce new 
witnesses at the next step, they‟d have to seek leave of the court. So they brought in 
everything but the kitchen sink, and as a result, managed to lengthen the hearing, the cost of it, 
and everything else. It was a fault of the process.
30
  
[Q]uite often it was legal counsel who should know better, making a meal of the case, trying 
to make something out of nothing, with volumes of evidence that were so peripheral to the 
case that it would drive you bonkers. 
Particularly if the hearing is say two years later, they might have not been able to get 
supporting evidence… or they want to keep costs down… [so] they don‟t bring sufficient 
witnesses. 
 
Of note from this adjudicator‟s comments, is that when insufficient witnesses were 
called this may have been in an effort to constrain proceedings and consequently 
reduce costs on the parties. On the other hand, a protracted hearing would have been 
likely to result in substantially higher costs.
31
 Regarding irrelevant witnesses, 
adjudicators commented that often everything and everyone possible was dragged into 
the procedure. This may have been due to the fact that, at that time, there was no de 
novo hearing on appeal so every possible option or argument had to be included at the 
Tribunal hearing stage.
32
 
 
Another issue identified by adjudicators above was that after considerable delay in the 
case being heard it may not have been possible to obtain sufficient witnesses to 
support the claim or provide evidence of the personal grievance or its defence. It was 
                                                             
30
 There was no de novo hearing and therefore new evidence could generally not be brought on appeal.  
Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 95. 
31
 See para 6.8.3. In determining the level of costs the Tribunal took into account the length of the 
hearing and preparation time. See Chapter 5.4.7. 
32
 See Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 104, which proscribed the Employment Court‟s jurisdiction. 
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also possible that memories of events may have faded, or that either parties or 
witnesses may have moved, making witnesses difficult to locate, which could have 
impacted on parties‟ ability to support their claims or defences. As shown at Table 
5.37, the delay between the event precipitating the personal grievance and the actual 
hearing was often considerable. Therefore, access to relevant and sufficient witnesses 
could have been a substantial difficulty. As shown in Chapter Five, long delays 
occurred frequently.
33
 
 
A further issue was whether allowances payable to witnesses were adequate, making 
it possible for them to participate freely in the process. Arising from this question was 
whether the level of allowances deterred witnesses from appearing without being 
summonsed. Witness allowances and expenses were payable under Regulations 45 
and 46 of the Employment Tribunal Regulations 1991, which in turn referred to the 
District Courts Act 1947 and subsequent District Court Rules, which stipulated that 
witness allowances and expenses were payable under the Witnesses’ and Interpreters’ 
Fees Regulations 1974. The schedule to the Regulations provided that the rate 
payable to witnesses for up to three hours absence from their normal place of work or 
residence was $25.00, and for a period of absence exceeding three hours was 
$50.00.
34
 If the witness would suffer a loss of earnings due to time spent travelling 
from the usual place of work or residence to the courthouse for the purpose of giving 
evidence, then that time could be counted as if it were time spent at the hearing.
35
 
According to the Minimum Wage Order 1997, the minimum wage payable to youth 
workers (that was those under 20 years of age) in 1997 was $4.20 per hour, and the 
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 See Chapter 5.4.9. 
34
 Witnesses’ and Interpreters’ Fees Regulations 1974, sch 7, cl 3. 
35
 Ibid, sch 7, cl 4. 
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minimum wage payable to adult workers (i.e. those over 20 years of age) was $7.00 
per hour.
36
 Therefore, the allowance payable to adult witnesses was only slightly 
higher than the minimum wage, at $8.33 per hour. 
 
Witness allowances and expenses were paid by the party requiring the witness to 
appear. Travel expenses and meal allowances were paid at the time of the witness 
summons, while witness fees were paid after the hearing depending on how long the 
witness was required. Witness allowances and expenses could then be claimed as 
costs and disbursements.
37
 It may have been that parties to personal grievances were 
unwilling to call particular witnesses as the party who was not awarded costs and 
disbursements bore the cost of witness expenses and attendance fees; this could have 
caused injustice where costs were allowed to lie where they fell. 
Table 6.2: Did the Allowances and Expenses Payable to Witnesses Adequately 
Reimburse Expenses Incurred? 
Adjudicators Response Rate (N=20) 
Yes 1 
No 13 
Don‟t Know
38
 6 
 
Table 6.2 shows that a clear majority of adjudicators thought that the level of 
allowances and expenses did not adequately reimburse witnesses. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
36
 Minimum Wage Order 1997, clauses 2 and 3. 
37
 Personal correspondence with Deborah Downie, Secretary of the Employment Tribunal, 28 January 
2005. 
38
 As above, one response was not recorded. 
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Table 6.3: Were the Level of Allowances/Expenses a Deterrent for Witnesses 
Appearing at Tribunal Hearings Without Being Summonsed? 
Adjudicators Response Rate (N=20) 
Yes 2 
No 13 
Don‟t Know39 5 
 
In contrast, Table 6.3 shows that adjudicators – despite their views in Table 6.2 – 
believed that the level of allowances and expenses paid to witnesses was not a 
deterrent for witnesses to attend adjudication without being summonsed. This begs the 
question: if the level of allowances and expenses payable to witnesses was not 
sufficient, why were the rates of allowances payable to witnesses not a deterrent to 
them appearing? It is only possible to surmise the answer to this question but it may 
have been that witnesses were keen to see justice being done; they may have had 
some level of dissatisfaction with either the relevant supervisor or employer; they may 
have felt under an obligation to appear; or they simply may not have been concerned 
about the rate payable.  
6.4.4 PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE BY PARTIES 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the Employment Tribunal Regulations 1991 provided 
for how evidence was to be adduced in adjudication, and the process for examination 
and cross examination of witnesses.
40
 Regulation 49 provided that each party or 
witness could give his or her evidence-in-chief by reading or confirming a written 
brief or statement of evidence. Adjudicators were asked whether parties in 
adjudication hearings ever experienced difficulties in presenting evidence-in-chief and 
whether parties usually used written statements as guidelines. The purpose of this 
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 As above, one response was not recorded. 
40
 Employment Tribunal Regulations 1991, reg 49. See also Chapter 2.4.3–2.4.3(a). 
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approach was to gauge whether the adjudicators displayed a level of understanding of 
non-formal approaches and could adjust their processes and decision-making to 
accommodate differences and allow parties to present evidence in the most 
appropriate manner commensurate with individuals‟ backgrounds and abilities. This 
was particularly important in situations where parties were self represented and had 
evident difficulties understanding formal adjudication process. This required, at times, 
adjudicators to go beyond the basic requirements of their role and use a more enabling 
approach. All adjudicators said that parties to adjudication used written statements of 
evidence and some said that this was especially prevalent among parties represented 
by lawyers. One adjudicator also stated that the Tribunal encouraged parties to use 
written statements of evidence. Some adjudicators said that it was only self-
representatives who did not always use written statements of evidence as they were 
unaware of the process.
41
  
 
The responses from adjudicators were mixed as to whether parties in adjudication 
hearings experienced difficulties in presenting their evidence-in-chief. Some 
difficulties acknowledged by adjudicators were: people could be overcome with 
emotion; reading and language difficulties; difficulty in understanding words where a 
brief is written by lawyers; translation; cultural differences, for example sitting down 
in the witness box; and sickness or disability. When discussing these matters 
adjudicators commented as follows:  
For example parties get overcome by emotion and can‟t proceed and sort of break down and 
we have to take a break. Other people obviously have reading or language difficulties. Others 
are perhaps a little bit frightened or intimidated by the process and are very nervous. 
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 For adjudicators‟ comments on assisting self-representatives see para 6.4.5 and 5.7.7. 
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Often the brief‟s been written by the lawyer with these wonderful words and things, and when 
they got to read it, and they can hardly read, and they certainly don‟t understand the words 
that they are saying. 
They may look shifty and all that and dishonest, or they may just be absolutely bloody 
terrified. And it‟s hard to know. 
Very occasionally counsel will seek permission to read out their briefs of evidence where 
people do have reading difficulties. 
But the quality of presentation and the quality of their evidence can often be poor. So while 
they can get it across, they can be rambling all over the place, there can be lots of irrelevancies 
and stuff like that. 
You‟d be surprised at the number of people, some of whom are verbally very fluent, who 
can‟t read very well. 
If it‟s written, you can simply ask them to affirm, and they simply affirm that the evidence in 
chief is the evidence they want to give and you move on to cross-examination or you can get 
the lawyer or advocate to read it for them. 
Obviously people vary a lot in terms of confidence. Taking the witness stand is a very scary 
thing for anybody, some people are more confident than others…I even gave him a break and 
said “go out and have a cup of tea and then come back” but he still couldn‟t. 
 
Two adjudicators commented that they could vary the procedure if difficulties in 
presentation of evidence occurred while others stated that they encouraged 
participants to simply „tell their story‟. Tribunal Adjudicators had the authority to 
alter or vary the procedure for conducting the hearing, provided any alteration was 
conducted in a fair manner,
42
 as well as the authority to question witnesses provided it 
was done fairly.
43
  
6.4.5 SELF REPRESENTATIVES 
 
As parties could represent themselves at adjudication, a possible issue was whether 
self-represented parties experienced particular difficulties at hearings. It has already 
been noted that some self-representatives were unaware of the process and did not 
know that they could use written briefs or statements of evidence. Adjudicators were 
asked if self-representatives had particular difficulties with presenting evidence and 
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 Employment Tribunal Regulations 1991, SR 1991/227/49(2). Davidson v Telecom Central Ltd 
[1993] 2 ERNZ 819, 838. 
43
 Davidson v Telecom Central Ltd [1993] 2 ERNZ 819, 838. See Chapter 2.4.3(c) for some discussion 
on the role of adjudicators and varying procedures. 
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examining witnesses, and if the answer to the above question was yes, how did they 
assist? All 20 adjudicators stated that self-representatives had difficulties, and one 
adjudicator was not recorded. Of the 20 adjudicators‟ responses recorded, 13 stated 
that there were special difficulties with cross examination, three identified 
examination of witnesses in general as a difficulty, and seven mentioned problems 
relating to evidence. All 20 adjudicators recorded said that they would assist self-
representatives in some way, including:
44
 
 Explaining the procedure;  
 Explaining cross examination and evidence; 
 Summarising evidence; 
 Swearing parties in and letting them talk; 
 Asking questions;45 
 Adapting the procedure; 
 Discouraging a legalistic approach; 
 Providing encouragement and guidance; 
 Handing out Regulation 49, which detailed the procedure of the Employment Tribunal. 
 
Goddard CJ commented in Davidson v Telecom Central Limited
46
 that adjudicators 
had to be detached to present a picture of even-handedness, and should not question 
witnesses to satisfy their curiosity as to their credibility.
47
 Although self-represented 
parties may not have been aware of their right to use written briefs or statements of 
evidence, the Court clearly indicated that adjudicators should not take over the role of 
questioning witnesses, and generally should not become closely involved in the 
presentation of evidence. However, one adjudicator remarked in response to Goddard 
CJ‟s guidelines that: 
                                                             
44
 Employment Tribunal Regulations 1991.  
45
 See Chapter 2.4.3(c) for a discussion of adjudication procedure and role of the adjudicator in asking 
questions. 
46
 [1993] 2 ERNZ 819, 838. 
47
 Ibid. See also Chapter 2.4.3(c). 
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I tried always in my own cases to strike a balance between assisting the party to get their story 
across to make the points they needed to make in cross-examination, without giving them such 
assistance as to make their case to the detriment of the other party…[w]e had to help with the 
process as much as possible, but we couldn‟t put words in their mouth…[s]o sometimes you 
have to go far enough to ask questions to get the job done, but I‟ve tried not to go so far as to 
make the case for the person whose presentation is deficient.  
 
The types of assistance provided by adjudicators to self-representatives suggest that 
the procedure itself may have been intimidating to users, or was at least perceived to 
be, thus making the process less accessible to self-represented parties. The procedure 
to be followed in the adjudication hearing was contained in Regulation 49 of the 
Employment Tribunal Regulations 1991.
48
 This regulation provided the order in 
which steps of the adjudication process were to be followed and what was required by 
parties in terms of the presentation of evidence and examination and cross-
examination.
49
 As can be seen from Regulation 49, the legal requirements for 
participating in adjudication were comprehensive, and it is therefore possible that self-
representatives were unaware of, or unable to understand, what was required of them 
under the Regulations. The reason why some parties chose to represent themselves 
may have related to financial constraints or because they were not represented by 
unions who may have provided representation free of charge to members.
50
 
6.4.6 UNSEEN MATERIAL AND WRONG LEGISLATION 
 
As there were certain stipulated legal requirements and procedures that had to be 
followed prior to, during and after the adjudication hearing, it was conceivable that 
parties may have been unaware of the requirements contained in the Employment 
Tribunal Regulations 1991. Likewise, representatives may have been unfamiliar with 
                                                             
48
 For information on application to the Employment Tribunal or making a response to a claim of 
personal grievance, and the procedures to be followed at adjudication, see Appendix II. 
49
 See Chapter 2.4.3(c). 
50
 See Chapter 5.4.3 for a discussion on the provision of legal representation and assistance by State 
and Private Sector Unions. 
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steps to be followed under the legislation. Adjudicators were thus asked how they 
responded if unseen material, which should have been disclosed at discovery but had 
not been, was introduced by the respondent at the hearing. Fourteen adjudicators said 
that they would have allowed the applicant to take an adjournment. In addition, seven 
adjudicators said that they would allow the applicant to recall and examine witnesses 
if needed.  
 
If representatives brought cases under the wrong legislation, adjudicators were asked 
what approach they took to remedy the situation. Adjudicators made the following 
comments:  the situation would be remedied via costs; an application to strike out 
would have been invited; or the defect could be amended under s 140.
51
 If it was the 
wrong part of the legislation or the wrong section, you could give the opportunity to 
amend or use s 34 to amend.
52
 An alternative view was that this was an administrative 
function dealt with by appropriate staff, or the problem could have been sorted at 
mediation. If there was disagreement between the parties regarding an amendment, it 
was discussed with them and mediated if necessary. If there was no legal jurisdiction, 
the Tribunal could not have heard the case, for example if a claim was brought under 
the wrong legislation. In Wellington, adjudicators advised that they took a case 
management approach, so those types of issues were identified and resolved early. 
Whilst identifying the issues of concern, some adjudicators believed that it was also 
important to assist representatives in maintaining dignity despite the error. In 
Auckland, two adjudicators advised that in those circumstances the case would have 
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 Employment Contracts Act 1991. 
52
 Ibid, s 34, gave the adjudicator authority to find that a personal grievance was of a type other than 
that which had been alleged. It was not intended that this section be used by the parties to correct an 
error in the use of an incorrect section or piece of legislation. It provided some ability for adjudicators 
if the personal grievance had been of the wrong type. See Chapter 2.3.3 for a brief discussion of s 34 of 
the Employment Contracts Act 1991.  
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failed or it would have sounded in costs. Three Auckland adjudicators advised that 
they had no experience of cases having being brought under the wrong legislation. A 
further Auckland adjudicator said they had taken no action. One Auckland adjudicator 
advised that they had taken a similar approach to Wellington adjudicators; the „case 
management‟ approach, and another stated that they would amend the case 
appropriately. One Wellington adjudicator advised that they would correct the error 
and another commented that they had no experience of this issue. In Christchurch, one 
adjudicator advised that there was no issue, a second advised that they would amend 
the Statement of Claim, with a third adjudicator stating that the case would have 
failed. In Dunedin two adjudicators advised respectively that they had no experience 
of incorrect legislation having being used, and the second stated that the legal 
representatives would have been sent off to amend the statements appropriately. 
 
Adjudicators‟ comments emphasise that despite sometimes fairly significant errors 
and potential for delay, they were prepared to use a variety of strategies and  a flexible 
approach to remedy procedural irregularities with an overall goal of allowing parties 
to present their case with a minimum of legal straitjacketing. For example, the case 
management approach in Wellington prevented many problems arising and may have 
meant that such issues did not reach adjudication. In this respect, it could be inferred 
that the approach of the adjudicators assisted in implementing the Government‟s 
intention of making the procedure easy to follow.
53
 
6.4.7 REPRESENTATIVES AND PARTIES 
 
If representatives were inadequate in their method of examining or cross-examining 
witnesses, it was important to assess whether adjudicators assisted. Adjudicators 
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responded in general terms that they would talk to representatives about their method 
or technique, and ask questions where critical information was left out. In particular, 
seven adjudicators said that they would not interfere with the examination process, 
but would interfere at the end if issues remained outstanding. Four adjudicators 
advised they were prepared to assist self-representatives. Three adjudicators indicated 
that they would become involved in the examination process if necessary to clarify 
circumstances and issues. Three adjudicators advised that they would not interfere 
with the process unless a failure to intervene could have resulted in an injustice. If a 
lack of such intervention would have caused some delay, one adjudicator advised that 
they would become involved. The same adjudicator believed that problems with the 
approach taken by the representatives were the responsibility of the party concerned. 
Another adjudicator indicated that when there were difficulties with lay people 
making statements instead of asking questions, the adjudicator said they would assist 
with the formation of appropriate questions. Another adjudicator advised that they 
would not help with examination questions, but would assist on issues relating to 
remedies. Another adjudicator indicated that if complex questions were involved they 
would assist and would steer the parties back to the relevant issues, if they had strayed 
from the issues in question. Only one adjudicator advised that they would not assist in 
any circumstances. One adjudicator believed that it was their function to „find the 
truth‟ and would therefore become involved with the process, with another 
adjudicator saying that they would „wade in‟.  
 
In detail, adjudicators made the following comments when discussing inadequate 
representation. One adjudicator commented that: 
[A] party is responsible for the representative that they engage. They‟re paying them fees and 
if they don‟t get adequate representation then that‟s their problem with that representative. 
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Similarly, another adjudicator stated that „if people have got bad representatives that‟s 
their bad luck.‟ In contrast, it was observed by another adjudicator that: 
[the issue of inadequate representation] is a tricky one because the Court‟s directions are quite 
clear that as adjudicators we‟re supposed to be hands off. It‟s for the parties to conduct their 
own case and how they are going to present it. If on the other hand I‟m conscious that 
important issues need to be brought out then rather than ask them to ask it, I will ask those 
questions myself…but again, I was conscious as a Tribunal Member of the restrictions on the 
degree of intervention that the adjudicator has. 
This attitude was shared by another adjudicator who commented that: 
[P]robably the biggest bugbear in the Tribunal that causes the greatest angst to parties, 
adjudicators and everybody else was how far did you go, where cross-examination was 
inadequate, in getting to the truth of the thing…[t]he difficulty was that you were charged 
with making a decision and you needed to know as much as you could about the things that 
were really relevant and upon which the decision rested so that obviously the huge temptation 
was there to ask the questions to get the information you needed from the witnesses.  It‟s the 
universal dilemma… I took the view that my job was to find the truth and to try and make a 
decision based on the facts and that I was going to find the facts regardless. But I‟d be lying if 
I didn‟t say that I knew that caused problems from time to time and made some people very 
unhappy. And I understood why. It was a very, very difficult issue. 
 
These comments from adjudicators illustrate the difficulties faced when using the 
adjudication procedure stipulated by the Employment Contracts Act 1991. In 
comparison, the conciliation system used to resolve personal grievances under the 
Labour Relations Act 1987 was much less formal; likewise the procedure used under 
the Employment Relations Act 2000, now in operation, is much less prescriptive.
54
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 Labour Relations Act 1987, Part IX; Employment Relations Act 2000, Part 9. This can also be 
contrasted with Industrial Tribunal system in England. Generally, members of the Industrial Tribunal 
did not intervene where parties were legally represented. However, where parties were unrepresented 
and were experiencing difficulty in presenting their case the chairperson was more likely to participate. 
The Industrial Tribunals (Rules of Procedure) Regulations 1980 stated that the Tribunal: “shall so far 
as it appears to be appropriate seek to avoid formality in its proceedings and it shall not be bound by 
any enactment or rule of law relating to the admissibility of evidence in proceedings before the courts 
of law.” One-time President of Industrial Tribunals, Sir Diarmaid Conroy, has also commented that: 
The tribunals are meant to provide simple informal justice in an atmosphere in which the 
ordinary man [sic] feels he is at home…an atmosphere which does not shut out the ordinary 
man so that he is prepared to conduct his own case before them with a reasonable prospect of 
success. 
See Conroy, Diarmaid, 1971a „Do Applicants Need Advice or Representation?‟, The Future of 
Administrative Tribunals. Edited transcript of proceedings of a conference held at Institute of Judicial 
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The danger was – according to adjudicators – that in some instances, issues were 
missed due to the formality and complexity of the system, and the fact that the process 
was adversarial. Therefore, the issues of formality and standard of representation in an 
adversarial system are inevitably linked. This approach appears to conflict with the 
general principle that the best way to obtain accuracy of disputed facts was through 
cross examination.
55
 However, in the case of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 
Parliament intended to make the procedure quick, inexpensive and informal, so the 
general legal principle was being set aside to expedite resolution of personal 
grievances.
56
  
 
Comments by adjudicators emphasised that there was some confusion over the role of 
adjudicators as decisions of the courts were inconsistent. One adjudicator said that 
they would just „wade in‟ in adjudication, while at least two adjudicators said that 
they would not assist because that was not the role of the Tribunal. One adjudicator 
noted that on this issue the approach varied from adjudicator to adjudicator. 
 
Due to the nature and character of personal grievances, it was possible that 
adjudicators may have encountered hostile parties, witnesses or representatives to a 
personal grievance. Adjudicators were asked how they dealt with hostile parties to a 
personal grievance, including parties, witnesses or representatives. Suggestions that 
adjudicators had for dealing with hostile parties were: 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Administration, University of Birmingham, April 1971, Birmingham: Institute of Judicial 
Administration. See also Linda Dickens, Michael Jones, Brian Weekes and Moira Hart, Dismissed: A 
Study of Unfair Dismissal and the Industrial Tribunal System, (1985) 73–74. 
55
 In Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 (HL), it was held that if the court was to disbelieve one witness 
then the court should have the opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Cross examination is intended 
to allow the witness to explain the relevant evidence. The rule was to ensure coherence of evidence 
before the court. The High Court Rules provide that if a witness is to be disbelieved, the witness should 
be cross-examined (r 441K). I McIntosh (ed), McGechan on Procedure (loose-leaf, 2005), HR441K. 
56
 WF Birch, Report Back Speech Notes – Press Release 22 April 1991. 
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 Staying calm and telling the hostile party that they were not helping themselves; 
 Explaining the role of the Tribunal; 
 Threatening an exclusion; 
 Making the process transparent and fair; 
 Taking an adjournment; 
 Applying the case management approach to iron out problems; 
 Restoring formality; 
 Talking to representatives out the back; 
 Instructing witnesses that they must answer questions; and 
 Advising parties that if they do not like the ruling, they can appeal. 
 
Adjudicators were asked whether they had ever experienced any adverse reactions to 
their decisions by either parties or their representatives. Not many adjudicators said 
that they gave oral decisions, and if they did, adverse reactions sometimes occurred. 
Some examples of how parties have reacted to decisions of adjudicators follow. 
However, it was not always clear whether or not adjudicators were referring to oral 
decisions or written ones: 
I don‟t, haven‟t tended to give oral decisions anyway, so I haven‟t been able to sit there and 
watch the faces drop and the swear words come out and the stormings out of the room.   
But I have had people contact me outside later, or take offence to a decision, write me long 
and nasty letters about how come I saw it this way or that way or whatever.  And there‟s 
always the problem of leaning over in the supermarket and getting stuff out of the freezer and 
looking up and there‟s the person who was on the other side. 
I don‟t deliver oral decisions where there is animosity or hostility in the room, simply to avoid 
exacerbating that hostility further. I‟d rather reserve a judgment and give it to them in two 
days time or a days time when they‟ve got away from the place rather than the parties 
confronting each other or worse confronting me and showing contempt to the institution. 
…the Respondent was a very volatile person and she jumped up and started screaming and 
yelling and carrying on, and I remember another time bumping into somebody who was quite 
a senior manager in a company that had lost a case and I was with somebody who knew him 
and she introduced me to him, and he started in the middle of this café, started berating me 
about my decision. It was very embarrassing and he wasn‟t at the hearing, but wasn‟t pleased 
at all with the decision.   
I recall one occasion where I gave an oral decision and the unsuccessful plaintiff wanted to 
debate it in the hearing room. I told him that once I‟d made the decision my function was 
over, but that he had an absolute right to appeal my decision, and then left the room. 
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6.4.8 VARYING THE PROCEDURE 
 
Under the Labour Relations Act 1987, it had been possible for the Grievance 
Committee to vary personal grievance procedures if sexual harassment had been 
alleged.
57
 This provision was not included in the provisions of the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991. The Employment Tribunal Regulations 1991 set out the 
procedures, which adjudicators were obliged to follow, but there was no special 
provision for sexual harassment proceedings.
58
 However, it was possible under reg 
49(2) of the Employment Tribunal Regulations 1991 for adjudicators to intervene or 
vary the procedure in a fair manner. Regulation 49 read as follows: 
Procedure in adjudication proceedings –  
(1) In adjudication proceedings, the Tribunal shall usually proceed in the following manner: 
(a) Every witness shall be examined on oath (which term includes an affirmation): 
(b) Each witness may give his or her evidence-in-chief by reading or confirming a 
written brief or statement of evidence: 
(c) The Tribunal shall first hear the applicant and such evidence as the applicant may 
adduce: 
(d) The Tribunal shall then hear the respondent and such evidence as the respondent may 
adduce: 
(e) If the Tribunal is satisfied that evidence adduced by the respondent included material 
that could not reasonably have been foreseen by the applicant, it may, if that material 
requires an answer, allow the applicant to adduce evidence in rebuttal: 
(f) The parties may examine, cross-examine, and re-examine witnesses: 
(g) Either party may, in an address to the Tribunal, sum up the party‟s case: 
(h) The Tribunal shall consider the matter and deal with it in accordance with the 
appropriate Act. 
(2) Nothing in subclause (1) of this regulation prevents the Tribunal from intervening at any 
stage in any proceedings that are before the Tribunal or from varying, in relation to any 
such proceedings, in a manner that is fair, the procedure prescribed by that subclause. 
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 Labour Relations Act 1987, s 221. 
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 Employment Tribunal Regulations 1991, reg 49. 
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Adjudicators were asked in what circumstances they would vary the procedure for 
conducting hearings as provided for in the regulations. All adjudicators stated that 
they would vary the procedure, if appropriate. Many said that flexibility was the key 
to the procedure operating effectively. The most frequently cited reason for varying 
the procedure was because of self-representatives. Some adjudicators advised that 
they would vary the procedure when both parties consented. 
 
Some examples of how the procedure was varied were: changing the order of the 
process to make it fair to the parties;
59
 hearing the employers‟ case first; changing the 
order of witnesses;
60
 allowing re-examination;
61
 questioning the witnesses if 
representatives were incompetent;
62
 incorporating cultural requirements or requests;
63
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 Employment Tribunal Regulations 1991, reg 49(2) provided that „nothing in subclause (1) of this 
regulation prevents the Tribunal from intervening at any stage in any proceedings that are before the 
tribunal or from varying, in relation to any such proceedings, in a manner that is fair, the procedure 
prescribed by that subclause. This provision appears to be in conflict with the general provision that the 
applicant in all civil cases is entitled to be heard first if he or she bears the evidential burden‟ (D 
Matheson (ed), Cross on Evidence (8
th
 ed) 2005, 239. In personal grievance cases, the applicant has the 
obligation to prove that the action which caused the grievance arose after which the respondent had an 
obligation to justify the decision. See Chapter 2.3.3(a) for a brief discussion on the burden of proof in 
personal grievance cases. 
60
 Employment Tribunal Regulations 1991, reg 49(2) provided that the adjudicator could alter the order 
of witnesses, which contravenes the general principle that each party can determine the order of 
witnesses. See Montego Motors Ltd v Horn [1971] 2 NZLR 21, and D Matheson (ed), Cross on 
Evidence (8
th
 ed) 2005, 234. 
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 Ibid, reg 49(1)(f) allowed the parties to examine, cross-examine and re-examine witnesses. 
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 Ibid, reg 49(2) enabled the Tribunal to intervene at any stage in any proceedings that are before the 
Tribunal, in a manner that is fair. In general terms, Judges may ask questions of witnesses to clarify an 
issue or to help a witness or party understand the wording of a question – D Matheson (ed), Cross on 
Evidence (8
th
 ed) 2005, 326. However, they may not become part of the debate itself and take on the 
part of a representative; Yuill v Yuill [1945] 1 All ER 183; D Matheson (ed), Cross on Evidence (8
th
 ed) 
2005, 236. 
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 This type of variation of the personal grievance procedure was possible under regulation 49(2) 
Employment Tribunal Regulations 1991 where it was stated that the Employment Tribunal could vary 
in relation to any such proceedings in a manner that was fair the procedure provided in the appropriate 
sub clause. 
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varying the procedure in sexual harassment cases according to needs;
64
 being flexible 
with the regulations;
65
 swearing self representatives in
66
 and „letting them run‟.67 
6.4.9 CASELOAD 
 
One possible reason for the delay in obtaining an adjudication, and subsequently a 
decision, may have been the caseload of adjudicators. As discussed in Chapter Five, 
the caseload of adjudicators varied between Registries, as did the number of 
adjudicators hearing personal grievances.
68
 It was found in Chapter Five that 
adjudicators in Christchurch had a significantly higher caseload than any of the 
jurisdictional centres and also had a lower number of adjudicators than Auckland, 
Hamilton and Wellington.
69
 Adjudicators were asked how they would describe their 
caseload in comparison to that of other adjudicators. 
Table 6.4:  Caseload of Adjudicators 
Adjudicator’s Response Rate (N=20) 
Fair  11 
Heavy 7 
Light 0 
Don‟t Know 2 
 
No adjudicators believed that their caseload was light. Of the category of adjudicators 
who thought that their workload was fair, four were from Auckland, five from 
Wellington, and two were from Dunedin. No Adjudicators in Christchurch believed 
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 Any such variation was a further possibility under regulation 49(2) Employment Tribunal 
Regulations 1991. 
65
 The regulations themselves provided some flexibility as to process but what was actually meant by 
being flexible with the regulations was not clear. 
66
 This meant allowing a self-representative to simply tell their own story and allowing them to act as 
their own witness. 
67
 In theory, this process conflicted with reg 49(1) as it stipulated the order and process which the 
Employment Tribunal was to follow. However reg 49(2) was a sort of „catch all‟ provision and gave 
the Tribunal Adjudicators some flexibility in how they conducted their hearings. 
68
 See Chapter 5.4.4. 
69
 See Chapter 5, Tables 5.11 and 5.12. 
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that they had a fair caseload, although one did not know. Of those adjudicators who 
thought their caseload was heavy, five were from Auckland and two were from 
Christchurch. No adjudicators in Wellington or Dunedin believed that they had a 
heavy caseload in comparison with other adjudicators, although one adjudicator in 
Wellington did not know. It may have been that the case management approach taken 
by Wellington adjudicators resolved some cases thereby reducing the need for 
adjudication. Two adjudicators did not know what their caseload was in comparison 
to other adjudicators. This may have been because they were unaware of the workload 
of others. On reflection however, this question was too broad: it should have asked 
about their caseload in comparison to that carried by other adjudicators, as well as 
their caseload in general terms.
70
 A further question on the impact of high workload 
could have been what this did to the quality of case analysis and decision making as 
the responses highlighted delay as a factor impacting on the quality of outcomes. 
 
Several adjudicators remarked that delays in decisions being issued affected the 
caseload. One adjudicator stated: 
On a gut feeling I probably have a fairly high proportion…and that‟s certainly not a 
complaint. I give more decisions orally on the day of the hearing than any other Tribunal 
Member. I‟ve done that in nearly 50% of cases I‟ve heard since starting in the Tribunal. 
 
Another adjudicator stated that: 
In Auckland in any case, case allocation was done on a rota system where we had so many 
cases set down, and it was the same for everybody. Some people could not get through the 
caseload and others could. My decisions were issued always within 6 weeks of the hearing, 
often less than that. Some adjudicators took 18 bloody months you will find if you have a look 
at the figures. It didn‟t contribute to a good situation. Some adjudicators just couldn‟t cope 
with the decision-making process. 
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 For a discussion of the caseload of adjudicators and the number of adjudicators in each jurisdiction, 
see Ch 5, Tables 5.11 and 5.12 and accompanying text. 
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Interviews indicated that some adjudicators experienced frustration at the caseload 
that they carried or completed in comparison to other adjudicators. For example, one 
adjudicator stated, „[i]n the first few years of the ‟91 legislation, [my caseload was] 
heavy. When I found out what some of my colleagues were doing, and changed my 
ways, [it was] fair. Now read between the lines…‟. The above comments illustrate 
that there was a considerable degree of uncertainty for parties to a personal grievance 
both on availability of adjudicators due to their caseload and on how long they would 
have to wait for a decision. It may have been that the adjudicator gave an oral 
decision on the day or it may have been that parties would have to wait for up to 18 
months for a decision to be produced. If reinstatement was being sought, this would 
have caused considerable uncertainty and could have been financially detrimental for 
parties because they would have had to wait.
71
  
6.4.10 TIME LAPSE 
 
One of the main problems for parties using the adjudication system was the delays in 
the process. There was often a considerable delay between the event/s which gave rise 
to the personal grievance and its filing with the Tribunal, a delay between filing and 
adjudication, and a delay between the hearing and the date of decision.
72
 As noted in 
Chapter Five, these delays were contrary to the expressed purpose of the legislative 
provision.
73
 Tribunal staff and adjudicators did not have any control over or impact on 
delays between the event/s which gave rise to the personal grievance and the date of 
filing because lodging a personal grievance was the sole responsibility of the 
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applicant.
74
 The only time constraint was the initial notification of the personal 
grievance to the employer being the 90 day rule, by which applicants had to notify to 
the employer within 90 days of the event/s giving rise to the personal grievance.
75
 
Beyond notification no expressed time limit, apart from a six year constraint 
contained in the Limitation Act 1950 s 4, existed before the matter had to be lodged 
with the Employment Tribunal.   However, in cases where exceptional circumstances 
could be shown, Employment Tribunal adjudicators could waive the 90-day 
requirement and allow the personal grievance to be heard even if it was lodged 
outside the 90-day limit.
76
 Further comments by adjudicators on the 90-day rule and 
applicants‟ obligations in out-of-time applications, especially in relation to costs, will 
be discussed later in this chapter. 
 
All adjudicators stated that some of the delays between the personal grievance and 
filing were caused by the slowness or availability of representatives. Six adjudicators 
specifically said that lawyers caused delays during that time.
77
 Other factors identified 
by adjudicators that contributed to the delay between the event/s resulting in a 
personal grievance and lodging included: contingency representatives delaying the 
process to raise fees;
78
 personal pressures on parties; whether parties went to 
mediation; location of where the personal grievance occurred; availability of both 
representatives to assist; lack of co-operation between the parties; excessive exchange 
of correspondence between representatives which may have resulted in higher fees 
and caused delay; the 90 day rule which may have resulted in a three month delay 
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 Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 33. 
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 Ibid, ss 33(3) and (4). For a discussion on the application of the exceptional circumstances rule, see 
Chapter 2.4.1(c). 
77
 For lawyers‟ views on delays, see Chapter 7.6.3.  
78
 Contingency representatives were those whose payment depended on the outcome of the case, for 
example „no win, no fee‟ representatives in Christchurch.   
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between the event/s resulting in a personal grievance and its lodging; and the 
procedure itself, that was, writing a letter, receiving a response and then filing.
79
 As 
can be seen from these responses, there were many factors that contributed to the 
delay between the event/s resulting in the personal grievance and filing with the 
Tribunal. As mentioned above, Tribunal staff had no impact on delays during this 
period. However, the actions of representatives could have had an impact at this point. 
Therefore, the responsibility for any delay at this stage of the process may not in all 
cases be solely attributable to the actions of the applicant.
80
 
 
The second time lapse was between the date of filing the personal grievance with the 
Employment Tribunal and the date of hearing. When the Employment Contracts Act 
was passed in 1991, there were a number of personal grievances that had not been 
resolved. Consequently, personal grievances that had been lodged under the old 
system remained outstanding and were being heard alongside personal grievances that 
had occurred when the Employment Contracts Act 1991 was in force. The 
Employment Tribunal, therefore, was hearing personal grievances under both pieces 
of legislation.
81
 Adjudicators acknowledged that there was a significant backlog from 
the Labour Relations Act 1987, and that this was one of the reasons why there was a 
significant delay between lodging a personal grievance under the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991 and its adjudication.  
 
One adjudicator remarked: 
                                                             
79
 Employment Tribunal Regulations 1991, s 9. For a discussion of lodging a grievance and the 90-day 
rule, see Chapter 2.4.1(a) and 2.4.1(c). 
80
 See para 6.5.15 for a discussion on the Exceptional Circumstances Rule. 
81
 See Chapter 2.5. 
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The [Employment Tribunal] suffered from problems not of its own making. It began life 
charged with the disposal not only of a backlog of cases under the [Labour Relations Act] but 
within [three months‟ a] backlog of its own cases accrued between 15 May 1991 when the Act 
came into force and 19 August 1991 when the first [Employment Tribunal] Adjudicators were 
sworn in. The caseload rose to 5500 cases annually about 1/8 of the whole civil litigation 
burden in all jurisdictions in [New Zealand], without a commensurate increase in 
[Employment Tribunal] adjudicators. At peak the [Employment Tribunal] had 28 adjudicators 
nationally, not all of them full time. By way of contrast the total appointments to the 
[Employment Relations Authority] and the new Mediation Services amounted to 55 full time 
officers. 
 
Another factor affecting the delay at this stage was the availability of parties and their 
representatives. As found in Chapter Five, most parties to personal grievances chose 
to be represented rather than representing themselves; therefore, the availability of 
representatives was a contributing factor in the delay of the process.
82
  
 
There were also a number of administrative factors that adjudicators believed 
contributed to the delay at this stage. These included: institutional delays; lack of 
resources; availability of rooms; administrative incompetence; and Employment Court 
requirements for the Registry to consult.
83
 A further contributing factor was 
interlocutory matters being determined by the Court, which resulted in further delay 
in hearing the substantive personal grievance.
84
 It was also found in the Industrial 
Tribunal in England that legal representatives were more likely to extend the process 
by taking interlocutory steps.
85
 
 
                                                             
82
 See Chapter 5, Table 5.10. 
83
 The consultation referred to here related to such matters as dates, times and venues for adjudication 
hearings. Often there were difficulties when several parties were involved, and a number of 
representatives‟ diaries had to be matched up. Telephone discussion with Alistair Dumbleton, Former 
Chief of Employment Tribunal, 1 November 2005. 
84
 See Chapter 2.4.4(e) for a discussion on interim reinstatement. The Employment Tribunal also had 
authority to hear applications to produce documents which according to one Employment Tribunal 
adjudicator was the only interlocutory function which the Tribunal had the authority to participate in. 
Telephone discussion with former Tribunal Adjudicator, Jeff Goldstein, 1 November 2005. See also 
Employment Contracts Act 1991, ss 96 and 126(2)(c). 
85
 Ibid. 
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Adjudicators also considered that there were too many personal grievances due to 
increased jurisdiction while there were too few adjudicators to hear the cases.
86
 One 
adjudicator remarked: 
[w]hen you file you get into the whole paraphernalia of the regulations that certain things 
happen in response times and all that. And then, when all that was done, it went into the back-
log. Once everything was completed it went to the end of the line, and the line was way out of 
control because there were too many cases and too few adjudicators. And it wasn‟t helped by 
the fact that some adjudicators thought it was ok to not put a decision out for 18 months. 
 
Adjudicators also noted that a deficiency of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 was 
that there was no time limit for referring a personal grievance to the Tribunal after 
notifying the employer. 
 
The third stage where time delays could have occurred was between the date of 
hearing and the date the decision was produced. Adjudicators noted the following 
elements: there was a delay in adjudicators writing their decisions and there were poor 
cases that dragged the procedure out unnecessarily.
87
 Other factors which crossed 
over into the third stage were: the legal profession causing delays because they were 
used to lengthy court cases and delayed litigation; representatives who might sit on 
the case and delay taking action; backlog and institutional delay from the Labour 
Relations Act 1987; a lack of co-operation between parties during the hearing process; 
the hearing procedure itself, which could have been protracted if the case had begun 
with mediation; and lack of resources in the Tribunal, including a lack of adjudicators.  
One adjudicator commented: 
                                                             
86
 For numbers of adjudicators in each centre, see Table 5.11. The increased jurisdiction was created 
under Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 33(1), which provided that all employees irrespective of 
union membership were entitled to take a personal grievance. 
87
 For a short discussion on time lapse, see Chapters 7.5.8 and 5.4.9. 
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The Employment Tribunal took a tremendous amount of flak and I remember that a number of 
members of the Tribunal actually lost their jobs as a result of the Tribunal being blamed for 
delays which were caused more by the way that the legal profession in particular operated 
than anything else. They seem to have a different view of time. They‟re used to courts on 
schedules where it‟s not unusual for litigation to be 12 months, 2 years, or three years out.88 
 
These comments could suggest that legal representatives are not best suited to a 
Tribunal adjudication system which was intended to be informal and not to replicate 
the formal litigation structure of the courtroom. 
6.4.11 MEDIATION  
 
There was no obligation to attend mediation, so parties could make their own 
determination about whether mediation was useful and consequently whether they 
would participate.
89
 Adjudicators were asked to consider what the advantages and 
disadvantages to mediation were for parties to a personal grievance. Advantages 
commonly raised by adjudicators were: 1) mediation clarified the issues between the 
parties; and 2) mediation provided both parties with a better understanding of the 
opponent‟s case. Further advantages identified by adjudicators were: 
 Mediation identified the risks and merits of proceeding to adjudication; 
 Mediation filled gaps in cases prior to adjudication; 
 It was cheaper for parties if they settled at mediation; 
 Parties could get a third party/mediator opinion; 
 It showed a willingness of the parties to discuss the issues; 
 It meant that parties were better prepared when they appeared at adjudication; 
 Parties could retain control of the decision-making process; 
 Confidentiality; 
                                                             
88
 These observations of the legal profession were shared by commentators in England, who found that 
as with getting to a hearing, legal representation is associated with more time being taken in a hearing. 
Linda Dickens, Michael Jones, Brian Weekes and Moira Hart, Dismissed: A Study of Unfair Dismissal 
and the Industrial Tribunal System, (1985) 205, also noted that:  
[w]hile in part this is possibly a result of more complex cases being handled by legal 
representatives…the time taken also reflects the manner in which legal representatives choose to 
present cases, often with detailed opening and closing statements, calling of several witnesses, and 
citing of case law. 
89
 Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 80. For a discussion on attendance at mediation see Chapter 2.3.2. 
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 Familiarity with the process of mediation would be an advantage if the case was referred 
back to mediation by an adjudicator. 
 
One adjudicator said: 
It was incredibly efficient and sophisticated – I have no idea why they decided to disband it. It 
was very orderly and it really did mean that most things were sorted out at mediation. 
 
These observations on the advantages of mediation are similar to those made by Paul 
Roth, who suggested that mediation was advantageous because it was quick, cheap, 
less stressful, private, voluntary, and identified outstanding issues or concerns.
90
  
 
Adjudicators, although very supportive of mediation, identified disadvantages to 
mediation as: 
 Mediation was a disadvantage if the case did not concern a genuine personal grievance, 
but was rather only about enforcement of a clear obligation; 
 It was more expensive if mediation was not successful; 
 There could have been a possible time delay if mediation was unsuccessful; 
 Mediation may have entrenched positions further; 
 If the parties did not attend mediation it could have sounded in costs; 
 Mediation was a disadvantage if parties refused to negotiate; 
 If mediation was unsuccessful, the detail had already been disclosed prior to adjudication 
which could result in disadvantage to the other party; 
 If not settled at mediation, it could be an emotionally costly process. 
 
From 30 June 1996 to 30 June 1997, 5424 applications to the Employment Tribunal 
were received; 3202 mediations were scheduled; and 400 adjudications were 
serviced.
91
 From 30 June 1997 to 30 June 1998, 5332 applications to the Employment 
Tribunal were received; 3107 mediations were scheduled; and 492 adjudications were 
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 P Roth, „The Grievance Procedure‟ in J Hughes, P Roth and G Anderson (eds), Personal Grievances  
(1999) 2.20. For a discussion on mediation and mediation procedure see Chapter 2.4.2. 
91
 Labour Department, Annual Report ending 30 June 1997, 36. 
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serviced.
92
 As mentioned in Chapter Five, it is not clear from these figures how many 
of those applications related to personal grievance claims and how many were 
disputes or other forms of action. The figures do make it clear that there were many 
more mediations scheduled than adjudications. However, it is not known how many 
personal grievances were resolved at mediation as mediation proceedings were 
privileged under the Employment Contracts Act 1991.
93
 Between 1996 and 1997, 
2864 mediations were conducted by the Mediation Service; for 1997 to 1998 the 
number of mediations conducted was not recorded.
94
 
6.4.12 REMEDIES 
 
In general terms, adjudicators were asked about remedies and how they awarded 
them. The questions were divided up into sections that asked about specific 
remedies.
95
 Adjudicators‟ responses tended to be blurred, and they frequently spoke in 
general terms about how they awarded compensation and assessed reimbursement and 
whether or not reinstatement was a potential option. 
 
Remedies for personal grievances were available under ss 40, 41 and 42 of the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991. Available remedies included reimbursement, 
reinstatement, and compensation.
96
 Where remedies sought by parties to a personal 
grievance were perceived to be unreasonable, adjudicators were asked how this 
affected their approach. Most adjudicators replied that they would just ignore or not 
take much notice of unreasonable remedies sought. One adjudicator mentioned that 
lawyers put big claims in just to be on the safe side. It was also suggested that if 
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 Ibid 42. 
93
 Employment Contracts Act 1991, ss 37 and 88(7). 
94
 Labour Department, Annual Report for year ended 30 June 1996, 138. Also see Labour Department, 
Annual Report for year ended 30 June 1997. 
95
 See Appendix IV. 
96
 For a detailed list of remedies available under the Act, see Chapter 2.4.4. 
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parties sought unreasonable remedies it may sound in costs against them. 
Adjudicators mentioned that they would follow court precedents in awarding 
remedies.
97
  
 
Some adjudicators said that if parties sought unreasonable remedies it did affect their 
approach and/or attitude to the parties and some thought less of representatives who 
brought excessive claims, as it gave applicants high expectations. Two adjudicators 
said that it subconsciously prejudices you against the applicant and consequently 
makes you wonder what the motives of applicants were who sought unreasonable 
remedies. One adjudicator stated that: 
I guess it depends on who has actually put down the remedies because if it‟s an unrepresented 
person he or she will have no idea of what‟s reasonable or what‟s unreasonable. If it‟s a 
solicitor that‟s put down something unreasonable, then I‟d lay that at the door of that person 
and not at the door of the applicant by and large, although I accept that some applicants may 
give solicitors instructions to claim $200,000 when that patently isn‟t going to happen. 
 
Another adjudicator mentioned that unreasonable remedies claimed alone were 
reasonable, but if accompanied by arguments which do not support the claim, it gave 
the adjudicator a poor view of the party.
98
 
 
Reference to the data contained in Chapter Five regarding remedies sought and 
granted clearly shows that applicants rarely received remedies at the rate requested. 
Adjudicators must have become accustomed to significantly larger claims than they 
                                                             
97
 In Telecom South Ltd v Post Office Union [1992] 1 NZLR 275; Air New Zealand Ltd v Johnston 
[1992] 1 NZLR 159; and Minister of Education v Dailey [1993] 2 ERNZ 321, the Court of Appeal 
provided guidelines on factors to be considered by the Tribunal when granting reimbursement and 
compensation. In Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections v Dodds, (unreported, CC6/03, 
Employment Court Christchurch, 4 March 2003, Goddard CJ) the Employment Court stated that the 
Tribunal would have to have acted on a wrong principle of law or made a wrong estimation of the 
respondent‟s loss. Goddard CJ stated that he may have awarded slightly less due to contributory fault, 
but this distinction would not have been significantly different. 
98
 For a discussion of remedies sought and granted, see Chapter 5.4.7. 
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were prepared to award and it appears that in general terms they were not prepared to 
award beyond the levels suggested by the Employment Court.
99
 
 
When reviewing cases from the Employment Tribunal in 1997, it was found that on 
occasion parties or their representatives sought remedies which were not contained in 
the legislation, for example, apologies, references, interest,
100
 and higher 
reimbursements than court guidelines.
101
 Adjudicators were asked what their attitude 
was to the parties if remedies sought were not provided for in legislation. Most 
adjudicators said that it did not affect their attitude to the parties and that they simply 
advised that the remedies they sought were not available. A number of adjudicators 
advised that it would have affected their attitude to representatives but not the parties 
themselves, while two adjudicators said that it would affect their attitude to the parties 
and that it might sound in costs. One adjudicator said that this problem could have 
been resolved by case management, and another believed that they could at times 
have circumvented the legislation. Four adjudicators took the view that other remedies 
were available through mediation. The nature of mediation was such that parties could 
negotiate any settlement that they deemed appropriate in the circumstances. If a 
mediated settlement was not adhered to by either party, it could be enforced by a 
                                                             
99
 In Trotter v Telecom Corporation of NZ Ltd [1993] 2 ERNZ 659, Goddard CJ commented that the 
Tribunal was to reduce remedies where it was just and equitable (s 41(3)(b)). Arguably the Tribunal 
was not prepared to award to the level suggested by the Court as being necessary, in some cases. 
100
 See Beazley v Department of Justice [1995] 2 ERNZ 465 where it was held that there was not 
general jurisdiction to award interest in claims for compensation and reimbursement. There was some 
possibility that interest may have been available via s 49 of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 where 
arrears of wages and other monies available under s 48 of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 were 
being considered. See G Anderson, J Hughes and P Roth, Personal Grievances (1999). 
101
 These were mentioned by adjudicators as examples of remedies that were not available under the 
legislation. See also the Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 41(1)(b). In Trotter v Telecom Corporation 
of NZ Ltd [1993] 2 ERNZ 659, Goddard CJ commented that the limit of power of the statutory 
discretion was not to award more than the loss. Secondly, if there was a personal grievance and 
remuneration was lost, the employee was entitled to receive the amount of the loss, unless a good 
reason existed to deprive the applicant of the full amount.  
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compliance order.
102
 One adjudicator noted that remedy claims could be made by 
parties through their representatives which were convoluted and showed a clear lack 
of understanding, and in that case it would be easier to find in favour of the other side: 
There‟s been cases where I‟ve decided in favour of one side, simply because it‟s been open for 
me to do it. There‟s sufficient evidence to do it, and it‟s a hell of a lot easier than finding for 
the other [side], because it‟s so much harder to write. 
 
This approach could have resulted in injustice to one party if their representative 
happened to take a more convoluted or complex approach when submitting their case 
and asking for remedies. Similarly, a party themselves may have taken a convoluted 
approach or asked for remedies that were not available without knowledge of 
constraints. 
 
Adjudicators were given discretion under the Act to award whatever remedies were 
appropriate, although there were guidelines on the allocation of particular remedies 
and the courts also gave some directions to the Tribunal as to how remedies should 
have been awarded.
103
 As there was discretion on how and if remedies were to be 
awarded, how adjudicators used that discretion was of interest. In general, 
adjudicators indicated their belief that the rules were clear so they just applied them 
and decisions were made on the evidence and the overall reasonableness of the 
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 Tucker v Cerissi Leather Ltd [1995] 2 ERNZ 11. For more discussion of mediation, see Chapter 
2.4.2. 
103
 The guidelines for reimbursement were laid down Goddard CJ in Trotter v Telecom Corporation of 
NZ Ltd [1993] 2 ERNZ 659. They provided that: (1) A personal grievance had to be established; (2) As 
a result of the personal grievance remuneration was lost; (3) What was the extent of the loss; (4) Award 
the amount of the loss if it amounted to the equivalent of three months‟ ordinary time remuneration, or 
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a greater amount by way of compensation; (6) Give consideration to any contributory fault; and (7) If 
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for reinstatement were set down by Goddard CJ in Ashton v Shoreline Hotel [1994] 1 ERNZ 421. If it 
was possible to reinstate, reinstatement should ordinarily happen, unless the applicant could not have 
been placed in a position which was not less advantageous to the employee (s 40(1)(b)). On guidelines 
generally, see Employment Contracts Act 1991, ss 40, 41 and 42; Telecom South Ltd v Post Office 
Union [1992] 1 NZLR 275; Air New Zealand Ltd v Johnston [1992] 1 NZLR 159; and Minister of 
Education v Dailey [1993] 2 ERNZ 321. 
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package. When discussing specific remedies available under the Act, adjudicators 
took the following factors into account when exercising their discretion. This included 
the statutory obligation to take into account contributory fault in any personal 
grievance and reduce remedies accordingly under Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 
40(2).  
6.4.12(A) REINSTATEMENT 
 
Adjudicators also followed case law considerations when issuing orders for 
reinstatement. These included taking into account objections by either party when 
reinstatement was being considered;
104
 the consideration of whether the position or 
the work itself was still available;
105
 whether there had been a breach of trust and 
confidence in the relationship between the employee and employer;
106
 and if there had 
been a long delay in the personal grievance procedure being initiated.
107
 Adjudicators 
also took into account whether or not reinstatement was practical under all the 
circumstances and viable on the merits of the case.
108
 Adjudicators also made the 
following comments in relation to the feasibility of reinstatement: the belief that 
reinstatement was only a practical option for employers of large companies;
109
 
whether employees were genuinely seeking reinstatement or whether it was a 
bargaining tool; and adjudicators also considered whether or not the relevant position 
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 Port of Wellington Ltd v Longwith [1995] 1 ERNZ 87 (CA). 
105
 Asken & Ors and 2 Ors v NZ Rail Ltd unreported, Goddard CJ, 12 July 1994, WEC 33/94, where the 
issue was whether the work performed is still available. 
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 Airways Corporation of NZ Ltd v Brunton [1994] 1 ERNZ 352. 
107
 Ashton v Shoreline Hotel [1994] 1 ERNZ 421 and NZ Workers IUW v Papuni Station: Proprietors 
of Tahora 2F2 [1989] 3 NZILR 270. 
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 See King v Director-General of Social Welfare, unreported, Employment Court, Auckland, AEC 
108/97, 26 September 1997, where Judge Colgan said in balancing the interests of the parties and 
practicability of ordering reinstatement it was necessary to consider the both past and future issues in 
an attempt to work out a practical solution. 
109
 This view was shared by the Industrial Tribunal in England: Linda Dickens, Michael Jones, Brian 
Weekes and Moira Hart, Dismissed: A Study of Unfair Dismissal and the Industrial Tribunal System, 
(1985) 112. 
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was merely a job or an aspirational career step. A further consideration taken into 
account by adjudicators was whether the employing company was still in existence; if 
not, reinstatement could not be ordered. The final consideration for adjudicators was 
the likely effectiveness of the employee, should reinstatement have been ordered. 
These responses demonstrated that adjudicators took a range of contextual factors into 
account when deciding if reinstatement was appropriate. 
 
When discussing reinstatement, one adjudicator commented: 
Reinstatement was rarely asked for, and this is a reflection of the delay. With the delay came 
not many reinstatements and in turn came „don‟t bother applying for it‟ because the delay 
worked on the applicants and „it‟s too late now, I‟ve got on with my life‟.  
Another adjudicator also commented that reinstatement was always the most 
appropriate method of resolution if practicable. However, as seen in Chapter Five, 
reinstatement was not a remedy that was frequently sought or granted in dismissal 
cases.
110
  
6.4.12(B) REIMBURSEMENT 
 
In response to the question of which factors they took into account when awarding 
reimbursement, adjudicators advised that in exercising discretion they took into 
account the factors stipulated by the legislation and precedents. This included the 
actual loss the employee had experienced and whether or not they had made any 
attempts to mitigate that loss.
111
 Adjudicators were unlikely to have awarded more 
than 12 to 18 months‟ reimbursement of wages as the applicant should have found 
alternative employment by the time of the hearing.
112
 Adjudicators had to decide 
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 See Table 5.31 and related text. 
111
 Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 41(1)(b). 
112
 Ibid, ss 41(1)(b) and 41(2). In Pascoe v Covic Motors Ltd [1994] 2 ERNZ 152 it was said that „[t]he 
duty to mitigate one‟s loss is to be taken into account not under the discretion to extend the period of 
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whether or not to exercise the statutory discretion to award more than three months‟ 
wages by using the provisions contained in the Act.
113
 Section 41(3)(b) also required 
adjudicators to take into account any contributory behaviour of the employee and 
accordingly make any reduction to reimbursement on the basis of fairness and equity. 
Adjudicators also stated that in awarding reimbursement they would have based their 
decisions on the mathematical stipulations contained in ss 40 and 41 of the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991. That meant calculating wages or other money lost 
and awarding reimbursement based on the lesser of three months‟ ordinary time or the 
lost remuneration, whichever was the lesser.
114
 When determining reimbursement 
adjudicators also considered whether the claim made by the applicant was accurate, 
and they may have reached their decision on the basis of the employer‟s ability to pay. 
 
Adjudicators exercised their discretion to take into account varying circumstances in 
different ways, but they generally followed the formula provided by legislation and 
directives from the Court, thus applying the law to the facts: 
You have to apply the law. There is some conflict in what that means, whether you start out 
by looking at what has been lost and bring it down from say 9 months, if that‟s the time 
they‟re claiming, or, look at three months, and whether you should exercise your discretion 
and go up, or exercise your discretion and go down. But we now know that the law requires 
people to be looking for jobs from day one rather than after three months and we have to look 
at mitigation to determine reimbursement level, how much they‟ve lost and whether it‟s 
because of the grievance. The legal principles are just applied there. 
 
6.4.12(C) COMPENSATION 
 
Employment Tribunal adjudicators were asked what factors they took into account 
when awarding compensation as this was an area where discretion was less 
                                                                                                                                                                              
loss expressed in s 41(2), but when considering the burden placed on an employee by s 41(1)(b) and s 
41(2) to prove remuneration lost as a result of the personal grievance.‟ 
113
 Ibid, s 41(2). 
114
 Employment Contracts Act 1991, ss 40(1) and 41(1). 
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constrained and subjective in nature. For example, the gender, ethnic origin or 
wage/salary level of the applicant. Compensation could have been awarded for 
humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to the feelings of the employee, and/or loss of 
any benefit.
115
 When adjudicators were asked this question they did not distinguish 
between awards of compensation for loss of dignity and injury to feelings, and loss of 
benefit, but tended to comment in more general terms. For example, some of their 
comments were that they took into account such matters as: the seriousness of the 
substantive issues and how they directly affected the employee; and the context of the 
whole situation, for example, the type of work, the relationship with 
employer/supervisor, the likelihood of the employee finding future work and the 
damage which the employee had suffered. Further issues which adjudicators 
considered included the level of humiliation and distress – inevitably this involved a 
subjective approach including assessing any ongoing humiliation and distress. This 
involved ascertaining issues of credibility and weighing up competing evidential 
claims. A further approach used by adjudicators was applying the „egg-shell skull‟ 
principle. That was, employees were taken as they were found. This could have 
included the age, gender, ethnicity or disability of the applicant. Adjudicators thought 
that if employers had limited resources there was little point in awarding large 
amounts of compensation. They therefore took into account the ability of the 
employer to pay when awarding compensation. If the employee had longer service 
with the employer they were more likely to have been awarded higher compensation 
than if they had been short term employees. Further factors considered by 
adjudicators when awarding compensation included the merits of the case, precedents, 
the honesty of the employees concerned and contributory fault. 
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 Ibid, ss 40(1)(c)(i) and 40(1)(c)(ii). 
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The following tables provide a further breakdown of factors that adjudicators took 
into account when awarding compensation.
116
 
Table 6.5: Adjudicators’ Views on Gender 
Taken into Account? Adjudicator response rate (N= 18) 
No 14 
Not Consciously 2 
Depending on Circumstances 1 
Depending on Family Status and Responsibility 1 
 
Table 6.6: Adjudicators’ Views on Ethnic Origin 
Taken into Account? Adjudicator response rate (N = 18) 
No 15 
Not Consciously 2 
Yes, Depending on Circumstances 1 
 
Although most adjudicators recognised the importance of neutrality in relation to 
consideration of gender and ethnic origin, there was general awareness that these 
factors were often present in personal grievance claims. While gender and ethnicity 
were not directly relevant to compensation, they were acknowledged as inherent 
characteristics of applicants and therefore considered indirectly by adjudicators when 
awarding compensation. This gives expression to the „egg shell skull‟ principle where 
applicants were taken as they were found. Such characteristics were thus relevant to 
the individual applicant and the impact on them personally:  
Gender doesn‟t come into it. What I tend to take into account is the evidence of the impact on 
the individual. 
 
                                                             
116
 Cf Dickens et al above n 87, 125, who observe that the Industrial Tribunal recompensed those 
dismissed unfairly for the loss they suffered as a result of the dismissal but that the unfairness itself 
attracted no compensation.   
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For example, one adjudicator thought that gender could affect their decision making 
from another angle; where female applicants may have had significant family 
responsibilities that impacted on the decision, in which case, the gender of the 
applicant concerned did affect the decision of the adjudicator, and how remedies were 
awarded.   
Table 6.7: Adjudicators’ Views on Age  
Taken into Account? Adjudicator response rate (N = 12) 
Yes 3 
No 3 
Length of Service rather than age 6 
 
Table 6.7 above shows that six adjudicators took into account length of service when 
awarding compensation rather than age. Three adjudicators indicated that they did not 
take age into account. 
Table 6.8: Adjudicators’ Views on Wage/Salary 
Taken into Account? Adjudicator response rate (N= 13) 
No 4 
Yes 6 
Philosophically No, but in Reality, Yes. 3 
 
Table 6.8 shows the responses from adjudicators to the question of whether the salary 
or wage level of the applicant was a factor when awarding compensation. This table 
shows that six adjudicators said that they did take into account wage and salary level. 
Four indicated that they did not and three replied that philosophically this ought to 
have made no difference but in reality it did.  
 
All adjudicators acknowledged that the decision-making process was very subjective 
and based upon an assessment of individuals‟ characteristics their circumstances and 
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credibility. One adjudicator commented „[y]ou can have the same set of facts, get six 
different adjudicators, six different judges, you‟d probably get six different answers. It 
should be within a range.‟ 
What was important to me was how long a person had been in the job because it‟s not just a 
question of seniority, it‟s a question of emotional investment – the longer you‟ve been in a 
job, the stronger your expectations are, and the more you are entitled to consideration in that 
particular context, and if you don‟t get it and it‟s a particularly abrupt situation like the one I 
was describing before of a mature woman close to the age of retirement who got brutally 
dumped on, then her evidence as to the degree of humiliation and hurt will be more 
compelling in the context. 
 
6.4.12(D) SEXUAL HARASSMENT  
 
Adjudicators were asked what remedies they awarded in sexual harassment cases.
117
 
Generally, adjudicators indicated that remedies depended on the circumstances of the 
case and any loss or harm suffered by the Applicant. Remedies awarded were often 
low, with one adjudicator stating that they were not prepared to be the first one to 
order high amounts. Further, few adjudicators made recommendations.
118
 Reasons for 
not making recommendations included the difficulty in avoiding a punitive element; a 
perceived presumptuousness in making recommendations; and difficulty of 
enforcement.
119
 On the positive side, one adjudicator advised that they would make 
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recommendations for employers who had no policy for dealing with sexual 
harassment or in cases where there were serious problems. Another adjudicator 
approached sexual harassment claims in the same way as any other case with another 
recommending that the person doing the harassing be transferred, and not the person 
being harassed. The adjudicators acknowledged a more sensitive approach was 
required in sexual harassment cases and evidence often difficult to assess but the 
relatively small number of cases adjudicated made it difficult to identify significant 
remedy trends from the responses. 
6.4.12(E) CONTRIBUTORY FAULT 
 
Adjudicators were asked how they took into account and measured contributory fault 
when awarding remedies. This is a significant element which could have had a 
substantial impact on how remedies were granted. Section 40(2) of the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991 stated that where the Tribunal or the Court determined that an 
employee had a personal grievance because the employee had been unjustifiably 
dismissed, the Court should consider whether the actions of the employee contributed 
towards the situation. The Court or Tribunal had the power to reduce remedies 
accordingly. In cases of reimbursement, s 41(3)(b) of the Employment Contracts Act 
1991 provided that a reduction in payment to the employee could be made where the 
situation complained of was partly due to the fault of the employee. Any reduction 
had to be made on a just and equitable basis.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
future form of sexual harassment. Comparison has been made with the provisions in the Labour 
Relations Act 1987, s 41(3) which stated that that any order gave direction to the employer on how to 
deal with sexual harassment in the future. See G Anderson, J Hughes and P Roth, Personal Grievances 
(1999). 
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Adjudicators advised that when considering how to award remedies, they took into 
account the behaviour of the applicant in the particular circumstances of the case. As 
well as considering the factual circumstances adjudicators were required to consider 
the legislative framework and apply the law appropriately. Adjudicators also 
considered the overall effects of the applicant‟s actions in proportion to the personal 
grievance.
120
 They also had to balance the extent to which the applicant‟s actions were 
linked to the dismissal.
121
 Adjudicators also examined the evidence being presented 
and adopted a subjective approach to its application and consequent award of 
remedies.
122
 When considering the effect and extent to which contributory fault 
should be taken into account, adjudicators accepted that they looked at the 
blameworthy behaviour of the applicant using a „moral yardstick‟. This approach was 
largely dependent on the views and approach being taken by individual adjudicators 
and did not necessarily include any precise legal application or consideration. 
 
Adjudicators disagreed on the following four factors:  
1. Whether they should follow the directions of the Employment Court;123 
2. On views taken by the Employment Court on whether you could have contributory fault 
in procedural fairness cases; 
3. Whether you could have had more than 50 percent contributory fault; and 
4. Whether to view contributory fault by way of percentage or not. 
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 In Paykel Ltd v Ahlfeld [1993] 1 ERNZ 334, Judge Travis quoted Brandon LJ in Nelson v British 
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causal link when contributory fault is being considered. 
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The measuring of contributory fault by adjudicators in personal grievance cases was 
inconsistent. Some adjudicators chose to apply guidelines developed by the 
Employment Court while others did not. One adjudicator recognised this, commenting 
that the calculation of contributory fault was not a precise science and largely a matter 
of instinct.
124
 The discussion above has illustrated that the calculation and impact of 
contributory fault in personal grievance cases was variable depending on a number of 
factors including: the circumstances of the case, which adjudicator was hearing the 
personal grievance, and whether adjudicators chose to follow the directions of the 
Employment Court. 
6.4.12(F) COURT DIRECTIONS 
 
This was representative of remedies in general. The Employment Court gave 
adjudicators direction on how remedies should be awarded and the amounts that were 
appropriate for different types of personal grievance. Adjudicators were asked what 
their attitudes towards the Court‟s directions regarding remedies were. Adjudicators‟ 
responses were varied to this question. Most adjudicators acknowledged that they had 
to follow the Court, but some found ways of distinguishing cases and using discretion. 
One adjudicator made the following comments in relation to directions by the Court 
on remedies: 
The proper answer is that the Tribunal had to follow the Court‟s decisions. The Court has 
quite clearly said that this is the law in relation to assessing, apportioning remedies, and that‟s 
the duty of the Tribunal to follow. I said that‟s the proper answer, but in some cases lip service 
may be paid to it, ha ha. That‟s not to say that I don‟t sit there and say that Court decision is a 
load of rubbish, and I won‟t sort of find a way that I can say that that Court decision doesn‟t 
actually apply to the facts of this case. 
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 See Chapters 2.4.4(d) and 5.4.6 for further discussion on contributory fault. 
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Another adjudicator commented that: „I ignored them. They‟re so bloody inconsistent 
in that Court. For two or three years they‟ll be thumping one way of approach, then 
they completely back track.‟  
6.4.13 USE OF SECTION 34 EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS ACT 1991 
 
Section 34 of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 provided: „Nothing in this part of 
this Act or in any employment contract shall prevent a finding that a personal 
grievance is of a type other than that alleged.‟ This meant that the Tribunal and/or the 
Employment Court had a discretion as to the type of the personal grievance which 
was found.
125
 For example, in NZ Van Lines v Gray 
126
 the applicant alleged that they 
had been dismissed on 9 January. The adjudicator invited parties to make submissions 
on whether the relevant date was 12 January and whether the action complained of 
could have been an unjustified disadvantage or dismissal. In response, the employer‟s 
representatives submitted that the grounds should not have been altered. However, the 
Tribunal directed that further submissions and evidence could have been made and 
heard at a later date. Parties made no further submissions. As a result, the Tribunal 
held that the applicant had been unjustifiably dismissed and/or disadvantaged, and this 
was from the later date of 12 January. The company was ordered to reimburse lost 
wages and pay compensation. The Employment Court held that as the adjudicator had 
provided both parties with ample opportunity to address him on the alternate date, he 
acted appropriately in giving the parties notice of his intention. The Court therefore 
held no injustice had occurred.
127
 Also see McPherson v Tavern Casino Ltd t/a 
Birdcage Tavern & Liquorland
128
 where a claim of unjustified dismissal under s 
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 J Horn (ed), Employment Contracts (first published 1991), vol 1 EC34.04. 
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 [1999] 1 ERNZ 58. 
127
 J Horn (ed), Employment Contracts (first published 1991), vol 1 EC34.04. 
128
 21/3/00, Colgan J, AC16/00. 
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27(1)(a) of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 was more appropriately dealt with as 
a claim for unjustified disadvantage under s 27(1)(b) of the Employment Contracts 
Act 1991.
129
 
 
Adjudicators advised that this was not a significant issue, with three adjudicators 
stating that this issue did not come up very often and a further three stating that this 
issue had not come up at all. When deciding whether or not to amend the type of 
personal grievance; adjudicators said that they took several factors into consideration 
including: the real nature of the personal grievance as perceived by the adjudicator; 
the nature and the facts of the case; the justice of the case; fairness; experience of 
representatives; whether the parties asked the adjudicator to amend the type of 
personal grievance; and whether the respondent had a fair opportunity to answer the 
issues. In amending the type of personal grievance under s 34, adjudicators said that 
they might simply make the change, give parties a chance to comment, or try and get 
the parties to agree. One adjudicator remarked: „I would always try and get the parties 
to agree. Normally they do because you tell them if you are not back here today you‟ll 
be back in a week or in another time and it will cost you more money.‟ The fact that 
some parties and their representatives made claims under the wrong headings could 
suggest that the requisite process may not have been as straight-forward as was the 
intention of the legislators.
130
 Or alternatively, it could suggest that legal 
representatives were insufficiently familiar with appropriate heads of personal 
grievance and their requirements. However, any problems in this direction were able 
to be resolved by the use of s 34, but the adjudicators had a fairly flexible approach to 
this and took a number of contextual issues into account. 
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6.4.14 DECISIONS APPEALED 
 
Decisions of the Employment Tribunal could have been appealed to the Employment 
Court on points of law.
131
 All adjudicators interviewed said that they had had 
decisions that had been appealed. Adjudicators were not specifically asked if any 
appeals occurred in 1997 so the responses received from adjudicators related to their 
time as Employment Tribunal Adjudicators. Fourteen adjudicators said that appeals 
had been based on remedies; nine adjudicators stated that appeals had been on 
substantive grounds; and eight adjudicators said that appeals had been both on 
remedies and substantive grounds. Two adjudicators said that their decisions had been 
appealed on a complete range of issues. A number of different reasons were given by 
adjudicators as to why their decisions had been appealed. It was possible that the 
decision had not been written tightly enough, there may have been an arguable case 
for appeal, or in some cases the decision may simply have been wrong on factual 
and/or legal principles. It was also acknowledged that in some cases parties did not 
understand the decision or simply disagreed with it. In some instances it was 
representatives advising their clients to take an appeal, whether as a tactical measure, 
to preserve union strength by providing a united front of workers against the 
employer, or more significantly because the nature of the case meant that it could be a 
significant precedent for either party that established groundbreaking rules for other 
cases. Adjudicators also suggested that some parties irrationally appealed simply 
because they could afford to, or because they just wanted money. One adjudicator 
believed that some parties appealed simply because their views on the personal 
grievance were so entrenched – „the nutty factor‟ as one response suggested: 
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There are people who, no matter what you say, are convinced of the inevitable rightness of the 
situation and will take it to the Privy Council if they can.       
 
One adjudicator said that borderline cases that took considerable time determining 
were often not appealed. By contrast, another adjudicator said that the cases which 
you spent most time considering were borderline were the ones most often appealed. 
The mixed responses indicated that unless the case involved a significant potential 
precedent or strong sense of injustice by either party that the process or outcome had 
been unfair it was difficult to make any general assumptions as to which cases would 
have been appealed and why parties appealed.  However, a relatively low rate of 
appeals tended to indicate the general efficacy of the process. 
6.4.15 LEGAL OBLIGATIONS 
 
When lodging and responding to a personal grievance, both parties had legal 
obligations under the Employment Contracts Act 1991.
132
 These included an 
obligation to inform the respondent if the applicant was legally aided, an obligation to 
file documents on time, and ensuring that the correct cause of action was cited. 
Adjudicators were asked what view they took of parties not complying with legal 
obligations. This question was asked for three reasons: firstly, to determine whether 
parties or their representatives were taking a careful and thorough approach to the 
personal grievance process; secondly, to ascertain whether adjudicators were required 
to spend a significant amount of time resolving legal inaccuracies; and thirdly, 
whether parties‟ non-compliance with their legal obligations affected adjudicators‟ 
attitude to the claim, its resolution, or the parties themselves. 
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 For details of the obligations of parties in personal grievance situations see Employment Contracts 
Act 1991, Part III, and first schedule to that Act. Also see Employment Tribunal Regulations 1991. 
 356 
The general response from adjudicators was that they judged non-compliance on the 
nature and facts of the case, together with an assessment of whether there had been a 
disadvantage to the other party due to the non-compliance. Adjudicators had different 
ways of dealing with non-compliance with legal obligations. It was acknowledged 
that at times it would be a balancing act to ensure that there was no injustice caused 
by one party not complying with their legal obligations. It was also acknowledged that 
some problems with requirements could be easily resolved procedurally by Tribunal 
staff, usually by ringing the parties, advising them of the legal requirements, and 
sorting the situation out. However, there were some requirements the Tribunal could 
not fix. For example, if the application was out of time for no good reason, it would 
have to be struck out.
133
 For the Employment Tribunal to remedy the situation there 
had to be exceptional circumstances.
134
 Depending on the nature of the irregularity, 
adjudicators might raise the matter at the beginning of the hearing, leave it to the 
parties to sort out, adjourn until it was remedied, or simply hear the case anyway. 
 
A number of adjudicators specifically commented on the requirement that 
respondents‟ had to be informed that an applicant was legally aided due to legal cost 
considerations with legally aided parties usually not having costs awarded against 
them. Twelve adjudicators said that this was irritating if the error was committed by 
an experienced representative or lawyer. Additionally, one adjudicator stated that 
lawyers not disclosing client legal aid status should pay costs or be referred to the 
Law Society, while another adjudicator said that decisions would be referred to the 
Legal Services Agency. Four adjudicators said that under the exceptional 
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circumstances rule, this might result in costs being awarded against a legally aided 
party.
135
 
 
The responses demonstrated that sometimes parties, depending upon the experience of 
representatives, did not necessarily adhere to specified procedural rules, this caused 
adjudicators to spend time on resolving procedural/legal deficiencies in a variety of 
ways that sometimes caused delay or cost implications. In general terms adjudicators 
said they practiced tolerance in response to such deficiencies and they tried hard to 
not let them affect the parties‟ claims; the exception being when representatives‟ 
behaviour could be sanctioned in other forums.   
6.5 CATEGORY 2: TYPES OF PERSONAL GRIEVANCES 
 
The second group of questions related to the types of personal grievances that parties 
took and how this affected adjudicators‟ attitude to both the parties and the personal 
grievance itself.
136
 The type of personal grievance may have had an impact on how 
the adjudicator either perceived the personal grievance or the parties to it. As 
discussed above, it was possible for adjudicators to vary the adjudication hearing 
procedure in a fair manner.
137
 Therefore, it was of interest to determine whether 
adjudicators varied their hearing of cases depending on the nature, type, or sensitivity 
of the personal grievance. 
 
All adjudicators interviewed said that in general terms they would not alter the 
procedure due to the type of personal grievance. Seven adjudicators said that they 
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might change the procedure in sexual harassment cases to have more sensitivity, with 
one adjudicator saying that they would seek to make the hearing a „safe‟ environment. 
Four of these seven adjudicators were female. One adjudicator said that the type of 
personal grievance would not consciously affect the hearing of the case. 
 
Two adjudicators said that they might vary the procedure in discrimination cases, 
while two other adjudicators said that the type of evidence presented rather than the 
type of personal grievance might affect their hearing of the case. 
 
Under the Labour Relations Act 1987, special procedures had been introduced for 
workers wishing to take a personal grievance on sexual harassment grounds.
138
 The 
special procedures permitted the mediator to take more of an inquisitorial role. The 
complainant and respondent would be heard individually by the mediator. 
Complainants could have their support organisation with them (and usually did), but it 
was never necessary for the complainant to face the alleged harasser. A 1991 Ministry 
of Women‟s Affairs study indicated that most women preferred the Labour Relations 
Act 1987 personal grievance procedure rather than that under the Human Rights 
Commission Act 1977 when faced with sexual harassment.
139
 This was because the 
Commission did not at that time encourage a person to have the support of a union or 
other representative with them during an investigation. The impact of this was an 
employee frequently felt vulnerable and unsupported when making a personal 
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complaint to a stranger.
140
 The special procedure that was provided for in the Labour 
Relations Act 1987 was not included in the Employment Contracts Act 1991, which 
meant that a sexual harassment complaint was dealt with in the same manner as any 
other type of personal grievance. The then Minister of Women‟s Affairs, Jenny 
Shipley, asked the Minister of Labour to revise this process and to reintroduce the 
special process for sexual harassment cases. This request was not acceded to.
141
 
 
As the procedure for hearing sexual harassment complaints had been altered by the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991, adjudicators‟ attitudes to sexual harassment claims 
were of particular interest. Three adjudicators advised that they had heard no sexual 
harassment claims, and of those three, two advised that they would be sensitive. 
Sixteen adjudicators advised that they would take a more sensitive approach in sexual 
harassment cases. Of those 16, six of the adjudicators were female. This is a high 
percentage given that only seven of the 21 adjudicators interviewed were female. 
Adjudicators indicated that there were a number of ways in which they could show 
sensitivity including: controlling bullying representatives; taking a case management 
approach; talking to counsel beforehand; asking representatives if they wanted any 
special arrangements; altering the room set up; taking adjournments; being more 
interventionist; monitoring cross examination; being more aware of people‟s 
reactions; being sympathetic; taking more time; making people feel as comfortable as  
possible and sensitising oneself to the issue.  
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Two adjudicators indicated that they would show sensitivity or vary the procedure in 
any case that needed it, not just sexual harassment claims. Similarly another 
adjudicator said that they would show sensitivity to the issue rather than the type of 
personal grievance. It was also noted by another adjudicator that the adjudication 
procedure itself was bad for sexual harassment cases and that the investigative process 
of the current Employment Relations Authority was better. One adjudicator said that 
they would not take a more sensitive approach to sexual harassment claims because 
the regulations did not distinguish between different types of cases.  
I don‟t go in to a hearing thinking this is a sexual harassment claim [and] I must approach it 
differently. The regulations don‟t distinguish between types of cases. In one case…at the last 
minute one of the counsel of one of the parties wanted us to arrange screens and all sorts of 
things. And we said well that‟s your problem…you should have given us plenty of advance 
notice because we can‟t arrange all this stuff in the time frame you‟ve given us. That could be 
said to be an insensitive approach but the reality was they didn‟t give us the time. 
 
In theory, it was possible for adjudicators to take a more sensitive or varied approach 
if the circumstances of the case or cause of action required it, by allowing the 
applicant to give evidence without the respondent being present and vice-versa, and 
for a continuing discussion on elements of the issue to be carried out without the two 
parties actually meeting one another.
142
 However, it was at adjudicators‟ discretion 
whether they varied the procedure in certain cases, and the sensitivity of the 
adjudication procedure could therefore have depended on which adjudicator heard the 
case. 
 
Under section 40(1)(d) of the Employment Contracts Act 1991, where the Tribunal 
had found that there was sexual harassment at a workplace, the Tribunal could make 
recommendations to the employer concerning their actions and any rehabilitative 
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action to be taken toward the grievant. Seven adjudicators stated that they had not 
made recommendations because they had not conducted a case that required them (i.e. 
a sexual harassment case). Of those adjudicators who had heard sexual harassment 
claims, their views were quite evenly divided as to whether they would make 
recommendations, with six saying they would, seven saying they would not, and two 
saying they would make „comments‟. Some reasons given by adjudicators for making 
recommendations were to ensure employers set up procedures to avoid sexual 
harassment, to have an impact on future conduct, and to get the employer up to best 
practice. Adjudicators also said they would make recommendations where it would be 
of practical value, where parties asked them to, or where there was a particular 
problem. Of those adjudicators who said they would not make recommendations, the 
reasons for not doing so were that there was a risk of it being taken the wrong way, it 
was not their role, the employer generally knew exactly what to do, it was unfair 
because there was no chance for the employer to respond, and there was no point as 
„recommendations have no teeth.‟ One adjudicator commented: 
I hoped that what I said might have some sort of impact on the way the employer looked at 
women in the workplace and how other staff in the workplace conducted themselves in 
relation to women employees, that looking at setting up procedures for dealing with sexual 
harassment might stop these sorts of situations arising. I mean, the power was there. I used it 
because I was hopeful it would have some sort of beneficial effect.  
 
The responses were widely divergent mainly by gender on the issue of process 
with the clear implication that the allocation of a more sensitive adjudicator could 
have resulted in a more flexible approach being adopted in what might be 
traumatic or sensitive circumstances. Adjudicators appeared to wrestle with the 
tension of deciding to not appear biased by adhering to normal process whilst 
arguably not balancing this by taking special contextual factors into account.   
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6.6 CATEGORY 3: PARTIES TO PERSONAL GRIEVANCES 
 
 
The third category of questions related to parties, and whether certain characteristics 
of parties affected adjudicators‟ approaches to the parties or to the personal grievance. 
Possible characteristics that might have affected adjudicators‟ attitudes included the 
occupation of either party. For example, if the applicant was in a more senior position, 
were adjudicators more sympathetic to their claim? Similarly, did the nature of the 
work itself or the industry in which the personal grievance arose impact on the 
attitude of the adjudicator or on remedies granted if the personal grievance was 
successful? Another factor which could have had an impact on the attitude and 
consequences of adjudication was the approach of the adjudicator to the gender of 
either party. For example, did adjudicators take a more lenient approach if the 
applicant was female? The social status of either party or their ethnicity may also have 
had an effect on how the adjudicator either viewed the parties or the personal 
grievance itself. For certain types of occupation, gender may have had a significant 
effect on the nature of the problem while the ethnicity of either party could have 
impacted on the sensitivity to either party or the personal grievance itself. A further 
issue which could have impacted on the approach taken by adjudicators was the 
disability of either party. It would have been paramount for adjudicators to set 
preconceived ideas regarding the effects of disability aside, but for them to feel free to 
ask questions, or if necessary to seek advice if further information was required. 
Another issue that was of interest in relation to parties was a possible power 
imbalance between employer and employee. In most instances the employer who 
retained the services of the employee and had the available option of terminating 
employment, clearly had the potential to create a power imbalance. Another 
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consideration was instances where there were multiple applicants, which could have 
caused adjudicators practical difficulties. Further, the frequent reappearance of parties 
could have caused irritation to the adjudicator and may have had a possible impact on 
the ability of an adjudicator to work in a neutral fashion.  
6.6.1 POWER IMBALANCE 
 
It was possible to take the view that there was a power imbalance between the 
employer and employee in a personal grievance and the general employment 
situation. If this view was subscribed to, it could have had an impact on the manner in 
which adjudicators conducted adjudication hearings and may have affected if and how 
remedies were awarded. To examine whether this risk existed, adjudicators were 
asked whether they perceived that a power imbalance existed, and if they did take that 
view, what measures they took to remedy the situation.  
 
All adjudicators agreed that there was a power imbalance between employers and 
employees within the Employment Tribunal framework. Intuitively, there is a power 
imbalance due to the nature of the employment relationship. Adjudicators commented 
as follows: 
There are power imbalances there and they‟re simply fundamental to the employment 
relationship. That‟s why you have a personal grievance remedy, which is an employee‟s 
remedy … So I think it‟s like the difference between cats and dogs, the difference between 
employer and employee. There is a power imbalance inevitably. In economic terms, the 
employer controls the ability to employ people and retain them in employment; has the job 
employees want. 
 
No of course not. That may be a matter of philosophical or political belief. In the workplace 
there is a power imbalance. In the legal situation there is a power imbalance. 
 
I don't think that the statement that there's a power imbalance between employer and 
employee is a correct analysis of it. I think when you have a legal process, adversarial 
process… that the economic base of each side will reflect their ability to deal and handle with 
the issues, so, if you assume that employers are always wealthier than employees, then you 
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might accept that, but that isn't always the case: organised labour versus a small employer.  So 
on an economic model, it's a question of fact in each case, and you might make 
generalisations. Now if we look at it within an Employment Tribunal framework, it is a matter 
of resources, classically, an ill-educated person who cannot articulate their side of the 
argument who can engage a QC who can will do better than a well educated employer who 
can articulate their argument who acts for themselves.  
 
No. There are a range of power imbalances that can occur in the employment relationship. 
Whether the person is legally aided creates a power imbalance against the employer but of 
course the employer has the way and the means to prolong litigation and make litigation worse 
for applicants. It is in that regard that I‟ve always taken the view not to be overly legalistic, to 
cut through what I might perceive as being attempts to delay proceedings or to litigate at a 
very high technical and legal level. And in cutting through that hoping that the power 
imbalance can be addressed in the nature of the hearing itself. Principles of fairness and 
natural justice should ensure that the power balance at least in the hearing is equal or 
balanced. 
 
I think the only power imbalance there was access to senior and experienced representatives. 
Or in the sense that the competent, good representatives, and there might be a sheer inability 
to access information about who is good. It's not necessarily just cost. Because for example 
there are some quite good lay advocates, and there are some absolutely terrible ones. And an 
Applicant is just not going to be in a position to know who's good or who's bad. And 
employers will be in a better position, although small employers aren't. Small employers will 
go, they've got the same problem at another level. Where the power imbalance is, is the big 
companies who can afford good representatives. 
 
These comments show that some adjudicators took the view that there was a power 
imbalance in the employment relationship between employers and employees. 
However, in relation to the Employment Tribunal situation, it appears that a 
reoccurring view was that the inequality related to the standard of representation. On 
the one hand, employees may have qualified for legal aid and therefore had the ability 
to re-appeal provided they met the criteria for the allocation of legal aid.
143
 But on the 
other hand, employers may have had the ability to retain competent counsel who 
could have served their interests well. Another possibility from the comments 
received, was that small employers may have found the level of compensation 
required of them difficult to comply with, particularly if they were small employers 
with low income and turnover thresholds.  
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In summary, adjudicators therefore acknowledged that any power imbalance revealed 
itself in two main ways:  
 There was an economic power imbalance between employers and 
employees. This could have been where employers had more money than 
employees; or conversely, employees may have had legal aid and 
consequently the economic imbalance was reversed as the party in receipt 
of legal aid had their legal costs met; thirdly, small employers could be 
vulnerable as they may not have been in a strong position to pay for the 
legal process in terms of representation and/or time. 
 Adjudicators identified that there was potentially a representational 
imbalance. In theory, if both parties were represented there should have 
been no imbalance; however, some parties were not represented, or 
alternatively both parties may have been represented but the standard of 
representation may have had varying levels of competence. In other words, 
„there are some quite good [representatives] and there are some absolutely 
terrible ones.‟ 
 
In discussing the relative disadvantage between the employer and employee, Linda 
Dickens identified that employees had a relative disadvantage to that of the employer 
due to their relatively inferior resources compared with employers generally. This 
relative disadvantage affected the employees‟ ability to prepare and present their case. 
Further, the employer would have been more likely to have had experience of dealing 
with the officialdom and bureaucracy inherent within the Employment Tribunal 
system.
144
 
6.6.2 CORRECTION OF POWER IMBALANCE 
 
Adjudicators were asked: if they believed a power imbalance existed between the 
parties, what steps they would take to remedy the situation? Adjudicators said that 
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they applied the principle contained in Employment Tribunal Regulations 1991, reg 
49(2), where it was stated that adjudicators had the discretion to intervene at any stage 
in any proceedings in a manner that was fair.
145
 In applying this principle, 
adjudicators indicated that they would: influence the atmosphere; intervene; aid 
unrepresented parties; and generally run a fair and transparent process. For example, 
if surprises were sprung on one party, it may have been appropriate to allow an 
adjournment to permit consideration by the other party. In general terms, adjudicators 
indicated that: „principles of fairness and natural justice should ensure that the power 
balance at least in the hearing is equal or balanced‟. Adjudicators believed they 
achieved this by ensuring the adjudication was run in a transparent and fair manner, 
making sure that everybody had a full opportunity to have their say even if they were 
„stumbling or whatever. Take the time. Don‟t rush it. Let them feel they‟ve had a 
decent hearing and give the decision with reasons so even if they are disappointed 
they won‟t be disgruntled.‟   
6.6.3 CLASS ACTIONS 
 
Adjudicators were asked if in cases where there were multiple applicants, it would 
have been more effective for class actions to have been brought.
146
 Responses from 
adjudicators were varied. Some adjudicators said it would have been a good idea with 
others saying that it would not. 
6.6.4 EFFECT OF OCCUPATION OF PARTIES 
 
As the substantive questions being considered in this thesis related to whether the 
adjudication system under the Employment Contracts Act 1991 worked and what 
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peoples‟ experiences were using it, adjudicators were asked whether the questions 
they asked and the approach they took varied depending on the occupation of the 
parties.  
 Seven adjudicators said that they did not vary their questions depending on 
the occupation of the parties. 
 Five adjudicators said no they did not vary the questions but qualified this 
response by saying that the questions they asked were based on their 
perception of the person; for example, questions asked of the parties would 
be varied depending on the ability of the parties to understand. 
 Eight adjudicators stated that they did adjust their approach and the 
questions asked depending on the occupation of the parties. Those 
adjudicators advised that they would adjust their communication style so 
that they would be communicating at the same level of the person 
concerned. Adjudicators commented that they always attempted to clarify 
issues, for example it was always important to use clear language and short 
questions at all times.  
 Only one adjudicator identified differing levels of obligation or 
responsibility of the parties depending on their occupation, for example a 
medical doctor would have significantly higher levels of responsibility in 
particular areas of work. 
 
Some of the responses received from adjudicators did not precisely answer the 
question, but rather focussed on the approach they took depending on the capacity of 
the parties concerned. 
 
In a similar vein, adjudicators were asked whether the occupation of an applicant 
affected their views of the seriousness of the action complained of. For instance, 
would the misconduct of a pilot or doctor be viewed more seriously than the 
misconduct of a cleaning worker or shop assistant? The majority of adjudicators (14) 
said no. Three adjudicators said yes, as they recognised that certain occupations 
 368 
carried more responsibility. One adjudicator did recognise that the occupation of the 
applicant was likely to affect the level of compensation awarded.  
 
However, reference to Chapter Five indicates that the occupation of the parties did 
affect the outcome of a decision. For example Tables 5.18 and 5.26 illustrate that 
those in the professional and management categories had a higher rate of success than 
employees in other occupational classes and secondly, employees in those 
occupational classes were awarded higher levels of compensation.
147
 Therefore, 
reference to Chapter Five has illustrated that there was a possible unexplained 
statistical link between the occupational class of the parties and remedies granted.  
6.6.5 EFFECT OF GENDER ON RESPONSES TO ADJUDICATOR QUESTIONS 
 
Adjudicators were invited to make general comments about the types of responses 
they received from female and male parties in the personal grievance adjudication 
process. That is, the nature of the behaviour of the parties and the answers they 
provided to questions and methods of giving evidence. In general terms adjudicators 
commented on the differing nature of responses between males and females, with one 
adjudicator stating: 
I‟m very aware that in very general terms men are outcome focussed and women are 
relationship focussed. This can affect even the remedies they‟re looking for, certainly in 
mediation, and they affect both their communication styles and their presentation. 
 
In response to the above question adjudicators commented on the responses received 
from males and females by saying that females could have been more vicious; more 
emotional, as opposed to the „kiwi bloke‟; focussed on relationship; were more 
sensitive to criticism; and more articulate. They indicated male parties tended to be 
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more focussed on outcome; more literal in their answers; made more unreasonable 
claims; had more entrenched views; and tended to struggle to express themselves. 
 
This information indicates a perception that females‟ responses to adjudicator‟s 
questions tended to be more emotionally focussed and attempted to explain the 
situation. Male responses tended to be more literal with a stronger focus on 
outcome.
148
 The male approach appears to have been less flexible taking a more literal 
approach to answering questions which suggests that female respondents may have 
been more suited to a potentially more flexible mediation approach to resolving 
personal grievances. 
6.6.6 EFFECT OF MEMBERSHIP OF EEO TARGET GROUPS ON ADJUDICATOR 
 
Equal Employment Opportunity Target groups were recognised in s 56 of the State 
Sector Act 1988. In that section, as part of the good employer obligations contained in 
the Act, all Public Service Chief Executives were required to put in place equal 
employment opportunity programmes and to recognise the aspirations of these groups 
in their employment. The groups listed included: women; Maori; ethnic or minority 
groups; and people with disabilities.
149
 It should be noted that there has never been 
equivalent provision in employment related legislation covering private sector 
employers although employers could not discriminate against employees for 
belonging to membership of any of the above target groups.
150
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During the interviews, adjudicators were asked if they had difficulty disregarding 
social status, gender, ethnicity, or disability of the applicant. Six adjudicators said 
that, no, they did not have difficulty in disregarding these factors when making a 
decision. Other adjudicators commented that they did not have difficulty setting these 
matters aside, except in circumstances where they were relevant. One adjudicator said 
„you have to make allowances for communications style‟. Therefore it was necessary 
for adjudicators to take the applicants „as they were‟ as styles or procedures etc may 
have been required to be amended depending on the circumstances. Two adjudicators 
said, yes, they did have difficulty setting these matters aside as you have to be aware 
of biases and try not to be influenced by them. One adjudicator remarked: 
The way I look at this job, and I know some of my colleagues in the Tribunal would not have 
agreed with me, I think if you come to a job like this everybody‟s got their own personal 
bundle of biases, and inevitably you do. That‟s one of the things of being human – you‟ve got 
a certain amount of baggage. We all have. And for me the challenge is trying to be aware of 
my own baggage, but I‟m sure that there‟s times when it has an effect. Because it‟s not when 
you‟re aware of it when it‟s a problem, it‟s when you‟re unaware of it. I‟m sure if I see a 
woman of about my age with two kids and struggling to balance the family and do a job and 
your employer gets cross because you won‟t work late one night, I‟m going to feel a big pang 
of sympathy for that woman because I relate to what she‟s going through… You can say “Oh 
my goodness we‟re well qualified, we‟ve got good CVs, we‟re paid a lot of money to be 
unbiased.” I think it‟s actually quite important to acknowledge that we‟ve all got biases and 
try to be aware of them so that you don‟t fall into the trap of being influenced by them. 
 
6.6.7 EFFECT OF REAPPEARING PARTIES 
 
On occasion applicants had a tendency to appear in multiple claims for personal 
grievances. Likewise, there were instances of employers repeatedly appearing in 
personal grievances against them. Adjudicators were asked if particular employees or 
employers appeared frequently before the Tribunal whether this affected their attitude 
in either the hearing process or their decision making. Ten adjudicators stated that 
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grievance contained in the Employment Contracts Act 1991.  
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reappearing parties did not affect either decision making or the adjudication process 
while ten adjudicators acknowledged that it did. Adjudicators further commented that 
the effect of reappearing parties was to create a feeling of initial bias, but then the 
adjudicator would deal with the case on its merits. They further commented that 
reappearing parties would create a loss of credibility to the parties concerned and 
would be an indication of behavioural patterns of the parties. Some adjudicators also 
remarked that reappearing parties would have an effect on awards of costs. In 
contrast, other adjudicators stated that reappearing parties were inevitably only larger 
employers and that they simply had to deal with each case on its merits. 
 
These comments indicated that there were circumstances where reappearing parties 
would have affected the attitude and behaviour of adjudicators. This could have 
resulted in an advantage for employees of employers who reappeared often, 
potentially affecting the judgment of the adjudicator and consequently the outcome of 
the personal grievance. Adjudicators may have assumed a pattern of behaviour on the 
part of the employer and may have tended to disbelieve their evidence. It is possible 
that adjudicators would have taken the view that reappearing employers had not 
„learned by their mistakes.‟ Likewise, reappearing employees may have been seen as 
a nuisance to adjudicators resulting in their claim being viewed with a level of 
scepticism which under the circumstances could have been reasonable, however the 
extant personal grievance may still have been justified. 
6.6.8 EFFECT OF MEMBERSHIP OF TARGET GROUPS ON REPRESENTATIVES’ 
APPROACH TO WITNESSES 
 
It was possible that membership of specific groups may have affected how 
representatives approached both parties and witnesses. If there were perceived 
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differences observed by adjudicators it may have affected how representatives treated 
both parties and witnesses resulting in a variation of outcome. Adjudicators were 
therefore asked whether they perceived any such differences. The responses of 
adjudicators can be generally summarised as follows: 
There is quite a marked range of politeness and skill displayed by representatives in their 
treatment of witnesses and they range across the spectrum of being rude, poorly skilled at 
cross examination to those who are excellent in terms of how they deal with gender, ethnicity, 
disability or social status of the witnesses; and representatives who show extremely courteous 
cross-examination and courtesy towards people just as individuals to those that are appalling. I 
guess that is across the range of our society and it‟s represented in the court room. 
 
6.6.9 EQUAL OPPORTUNITY TRAINING 
 
As adjudicators would have been required to communicate effectively with 
representatives, parties and witnesses from varying types of backgrounds, they were 
asked whether they had had any training in the areas of cultural protocols, disability 
or gender issues. Adjudicators advised that they had very little formal training. One 
adjudicator commented that they had received self training by way of communicating 
with other adjudicators, with another adjudicator remarking that training had been 
promised but had not transpired. This could have impacted on either parties or 
witnesses in the hearing situation. However, most adjudicators have acknowledged 
earlier that they did have the ability to adapt the hearing procedure and if necessary to 
take various issues and EEO requirements into account. One adjudicator shared the 
following views: 
I‟ll put this on the record. The Department promised much and delivered nothing… It was 
always, “No, we haven‟t got any money this year for this.” I mean they didn‟t provide money 
for us to meet as a group or any professional development at one stage for three years. For a 
professional organisation the training in the Employment Tribunal was an absolute disgrace 
…The Employment Tribunal Members tried to get training, professional training on mediation 
involving a lot of these things (gender issues and cultural protocols etc) from an 
acknowledged international. No. Stall, stall, stall, stall, stall. The Employment Tribunal was 
abolished. The Mediation Service was established under the Labour Department as an 
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employee and within one month they had this very training that we‟d been seeking for five 
years. It was just a disgrace. 
…I‟d have to say in Wellington we did a lot of work internally. We used to meet every couple 
of months and do our own internal training. We would normally have six days a year, but the 
other offices didn‟t do that at all. …But in these sorts of general areas nothing was done…it‟s 
just very irritating. 
 
Where power imbalances were acknowledged by adjudicators they demonstrated 
awareness of this and used various tools to redress imbalances including discretionary 
intervention. Parties were able to adopt a variety of strategies to contain costs and 
reduce delay by the use of approaches such as class actions but no trends were 
discernable due to the small sample size. 
 
Adjudicators demonstrated a good awareness of occupational and social background 
differentials of applicants and gender, ethnicity and disability factors. Despite 
adjudicators requesting it, this however, did not appear to be supported by appropriate 
professional training on specific awareness of diversity issues. 
6.7 CATEGORY 4: REPRESENTATION 
 
The fourth category of questions for adjudicators related to their perceptions of 
representation. Prior to the passage of the Employment Contracts Act 1991, personal 
grievances could only have been taken by union members. In these circumstances, 
union advocates or legal representatives commonly represented applicants.
151
 The 
Employment Contracts Act 1991 stated that all employees who were bound by an 
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employment contract which contained the personal grievance procedures had access 
to personal grievances.
152
 This meant that all employees were entitled to take a 
personal grievance should the situation arise; the option was not restricted to union 
members. As a result many employees who were not union members, for the first time 
took personal grievances and chose to be represented by barristers and solicitors.
153
 
As legal representation appeared to have been much more prevalent using this system, 
of note was whether or not adjudicators believed that the standard of representation 
was adequate.  
6.7.1 EXPERTISE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
 
Adjudicators were first asked if they perceived any varying levels of expertise 
between union advocates; advocates; counsel; and self representatives. Questions 
related to varying standards of representation, what the attitudes of adjudicators were 
to poor representation and whether they assisted in such cases. Adjudicators were also 
asked about the standard of self-representation and whether they made special 
attempts to assist parties who represented themselves. Ideas were sought from 
adjudicators as to how the standard of representation could be improved and whether 
poor presentation standards affected adjudicators‟ attitudes to either the case itself or 
its defence. Adjudicators said that, yes, there were varying levels of expertise between 
union advocates, advocates, counsel and self representatives. All adjudicators stated 
that there were huge levels of variation across the spectrum. However in contrast, one 
adjudicator commented that there was no one group which was better than another, 
the rule being that good advocates were where you found them. One adjudicator 
stated: 
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Yes, but the joke of it is not necessarily between those as groups but within the groups. 
Qualified counsel frankly, how the hell do they get their degree? Some of the Counsel horrify 
me… You get one or two good ones but sadly not that many. 
 
6.7.2 POOR REPRESENTATIONAL GROUP 
 
Adjudicators were then asked if they believed that there was a particular group of 
representatives who they perceived as not doing a good job. Replies to this question 
were varied, but affirmative responses included: 
 Yes: young and inexperienced; 
 Yes: old and experienced without a decent background in law; 
 Yes: union representatives and self representatives are the worst; 
 Yes: union advocates and contingency advocates; 
 Yes: self representatives; 
 Yes: the „Not so good‟ lawyers; 
 Yes: legal profession; 
 Yes: union representatives; 
 Yes: green incompetent lawyers;  
 Yes: contingency fee people – „maximum money for minimum effort‟. 
 
Other adjudicators did not take the view that there was one group of representatives 
who were particularly poor: 
 No: it is within groups, not a particular group; 
 No: it is individuals; 
 No: apart from self representatives. 
 
Clearly, these comments show that the majority of Employment Tribunal adjudicators 
were stating that there were varying levels of representational standards. All groups 
from which representatives originated were identified by some adjudicators as 
providing varying levels of representational standard. It is therefore not clear from the 
responses to this question as to which group adjudicators believed provided the 
highest standard of representation.  
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6.7.3 RAISING THE STANDARDS OF REPRESENTATION 
 
As the above question showed varying views of the standards of representation and 
varying levels of acceptance of that standard, the next question therefore focussed on 
how the standard of representation could be maintained or raised. Adjudicators had 
many varying ideas on how this could be achieved, some adjudicators focussed on 
education for representatives, including a return to the system which operated when 
the Union Representatives Education Leave Act 1986 was in force, some suggested 
improving university education to include competencies on representational skills. 
Another approach was to introduce minimum standards with an organisation such as 
the Employment Law Institute regulating the standards.
154
 
6.7.4 ALLOWANCES FOR POOR PRESENTATION 
 
Bearing in mind the potentially varied response which may have been received from 
the above question, adjudicators were asked whether they made allowances for poor 
presentation.  
Table 6.9: Do you make allowances for poor presentation? 
Adjudicator Response Number of Adjudicators 
(N = 19) 
No
155
 2 
Yes 3 
Yes for self-representatives 3 
Yes in all circumstances 9 
Yes for junior representatives 1 
Yes based on the morality of the case 1 
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focussed on the issues in the case. 
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Table 6.9 shows that a clear majority of adjudicators took poor representation 
standards into account (with only two saying that they did not) when attempting to 
clarify the facts or evidence being presented in a claim. The standard of representation 
could well have been an access issue for either applicants or respondents, with 
employees perhaps being obliged to use union representatives, representatives funded 
by legal aid or either advocates or counsel with little experience or expertise 
consequently costing less.
156
 Those surveyed commented as follows:  
I go back to being driven by the morality of the case again.  
If it‟s someone who is undeserving getting the shitty end of the stick I‟ll let it happen. So it‟s 
very moralistic. Not very scientific.  
If it‟s going to result in a screaming injustice I may try to manipulate things to go the right 
way. 
6.7.5 DIFFERENT APPROACH FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF REPRESENTATIVES 
 
Adjudicators were asked if they took a different approach to dealing with poor 
representation situations depending on whether the representative was an advocate, 
union advocate, counsel or the party was self represented.  
Table 6.10: Different Approach for Different Types of Representatives 
Adjudicator Response  Number of Adjudicators 
(N = 17) 
No 4 
Yes for self-representatives 9 
Perhaps – following assessment of the level of advocate‟s skill 4 
 
Table 6.10 shows that adjudicators would not generally take a different approach to 
dealing with evidence adduced by different types of representatives. However, the 
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majority of adjudicators were prepared to take a more active role where self 
representatives were involved. In other circumstances, it appears that adjudicators 
were most concerned with obtaining the evidence rather than dealing with difficult 
standards or poor representation. This information was collected from interviews with 
Employment Tribunal Adjudicators who spoke of the methods they used to bring 
forward relevant evidence.
157
  
6.7.6 STYLE AND STANDARD OF SELF REPRESENTATIVES 
 
As only a small minority of people chose to represent themselves in personal 
grievances, it was not possible to determine in what manner adjudicators dealt with 
the varying situations they became involved. Adjudicators were asked if they noticed 
a difference in presentation style and standard depending on whether the self 
represented person was an applicant or respondent. Only one adjudicator said yes, that 
they noticed a difference in presentation style and standard. All others said no, there 
was no difference whether the self representative was an applicant or respondent, with 
two saying that they thought that self represented respondents were more organised 
and identified that the higher onus on the respondent to justify their decision made 
some difference. Two adjudicators identified that lack of legal education could make 
a difference with one adjudicator commenting that a little legal education could cause 
more significant problems „the worst ones were those with a little bit of legal 
knowledge who thought they knew it all.‟ 
6.7.7 GUIDANCE OF SELF REPRESENTATIVES 
 
Adjudicators were asked if they tended to guide a self represented party or did they 
take a more relaxed approach to legal requirements and process? One adjudicator said 
                                                             
157
 Interviews held with Employment Tribunal Adjudicators are in the possession of the author. 
 379 
that they would do both things, that is help with questions and have a dialogue. 
Another adjudicator said that they allowed the self representative to present the case 
how they wanted to but required them to adhere to basic procedural guidelines. Seven 
adjudicators said that they took a relaxed approach when self representatives were 
involved, with nine adjudicators acknowledging that they did guide self 
representatives through the process, particularly in relation to questions. 
6.7.8 ASSISTANCE FOR INCOMPETENT LAWYERS 
 
When lawyers were perceived to be incompetent, adjudicators were asked if they 
assisted or guided them. In response, six adjudicators said no, five adjudicators said 
that they would discuss it with the lawyers if they were asking questions, five said that 
yes, they would assist but not to the same extent as they would self representatives. 
One adjudicator said: 
Yes. If a lawyer is simply new to the experience he or she will usually appreciate guidance. If 
on the other hand and I‟m talking about very rare cases the lawyer is both incompetent and 
arrogant it‟s a difficult situation for everyone. Anecdotally I‟ve added a little maxim here that 
mad lawyers and mad clients find each other like iron filings drawn to a magnet. 
 
Assist or guide to the extent that it‟s not responsible of me to allow their confidence to destroy 
the validity of the proceedings. That‟s the danger. You‟ve got to do that. Also you assist and 
guide to the extent that you make it clear to them what it is that you want from them without 
telling them how to run their case or running it for them. You make it clear to them what you 
think you need. 
 
To a degree. If the lawyer simply doesn‟t know that he has to put a case or if he doesn‟t know 
how to put an open ended question in the examination in chief then certainly I‟ll interrupt and 
I‟ll take the initiative and I‟ll explain what I require. If he keeps on doing it I‟ll keep 
interrupting. And sometimes I might take a break and take counsel out and just have a quiet 
chat with them. 
 
6.7.9 INEXPERIENCED AND INCOMPETENT LAWYERS 
 
Adjudicators were asked whether they would guide an inexperienced and incompetent 
lawyer. All adjudicators advised that they would offer some assistance to 
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inexperienced lawyers. How they would assist varied to some degree between 
offering assistance during the hearing or taking the lawyer out of adjudication to 
provide advice. All adjudicators had no tolerance for incompetent lawyers, with one 
stating that it was the role of law firms to train their staff. One adjudicator said: 
Yes to a degree. Everybody has got to start somewhere. You‟ve got young inexperienced 
lawyers coming in. It‟s unreasonable to jump on their head and expect them simply because 
they happen to be qualified to be expert so you give them rope without compromising the 
proceedings. In other words you don‟t humiliate them you don‟t embarrass them. You try to 
take them gently through the hearing.  
 
6.7.10 EFFECT OF PRESENTATION STANDARD ON ATTITUDE TO CLAIM 
 
The question was asked as to whether the standard of presentation of the claim 
affected the attitude of adjudicators to the claim or its defence.  
Table 6.11: Do Presentation Standards Affect the Outcome of the Hearing? 
Adjudicator Response Number of Adjudicators (N= 17) 
Yes 2 
No 6 
„No‟ in theory but „Yes‟ in practice 9 
 
This table represents adjudicators‟ responses to the question „Do Presentation 
Standards Affect the Outcome of the Hearing?‟ This question was listed in NUD*IST 
as a question that was asked in the interview. The answers given were very clear as to 
whether they were yes or no, or in theory no but in reality yes. Table 6.11 shows that, 
in theory, the roughly half of adjudicators believed that poor presentation standards 
would not have affected the outcome of the decision. Two adjudicators recognised 
that poor presentation standards could have an impact with six adjudicators clearly 
indicating that presentation standards had no effect on the outcome. Two adjudicators 
commented: 
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Yes. I have to admit it does. The less confident the case is presented I‟m afraid it does have an 
impact on the credibility of the case. Now I try to put that to one side but I‟m conscious that 
it‟s there and so I‟ll try to work to overcome that. It has a corrosive influence.  
 
I think so yeah. That‟s the art of persuasion. No doubt about it well presented well argued and 
this is why some advocates and lawyers get paid a lot more than others in the litigation sense. 
Because they do present so well they actually persuade; the 40/60 case against becomes a win 
for one side which shouldn‟t be or they reduce the remedies. That‟s what advocacy is all 
about. The answer is you can only use what is in front of you and if you‟ve got to look to see 
it look hard at a certain point you‟re not going to. And that‟s why it‟s a game. I say to people 
“You go to hearings for a decision. You don‟t go for justice.” And the decision maker decides 
on the basis of the argument and how it‟s presented. And that determines the outcome. So 
unless you can get through what the decision should be if you can‟t present it properly even 
though you‟re right, you‟re going to lose. Cynical but… 
 
Although the question was a closed question, where interviewee‟s chose to expand on 
the point, this additional data was included. 
 
Whilst demonstrating a good awareness of the variable factors of poor representation 
and the potential impact on parties, responses to how this was dealt with greatly 
varied. Of issue was the negativity in particular to incompetent experienced lawyers 
and the notion that sometimes no intervention was required to redress this imbalance. 
Whilst this may have led to variable outcomes the adjudicators‟ role in an adversarial 
system sometimes went beyond the requirements of their core function. However it 
was acknowledged that most adjudicators naturally took a supportive approach to self 
represented parties. Various recommendations were also made by adjudicators to 
improve the situation including: ongoing training and more emphasis on minimum 
standards for representatives. 
 
6.8 CATEGORY 5: COSTS 
 
The cost of taking a personal grievance and the potential for costs to be awarded 
against an applicant could have resulted in potential applicants being reluctant to 
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follow the process.
158
 It was not always clear from decisions of the Employment 
Tribunal how adjudicators awarded costs and on what basis Employment Tribunal 
Adjudicators made their decisions when costs were being awarded. In devising 
questions on costs, the procedure used by adjudicators for awarding costs was 
examined and questions derived by looking at both the decisions contained in the 
database and the hearing procedure itself. 
6.8.1 COST OF REPRESENTATION 
 
Adjudicators were asked if the cost of representation restricted access to the personal 
grievance procedure. Adjudicators agreed that the cost of taking a personal grievance 
caused problems with accessing the procedure. The reasons why all adjudicators took 
this view were varied but included; 
 People could not get the standard of representation they wanted or deserved depending on 
the merits of the case; 
 The cost of representation restricted access to justice in any institution; 
 Some people could not even afford the filing fee; 
 It affected access and quality of representation; 
 Solicitors‟ costs, advocates, sometimes union fees; 
 Yes, although that was one area where contingency fee people did provide a service 
where there was not anything; 
 Higher costs equals higher risk equals access more in jeopardy; 
 If you can get legal aid it‟s fine but if you cannot and you are poor it‟s very hard to run a 
case. 
 
Adjudicators made the following comments regarding the effect of the costs of 
representation on parties to a personal grievance: 
And I believe, nobody has done the research, but anecdotally I could say that my experiences 
there is a bigger preponderance of claims now from middle to high paid workers, and a lot less 
claims from union represented people and lower paid workers than there was. They have got 
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 See Chapter 7.4.1 for the impact of costs on employee representation and Chapter 5.4.8 for a 
discussion on the costs of representation.  
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to be a bit careful because the 1991 Act opened the jurisdiction up and made it available to a 
whole lot more people but I still see what I think is a decreased representation from low paid 
workers because of (1) their loss of union representation and (2) the fact that when they go 
along someone says to them “I guess I could take a grievance but it‟s going to cost you two or 
three grand and if we lose you might have to pay some costs so you might be up three or four 
grand.” And to a lot of people working on $8 $9 or $10 an hour they don‟t have that money. 
Certainly if they‟ve got it they can‟t afford to risk it. I think it has a significant impact. 
 
Very, very clearly and to the quality that you get quite often too. It‟s the difference between 
thinking “I‟ll go and get this chappy who is a QC who specialises in employment law if I can 
afford him/her”, and thinking “I have to do it myself and I don‟t really know what I‟m doing” 
particularly if the claim involves legally complex arguments. You‟re probably at less of a 
disadvantage if it‟s a simple personal grievance issue. But if there are difficult legal matters 
involved then I think you are clearly at a very significant advantage if you‟ve got somebody 
who is familiar with the law and knows how to present things. It‟s obvious. Which is why I‟ve 
always felt that it might be better to have gone back to when the unions had the right to do it, 
but of course that is never going to happen. Anyway don‟t tell anybody else that. Unpopular 
view. 
 
Yeah I think it does. Strangely if you can get legal aid that‟s fine. But if you‟re one of these 
people who can‟t get legal aid but you‟re poor you really do hesitate to run the case. 
 
6.8.2 PERSONAL GRIEVANCE COSTS – A BARRIER? 
 
Adjudicators were asked if they thought that the cost of lodging and bringing a 
personal grievance was a barrier which prohibited people from having access to the 
Tribunal.  
Table 6.12: Are costs a barrier to pursuit of personal grievances? 
Response of Adjudicator Number of 
Adjudicators (N = 16) 
Yes 7 
Yes but dealt with by contingency representatives 2 
No 1 
No when compared with fees charged elsewhere such as the Disputes 
Tribunal 
1 
No – costs, yes – representation 4 
Complexity of procedure more of a barrier 1 
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The clear majority of adjudicators said that the cost of taking a personal grievance 
was a barrier to using the procedure. One adjudicator recognised that fees for lodging 
a personal grievance were not unduly high but that there were fewer claims from low 
paid workers, which indicated that fee levels were a barrier to low paid employees 
who may have wished to take a personal grievance. A minority of adjudicators did 
acknowledge that costs were a barrier to using the procedure but believed that these 
circumstances could have been dealt with by contingency representatives. However, it 
has to be taken into account that, anecdotally, „No Win, No Fee‟ representatives only 
tended to take cases which had a strong likelihood of success and were not legally 
complex in nature.
159
 Several (six) adjudicators said that they believed the filing fee 
was not a bar to lodging a personal grievance, however five had qualifications to this 
response.
160
 Four adjudicators said that the filing fee was not the problem but the cost 
of representation was. One adjudicator said: 
I don‟t think the lodging fee has been an impediment and I don‟t think the initial cost of work 
by a representative is necessarily an impediment. Representatives can give advice to 
applicants and respondents and for the applicant and respondent to either go to mediation or 
come and do adjudication themselves on the basis of the legal advice. The impediment is 
where the legal profession either quote their bills up front or parties have learnt anecdotally 
that the costs of legal practitioners are so high that they do not bring cases. I am most certain 
that it is a big factor as to why people haven‟t brought cases before the Tribunal.161 
Therefore over half of the adjudicators interviewed believed that the unavoidable 
costs such as application fees and representation costs constituted a significant barrier 
to personal grievance applicants. 
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 Personal understanding of author after discussion with representatives at Christchurch Community 
Law Centre. 
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 Employment Court and Employment Tribunal (Fees) Regulations 1997. S 3 refers to sch 2 which 
indicated that the fee for lodging a personal grievance to the Employment Tribunal was $70. 
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  Another adjudicator said that the cost of lodging a claim with the Small Claims Tribunal was more 
expensive. The Small Claims Tribunal is now the Disputes Tribunal. Section 24(1) of the Disputes 
Tribunal Act 1988 provides that a prescribed fee has to be paid when lodging a claim with the Disputes 
Tribunal, the rates being for claims valued at up to $1000 the fee is $30.00, for claims between $1000 
and $5000 the fee is $50 and for claims between $5000 and $7500 the fee is $100. Checking the 
relevant legislation has found this supposition to be accurate.   
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6.8.3 FACTORS TAKEN ACCOUNT OF IN AWARDING COSTS 
 
Another potential restriction on taking a personal grievance was the possibility that 
either the adjudicator might order costs to rest where they fell or alternatively, if the 
personal grievance was lost, that costs may have been awarded against the applicant. 
Adjudicators were therefore asked what factors they took into account when awarding 
costs. A list of factors was suggested to adjudicators which may have impacted on 
how costs were awarded. These were:   
 How the case was conducted; 
 How parties acted; 
 Significance of case to the parties; 
 Preparation time; 
 Arguments lacking substance; 
 Legalistic/technical arguments; 
 Actual costs. 
 
Adjudicators responded as follows: 
 
Factors: re Costs Adjudicator Responses 
How the case was 
conducted 
Four adjudicators said yes, if the case was inefficiently conducted and two 
said yes if it unnecessarily extended the case. 
How parties acted Three adjudicators said yes. Three adjudicators said yes if it made the 
hearing longer. One said yes if the party was obstructive. One adjudicator 
said no. 
Significance of case to 
the parties 
Three adjudicators said yes. Two said yes but all cases were significant to the 
parties. One adjudicator said yes but that it was not a big deal. One 
adjudicator said sometimes. Two adjudicators said no. 
Preparation time Nine adjudicators said yes. One adjudicator said no, that they took a 
mathematical approach. 
Arguments lacking 
substance 
Seven adjudicators said yes if it extended the case. One adjudicator said no 
that there was usually a grain of good sense in the arguments. 
Legalistic/technical 
arguments 
Nine adjudicators said yes if it extended the case.  
Actual costs Four adjudicators said yes. Two adjudicators said that they use it as a starting 
point. One adjudicator said that this was the most significant factor. One 
adjudicator acknowledged that lawyers were bad at giving evidence of this. 
One adjudicator said no that they would work out what was reasonable and 
take a percentage. 
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Six adjudicators advised that they would take into account all of the above seven 
listed factors. One adjudicator said, „If the case was routine we would just go with 
that but we would always invite the parties to settle costs‟. The award of costs covered 
a variety of contextual factors, but predominantly preparation time and the length of 
hearing and whether overall proceedings were deliberately extended determined such.    
6.8.4  SELF-REPRESENTATIVES AND COSTS 
 
Adjudicators were asked what their view was of the principle that self representatives 
cannot claim for the cost of their time.
162
  
Table 6.13: Should self-representatives be able to claim for the cost of their time? 
Adjudicator responses Number of Adjudicators  
(N = 17) 
Self-representatives should not be able to claim costs of time 5 
Self-representatives should be able to claim costs of time 10 
Do not have a definite opinion either way 2 
 
Table 6.13 shows that half of adjudicators believed that self representatives should be 
able to claim for the cost of their time, with five adjudicators taking the contrary view. 
Two adjudicators did not know whether or not self representatives should be able to 
claim for their time. The reasons given by adjudicators for supporting the view that 
self representatives should be able to claim for time included: 
 It was grossly unfair that they could not; 
 Simply wrong; 
 Should be able to on the principles of equity; 
 They should be able to as they may lose a couple of days pay; 
 They should be able to but how it would be quantified was another issue. 
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 For a discussion on executive time and costs for self representatives, see Chapter 2.4.3(d). 
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Those taking the view that adjudicators should not be able to claim for the cost of 
their time said so because: 
 It should not differ from ordinary courts where self representatives could not claim for 
fees; 
 Should not be able to claim all time because of inefficiency; 
 Nobody else can claim for cost of time.  
 
Adjudicators were asked if they could give examples where it would have been just to 
award a self representative costs for their time. Adjudicators responded as follows: 
 Five adjudicators said that they could not remember any specific examples; 
 One said that where the respondent was running their own business they should have been 
able to claim for cost of time; 
 Two adjudicators said that parties who had taken time off work should have been able to 
recover the cost of time; 
 One commented that most self represented cases were quite short so should recover; 
 One said they do not normally claim for the cost of time but ask for reimbursement of the 
filing fee; 
 
Irrespective of the views of adjudicators it is worth noting that representatives would 
have charged for their time so perhaps to self representatives this would appear unfair. 
Further, an employee would have been required to use time off from work if they had 
a representative and if they chose to self represent they would have received no 
compensation for time. By contrast, other parties who were represented were entitled 
to claim a proportion of costs incurred. 
6.8.5 EXPENSES  
 
It was possible that parties and their representatives may have claimed expenses 
which were perceived to have been unreasonable or excessive.
163
 Adjudicators were 
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therefore asked how they determined whether or not expenses claimed were 
necessarily and reasonably claimed.  
Table 6.14: What Expenses are Reasonable? 
Expenses adjudicators would allow costs for Number of Adjudicators (N = 19) 
Photocopying/Disbursements 3 
Travel 2 
Filing Fees 1 
Any reasonable/necessary costs 11 
Expenses proven by invoice 1 
Accommodation 1 
 
Table 6.14(a) What expenses are not reasonable? 
Expenses adjudicators would not allow costs for Number of Adjudicators  
(N = 5) 
Nothing other than travel/disbursements 1 
No extravagances 1 
Phone/Travel expenses when a local lawyer could have been 
hired 
1 
Excessive mileage 1 
Costs that should not have been incurred 1 
 
The answers from all adjudicators indicating what would be allowed appear to be 
rather arbitrary, with some agreeing to cover the cost of travel while others would not 
stating that a local representative could have been used. It does, however, appear that 
if expenses claimed were reasonable there was a strong likelihood that they would 
have been granted, the difficulty being determining what was reasonable under the 
circumstances with the possibility that adjudicators may use a different measure of 
reasonableness.  
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6.8.6  COSTS FOR EXECUTIVE TIME 
 
On occasion respondents employed their own legal or human resources staff. If those 
staff members advised and represented the party concerned, their time was described 
as executive time. Adjudicators were therefore asked how they determined whether or 
not to award costs for executive time. Adjudicators replied: 
 The seniority of the executive was assessed when awarding costs; 
 On the facts of the case; 
 Look at actual costs and apply the appropriate principles, it would cost respondent less 
than getting someone else in; 
 When the claim was frivolous; 
 Depended on the evidence, reasonableness and actual time; 
 I‟m sympathetic where the employer was mucked around by the applicant or their lawyer; 
 Whether or not the role was within their job description; 
 I would treat the same as it if were a union, I‟d give costs to them; 
 Whether it‟s fair to reimburse; 
 Not likely to award unless exceptional circumstances. 
 
Four adjudicators said that they never awarded executive time. 
6.8.7  APPLICANT’S OBLIGATION IN OUT OF TIME APPLICATIONS 
Out of time applications could have been seen as an inconvenience to employers.
164
 
That is, if an employee had a personal grievance then they had an obligation to lodge 
the personal grievance and comply with other obligations on time. It could therefore 
be seen as slightly punitive to the employer if applicants did not have to contribute to 
the costs of the respondent if applications were made out of time and leave was 
                                                             
164
 As they may have considered the incident which constituted the grievance occurred some time in the 
past and had been either resolved or ignored by the employee.  However, the 90 day rule meant that 
anything up to 3 months after the incident, or in exceptional circumstances more than 90 days later, the 
personal grievance may still have been required to be resolved.  By this time employers may have 
appointed a new staff member in dismissal cases or may have taken some other action which they 
considered had resolved the situation. For a discussion of out of time applications and when the 
exceptional circumstances in which the 90 day rule can be set aside, see Chapter 2.4.1(c).   
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granted to pursue a personal grievance. Adjudicators were therefore asked how they 
viewed the applicant‟s obligation to contribute to the respondent‟s costs in out of time 
applications.  
Table 6.15: Do Applicants have an obligation to contribute to the respondent’s costs 
in out of time applications? 
Adjudicator Responses Number of Adjudicators 
(N= 18) 
Case by case analysis undertaken 5 
All unsuccessful parties treated the same 3 
On the basis of costs 6 
Nominal amount to reflect time and trouble taken 1 
Must ensure someone is accountable 1 
More likely when the applicant fails in their case 1 
Never encountered 1 
 
 
Table 6.15 shows that 6 adjudicators said that whether or not applicants would have to 
meet the costs of the respondent in these circumstances would have depended on how 
costs would have been awarded anyway. Five adjudicators said that whether the 
applicant would be required to contribute to the respondent‟s costs in out of time 
cases would have depended on an analysis of the facts and circumstances of the case. 
For three adjudicators, all unsuccessful parties would have been treated the same way 
and the „out of time‟ element was immaterial. In four cases, only one adjudicator 
thought that they must ensure that someone was accountable; and one adjudicator said 
that if the applicant failed in their case they would be more likely to award costs in 
out of time cases against unsuccessful applicants. One adjudicator said that they had 
never encountered this situation so could not comment. Clearly the above results 
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indicate that the most common approach was to determine how costs would have been 
awarded anyway depending on the success or otherwise of the case.   
 
One adjudicator responded to the above question by saying: „Someone has to take 
responsibility for the fact that someone has sat on their bum.‟ This adjudicator clearly 
believed that if the reason for not lodging the application within the requisite time was 
fault or negligence, that person should bear responsibility via costs. 
 
The responses illustrated the manner in which cost factors were assessed varied with 
no agreed standard approach for instance: some took the view that a party engaged in 
delaying tactics should contribute more in costs, if claims were pursued regardless of 
merit 17 adjudicators would punish this by a costs award against the claimant but not 
all adjudicators adopted the same approach to unmeritorious claims.  It is possible 
from the interviews to suppose that one adjudicators‟ response that drew the 
distinction between a morally just or a legally sustainable claim was a widespread 
view. 
6.8.8  NO FAULT IN OUT OF TIME APPLICATIONS 
 
It could have been that the late application was not due to any particular fault or 
negligence of the employee.
165
 Adjudicators were therefore asked if the late 
application, due to either illness of the applicant or action of the employer, was a 
factor taken into account. Adjudicators responded as follows: 
 Six adjudicators indicated that this was one factor which would have been taken into 
account; 
 Three adjudicators said that this would be an exceptional circumstance which would need 
to be proven by the applicant; 
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 Three adjudicators said they had never come across this situation; 
 Two adjudicators said this would go to where the responsibility lay, that was, who was 
responsible for the application being out of time; 
 Two adjudicators noted that it would be very difficult to bring a case out of time; 
 Two adjudicators indicated that they would be driven by legal principles; 
 One adjudicator said that they would not be influenced by late applications. 
 
6.8.9  COSTS AGAINST CLAIMS WITHOUT MERIT 
 
It was unclear from the decisions of the Employment Tribunal how many claims were 
made to the Employment Tribunal which lacked merit. There was a possibility that 
unmeritorious claims were using up adjudicators‟ time and possibly resulting in 
delays for other applicants who had justifiable claims or personal grievances. 
Adjudicators were therefore asked if a losing party brings a claim without merit, and 
despite clear warning has continued with it, do you award costs against that party? 
Seventeen adjudicators said yes, that they would award costs against this type of 
party. Of those 17, two acknowledged that they would take into account the financial 
circumstances of the party concerned. One adjudicator said that it was seldom that 
you would see a claim totally without merit. One adjudicator said no, that they would 
not award costs or provide warnings against an unmeritorious party. One adjudicator 
said: 
It‟s a factor which you‟d take into account amongst other things. Just because a claim‟s 
without merit and they‟ve been warned I don‟t think that‟s sufficient to say “I‟m going to 
award a huge amount of costs against you”. Particularly if the person is unrepresented and 
they haven‟t had the means to get legal advice I don‟t think you should be further penalised 
because some people can be morally right but not legally right and so I can fully understand 
why the person thought “I‟ve been really hard done by here” but you can‟t force it within the 
legal definition of a personal grievance but yeah you have been treated really badly. 
 
Some adjudicators are therefore stating that they would award costs if the claim 
lacked merit but acknowledge that there will be a series of other circumstances which 
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would also be required to be taken into account. For instance, there is little point in 
awarding costs against a party who has little in the way of financial resources. 
6.8.10  PENALTY FOR INAPPROPRIATE CLAIM 
 
Parties may have made inappropriate or excessive claims.
166
 Adjudicators were 
therefore asked if they penalised parties for making an inappropriate claim.  
Table 6.16: Are parties penalised for presenting an inappropriate claim? 
Views of adjudicators Number of adjudicators who agree (N = 17) 
Costs punitive 1 
Costs compensatory 5 
One factor considered 2 
If it extended time unnecessarily 1 
Vexatious/frivolous 3 
Yes 3 
No 2 
 
Table 6.16 shows whether adjudicators thought that parties were penalised for lodging 
an inappropriate claim.
167
 However, s 34 of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 
provided that nothing in any employment contract could prevent a finding that a 
personal grievance was a type other than that alleged.
168
 Five adjudicators said that 
they thought that costs were compensatory and therefore not punitive. Some 
adjudicators said they thought costs were punitive if claims were vexatious or 
frivolous and the same number of adjudicators said they would penalise if 
inappropriate claims were made. The inappropriateness of the claim was only one 
factor to consider for two adjudicators, with the same number saying that they would 
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 Inappropriate claims could have meant vexatious or frivolous claims – see Employment Contracts 
Act 1991, s 99 – or could have meant claims brought under the wrong legislation or remedies which 
were not available under the Employment Contracts Act 1991.  
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 See above n for the definition of inappropriate. 
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 For a discussion of s 34, see para 6.4.13 and Chapter 2.3.3. 
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not penalise for inappropriate claims. One adjudicator commented that inappropriate 
claims extended the time involved unnecessarily, and another said that costs were 
punitive. 
 
The largest number of adjudicators agreed that the purpose of a costs award was 
compensatory and should not be used in a punitive manner and consequently 
inappropriate claims were not all dealt with by using this approach. However this was 
not a unanimous approach; a variety of comments were made. One adjudicator said 
„[a]gain it depends on what the claim has been, in what circumstances the person has 
persisted with the claim, whether the person has been legally represented or got legal 
advice, or whether the person is a nutter.‟ 
6.8.11  FRIVOLOUS OR TRIVIAL CLAIMS 
 
There was a possibility that adjudicators‟ time may have been wasted in hearing 
frivolous claims. To determine whether or not their time was wasted in hearings, 
adjudicators were asked whether they had had experience of having to adjudicate 
cases which were frivolous or trivial. Ten adjudicators said that they had not heard 
any frivolous claims with two of the 10 stating that all cases had some merit. Two 
adjudicators pointed out that frivolous or trivial claims were pre-empted at mediation. 
Two other adjudicators said that there can be elements to a case which might be 
irritating but people did not usually get involved in taking a personal grievance for the 
fun of using the process. One adjudicator said that although there were irritating 
points adjudicators could have used the legislative provision to strike out in frivolous 
or trivial cases.
169
 Seven adjudicators said that they had had frivolous and trivial 
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proceedings, at any time dismiss any matter before it which it thinks frivolous or trivial; and in any 
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claims with six of those seven saying that there had only been one or two such cases. 
One adjudicator said: 
Yes. Well I‟ve had cases where people have been in fights. They have behaved in ways that 
meant there is no relationship that could possibly continue between the employee and the 
employer and where I think they were ill advised by their lawyers. And you get that and it‟s 
quite clear but I think one of the chief factors is that when you go reading back on some of 
them it‟s usually a factual thing that determines whether it is frivolous or not. Because the 
chief thing that I find in these sorts of cases is if on the applicant‟s own facts it‟s a ridiculous 
case then you really do make a determination award heavily against them. 
 
6.8.12  DECISION ON WHETHER A CASE IS FRIVOLOUS OR TRIVIAL 
 
Adjudicators were asked how they determined whether a case was frivolous or 
trivial.
170
 
Table 6.17: How do you determine if a case is frivolous or trivial? 
Response of adjudicator Number of adjudicators 
(N= 15) 
Never Arisen 4 
Would have to be blatantly ridiculous 2 
Determination as to the nature of the case 9 
 
Table 6.17 shows that nine adjudicators said that they would determine this question 
by the nature of the case and its surrounding circumstances. For four adjudicators that 
situation had never arisen, while two adjudicators said that the case would have to be 
blatantly ridiculous before they took action. These responses make it clear that the 
Employment Tribunal‟s time was not consumed with a whole series of ridiculous 
cases. Therefore adjudicators‟ time was not being wasted in needless hearings and 
                                                                                                                                                                              
such case the order of the Tribunal may be limited to any order on the party bringing the matter before 
the Tribunal for payment of costs and expenses.‟ 
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 Ibid, s 99, provided that the Employment Tribunal could strike out a case if it was frivolous or 
trivial. The Court in Dickson’s Service Centre Ltd v Noel [1998] 3 ERNZ 534, applied a high standard: 
the test was very high. This decision was however in relation to s 121 of the Employment Contracts Act 
1991, which related to the Court‟s authority to strike out in trivial and frivolous cases, rather than the 
Employment Tribunal. It has been assumed that the equivalent rule would have applied to the 
Employment Tribunal under s 99. 
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such cases could have been determined through either case management, where 
available, or mediation, where pursued. The lack of frivolous and trivial cases may 
also have been a result of the system itself. With a large number of applicants feeling 
the necessity to employ legal representatives to present their cases, it would not have 
been appropriate to waste funds on ridiculous cases.
171
 One adjudicator said, „[t]he 
first thing I look at is if what they‟re claiming and even on their own facts it‟s 
ridiculous then it‟s obviously a frivolous case but quite often something is only 
frivolous if in fact the respondent‟s facts are preferred to the applicant‟s.‟ A second 
adjudicator said: 
In mediation it was just that there were people who had clearly come because Social Welfare 
had said to them we‟re going to stand you down for six months and they‟d come here because 
they couldn‟t live you know. And they know that perfectly well. There are just the odd cases – 
I remember one once he‟d made a major terrible breach of health and safety procedure he was 
a danger to himself and he‟d done it twice. And there was no way he couldn‟t have been 
sacked because he was a danger to himself and others and any lawyer would have told him 
that. But Social Welfare had told him he‟d be stood down so he was just going through the 
motions. 
The small sample of adjudicators, only one third commenting on frivolous/trivial  
claims, made it difficult to draw firm conclusions and it may well be that the system 
weeded out such claims at an earlier stage; likely at the mediation stage. 
6.8.13  EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES RULE 
 
Where a party was in receipt of legal aid, the Exceptional Circumstances Rule meant 
costs would not be awarded against that party unless there were exceptional 
circumstances.
172
 Adjudicators replied as follows: 
 Fifteen adjudicators said that they had never applied the exceptional circumstances rule; 
 Two adjudicators had applied the rule once. 
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 See Chapter 5.4.7(a) for a discussion of exceptional circumstances which might apply when legal 
aid had been awarded by the Legal Services Board. 
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Of the 15 adjudicators who said that they had never applied the rule, for them to apply 
this principle they said: 
 It had to be a really exceptional case. 
 It‟s a high threshold that had to be met. 
 
One adjudicator said: 
I was only faced with that situation and X had done it and it had gone to appeal and it was 
overturned and after that I‟ve set my costs in accordance with I‟ve never used those 
exceptional circumstances. So I don‟t think I could be persuaded. But X actually had a case 
and he awarded costs against a legally aided party and it was appealed and thrown out I think 
by Judge Finnegan and after that I just thought “no way”. 
 
6.8.14   HARSHNESS OF RULE 
 
As the rule on exceptional circumstances may have appeared harsh, adjudicators were 
asked if the rule relating to exceptional circumstances in legal aid cases was too 
stringent. Seven adjudicators said yes. They provided the following comments: 
 It‟s too harsh on a successfully defending party; 
 There needs to be more ability to award costs when they should not have gone to 
mediation; 
 Should look at the merits of the case; 
 Should be able to award when cases were being dragged on by lawyers wanting legal aid 
money; 
 Some milking of the system; 
 It was too harsh. 
 
Six adjudicators said that they thought the rule was not too harsh and stated: 
 The legislation was fair and reasonable; 
 The level was pretty high but probably appropriate; 
 There had to be some protection for people who sought and were awarded legal aid and 
who proceeded with the case presuming there were no costs for them; 
 Provided there was a safety barrier for applicants with genuine cases. 
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Four adjudicators said that they had never used the rule and had never thought about 
it.  
6.8.15  ALTERNATIVE TO EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES RULE 
 
Adjudicators were asked if their answer to the above question was yes what an 
appropriate alternative rule would be. Adjudicators made the following suggestions: 
 
 Legal aid provider should be able to revisit whether the person should have to contribute 
to costs; 
 A question of whether it is just to shield a legally aided person; 
 More flexibility to take circumstances into account; 
 The mediator should be able to comment on the likelihood of success; 
 Objective test as to whether the case has merit before legal aid is granted; 
 Legal Aid Committee balancing people‟s right to be heard with which cases to grant; 
 Legal Aid Committee should shoulder some responsibility for their decisions to grant 
legal aid to cases with little chance of success; 
 Look at whether the threshold is too high; 
 Legal aid should not be available in employment, or it should be limited; 
 Costs against lawyers; 
 There should be more in the legal aid pot. 
 
One adjudicator indicated that they had never thought about this question. Another 
adjudicator said: 
I think it‟s not necessarily an alternative rule but maybe looking at the threshold as to whether 
it‟s too high and what the practical effects would be if it was perhaps changed. I quite like the 
notion of the exceptional circumstances because it does provide a safe guard. It does provide a 
barrier to test a case on but I would go so far as to say controversially I don‟t think legal aid 
should be available to anyone in the employment law jurisdiction and if it is it should be an 
amount of money to enable a person to get legal advice from an appropriate organisation to 
enable them to advocate for themselves their own cases. The employment law provides 
representation it is not an absolute right it‟s a choice and in an environment of civil matters 
and choice then one has to question the value that the tax payer gets for legal aid in the 
employment area where it might well be better placed in other jurisdictions.  
 
As would be logically expected, exceptional circumstances rarely arose where it was 
appropriate to award costs against a legally aided party with one adjudicator 
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expressing total opposition to the actual concept and the finding of four saying they 
had not even thought about it. 
 
6.9 RESOURCES 
 
An issue raised by six adjudicators, approximately a third of the sample group, 
was what they perceived to be a lack of resources being provided to the 
Employment Tribunal. These adjudicators have compared the funding being made 
available to the Employment Relations Authority and have voiced some 
dissatisfaction at the level of staffing and services which were provided to the 
Employment Tribunal.  
 
However, general comments made by adjudicators on adequacy of resources 
varied and included: 
We developed good mediation. The Tribunal had no fiscal cap and extensive statutory powers 
and it exercised the jurisdiction responsibly. The problems it had were not of its own making – 
there was a backlog from the [Labour Relations Act] and [Employment Contracts Act] and not 
enough Tribunal members for the case loads. It could have been more efficient with simple 
enforcement cases and it could have had better [public relations] and looked after its own 
interests better, but generally it was a good adventure. 
 
There is insufficient accountability from some individual members on their output etc. The 
voice of people going through the system didn‟t get heard. The delay in putting out decisions 
was the worst part. There were different practices between divergent registries there should 
have be one registry with serviced offices. The Tribunal didn‟t circuit to remote parts of New 
Zealand. There was a lot administrative inefficiency. 
 
The Tribunal did a good job under difficult circumstances of being insufficiently resourced. 
The problems with it could have been remedied rather than throwing the baby out with the 
bath water. 
 
It operated well; the only problem was backlog and resourcing. There is heaps more money in 
the new system. 
 
The Tribunal was hamstrung by resourcing issues and by the Court. 
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I would say the Employment Tribunal if given the resources that the Mediation Service of the 
Labour Department and the Employment Relations Authority has…If you gave them that $40 
odd million and you upped the number of people on the Employment Tribunal‟s mediation 
and adjudication function, then with perhaps a beefing up of the support staff to do more of 
the work that‟s done by low-level mediators, staff and their info centre, you could put that 
money into the Employment Tribunal as well, you‟d have a system that worked just as well if 
not better than the Employment Relations Authority and the Mediation Service. But there was 
nothing wrong with the system as designed. 
6.10 ADJUDICATORS’ GENERAL COMMENTS 
 
Finally, adjudicators were asked if they had any general comments to make about the 
adjudication process applicable under the Employment Contracts Act 1991. 
Adjudicators gave a large variety of responses, many of which have been outlined 
above. However, one specific answer to this question was: 
The Tribunal could have been a better mechanism and there are four areas of fault. 1. The 
Court made it excessively complex; 2. Tribunal adjudicators could have gotten together and 
got things going … There was bad productivity by adjudicators and some should not have 
been renewed but nothing was done; 3. The Department has been useless; 4. There was an 
absence of systems and guidelines, which also meant huge regional differences in 
productivity. 
 
It caused the Tribunal to get a lot of flak, be blamed for lengthy delays etc. It wasn‟t assisted 
by the fact that the Tribunal came to be dominated by people from the legal profession. Now 
the legal people said „No, no, no. We‟re a Tribunal. We can‟t do this. We can‟t do that, we 
can‟t do the other. We‟ve got to deal with this in a legal and appropriate fashion.” People in 
the Tribunal who came through from the Mediation Service and wanted to take the less formal 
road, lost that argument in „91. There was a big debate that went on within the Tribunal itself 
and the lawyers won out. The [legal people] of this world won out…The Court was 
responsible and the group of excessive legalists within the Tribunal itself were responsible. 
And those of us who tried very hard to maintain the sort of inquisitorial style that we had, the 
way mediation would do business, we tried really hard and we just lost the battle. The Court 
just filled the hole with concrete. We were buggered, not to put too fine a point on it. 
 
[There] are Tribunal adjudicators who are just not cutting it, but they just get their warrants 
renewed. They‟ve never been approached saying “Look. Here are the figures. Your 
productivity is rat shit. Do this, that or the other or you won‟t be renewed.” That‟s never ever 
happened and should have done…You‟ll find massive regional differences between 
Wellington and Auckland. Auckland is a world unto itself. They don‟t talk with one another. 
There‟s so much we can do to get this damn system to work better. There‟s a manual that we 
all had. I wrote that in exasperation that there was nothing. It‟s absolute stupid arrogance. I 
think collectively they were full of pomposity so you actually got adjudicators of the Tribunal 
who…it‟s the biggest job they‟ve ever had. It‟s gone to their heads and they can‟t think about 
delivery to the public because that‟s what it‟s about. It‟s about a service. Uneven application 
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of a system fosters the feeling of injustice. Even application is a fundamental ingredient I 
think of delivery of justice. I took the practice note up to Auckland and they wouldn‟t have a 
bar of it. 
6.11 CONCLUSION 
 
The interviews have allowed an examination of the objectives of the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991 from the perspective of adjudicators and whether those objectives 
were met. The value of adjudicators‟ views on these issues in the context of access to 
justice has been discussed more fully in Chapter Three. The information contained in 
this chapter has to some extent been presented in a quantitative format as the 
interviews were relatively structured. In addition to the use of the tables to summarise 
key points and provide context for the detailed comments made by adjudicators, this 
chapter used a qualitative approach to ascertain adjudicators‟ opinions. Some general 
conclusions on the categories examined were: 
(a) Process 
In general, although harbouring views on the efficacy of the process and the extent of 
its legalistic nature, none of the adjudicators interviewed believed that the process in 
itself entirely supported the ideals of a low level, informal Tribunal that provided 
speedy, fair and just outcomes. In essence, most agreed that its overall legal 
complexity and capture by the legal profession and the lack of adequate resourcing 
had caused delay and a lack of „user friendliness‟. Another negative feature identified 
by all interviewed was the delay occasioned by parties advancing unnecessary 
submissions and irrelevant witnesses being called due to the lack of rules governing 
this problem. Adjudicators had a variety of strategies to remedy errors in procedures 
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by parties. For instance in response to hostile parties, some increased formality, 
whereas others decreased it to keep the process moving. 
(b) Types of Personal Grievances 
Some adjudicators indicated a level of flexibility in dealing with different types of 
personal grievance. The main contentious issue and one of divergent opinion was how 
the process should be altered to cope with sensitive issues such as sexual harassment 
complaints. The degree to which sensitivity was practiced seemingly depended upon 
the attitude and/or gender of adjudicators. A lack of specialist awareness training, 
which many adjudicators sought, appeared to be a significant issue and a potential 
barrier to a fair and consistent approach to handling sensitive claims. 
(c) Parties 
All adjudicators to a certain degree accepted that an inherent power imbalance 
between employers and employees existed. In analysing this more deeply two main 
categories of imbalance were agreed upon, being economic power imbalance and 
concomitant access to skilled representation. The only exception generally at variance 
with this view was the relative lack of power of small poorly resourced employers. 
 
Where inherent power imbalances were acknowledged by adjudicators they used 
various tools to redress these such as including discretionary intervention. Parties 
were able to adopt a variety of strategies to contain costs and reduce delay by the use 
of approaches such as class actions but no trends were discernable due to the small 
sample size. 
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Adjudicators demonstrated a good awareness of the need not to discriminate on the 
basis of occupational and social background differentials of applicants and gender, 
ethnicity and disability factors. Despite adjudicators requesting it, this however, did 
not appear to be supported by appropriate professional training on specific awareness 
of diversity issues. It could thus be concluded that adjudicators tried hard to 
accommodate the variables of parties‟ backgrounds and they devised strategies to 
ensure that the goal of overall fairness was not ignored. It was not clear to what extent 
adjudicators who said that they did not take characteristics of parties such as age, 
gender, occupation and ethnicity into account were fully conscious of potential 
prejudice and able to reflect on it and eliminate it from their deliberations. 
(d) Representation 
Adjudicators appeared fully aware of the need to make allowances for the varying 
skill levels of representatives and to, on occasion, assist inexperienced 
representatives. In particular, care was taken to assist self-represented parties. 
However, adjudicators showed little tolerance for incompetent experienced lawyers at 
the potential expense of fairness to parties who perhaps had legitimate claims.  
 
To resolve imbalances some adjudicators suggested more emphasis on educating 
representatives and the setting of minimum advocacy standards.   
(e) Costs 
The cost of mounting a personal grievance was seen by over half of adjudicators 
interviewed as being a significant barrier to resolving personal grievances. This would 
seem not to be consistent with the objectives of the act of fair access to low level 
justice. 
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The approach to awarding successful parties recompense for costs incurred was 
significantly variable with no standard formulae being agreed upon. This was an area 
where adjudicators exercised wide discretion based on a number of contextual factors 
including Employment Court directives.  
 
Legally aided parties generally had no cost implications except where exceptional 
circumstances were deemed evident. However, exceptional circumstances were rarely 
found and one adjudicator believed even this rule was too harsh.  
 
Costs could arguably be a barrier to the pursuit of trivial/frivolous claims as only a 
third of adjudicators surveyed mentioned this as being an issue with most opining that 
the system weeded out such claims. 
(f) General Opinion 
A third of adjudicators interviewed considered that a lack of resources and uneven 
workload allocation were major issues in terms of the creation of delay and the ability 
to meet the objective that cases be dealt with expeditiously. Other factors identified by 
adjudicators that militated against the objects of the act included: 
 Court imposed complexity 
 Regional differences due to lack of consistent guidelines for 
adjudicators and resource allocation 
 Workload allocation issues 
 Domination by the legal profession and at time insistence on 
adherence to strict legal proceduralism at the expense of a less 
formal inquisitorial approach. 
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However, in general terms adjudicators were comfortable with the process and their 
ability to adapt it to emerging needs. In addition, the level of authority conferred by 
the formality of the institution and regulatory framework was seen to confer status on 
adjudicators and engendered respect by users.   
Chapter seven examines the contrasting perspective of employees, employers and 
their representatives to determine their views on the efficacy of the system. 
 406 
CHAPTER 7 
INDEX OF TABLES ................................................................................................................. 407 
SURVEY OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE PERSONAL GRIEVANCE ADJUDICATION 
PROCESS............................................................................................................................. 409 
7.1  INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 409 
7.2  VALUE OF THE SURVEYS............................................................................................... 410 
7.3  SURVEY CATEGORIES ................................................................................................... 411 
7.3.1 SELECTION PROCESS ................................................................................................ 411 
7.4 EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYER FINDINGS ......................................................................... 412 
7.4.1 CHOICE OF EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION ................................................................. 412 
7.4.2 CHOICE OF EMPLOYERS‟ REPRESENTATION ............................................................. 419 
7.4.3 STANDARD OF REPRESENTATION ............................................................................. 421 
7.4.4 MEDIATION ............................................................................................................... 423 
7.5 THE ADJUDICATION PROCESS ....................................................................................... 427 
7.5.1„CONFUSING‟ ............................................................................................................. 431 
7.5.2„FORMAL‟ .................................................................................................................. 434 
7.5.3„INFORMAL‟ ............................................................................................................... 437 
7.5.4„LEGALISTIC‟ ............................................................................................................. 437 
7.5.5„INTIMIDATING‟ ......................................................................................................... 438 
7.5.6„TIME-CONSUMING‟ .................................................................................................. 438 
7.5.7„SATISFACTORY‟ ....................................................................................................... 439 
7.5.8 DID ADJUDICATION WORK? ..................................................................................... 439 
7.6 REPRESENTATIVES ......................................................................................................... 451 
7.6.1 REPRESENTATIVES AND GROUNDS FOR PERSONAL GRIEVANCES ............................. 452 
7.6.2 FEES AND COSTS ...................................................................................................... 455 
7.6.3 PROCESS ................................................................................................................... 459 
7.6.4 OTHER APPROACHES ................................................................................................ 466 
7.6.5 SELF REPRESENTED PARTIES .................................................................................... 467 
7.7 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................ 468 
 407 
INDEX OF TABLES  
 
TABLE 7.1: EMPLOYEES REPRESENTED BY UNIONS .............................................................. 413 
TABLE 7.2: HOW EMPLOYEES (APPLICANTS) CHOSE THEIR REPRESENTATIVE  ................... 415 
TABLE 7.3: DID YOU APPLY FOR LEGAL AID? ...................................................................... 417 
TABLE 7.4: DID COST IMPACT ON CHOICE OF EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVE? ..................... 418 
TABLE 7.5: WHO REPRESENTED EMPLOYERS AT THE HEARING? ......................................... 419 
TABLE 7.6: WERE PARTIES SATISFIED WITH THE STANDARD OF REPRESENTATION? .......... 421 
TABLE 7.7: WERE EMPLOYERS SATISFIED WITH THE TYPE OF REPRESENTATION THEY 
CHOSE? .................................................................................................................................. 422 
TABLE 7.8: DID PARTIES ATTEND MEDIATION? ................................................................... 423 
TABLE 7.9: DID THE REPRESENTATIVE HAVE EXPERIENCE IN MEDIATION? ........................ 423 
TABLE 7.10: WAS MEDIATION ATTENDED (PRIOR TO ADJUDICATION) AND WHO 
REPRESENTED THE PARTIES? ................................................................................................ 425 
TABLE 7.11: WERE PARTIES AWARE OF THEIR LEGAL OBLIGATIONS? ................................ 427 
TABLE 7.12: HOW DID PARTIES DESCRIBE THE ADJUDICATION PROCESS? .......................... 429 
TABLE 7.13: HOW DID PARTIES DESCRIBE THE ADJUDICATION SYSTEM? ........................... 439 
TABLE 7.14: NEW INFORMATION FOR EMPLOYEES AT HEARING? ........................................ 441 
TABLE 7.15: DID EMPLOYEES BELIEVE THEY RECEIVED ADEQUATE COMPENSATION?...... 442 
TABLE 7.16: DID ADJUDICATION RESOLVE THE PERSONAL GRIEVANCE? – APPLICANTS ... 442 
TABLE 7.17: DID ADJUDICATION RESOLVE THE PERSONAL GRIEVANCE? ........................... 446 
TABLE 7.18: WHICH PARTY DID THE REPRESENTATIVE ACT FOR? ....................................... 451 
TABLE 7.19: DID THE REPRESENTATIVE BELIEVE THAT THERE WERE GROUNDS FOR THE 
PERSONAL GRIEVANCE? ........................................................................................................ 452 
TABLE 7.20: DID THE REPRESENTATIVE (FOR EITHER PARTY) BELIEVE THERE WERE 
GROUNDS FOR THE APPLICANT PURSUING A PERSONAL GRIEVANCE? ................................ 454 
TABLE 7.21: WAS THE APPLICANT LEGALLY AIDED? .......................................................... 455 
TABLE 7.22: HOW WERE FEES DETERMINED? ....................................................................... 456 
TABLE 7.23: HOW DID REPRESENTATIVES DESCRIBE THE PROCESS? ................................... 459 
TABLE 7.23(A): HOW DID TYPES OF REPRESENTATIVES DESCRIBE THE PROCESS? (AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL REPRESENTATIVE RESPONSE) ................................................... 459 
 408 
TABLE 7.24: REPRESENTATIVES‟ VIEWS OF THE ADJUDICATION PROCESS .......................... 461 
TABLE 7.25: AGREEMENT ON NATURE OF ADJUDICATION PROCESS BY REGIONAL AREA ..... 461 
TABLE 7.25(A): REPRESENTATIVES‟ VIEWS (NATIONWIDE) ................................................. 462 
TABLE 7.25(B): BREAKDOWN OF RESPONSES BY REPRESENTATIVE TYPE – QUICK ............ 464 
TABLE 7.25(C): BREAKDOWN OF RESPONSES BY REPRESENTATIVE TYPE – INEXPENSIVE .. 464 
TABLE 7.25(D): BREAKDOWN OF RESPONSES BY REPRESENTATIVE TYPE – 
STRAIGHTFORWARD .............................................................................................................. 465 
TABLE 7.26: DID REPRESENTATIVES BELIEVE THAT ADJUDICATION RESOLVED THE 
PERSONAL GRIEVANCE? ........................................................................................................ 465 
TABLE 7.27: DID REPRESENTATIVES BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS A MORE EFFECTIVE MODEL 
TO RESOLVE PERSONAL GRIEVANCES? ................................................................................. 466 
 
 409 
C h a p t e r  7  
SURVEY OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE PERSONAL 
GRIEVANCE ADJUDICATION PROCESS 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter Seven examines a survey of all participants in 150 personal grievances 
decided in 1997. Participants were employees, employers and their representatives, 
together with parties who chose to represent themselves. A total of 407 personal 
grievances were adjudicated in 1997 by the Employment Tribunal. Due to financial 
and practical constraints it was impossible to survey the participants in 407 cases. It 
was therefore decided that a representative sample of 150 personal grievance cases 
was appropriate to survey in some detail. This involved surveying 150 employees, 
150 employers and 300 representatives who each represented one of the parties. 
Despite these ambitious intentions, a small number of employees responded to this 
survey and this should be kept in mind when considering the results. A larger number 
of employers responded to the survey and many representatives chose to take part.
1
 
The nature of the questions asked affected the manner in which the data was analysed. 
It was decided that since parties were being requested to consider sometimes very 
personal information in the case of employees on matters which occurred some time 
ago, probably the most productive type of question would require only a short 
response rather than a detailed reflection. Sensitive information on the quantum of 
settlement and the type of personal grievance was not sought.  Had the very small 
                                                             
1
 See n 28 and related discussion. 
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response rates been anticipated, an alternative approach that emphasised detailed 
qualitative analysis of a small number of cases would have been implemented. 
 
The information sought from participants in personal grievances in this chapter was 
more about process than the analysis of cases in Chapter Five. The data contained in 
Chapter Five was obtained strictly from Employment Tribunal case decisions in 1997 
and did not survey the personal views and opinions of participants in those cases. 
What the survey in this chapter did was to obtain the details of the views of 
participants in the personal grievance procedure that were not obtainable from the 
objective data in Chapter Five.  
  
Although previous research on the outcomes of personal grievances had been 
conducted there was little information available on what impression the system had 
left on both parties and their representatives or whether it met their expectations.
2
 One 
of the fundamental reasons for undertaking this research was to fill this knowledge 
gap. This chapter has identified trends and common views of participants who used 
adjudication as to the appropriateness of the procedure for their needs and whether or 
not there was a better alternative.  
7.2 VALUE OF THE SURVEYS 
 
 
It was important that users of the adjudication system could have their perceptions 
and opinions acknowledged and recorded. Parties and representatives were those who 
were most aware of how adjudication worked and if it met their requirements and, 
ultimately resolved the personal grievance. If users thought that an alternative 
                                                             
2
 See Chapter Four, n 9 and related text. 
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mechanism was more suitable then those alternatives were recorded. The questions 
also attempted to identify any barriers to resolution of personal grievances including 
costs and issues relating to representation.
3
 
7.3 SURVEY CATEGORIES 
 
 
To determine whether the process worked, questions for all survey participant groups 
were divided into sections:
4
  
 Representation – that is, who represented whom;  
 Process – which looked at people‟s perception of the adjudication process 
from commencement to resolution;  
 Mediation – whether mediation had been used and if so why it had been 
unsuccessful; and 
 Adjudication – the result of adjudication and whether parties were satisfied 
with the outcome. 
 
7.3.1  SELECTION PROCESS 
 
Of the 407 personal grievance cases decided in 1997, the percentage of cases heard in 
each region was divided up. These figures showed that 45 percent of cases were heard 
in Auckland, 23 percent in Christchurch, 20 percent in Wellington, nine percent in 
Hamilton and three percent in Dunedin. In relation to the sample of 150 cases this 
translated into 67 cases selected from Auckland, 34 from Christchurch; 30 from 
Wellington; 14 from Hamilton and five from Dunedin.
5
  
 
                                                             
3
 See Appendices I, II, III, IV for survey questions. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 For a more detailed description of the methodology used, see Chapter 4.4. 
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7.4 EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYER FINDINGS 
 
 
Of the 150 employees surveyed only 28 or 18.7 percent replied. This was a 
disappointingly low response and it is only possible to surmise the reasons for the low 
rate of return. Of note, some parties were very difficult to locate and survey forms 
were returned as wrongly addressed, as discussed in Chapter Four.
6
 Another 
possibility for the low employee response could have been that employees were not 
enthusiastic about discussing issues which had been resolved and had been dispensed 
with however, this possibility is entirely speculative. Out of 150 employers, 38 or 
25.3 percent responded to the questionnaire. Again, this represents a low response 
rate, the reasons for which may have included businesses changing hands. However, 
like the low employee response rate, the reasons given are speculative although the 
phenomenon is perhaps not unusual. For example, a similar study that took place in 
the United Kingdom experienced the same difficulty with low response rates.
7
 That 
study reported that out of a total of 53 potential participants only eight of those 
eventually took part.
8
 
7.4.1  CHOICE OF EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION 
 
The first group of questions related to how employees selected their representatives 
and what factors affected their choice; in particular, whether the cost of representation 
was a significant factor worth consideration. 
 
                                                             
6
 See Chapter 4.4. 
7
 J Earnshaw et al, Industrial Tribunals Workplace Disciplinary Procedures and Employment Practice 
(Feb 1998) Department of Trade and Industry, UK. 
8
 Ibid 10. 
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Table 7.1: Employees Represented by Unions9 
Union Member? Represented by Union? Responses Percentage 
No Not available
10
 21 75% 
Yes No 2 7% 
Yes Yes 5 18% 
Total  28 100% 
 
Of the total number of employees who responded to the survey, 21 were not union 
members and 7 were union members. Of the total number of union members who 
responded to this survey, 2 were not represented in their personal grievances by their 
union and 5 were. This question was asked to determine whether union membership 
amongst those who had been surveyed was representative of the overall working 
population at the time and whether those union members who participated in the 
survey had made use of their union in a representative role.
11
 
 
Union representation reduced costs for employees due to either representation by the 
union staff or the union paying for legal representation.
12
 Where these benefits had 
been lost (as in the case of those employees who had opted out of union membership) 
then the cost of taking a personal grievance significantly increased.
13
 The low rate of 
union membership can be explained as arising from the National Government‟s policy 
on union membership and representation.
14
 The supposition that the National party 
                                                             
9
 No self-represented employee responded to this survey. 
10
 This meant that no union had coverage of the workplace concerned. 
11
 General workforce membership of unions was 33 percent according to Survey of labour market 
adjustment under the Employment Contracts Act, (August 1997) Department of Labour. 
12
 See Chapter 5.4.4. 
13
 See Chapter 5.4.4 for a discussion on the cost of representation. See also 7.6.2 below for a discussion 
on representation and how fees were determined.  
14
 [1991] 514 NZPD 1437; see also National, New Choices, 1–2: it was promised as part of the election 
campaign that, if elected, the National Party would, amongst other things, reintroduce voluntary 
unionism, encourage more flexible bargaining arrangements between employers and employees, allow 
employees to choose their own bargaining agents, and give workers greater flexibility to decide who 
would represent them in dispute procedures. Further, an assessment of the likely impact of the 
Employment Contracts Bill, if passed into law, made by the Public Service Association in „Nats Plan 
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pre-election policy goals reduced union membership rates is supported by comparison 
between the level of union membership in the working population  given by the 
Department of Labour at that time as 33 percent  and the fact that only 25 percent of 
all applicants who participated in this survey were union members.
15
 Further support 
for this proposition can be drawn from the fact that overall union membership in the 
workforce in 1985 stood at 683,006 members, whilst by 1995, after the passage of the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991, this figure had decreased to 362,200; a reduction to 
53.03 percent of the 1985 figure and a loss of approximately 47 percent of the unions‟ 
membership base.
16
 
 
 Proportionately fewer union members took personal grievances under the provisions 
of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 than prior to its passage. This was almost 
certainly because non-union members were for the first time able to take personal 
grievances.
17
  
 
As noted above, from the survey of the Department of Labour, 33 percent of the 
workforce at large were union members. The survey for this research has shown that 
25 percent of the applicants surveyed were union members but the low response rate 
makes it difficult to validate this lower figure. It may be because unions would have 
continued a vetting process (based on the strength of the case) that they had 
                                                                                                                                                                              
For A Future Without Unions‟, PSA Journal, Sept 13–Oct 10, 1990, was that unions would no longer 
play a special role, that workers would be encouraged to move to individual contracts, and that worker 
free choice would mean that Unions would no longer have a guaranteed membership.. 
15
 Survey of labour market adjustment under the Employment Contracts Act, (August 1997) 
Department of Labour. 
16
 A Crawford, R Harbridge, and K Hince, „Unions and Union Membership in New Zealand: Annual 
Review 1995‟ (1996) 21 NZJIR 188–193. 
17
 However, see Labour Relations Act 1987, s 83, which provided for exemption from union 
membership on the grounds that the employee genuinely objected to being a member of a union. Those 
employees were issued with a certificate of exemption under s 95 of the Labour Relations Act and 
could have had direct access to the Labour Court under s 218(d). 
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previously operated under the Labour Relations Act 1987. This raises the question 
whether non-union applicants were more likely to bring personal grievances that had 
less merit than those that had been processed and advocated by the unions.  
 
Table 7.2: How Employees (Applicants) Chose their Representative 18 
Method of finding 
representative 
Responses  Percentage 
Union 7 29% 
Personal Contact 6 25% 
Phone Book 4 17% 
Usual Lawyer 3 13% 
Recommendation 2 8% 
Community Law Centre 1 4% 
Citizens Advice Bureau 1 4% 
Total 24 100% 
 
Despite the small number of responses, Table 7.2 suggests that the most common way 
applicants who were not union members found a suitable representative was by 
personal contact. However, it may have been in some cases that the contacts obtained, 
whilst being legally qualified, were not necessarily employment law specialists and 
therefore may not have been the most appropriate representative in a personal 
grievance claim.
19
 In such cases, inexperience of the representative resulted in some 
difficulty for parties. One explanation was employment law had become an expanding 
area of legal practice after the passage of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 due to 
the opening up of this type of representation work to non-union practitioners and the 
newfound right of non-union members to bring a personal grievance. Evidence for 
this assertion is drawn from comments made by adjudicators interviewed for this 
                                                             
18
 Note small number of responses to this survey. 
19
 See Table 7.6 and accompanying text for a discussion on the correlation between choice of 
representation and satisfaction of applicants in regards to both outcomes and the standard of 
representation that they received. 
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thesis that inexperience did result in some difficulty on occasion.
20
 An example of one 
adjudicator‟s views on inexperienced and inappropriate representatives was: 
Some of them are very, very good. Some of them would drag a dead horse in here and try and 
get it reinstated…It doesn‟t mean to say that, like you‟re only human to say, what crap has he 
got today, you have to park that at the door when you go in and deal with it. You park that 
concern that this person only brings rubbish to the Tribunal. You park it and you check on the 
case. And you probably find it is another pile of poop, but you deal with the parties 
courteously… in the same way you would deal with someone who had a meritorious case. 
 
According to this data, the second most common way for non-union members to 
select a representative was consulting the telephone book. This made it possible to 
locate a specialist employment law practice, as Barristers and Solicitors often list their 
specialties in the Yellow Pages. The third most popular way in which non-union 
members chose representation was to use their usual lawyer. This may have been 
satisfactory depending on the nature of their usual lawyer‟s practice, as previously 
discussed. The next most common method of selection for this group was to act on a 
recommendation. Again, it was possible that these recommendations could have been 
referral to representatives who lacked the requisite employment law skills and there 
was therefore some element of risk in using this approach. It may seem surprising that 
the least frequently used method of obtaining representation was through the 
Community Law Centres or a Citizens Advice Bureau. The reason for this being 
surprising is that Community Law Centres and Citizens Advice Bureaux have lists of 
employment law specialists, both counsel and advocates, to whom they may refer 
their clients. Furthermore, this referral service is free of charge.
21
 
                                                             
20
 See Chapter 6.4.7 and 6.7.2 for a discussion as to adjudicators‟ views on poor representation 
standards. 
21
 Personal experience from spending several years volunteering for Community Law Centres in 
Wellington and Christchurch where referrals (rather than direct advocacy) were made to appropriately 
qualified advocates and counsel and where referrals were received from Citizens Advice Bureaux. Also 
experience volunteering for the Citizens Advice Bureau in the Hutt Valley where referrals were made 
when required. It should be noted that the Legal Services Board in Legal Services – a Community 
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The potential cost of taking a personal grievance could have affected the choice of 
representative and indeed affected whether or not an employee decided to take a case 
at all. The cost of taking a personal grievance could therefore have been a barrier to 
accessing justice in the Employment Tribunal; a barrier recognised by adjudicators.
22
 
For those who qualified for legal aid the problem of the cost of representation was 
reduced, however access to legal aid was restricted.
23
 The survey results have shown 
that the majority of these grievants chose to be represented by counsel. The costs 
involved could have been resolved either by representatives taking a flexible approach 
to the payment of their accounts, to the availability of legal aid or to costs not being 
apportioned until the personal grievance was settled.  
 
Table 7.3: Did You Apply for Legal Aid? 
Application for legal 
aid? 
Granted? Responses  Percentage 
No – 20 71% 
Yes No 1 4% 
Yes Yes 7 25% 
Total  28 100% 
 
Table 7.3 shows how many applicants sought and were granted legal aid. The table 
indicates that a large majority of those who responded did not apply for legal aid. The 
Barristers and Solicitors Rules of Professional Conduct require that clients be notified 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Resource (1997) 51–52, stated that there were 18 community law centers nationally; however, there 
were nine districts that did not have Community Law Centres at that time. This meant that although 
there were a significant number of community law centres they were not present in all centres at that 
time. It is therefore perhaps for this reason that the result is not particularly surprising. 
22
 See Chapter 6.8.2 for a discussion on adjudicators‟ views on costs associated with the personal 
grievance procedure being a barrier to accessing the adjudication process. 
23
 See Chapter 5.4.8(a) for a discussion on the availability of legal aid. 
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about the availability of legal aid.
24
 No similar provision applied to advocates who 
were not practising barristers and solicitors. Table 7.3 also shows that one applicant 
applied for and was not granted legal aid. Altogether 8 of applicants who responded 
received legal aid. These figures imply that the overall rate of requests for legal aid 
was low, however of those who did apply for it the success rate was high.  
 
The high number of applicants who said they did not apply for legal aid could have 
decided not to because they had been advised they would not qualify because of the 
low-income threshold that applied.
25
 A further possibility was that some 
representatives took a „no win no fee‟ approach and therefore legal aid was not likely 
to be a consideration. To continue through the adjudication process without the 
guarantee of financial assistance arguably required a very strong belief in the strength 
of the claim. Reason dictates that recognition should also be made of an applicant 
group whose inability to procure legal aid coupled with an unwillingness to undertake 
personally the financial risks associated with adjudication, caused them to abandon 
any remedy for their personal grievances, either apparent or real. 
Table 7.4: Did Cost Impact on Choice of Employee Representative? 
Response Response (N = 27) Percentage 
Yes 9 32% 
No 18 68% 
 
In the clear majority of the above cases, the cost of bringing a personal grievance (the 
combination of the costs of legal representation, lodging fees and disbursements, 
travel and time off work, which were not included as specific sub groups in the survey 
                                                             
24
 See New Zealand Law Society, Rules of Professional Conduct For Barristers and Solicitors, 7
th
 ed. 
Rule 1.02 (5) indicates members of the legal profession must alert clients to the availability of legal aid. 
It is expressed as a „duty‟. Interestingly, firms have no obligation to take on legal aid clients! 
25
 See Chapter 5.4.8(a) for a discussion on the availability of legal aid. See also Chapter 8.2.3(a). 
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questionnaire) did not affect the choice of representative for applicants. This may 
have been because parties looked at issues other than this cost when selecting 
representatives; such as a strong belief in the strength of their case and that costs 
would therefore be awarded against the other party. Another reason for costs not 
affecting this result may have been that, as shown in Table 7.3, 25 percent of 
applicants were in receipt of legal aid.
26
 A condition of the provision of legal aid was 
that the representative was required to be a practising Barrister and Solicitor who had 
been approved by the District Law Society, which meant that the applicant‟s choice of 
representative was constrained.
27
 Costs also would not necessarily have been a factor 
if an applicant was a member of a union and therefore able to take advantage of union 
services; it should be noted that although in general such costs were often met by 
unions there was no blanket access policy that operated to meet all costs in all 
circumstances. 
7.4.2  CHOICE OF EMPLOYERS’ REPRESENTATION 
 
Table 7.5: Who Represented Employers at the Hearing? 
Representation Response  
Counsel                     27 
Advocates                      5 
In-house-representative                      2 
Self-Representative                  4  
Total 38 
 
                                                             
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Legal Services Act 1991, s 158F(1)–(5) specified that the District Law Society would provide a list of 
suitable Barristers and Solicitors who were fit, proper, and willing to undertake legal aid work to the 
District Legal Services Committee. 
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Of 150 employers surveyed, only 38 replied to this questionnaire (25 percent). It is 
unclear why the response rate was so low.
28
 It is possible that employers did not wish 
to revisit a resolved issue, they did not choose to participate in a survey of this type,
29
 
they simply did not consider the process of much value or the time required to 
participate may have appeared cumbersome. Research conducted by Jill Earnshaw in 
1995 indicated that the reason for employers‟ refusal to participate may have been 
their unwillingness to have their shortcomings before the Tribunal exposed to 
researchers.
30
 This could mean that those who did choose to participate reflected a 
bias in favour of the system in they used. Alternatively, it could be argued that those 
employers who chose to participate did so to criticise a system that they believed to 
have been unjust. 
 
Table 7.5 shows that by far the majority of employers chose to be represented by 
lawyers, followed by advocates, in-house representatives and lastly those who chose 
to represent themselves.
31
 However, three of the four self-representatives did not 
complete the survey forms for self-representatives and thus had to be discarded from 
that category. The person who chose self-representation said that the reason they 
chose this option was that „the lawyer was incompetent‟. The lawyer had represented 
this employer at a pre-hearing stage and subsequently the employer chose to represent 
him or herself at the hearing.  
                                                             
28
 This result may not be unusual for this type of survey. See Industrial Tribunals, Workplace 
Disciplinary Procedures and Employment Practise, 1997, Department of Trade and Industry. See also 
J Earnshaw, J Goodman, R Harrison, M Marchington, above n 7, where a letter and telephone based 
methodology elicited a response rate from employers of only eight percent. In contrast see L Dickens, 
Dismissed: A Study of unfair dismissal and the tribunal system (1985) where a high percentage of 
responses from employers was achieved through the use of a three stage process of, forwarding a letter, 
making telephone or personal contact, and then conducting an interview in person.  
29
 Response to survey questionnaire where employer refused to participate as they did not like taking 
part in this type of research. 
30
 J Earnshaw et al, Industrial Tribunals Workplace Disciplinary Procedures and Employment Practice 
(Feb 1998) Department of Trade and Industry, UK. 
31
 For a discussion on self-representation, see 7.6.6 below. 
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7.4.3  STANDARD OF REPRESENTATION 
 
Table 7.6: Were Parties Satisfied with the Standard of Representation? 
 Yes No Total Number 
Applicant 71% 29% 100% 28 
Respondent 81% 19% 100% 37 
 
 
Table 7.6 shows whether or not applicants and respondents were satisfied with the 
standard of representation they received. There were two categories of applicant: 
those who were union and non union members. Those who were union members 
could have been represented by a union representative or by counsel or an advocate 
provided by the union. Alternatively, such applicants could have chosen to appoint 
their own counsel or advocate as non-union applicants were obliged to do. Applicants 
were asked whether they were satisfied with the type of representation that they 
chose. One of the reasons for this was because at an earlier stage in the survey, 
applicants had been asked whether or not they were union members and if so whether 
the union had represented them. They were then asked in some detail as to how they 
chose their representative. Overall, 20 applicants were satisfied with the type of 
representation they chose and 8 of this group expressed dissatisfaction. By comparing 
the results of  Table 7.6 with the responses to the survey question 11, „In your opinion 
did the adjudication process finally resolve the personal grievance?‟, it was possible 
to establish that there was little, if any, correlation between an applicant‟s satisfaction 
with their representative and the party‟s view on resolution of the personal grievance. 
In only half of cases where applicants did not believe the personal grievance had been 
resolved, the applicants expressed dissatisfaction with their standard of representation. 
Applicants gave various reasons ranging from, „The witness lied‟ to „I was ripped off 
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by a dishonest employer‟ as to why, in their opinion, the personal grievance had not 
been resolved. 
 
 In respect of those who reported a feeling that the personal grievance had not been 
resolved the social climate of the time may have led to low expectations on the part of 
applicants. For example, one union official of the time was reported in an academic 
work as (while commenting on the impact of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 
coupled with the initiatives to deal with unemployment) having stated:
32
  
Carpenters used to be on an average rate of about $12.00 an hour with travelling time and with 
guarantees of pay when the building was stopped because of bad weather. All of that is gone. 
Carpenters are now being employed in the Lower Hutt on a rate of eight bucks [sic] an hour. 
So they lost $4.00 an hour. No travelling time and no down time. There is no over time. Job 
and finish. Flat rate.   
 
Well, it‟s very difficult on those carpenters but they have families to feed and the 
unemployment benefit is below $8.00 an hour. And if they turn the job down, they face 26 
weeks stand down. So they are being press-ganged into accepting terrible rates.   
 
Higher expectations on the part of employer respondents (given that the legislation in 
force at the time was seen in certain quarters as to some extent reflecting the agenda 
of the New Zealand Business Round Table) may well account for some of the 
dissatisfaction they expressed.
33
  
 
 
 
Table 7.7: Were Employers Satisfied with the Type of Representation They Chose?  
                                                             
32
 Ellen J Dannin, Working Free: The Origins and Impact of New Zealand’s Employment Contracts Act 
(1997), 108, citing Rick Barker, National Secretary New Zealand Service Workers Union. 
33
 Ibid. Dannin cites Treasury‟s: Briefing Paper to the Incoming Government 1990: „Treasury identified 
three fundamental flaws in existing labour law, flaws which also resembled those identified by the New 
Zealand Employers Federation and New Zealand Business Roundtable – (1) it  placed collective 
bargaining in the hands of unions and employer associations even though individual companies and 
workers “have better information and incentives to reach agreement”– (2) Unions were not accountable 
to employers or workers – (3) the law made it virtually impossible to alter bargaining arrangements.‟ 
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 Satisfaction =Yes Numbers 
Advocate 100% 5 
In-house representative
34
 100% 2 
Counsel 81% 26 
Self-representative
35
 50% 4 
 
Table 7.7 indicates that the majority of those employers surveyed were happy with 
their choice of representation. It is not clear why some types of representation were 
considered more satisfactory than others and variations in satisfaction may be 
influenced by the small sample size. However, it would be fair to bear in mind some 
of the observations already made in the earlier parts of this chapter.  
 7.4.4 MEDIATION 
 
 Table 7.8: Did Parties Attend Mediation? 
 Yes No Total Number 
Applicants 75% 25% 100% 28 
Respondents 76% 24% 100% 38 
 
To determine whether adjudication was the first formal attempt to resolve the personal 
grievance parties were asked whether they attended mediation.
36
 It should be noted 
that mediation was not a compulsory step in resolving personal grievances under the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991.
37
  
Table 7.9: Did the Representative have Experience in Mediation?38 
 Yes Number No Number 
Counsel 74% 80 1% 1 
                                                             
34
 In this thesis, in-house representative means an employee of the respondent who specialised in 
employment law/human resources. 
35
 This percentage should be treated with caution because of the very limited response from self-
represented parties.   
36
 See Chapters 2.4.2 and 6.4.11. 
37
 Ibid. 
38
 The results are presented as percentages of the total number of representatives surveyed. 
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Advocate    14% 15 2% 2 
Union Counsel 4% 4 –  
Union Advocate 5% 5 –  
Total for whole table = 100% 
All representatives in adjudication were asked whether they had any experience of 
mediation. Table 7.9 shows that the vast majority of representatives had such 
experience. This is unsurprising given the relatively high number of mediations 
(compared with adjudication) that occurred under the Employment Contracts Act 
1991.
39
 It was significant that although mediation was not compulsory under the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991, 70 percent of those cases which were mediated were 
successfully resolved.
40
 The high experience rate shown could have reflected a strong 
commitment by both counsel and advocates to resolve personal grievances at 
mediation. On the other hand, counsel and advocates could have used mediation as a 
„fishing-expedition‟ to learn details of the opponent‟s case prior to adjudication. In 
support of this view, one representative said, „It was an abuse of process, used as a 
fishing expedition‟. Further, a sample of representatives whose personal grievance 
cases had proceeded to adjudication gave the following reasons for why mediation 
had been unsuccessful:  
Usually because applicants are unrealistic in the level of compensation they seek or because 
on principle the company will not settle, for example a theft situation;  
 
Employer not prepared to move at all;  
 
Employer on power kick;  
 
The mediator followed stock standard routine process. Never got beyond position-taking, and 
the mediator insisted on giving his view as to the legal merits of the respective causes. 
 
                                                             
39
 See Chapter 6.4.11. See also Chapter 2.4.2: mediation was successful in over 70 percent of cases.  
40
 See Employment Contracts Act 1991 and Chapter 2.4.2. 
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Table 7.10: Was Mediation Attended (Prior to Adjudication) and Who Represented 
the Parties? 
 Yes No Total Number 
Counsel 70% 30% 100% 81 
Advocate 76% 24% 100% 17 
Union Counsel 50% 50% 100% 4 
Union Advocate 60% 40% 100% 5 
 
Table 7.10 shows whether mediation was attended or not and the type of 
representative concerned. The percentage rate refers to the percentage of all 
representatives surveyed. For example it can be seen that most of the representatives 
surveyed who were advocates attend mediation. What is not clear from the answers to 
the question was whether mediation was attended for the specific case included in the 
database in Chapter Five.  
 
Table 7.10 raises the question as to why the overall figure for union involvement was 
low, given that the Department of Labour reported that union membership amounted 
to 33 percent of the working population in 1997.
41
 However, the table figures 
represent only those personal grievances that went to adjudication and therefore do 
not take into account those which were successfully resolved at mediation. The figure 
for successful resolution in such cases was 70 percent, as discussed above.
42
 
Therefore, it may be possible to draw the inference that unions tended to use the 
mediation process as an effective mechanism for the resolution of personal grievances 
wherever possible, in preference to invoking the adjudication process. If this inference 
has been correctly drawn then applicants who used the services of their union would 
have the advantages of being a party to a mutually agreed settlement, a shorter time 
                                                             
41
 Department of Labour Industrial Relations Service: Survey of labour market adjustment under the 
Employment Contracts Act, August 1997. 
42
  See Chapter 2.4.2. 
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between the personal grievance arising and its resolution, and corresponding 
reduction in costs. There is no doubt that the unions developed a substantial level of 
skill in negotiating settlements via the conciliation conference process which operated 
under the provisions of the Labour Relations Act 1987.
43
 These advantages, of course, 
must always be weighed against the possibility that unions may have been inclined to 
negotiate settlements at mediation which were not as beneficial to the applicant as 
may have been awarded had the personal grievance been heard at adjudication. This 
matter will be discussed with a view to the access to justice issue in Chapter Eight 
along with the conclusions to be drawn from the data on Counsel and Advocates.  
 
Of further note, counsel had the ability to represent both applicants and respondents, 
giving them access to a greater pool of clients, compared to the unions who only 
represented member employee applicants. Given that unions could only service 
applicants who were members of the union, it is arguable that they could only 
represent 33 percent of half of the overall client pool. However, it is noteworthy that 
union membership was at the time skewed towards those working in the state sector 
which would shorten the unions‟ reach in respect of representing those working in the 
private sector. Some unions did set up „for profit‟ units to try to reach into the private 
sphere.  
 
It is at least arguable using the work in this thesis that the reason for a greater 
preponderance of counsel over advocates at the adjudication level was due to the 
formal and legal requirements of the adjudication process itself. Further, the surveys 
                                                             
43
 Labour Relations Act 1987, Part 9. 
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completed by legal representatives gave anecdotal evidence suggesting that factors 
such as the ability to obtain legal aid for adjudication; the public perception that the 
use of qualified counsel was of greater advantage in the legal process; and the belief 
that, to some extent dependant upon their experience, advocates were more likely to 
avoid the formal adjudication process in favour of utilising their skills as negotiators 
at mediation.
44
 It is further suggested that for those advocates who were working on a 
contingency fee basis there existed an incentive to settle the matter at mediation as a 
matter of economics. 
7.5 THE ADJUDICATION PROCESS 
 
Table 7.11: Were Parties Aware of Their Legal Obligations? 
 Yes No No 
Response 
Total Number 
Applicants 68% 25% 7% 100% 28 
Respondents 58% 26% 16% 100% 38 
 
The nature of the personal grievance procedure, including the lodging of forms and 
the 90-day rule, made much of the personal grievance process fairly technical and 
legalistic.
45
 Parties were therefore asked whether they were aware of their legal 
obligations, to find out how well they understood the process in which they had 
become involved. Altogether, 68 percent of applicants and 58 percent of respondents 
said that they were aware of their obligations.
46
  
 
                                                             
44
 Telephone conversations with Dennis Standring and David Beck, Barristers and Solicitors, SB Law 
(employment law specialists), Christchurch, 17 January 2006. 
45
 See Chapter 5.4.4 and Chapter 2.4.1. 
46
 See Chapter 6.4.2 for a discussion on administrative process and legal obligations. 
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Awareness of the legal obligations was perhaps most critical for the group who 
represented themselves. The one usable response in the self-representative category 
reported as having had previous experience and that they found the process to be 
legalistic. Notwithstanding these comments about legalism, the respondent in question 
believed that the personal grievance had been resolved. Those who were represented 
by either counsel or advocates would in general, have been able to rely on the advice 
and assistance of their representative to ensure that their legal obligations had been 
met.  
 
Further analysis of the survey responses of this group in Table 7.12 shows that a large 
majority of them saw the process in a negative light as they reported it as either 
confusing, time consuming, legalistic, intimidating or any combination of these. Far 
fewer reported that although the process had been time consuming it was also, in their 
opinion, satisfactory. One view expressed by a dissatisfied party was, „I don‟t believe 
the lawyer considered my case serious or of importance, bad preparation and took too 
long to go to Court [sic]‟. Although it would be unfair to hold this comment up as 
representative of the entire group under consideration, there were other comments in a 
similar vein.  
Participants in the survey could express their opinion by ticking as many boxes as 
they considered relevant to their experience. By choosing the option „satisfactory‟, the 
participants qualified a negative response so that „formal‟, which seems contrary to 
government intent, when combined with „satisfactory‟ on the same questionnaire, 
suggests that from the participant‟s personal perspective that the process was 
satisfactory despite its formality. 
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Table 7.12: How did Parties Describe the Adjudication Process? 
Response Applicants Respondents 
Confusing 21% 8% 
Formal                   43% 18% 
Informal 7% 16% 
Legalistic 36% 18% 
Intimidating 46% 18% 
Time-consuming 50% 53% 
Satisfactory 21% 37% 
Number 28 38 
 
These categories, with the exception of the question whether the process was 
satisfactory, were designed to evaluate the National Government‟s stated intention 
that the personal grievance process should be quick, informal, and straightforward.
47
 
In addition, an opportunity was provided within the question for participants to record 
any „other‟ comments they may have wished to make on their experience of the 
personal grievance process. The responses to this part of the question were so 
disparate that they could not be recorded in table form. 
 
The survey also aimed to address the issue of formality as raised in academic 
commentary. One such commentator noted that:
48
  
[T]he relative formality of the Tribunal process, with its attendant regulations presents a stark 
contrast to the relatively informal “shuttle diplomacy” of the Grievance Committee framework 
in the Labour Relations Act 1987.  
 
It is of further note that the necessity to avoid legalism was one of the four criteria 
raised by the Department of Labour in argument for the provision of specialist 
                                                             
47
 [1991] 524 NZPD 1437. See also Chapter 2.5 for further discussion. 
48
 J Hughes, in R Harbridge (ed), Employment Contracts: New Zealand Experiences (1993) 96. 
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institutions to address employment matters.
49
 In another contemporary document, the 
Department of Labour took the view that if specialist institutions were not available 
then legal and transaction costs would „create an advantage for the well endowed over 
the poorly endowed‟.50 
 
The descriptors in Table 7.12, however, should not necessarily be taken one-
dimensionally. If survey participants found the process legalistic, formal, time 
consuming, confusing, and intimidating, the process would be viewed negatively both 
in relation to the intentions of the National government and the personal experience of 
the participants. The word „informal‟ is taken to have positive connotations in both 
respects. The analysis emphasises the relationship between the descriptor 
„satisfactory‟ and the other choices. 
 
As the central theme of this thesis is access to justice, if any of the negative 
descriptors was accompanied by the „satisfactory‟ qualifier, then it may be argued that 
to some extent, remembering all those surveyed had their personal grievance 
adjudicated, the general principle of access to justice has been achieved. The „other‟ 
comments category also acted as a qualifier, as well as a catchall question.   
 
To an extent, these findings are limited by the design of the questionnaire, which did 
not expressly ask participants to provide reasons for their views. At the time the 
survey questionnaire was designed, it had not been intended to go to such depth. 
Given the multitude of meanings that individuals could attach to the list of 
                                                             
49
 Department of Labour, „Employment Contracts Bill: Outstanding Policy Decisions‟ to Minister of 
Labour, 29 January 1991. 
50
 Inter-Departmental Officials Committee, „Employment Contracts Bill: Outstanding Policy Issues‟, 
22 March 1991, as cited by R Ryan and P Walsh „Common Law v Labour Law‟ (1993) Australian 
Journal of Labour Law 230, 246–247. 
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descriptors, a more informative response might have been obtained had the reasons 
underpinning the answer provided been sought directly. 
7.5.1 ‘CONFUSING’ 
 
Altogether, 21 percent of applicants thought that their adjudication process was 
confusing. One applicant, in describing this perception, commented, „What I thought 
that the truth would be bought [sic] out more clearly. However it‟s like any other 
court, how clever are the people you have representing yourself or department.‟ One 
applicant, whose adjudication took place in Auckland, reported being dissatisfied with 
the standard of service provided by their advocate and recorded as reasons for their 
dissatisfaction the following comments: „He [the advocate] thought we could not lose 
– did not ask me to get witness to come in [sic]‟, „very expensive for what I got‟, and 
in answer to the question as to why mediation was not attended: „Was never given a 
option – he [the advocate] wrote to my employer‟.  
 
In line with results taken from the general population of the surveyed participants, the 
six members of this group who found the process „confusing‟, although reporting as a 
whole satisfaction with their representative, also reported to a high degree (83 
percent) that the personal grievance had not been resolved. One of the most explicit 
reasons given by an applicant for reporting a lack of resolution in their case was:  
The Court found for me in adjudicator Court [sic]. [The respondent] refused to pay. He [the 
respondent] then took it to the Appeal Court. They once again found for me and he refused to 
pay. It then went to the District Court and he didn‟t even turn up. My lawyer is now trying to 
get it accepted in the High court.  
 
This statement has provided evidence that the Applicant concerned was not happy 
with the resolution of their personal grievance, as it was still going through the 
hearing process in different venues. The normal process for conducting personal 
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grievances was by mediation if both parties agreed,
51
 adjudication by the Employment 
Tribunal,
52
 appeal on a point of law to the Employment Court
53
 and the final stage in 
the process being removal to the Court of Appeal.
54
 A further breakdown of the 
responses received from this group revealed that in every case where an applicant 
reported as being confused by the process it was also reported that the applicant had 
found the adjudication to be intimidating.  
 
Applicants chose more descriptors than respondents, some describing the process to 
be confusing, formal, legalistic, and intimidating. Some substituted „formal‟ with 
„time consuming‟. On the issue of legalism one applicant described the experience as 
„…a Hollywood drama on lawyers dodging issues and saving costs for [the 
respondent]‟. Interestingly, one member of this sub-group reported the personal 
grievance as being resolved despite elsewhere expressing dissatisfaction with the 
evidence adduced, the adjudicator‟s tendency in the applicant‟s view to believe the 
„lies‟ told by and on behalf of the respondent, and a belief that adequate compensation 
had not been awarded. Of the total group of „confused‟ applicants none chose to 
qualify their response by using the „satisfactory‟ descriptor or commenting under 
„other‟. At the same time, some parties had to assess the shifting nature of their 
relationship with a previous employer. A relevant comment is drawn from one 
applicant‟s response, „I was facing an enemy; you can forget your work service years. 
They arrogantly see you as less than a person‟. 
 
                                                             
51
 Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 79(a). 
52
 Ibid, s 79(c). 
53
 Ibid, s 94. 
54
 Ibid, s 95. 
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From this analysis it is clear that for these applicants the adjudication process was not 
a positive experience and therefore, when measured against the objectives of the 
legislation, as promulgated by the then Minister of Labour,
55
 for this particular group 
of participants the process had fallen short. 
 
Table 7.12 shows that, in contrast to the applicant group, only 8 percent of 
respondents reported the adjudication process as confusing. Although fewer used 
several descriptors, none who used confusing used satisfaction or qualified their 
answer with a personal comment. As with applicants reporting confusion, it is clear 
that the adjudication process fell short of the respondents‟ needs and of the then 
government‟s objectives.  
 
It is suggested that once the process had progressed beyond the mediation stage the 
likelihood of a win/win solution became more remote, as the opportunity to explore 
mutually acceptable solutions had ended. Further, the parties could have been likely to 
feel that they had lost personal control of the matter, as the process would then have 
been in the hands of their representative and the outcome decided by the adjudicator. 
Not only were the financial aspects of the case at risk for the parties but also personal 
qualities such as their self-esteem, dignity and integrity.  
 
As previously discussed, respondents reported as being confused at a much lower 
level than applicants. One possible explanation for this difference was that the 
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 [1991] 524 NZ Parliamentary Debates 1437. See also Chapter 2.5 for further discussion. 
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adjudication process, by its nature, required considerable „paper shuffling‟56 and 
knowledge of legal concepts and processes.  
7.5.2 ‘FORMAL’ 
 
Table 7.12 shows that 43 percent of applicants believed that the adjudication process 
was formal. Further analysis shows that only one of these people believed that the 
process was also satisfactory. Table 7.12 shows that 18 percent of respondents 
believed that the adjudication process was formal. Of these people, three considered 
the process was also satisfactory. As discussed above when considering skill sets, and 
for the same reasons, it was likely that applicants found the procedure more formal 
than respondents when faced with the courtroom arena and the procedure and 
etiquette involved in presenting and examining evidence and felt less well equipped to 
cope with the process.  
 
Table 7.12 clearly shows that few respondents thought that the procedure was formal. 
For a small minority, the survey showed the legislators‟ intention to make the process 
informal had not been met.
57
 However, in the majority of cases respondents‟ answers 
could be construed as meeting the legislature‟s intent. Conversely, for the applicants it 
was said in one questionnaire that the „[w]hole process was new to me.‟ Another 
response was, „QC for employer at mediation‟ and thirdly, „legal points ruled and 
grass roots facts never got heard or presented.‟   
 
The difference in the views of respondents and applicants on formality has raised the 
question whether the structures and support formerly enjoyed by applicants under the 
                                                             
56
 See Chapter 6.4.1 for related discussion. Also see Appendices 1 and 2 on question 1.4. 
57
 See Chapter 2.4.6. 
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Labour Relations Act 1987 had been destroyed by the introduction of the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991. Changes to union organisation, as contemplated in the 
Employment Contracts Bill,
58
 also by inference, undermined traditional structures to 
which applicants would have had recourse. This was exemplified by the „shuttle 
diplomacy‟59 that took place under the Labour Relations Act 1987 in the Grievance 
Committee process when compared with the more formal system initiated by the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991. Respondents arguably maintained a higher level of 
access to the requisite skill set, as observed above, because their position in the 
employment market remained unchanged, or even strengthened, by the weakening of 
unions.  
 
Alienation from the process is likely to have been exacerbated for those applicants 
who were claiming unjustified dismissal where, at best, the applicant was a former 
employee and had obtained work elsewhere. In other cases the applicant was 
unemployed. In either case the applicant was removed from their daily association 
with former workmates and normal support structures, which may have deprived the 
applicant of ready access to workplace counsel, information, and support. 
 
In the case where the applicant had become and remained unemployed (remembering 
that economic statistics indicate a high rate of unemployment at the time) the 
applicant‟s position would have been further exacerbated by having to cope with 
situations such as those described in one access to justice issue survey:
60
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 [1991] 524 NZ Parliamentary Debates 1437. 
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For the unemployed, economic survival carries with it a range of problems, many of which 
involve the law. Inability to pay for basic services such as housing, power and transport often 
turns into legal battles over tenancies, bonds and letting fees, debts, hire purchase 
repossessions and refinancing. People know little about the powers of debt collectors, 
landowners, bailiffs and police. Stresses of unemployment also spill over into domestic 
disputes, separation, custody and protection proceedings.  
 
If this finding is accepted then there is reason to believe that for unemployed 
applicants the same „stresses of unemployment‟ spilled over into the adjudication 
arena of employment law. 
 
This type of unemployment related stress was influenced by the provisions of the 
Social Security Act 1964 which was then in force. Under s 60H(3) a 26 week stand-
down could have been imposed if the Director General was satisfied that an applicant 
for a benefit had lost their employment due to misconduct.
61
 With the prospect of six 
months without income, applicants had little to lose by bringing a personal grievance 
claim which then entitled them to short term income support under the Social Security 
Act 1964 even in cases where they had been justifiably dismissed. It has been claimed 
that this was one cause of the backlog in personal grievance decisions in the 
Employment Tribunal.
62
  
It is suggested that for union members the possibility of avoiding this stress, 
particularly where the member was not at fault, can be seen from the union process as 
identified by one official:
63
 
One of the benefits which union membership in New Zealand brings is free access to legal 
representation and advocacy for employment matters. Payment of the union subscription 
means a union member will pay nothing for this service. Like Insurance, it is a benefit which 
you hope never to use, but is available when the need arises… the way in which a union 
manages a grievance – or any legal action – generally differs from the approach taken in 
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private practice and goes beyond merely cost saving to the aggrieved worker. A union will 
generally try to avoid the need for a third party. Before a personal grievance is put in the 
hands of a lawyer, the union will have tried vigorously to sort it out on the job. 
 
In comparison, the respondent group as a whole, although operating under the stress 
of a new legal challenge, operated in an environment where their organisational and 
personal workplace support structures remained mostly intact. 
7.5.3 ‘INFORMAL’ 
 
Only 7 percent of applicants and 16 percent of respondents described the adjudication 
process as informal. Parliament‟s intention that the Employment Tribunal and its 
procedures would resolve personal grievances informally had therefore not been met 
in the view of participants.  
7.5.4 ‘LEGALISTIC’ 
 
When asked if the adjudication process was legalistic in nature, 36 percent of 
applicants said „yes‟ and 18 percent of respondents agreed with this view. However, 
legalism could be seen either as a positive or a negative factor. Any legal process 
probably requires some degree of legalism
64
 to establish its credibility and practical 
workability. Conversely, too much legalism could have made the process 
cumbersome and difficult for parties to manage and be involved in.  
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7.5.5 ‘INTIMIDATING’ 
 
Some 46 percent of applicants and 18 percent of respondents described the process as 
intimidating. None of these people thought the process was satisfactory. Parties were 
not asked why or how they held this view. It is therefore not possible to determine 
their reasons. It may simply have been that participating in a formal legal process 
created some level of intimidation. Alternatively, it may have been the nature of the 
personal grievance itself and the behaviour of the parties to it which caused 
intimidation. This possibility has been alluded to above when discussing applicants 
dealing with the consequences of unjustifiable dismissal.  
7.5.6 ‘TIME-CONSUMING’ 
 
Parties were asked whether or not the personal grievance adjudication procedure was 
time-consuming. Applicants and respondents were very close to agreement on this 
question, with 50 percent of applicants and 53 percent of respondents stating that the 
adjudication process was time consuming. What is not clear from this finding is 
whether both applicants and respondents were referring to the hearing itself or 
whether they were referring to the whole personal grievance process from lodging the 
grievance until the date of decision. In hindsight, the question could perhaps have 
been more tightly framed. However, as discussed earlier, any unnecessary 
consumption of time is, in the view of this survey and in light of the then 
government‟s expressed intent, a negative outcome both at any part of or throughout 
the whole of the process. As indicated earlier there was still scope for participants to 
qualify their opinion in regard to this particular issue by the addition of the term 
„satisfactory‟ into their response. In fact none of the applicants took up this option. Of 
the respondents who reported the process as time consuming, 17 percent (6 people) 
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also reported satisfaction, suggesting that for this group the time taken to reach the 
decision did not in their view render the process unsatisfactory. One respondent 
reported that the process was „time consuming, [but] understandably so though‟ and 
also reported the process as satisfactory by stating that „[it was] positive; we felt well 
understood and heard. The adjudicator was excellent, highly professional!‟  
7.5.7 ‘SATISFACTORY’ 
 
Applicants and respondents were asked whether they thought the adjudication process 
was satisfactory. Only 21 percent of applicants and 37 percent of respondents thought 
the procedure was satisfactory. However, this result must be read in the context of 
discussion regarding the participants‟ concept of the word resolution (See Table 7.16). 
The inference was that the parties appeared to report satisfaction on the basis of the 
outcome they received, that is whether or not the Employment Tribunal found in their 
favour, rather than giving an opinion on the adjudication procedure itself.   
7.5.8 DID ADJUDICATION WORK? 
 
Table 7.13: How did Parties Describe the Adjudication System? 
 Employee Number Employer Number 
 Yes No  Yes No  
Quick 27% 73% 24 30% 70% 33 
 Inexpensive 29% 71% 28 18% 82% 34 
Straightforward 50% 50% 28 62% 38% 34 
 
Parties were asked how they would describe the actual adjudication system. The 
questions, as framed, related to the intention as expressed by the legislature when 
introducing the Employment Contracts Bill into Parliament.
65
 Table 7.13 shows that 
employees and employers had very similar views on the speed of the process. More 
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than half of the parties thought that the adjudication system did not meet the 
legislators‟ intention that the system be quick, easy and inexpensive.66 One applicant 
commented that, „it was quick for the actual hearing but too slow to get a date set, 
over a year‟ and in respect of procedure they stated the view that, „Mediation would 
be a more effective procedure than adjudication, if parties were committed to taking 
ownership [sic] in resolving matter‟.  
 
The response to the question whether adjudication was inexpensive was very similar. 
The majority of both employers and employers were of the opinion that adjudication 
was expensive. This therefore failed to measure up to the legislative intent.
67
 Some 
comments on this matter by respondents were:
68
  
Legal and witness fees were approximately $12,500 and we were awarded only $1,500 in 
costs, despite winning the case. 
Costs approximately $10,000 to $15,000 [the other party] gave his resignation in front of 
several witnesses and still went to the adjudication with legal aid. I understand he was granted 
$3,500 on his first attempt. After many letters to his solicitors was turned down. Third attempt 
[the other party] was granted more legal aid approximately $4,000 plus and carried on to the 
Tribunal. I think he should not have been granted so much legal aid as his case was absolutely 
hopeless. He was also convicted afterwards of four charges of perjury, on allegations that he 
made to the police against me. 
 
The following comments were made by employees:  
This same case has been to Appeal Court, District Court and now High Court and still waiting 
for payment.   
 
The cost of lawyers was over $8000.
69  
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Of those employees who reported that the process was inexpensive, 64 percent 
obtained representation through the services of their union or were granted legal aid.
70
 
The remainder, with only one exception, used advocates on a „no win, no fee‟ basis. 
One person from this group found that the process was inexpensive as the advocate 
involved „had never sent an account‟.  
 
Parties were also asked if they thought that the adjudication process was 
straightforward. Of those who answered this question, 50 percent of employees and 
62 percent of employers thought that adjudication was straightforward. While this was 
a majority of all participants this still left a significant number for whom the 
objectives as set by the legislature had not been achieved.  
Table 7.14: New Information for Employees at Hearing? 
Employee Response Percentage Number 
Yes 64% 18 
No 32% 9 
Total 100% 27 
 
A clear majority of employees said that there was new information brought forward 
by the employer during the adjudication hearing. If this was the case the Tribunal was 
permitted under regulation 49 of the Employment Tribunal Regulations 1991 to allow 
rebuttal from the applicant. Adjudicators, to cater for this possibility, were permitted 
to adjourn the hearing to allow the party concerned to make a fair response where the 
evidence could not reasonably have been foreseen.
71
 An unrestricted ability to grant 
adjournments would have opened the process up to abuse from parties wishing to 
conduct fishing expeditions. 
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It should be noted that no employee surveyed was reinstated.
72
 
Table 7.15: Did Employees Believe They Received Adequate Compensation? 
Employee Response Percentage Number 
Yes 32% 9 
No 68% 19 
Total 100% 38 
 
To assist in determining whether the adjudication system worked it was decided to 
ask employees if they thought that they had received adequate compensation if their 
personal grievances were upheld.
73
 Some employees commented as follows: 
 
The Courts found for me in the adjudicator Court. [The employer] refused to pay. He then 
took it to the Appeal Court. They once again found for me and he refused to pay. It then went 
to the District Court and he didn‟t even turn up. My lawyer is now trying to get it accepted in 
the High Court. It would have been fairer if he had been made to write out a cheque on the day 
of the adjudicator‟s decision. If I had owed him money, you can be sure he would have 
demanded his payment then and there. This man is notorious for taking things to court. 
 
I was adequately compensated by the adjudication but the employers company went into 
liquidation and I was added to the list of creditors, and received nothing. 
 
No because the employer has „shit‟ on other people besides me and is still doing it. 
 
No I was ripped off by a dishonest employer. 
 
I had a one-year contract. The student satisfaction survey was not carried out [this particular 
applicant was in the teaching profession and part of the performance assessment process 
related to the level of student satisfaction with the applicant‟s teaching methods]. I was 
returned and then not returned [It is taken from this sentence that the applicant believed he 
was going to get a new contract but then found out that this was not to be the case]. I believe 
that the case was influenced by the political atmosphere and the desire of employers to reduce 
claims. It was judged that since I was not employed (one contract had finished, the other was 
not offered), I did not have a valid case, yet costs were awarded against the employer. It is the 
law and the manner of employment which created that situation. My council [sic] thought we 
would succeed but the court was moving to support employers. 
 
Table 7.16: Did Adjudication Resolve the Personal Grievance? – Applicants 
Adequate Personal Grievance Percentage Number 
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compensation? resolved? 
Yes Yes 29% 8 
Yes No 4% 1 
No Yes 11% 3 
No No 57% 16 
Total  100% 28 
 
Applicants were asked if compensation awarded was adequate and if this resolved the 
personal grievance. In 29 percent of cases it was reported that the compensation 
received was adequate and the personal grievance had been resolved. A correlation 
was drawn on a percentage basis between all applicants who responded to the survey 
in respect of their responses to questions about compensation, resolution, and 
representation. This revealed that in 21 percent of all survey responses, those who 
reported that the compensation was adequate and that the personal grievance had been 
resolved also reported satisfaction with their representative. Those who were of the 
opinion that the compensation was adequate, the personal grievance resolved but still 
reported dissatisfaction with their representative made up only 7 percent of all 
responding applicants. 
 
From Table 7.16 it can be seen that in 4 percent of cases, applicants reported that they 
thought the compensation received had been adequate but that they did not believe the 
personal grievance had been resolved satisfactorily. Working the same correlation as 
above revealed that all of this group were nonetheless satisfied with the standard of 
their representative. 
 
 In 11 percent of cases, as listed in Table 7.16, it was reported that the personal 
grievance had been resolved but adequate compensation had not been received. In all 
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of these cases the applicants also reported being satisfied with the standard of 
representation they received. 
 
In the majority of cases, 57 percent, it was recorded that there had been inadequate 
compensation in the view of the surveyed party, and that the personal grievance had 
not been resolved. When the questions relating to resolution, compensation, and 
representation were combined, the data showed that 63 percent of those within this 
group were happy with their representation whilst the remainder were not. 
 
Although applicants‟ satisfaction with the standard of representation was high, there 
was a very high rate of dissatisfaction with the results of personal grievance 
adjudication and this therefore raises the question as to whether this dissatisfaction is 
related to the process itself. Despite this, from the figures it would seem that 
representation was not a negative factor in the minds of applicants in general.
74
  
 
The statistics show that even in cases where the personal grievance was felt to have 
been unresolved and where there was dissatisfaction with the level of compensation 
awarded, this did not necessarily reflect feelings of dissatisfaction with the 
representation received. This raises the question as to what type of behaviour a 
representative would need to engage in before they crossed the threshold that would 
make them likely to be seen by the applicant group as having provided an 
unsatisfactory service.  
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One applicant who reported representation as being unsatisfactory was of the opinion 
that the personal grievance was unresolved and the compensation received was 
inadequate. Commenting on their representative‟s behaviour they said, „He thought 
we could not lose – did not ask me to get witnesses to come in‟. The same applicant 
also stated, with regard to mediation, that they „[were] never given a [sic] option – he 
[the representative] wrote to my employer‟. On the matter of costs this applicant 
replied that the process was „very expensive for what I got‟. 
 
Another applicant reporting dissatisfaction with their representative stated, „[I] don‟t 
believe my lawyer considered my case serious or of importance, bad preparation and 
took too long to go to court‟. This applicant when reporting on mediation stated that 
they „weren‟t aware of such legal procedures‟, they felt ambivalent as to whether the 
costs were inexpensive as legal aid had been used but were of the opinion that their 
lawyer‟s fees were high. As to whether they perceived the adjudication process as 
straightforward, this particular applicant was moved to reply that „the process was; 
my lawyer wasn‟t.‟ 
 
A final example has been drawn from the responses of an applicant who had used her 
own lawyer who was not an employment law specialist. This applicant‟s explanation 
of her dissatisfaction with her representation was, „Not forceful enough, intimidated 
by the judge and the opposition – I still wish I had conducted my own case, with legal 
advice‟. This applicant reported the mediation process as being unsuccessful because, 
„The respondent just told barefaced lies that my lawyer could not cope with‟. On 
costs, she reported that the adjudication had not been inexpensive and that although 
they had been granted legal aid she „had to repay it when I sold my house‟. This 
particular applicant was also unimpressed with the adjudicator of the case, stating, 
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„The adjudicator took almost a year to give his opinion – completely unacceptable‟ 
(emphasis as provided). 
 
Table 7.17: Did Adjudication Resolve the Personal Grievance? 
 Yes No Total Number 
Employee 39% 61% 100% 28 
Employer 67% 33% 100% 31 
 
Table 7.17 shows that the responses from employers and employees were almost a 
mirror image of each other. (However, 19 percent of employers did not answer this 
survey question). Clearly, employers took a more positive view of the adjudication 
system as less than half of the responding employees stated that the personal 
grievance had been resolved. 
 
In hindsight, the framing of the question, „In your opinion did the adjudication 
process finally resolve the personal grievance?‟ may have resulted in the term „finally 
resolved‟ being interpreted differently by the various survey groups. It could be, for 
example, that those participants who were working from a legal background would 
see „resolution‟ as the Tribunal having made its decision, and responded to the survey 
accordingly, while those participants who were either applicants or respondents may 
have been reporting their personal feelings on the outcome. In order to address this 
concern the results from the survey questionnaire were broken down to illustrate how 
a particular group would respond to the question. 
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The low figures for a sense of resolution can be explained if it is accepted that few 
cases with little merit proceeded to adjudication.
75
 If that were the case, it could have 
been expected that the Employment Tribunal would predominantly be involved in 
deciding cases of competing merit or „borderline‟ cases, on the basis that if the answer 
to the rights and wrongs of any particular case was obvious then, apart from the 
„bloody minded‟ participant, it would be resolved at mediation.  
 
The question as framed required a yes/no answer, however several responses from 
this group included extra information that provided further illustration and arguably 
qualified the response. In one questionnaire where the respondent had circled yes as 
their answer as to whether the personal grievance had been resolved, the respondent 
then went on to say „because I fired him‟. In another case where the response to the 
question of resolution was in the negative the respondent felt that „the court was 
biased in favour of the employee‟.  
 
Survey responses from representatives showed that the majority, 83 percent, 
interpreted the term „resolved‟ to mean that resolution occurred when the Tribunal 
made a decision, regardless of the outcome. This is supported by one representative‟s 
response that, „It‟s not a matter of opinion, a decision had been made‟. Further, 
several members of the representative group who reported that no resolution had been 
achieved went on to comment that the particular case in question had gone on to 
appeal, the inference being that resolution would occur when a final decision was 
reached by the Court.   
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Degree of satisfaction may have related to factors over which there was little control, 
such as the procedure itself, which was stipulated in the legislation and regulations,
76
 
or the formal approach that had been adopted by those conducting the procedure. It 
has also to be remembered that the Employment Contracts Act 1991 was ushered in 
alongside the National Government‟s Economic and Social Initiative policy. These 
pieces of legislation were the basis of substantial social engineering, the results of 
which were seen in some quarters as; an impoverishment of those already struggling 
in the system,
77
 an increase in the number of the unemployed,
78
 and the 
disestablishment of legal necessity for employee‟s institutions such as their unions, in 
a time of high unemployment. These factors may have contributed to the negative 
perception of the relevant employees who expressed dissatisfaction with the standard 
of representation and the higher rate of satisfaction that was expressed by employers 
in their representatives. It is open to suggest that the expectations of the employee 
group were low and that resolution of the matter totally in their favour may not have 
been a perceived outcome on their part. However, there were at the time competing 
claims from employers that the personal grievance process was oriented in favour of 
the employees; this matter is discussed more fully in Chapter Eight.  
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Employers participating in the survey who fell into the group expressing 
dissatisfaction with the adjudication process made up 10 percent of the total 
respondent figure and seemed to be more scathing in their comments. For example, 
one of these employers took the view that the adjudication system was „[a] waste of 
time‟, „very expensive‟ and that „our experience led us to go in to Wellington to seek 
advice from [our] member MP. Our story is very long and the system let us down 
badly.‟ Another employer complained that „the case was spread out over a number of 
weeks because the time allocated was not sufficient‟ and they further took the view 
that „the Court goes to extreme lengths to find against the employer regardless of 
proven evidence and witness testimony.‟ 
 
It has been acknowledged that „justice delayed is justice denied.‟79 However, whether 
or not the personal grievance adjudication was „quick‟ might in some cases have been 
a matter of perception for the participants. For the lay person it may have appeared 
that the process was slow, however in terms of realistic time constraints for resolution 
of legal disputes the time lapsed may not have been unreasonable. A number of 
factors may have contributed to delays. The process of lodging a personal grievance 
and waiting for a hearing generally took the most time. Most Employment Tribunal 
districts had waiting lists for the allocation of adjudication hearing dates.
80
 The 
adjudication hearing itself was not generally protracted but waiting for the decision to 
be produced by the adjudicator could have taken some time.
81
 For example, one 
adjudicator commented that in an extreme case another adjudicator had taken two 
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years to produce a decision.
82
 It should be noted, however, that lengthy delays in 
producing decisions were not the norm.
83
 
  
Participants were not specifically asked their reasons for their views, so not all 
commented on their experiences in their own words, however there were a number of 
possible explanations for the procedure having appeared complicated to the majority 
of employees. The legal requirements regarding the notification of the personal 
grievance to the employer and lodging the personal grievance with the Employment 
Tribunal were prescribed by regulations, which the lay person would be unfamiliar 
with and likely to find daunting.
84
 The hearing process itself may have seemed 
similarly unfamiliar and complicated. If the employee was represented by an 
inexperienced representative it is possible that the procedure may have appeared more 
complex than it actually was, or the perception may have been the result of not having 
been clearly advised of what to expect in the hearing itself. Competent representation 
would be more likely to give the impression of straightforwardness. In some cases the 
nature of the issue in question may have meant it was able to be quickly resolved.  
 
Only thirty percent of employers who thought the personal grievance was not resolved 
described the process as straightforward. This may well have been as a result of the 
outcome of the personal grievance, as well as the factors discussed in the context of 
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employees above.
85
 In all cases the analysis is speculative because of the low response 
rate to the survey.  
7.6  REPRESENTATIVES 
 
Representatives‟ views were obviously important to give a balance to the views of lay 
participants in the adjudication process, although views within the ranks of 
representatives would, of course, also be varied. The response rate for representatives 
was higher than for the applicants and respondents at 36 percent.  
Table 7.18: Which Party did the Representative Act for? 
 Applicant Respondent Both
86
 
Counsel 23%   25 42% 46 10% 11 
Advocate 6% 6 7% 8 3% 3 
Union Counsel 4% 4     
Union 
Advocate 
5% 5     
Total for whole table = 100%, 109 replies 
Table 7.18 shows that the majority of representatives that replied to the survey were 
acting as counsel in adjudication. The total number of representatives who replied to 
the survey was 109. Approximately 75% of the representatives involved in 
adjudication were counsel who had been chosen by parties as their representative. 
This question was asked to ascertain whether the responses varied according to 
whether the representative was representing the applicant or the respondent. It is 
worth commenting here that some trade unions either employed advocates or counsel 
as staff members or contracted representation services from outside their organisation. 
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This may have meant that the union determined who the party would be represented 
by. 
7.6.1 REPRESENTATIVES AND GROUNDS FOR PERSONAL GRIEVANCES 
 
Table 7.19: Did the Representative Believe that there were Grounds for the 
Personal Grievance? 
 Yes No Unknown Total Number 
Counsel 51% 34% 15% 100% 82 
Advocate 50% 33% 17% 100% 18 
Union Counsel 100% – – 100% 4 
Union 
Advocate 
100% – – 
100% 5 
 
This question was asked to ascertain whether representatives believed that there was 
validity in the case that they advocated. The data collected is significant in that it has 
shown that in a third of the cases the representative went to adjudication with the 
belief that their client‟s case had no merit. The absence of further questioning meant 
that it was not possible to determine whether this had impacted on their conduct of the 
case (and, arguably, potentially its outcome.) It should be noted though that the 
representative‟s view was not necessarily conclusive, as in the final analysis the 
validity of the grounds was determined by the Employment Tribunal. Table 7.19 
clearly shows that the majority of representatives believed that the case which they 
advocated was valid. It also shows a striking similarity in the range of responses of 
both advocates and (non union) counsel.  
 
For those representatives who believed there were no grounds for the personal 
grievance it is argued that it would have been reasonable to expect a significant 
difference in the figures between counsel and advocates. For legal counsel, practice 
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was (and is) governed by Rule 1.02 of the Rules of Professional Conduct for 
Barristers and Solicitors which provided, amongst other things, that a practitioner 
must be available to the public and must not refuse to act without good cause.
87
 The 
accompanying commentary to this rule provides that good cause arises only where: 
counsel cannot attend to the client‟s needs promptly; counsel does not possess the due 
competence to carry out the work required; where a conflict of interest exists; or 
where counsel has too many other commitments. Therefore, in the absence of any of 
these circumstances the practitioner was obliged to present the case to the tribunal 
cases regardless of any personal assessment of their validity. 
 
In comparison, an advocate was not bound by these rules and therefore had the 
freedom to accept or reject cases. It is therefore of note, given the ability to reject 
those claims which, in their opinion, were without valid grounds, that the figures for 
the percentage of claims that advocates took to adjudication were only slightly less 
than that for counsel.  
 
There are other possible explanations for a representative taking a case to adjudication 
which they believed had no grounds. Despite the best advice from their representative 
some clients insist on taking their case further in the face of potential risks. Further, 
the financial realities of practice may override any moral objection and the ethos of 
legal practise is that the representative‟s view of the merits of the case should not 
influence the person‟s right to have their „day in court‟. 
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It is important to remember, however, that the representatives‟ comments referred to a 
particular case and may not, therefore, have mirrored their opinion of the merits of 
cases generally. 
 
Table 7.19 also shows that all union representatives, whether advocates or counsel, 
believed that there were grounds for the personal grievance. The purpose of asking 
this question was to determine whether union representatives were more or less likely 
to believe that their client‟s claim was valid. However, this data should be treated with 
caution as the response group was numerically small. 
  
The apparent difference between union representatives and other representatives on 
this point might be explained by the Unions‟ practice under the Labour Relations Act 
1987 of trying to resolve the issue „on the job‟ and only taking the matter to 
adjudication if it had passed their internal screening process.
88
 The likelihood of a 
union representative taking a case without merit to adjudication might therefore have 
been reduced.  
Table 7.20: Did the Representative (for either party) believe there were Grounds for 
the Applicant Pursuing a Personal Grievance?  
  Yes No Number 
Counsel Applicant 100% – 24 
 Respondent 35% 65% 43 
Advocate Applicant 100% – 6 
 Respondent  14% 86% 7 
Union 
Counsel 
Applicant 100% – 5 
Union 
Advocate 
Applicant 100% – 4 
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 Telephone conversation with Ross Wilson, President CTU, 30 January 2006. 
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Representatives were asked whether or not they believed that there was substance to 
the applicant‟s case. The small number of representatives who had acted for both 
applicants and respondents has been excluded from this table. Only advocates and 
counsel acting for respondents reported that they did not believe that there was 
substance to the applicant‟s case. As previously discussed, counsel had little 
discretion over which cases to take up as they were bound by the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, whereas advocates were not bound by such restrictions, and 
generally had more flexibility in who they chose to represent. Advocates may have 
been able to avoid representing respondents more easily where they believed the 
applicant‟s personal grievance was well founded and the respondent‟s position 
untenable. A note of qualification should be sounded here that such a proposition 
would not be applicable, for example, to „in-house‟ advocates who were permanently 
in the employ of a respondent.  
 
All representatives who were either union advocates or union counsel, and therefore 
only represented applicants, believed that there were grounds for the personal 
grievance.  
7.6.2 FEES AND COSTS 
 
Table 7.21: Was the Applicant Legally Aided? 
Response Percentage Number 
No 89% 97 
Yes 11% 12 
Total  100% 109 
 
Table 7.21 shows that legally aided applicants represented 12 people; a very small 
proportion of those surveyed who took a personal grievance to the level of 
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adjudication in 1997.
89
 One of the reasons for this low level of assistance may have 
been that when represented by an advocate, parties did not (at that time) qualify for 
legal aid.
90
 If an applicant was represented by counsel they would qualify for legal aid 
provided their assets and income were below the recommended level.
91
 Few 
employers would qualify because of the low income thresholds imposed by 
regulation.
92
 
Table 7.22: How were Fees Determined? 
Hourly 42% 
Time 19% 
Union Fees
93
 8% 
NZLS Rules of Conduct 9% 
Legal Aid 6% 
Contingency 2% 
Contract 4% 
Other 10% 
Total % 
Total number 
100%   
104 
 
Table 7.22 illustrates how all representatives surveyed determined how they charged 
fees to their clients. The New Zealand Law Society Rules of Professional Conduct 
described the factors applicable to setting legal fees.
94
 Rule 3.01 provided:  
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 For a discussion on general topics see Chapter 5.4.1, Table 5.1. For a discussion on the availability of 
legal aid in personal grievance claims, see Chapter 2.4.3(d) and Chapter 5.4.8(a). 
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 For a discussion on the availability of legal aid in personal grievance claims, see Chapter 2.4.3(d) 
costs and Chapter 5.4.8(a). Note, the Legal Services Agency, under ss 69 and 70 Legal Services Act 
2000, may now approve non-lawyer personnel, such as qualified legal executives, paralegals, and law 
clerks, to provide services to clients and receive remuneration from the agency in certain 
circumstances. This was not the case at the time this survey relates to. At that time the rules were 
governed by s 158F Legal Services Act 1991 which only made provision for those holding annual 
practicing certificates who had been approved and forwarded to the Legal Services Agency by the 
District Law Society. Telephone discussion with Ian Thompson, Employment Services Advocate, 
Christchurch, 24 April 2006. About thirteen advocates are at the time of writing on the list of approved 
legal aid providers. 
91
 Ibid. 
92
 Ibid. 
93
 Union membership subscriptions. 
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A practitioner shall charge a client no more than a fee which is fair and reasonable for the 
work done, having regard to the interests of both client and practitioner.  
 
The commentary to this rule provided that „charges must be fair and reasonable in all 
the circumstances.‟ Practitioners were referred to the Society‟s Conveyancing Practice 
Guidelines. The „Principles of Charging‟ set out in the guidelines included: 
Charges by a lawyer for professional work shall be calculated to give a fair and reasonable 
return for the services rendered, having regard to the interests of both client and lawyer. 
Charges shall take account of all relevant factors, including: 
a) the skill, specialised knowledge, and responsibility required 
b) the importance of the matter to the client and the results achieved 
c) the urgency and circumstances in which the business is transacted  
d) the value or amount of any property or money involved  
e) the complexity of the matter and the difficulty or novelty of the questions involved 
f) the number and importance of the documents prepared or perused 
g) the time and labour expended  
h) the reasonable costs of running a practice 
  
The weight and emphasis given to each factor would have depended on the 
circumstances of the case and how the practice operated. In addition to fees charged 
by representatives all clients were also obliged to pay goods and services tax (GST). 
This added an extra 12 percent to the cost of representation.  
 
Table 7.22 shows that 9 percent of representatives said that they followed the New 
Zealand Law Society Rules of Conduct but did not provide any illustration of how 
this worked. The table shows that the majority of representatives set their fees by 
some form of time mechanism. One variation of this method included a fixed charge 
plus an hourly rate, for example, a fixed charge of $200 for bringing a personal 
grievance, with an additional $250 per hour for time spent.  
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 New Zealand Law Society, Rules of Professional Conduct (4
th
 ed) 1996. 
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Overall, 42 percent of representatives advised that they used an hourly rate to set their 
fees. In addition, a small number of other representatives (1 percent in each case) 
charged an hourly rate plus extra charges, for example percentage of winnings, value 
of case and the ability to pay was taken into account. On one occasion the time rate 
was discounted.  
 
In all, 8 percent of representatives replied that they set the fees based on time spent on 
the personal grievance as a whole.
95
 It is not really clear how this time element was 
calculated. For instance, 7 percent of representatives said that they charged for time 
and attendance. Presumably attendance simply meant the time spent attending 
meetings, mediation and adjudication. Other representatives gave additional factors 
which included fees adjusted for success, for complexity of the case, urgency or 
importance. In addition, some representatives advised that fees were reduced to a fair 
level based on their original estimate of costs and returns. 
 
Table 7.22 shows that the majority of representatives calculated their fees on some 
form of time spent basis. There were a significant number of variations as to how this 
was calculated. In 20 percent of the responses received, other ways of setting fees 
were indicated, for example, by way of contingency fees. The remaining 4 percent of 
responses comprised those who had paid no fee. A few had not replied to the 
question. 
After all factors have been taken into account the time element was clearly the one 
most favoured by representatives. From an access to justice perspective it is of 
                                                             
95
 See Chapter 2.4.3(d) for a more detailed discussion on fee fixing. 
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concern that such a low percentage of representatives‟ fees were paid by legal aid or 
through union fees. This concern is reinforced by some of the comments made by 
adjudicators, outlined in Chapter Six,
96
 about the tendency of some lawyers to prolong 
the process. 
7.6.3 PROCESS 
 
Table 7.23: How did Representatives Describe the Process?  
Response Percentage 
Confusing 6% 
Formal 44% 
Informal 14% 
Legalistic 25% 
Intimidating 4% 
Time-consuming 28% 
Satisfactory 62% 
Other 10% 
Number 109 
 
The figures in Table 7.23, and the comments underlying them, show that nearly two 
thirds of representatives surveyed found the adjudication process to be satisfactory, 
although it was also commonly described as formal and time-consuming. Each 
representative could choose as many descriptors as they thought appropriate. This 
does not fully accord with the legislator‟s intentions, although the level of satisfaction 
is greater than for applicants and respondents.
97
 
Table 7.23(A): How did Types of Representatives Describe the Process? (as a 
percentage of the total representative response) 
Response Counsel Advocate Union Counsel Union Advocate 
Confusing 4% 22% – – 
                                                             
96
 See Chapter 6.4.1–6.4.7 
97
 For discussion on the intentions of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 see Chapter 2.3.1; Political 
Development and Chapter 6.4.1; Nature of the Adjudication Process. 
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Formal 41% 39% 75% 80% 
Informal 13% 17% – 20% 
Legalistic 18% 33% 50% 80% 
Intimidating 1% 17% – 20% 
Time-consuming 24% 50% – 20% 
Satisfactory 68% 33% 75% 40% 
Number 82 18 4 5 
 
The majority of legally qualified representatives took the view that adjudication was 
satisfactory. However, counsel also thought that adjudication was formal and time-
consuming. In comparison to counsel only a small number of advocates (six) thought 
that adjudication was satisfactory. This may have been because advocates did not hold 
a practicing certificate although they may have held legal qualifications.
98
 It is 
possible that formal legal training allowed counsel to feel more comfortable with the 
adjudication process.  
 
Union advocates and union counsel were employees of the relevant unions, or 
contracted by them, and comprised the smallest group of survey responses. It was not 
always possible to determine where a union representative was employed. The figures 
show that contrary to the intentions of parliament only a small number of union 
representatives found that adjudication of personal grievances was satisfactory and 
those who held that opinion tended to be those with legal qualifications.  
 
To assess further how representatives viewed the adjudication process, representatives 
were asked for their views in terms of the Government intentions: was the process 
quick, inexpensive, and straightforward? 
                                                             
98
 See Chapter 5.4.4; Representation, for a discussion on types of representatives. 
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Table 7.24: Representatives’ Views of the Adjudication Process 
Response Yes No Total Number 
Quick 30% 70% 100% 107 
Inexpensive 27% 73% 100% 103 
Straightforward 73% 27% 100% 91 
 
According to most representatives surveyed, apart from the responses on 
straightforwardness, the government‟s intentions were not met. The logical 
explanation for the representatives‟ much more positive view of straightforwardness 
is that they were working within the system frequently and would therefore have 
become used to its complexities. In comparison, applicants and respondents may 
have used the personal grievance system only once in their working lives.  
 
It was decided to consider whether the geographical area in which the personal 
grievance occurred, may have had an impact on how the representative viewed the 
process. The following table is a breakdown of the figures in Table 7.24 into regional 
areas according to Employment Tribunal jurisdiction. 
Table 7.25: Agreement on nature of adjudication process by regional area 
Response Auckland/ Hamilton Wellington Christchurch/ 
Dunedin 
Quick = Yes 31% 29% 28% 
Inexpensive= Yes 28% 29% 50% 
Straightforward= Yes 81% 85% 50% 
Number 66 29 33 
 
As this table shows, the regional figures mirror the national totals except for 
Christchurch/Dunedin, where the percentage of representatives who found the process 
straightforward was significantly lower. Unfortunately, the data did not reveal the 
reasons for this point of difference, which may have been a result of the way the local 
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Employment Tribunal offices organised and managed the procedure, or a more 
random result because of the low sample size. Differences in results for Christchurch 
and Dunedin in total 1997 cases had been identified.
99
 
 
As the information in Table 7.25 is focussed on the individual aspects of the question, 
perhaps a better view of how the process performed in comparison with the 
government‟s expectations could be established from combining the various 
permutations available to representatives when they answered the question in full. The 
following table gives the figures on a nationwide basis for the largest groupings. 
 Table 7.25(A): Representatives’ Views (nationwide) 
 Percent Number 
Neither Quick nor Inexpensive, but Straightforward= Yes 32% 31 
Neither Quick nor Inexpensive nor Straightforward= Yes 25% 20 
Quick and Inexpensive and Straightforward= Yes 14% 13 
Not Quick, but Inexpensive and Straightforward= Yes 11% 10 
 
The representatives‟ choice of descriptors does not support a view that the 
government‟s predictions in respect of speed, expense and straightforwardness were 
correct.  
On the matter of speed, the following comments were made: 
The process was not quick because „time delay between hearing date and problem occurring.‟ 
(Advocate) 
 
Time involved in mediation. (Advocate) 
 
Legal profession built up fat portfolio to accumulate costs. (Advocate) 
 
                                                             
99
 See Table 5.12. In Christchurch, a smaller number of adjudicators completed a similar workload to 
elsewhere, in Dunedin results were skewed by a small number of unusual cases. 
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There was approximately a four-month delay from filing defence through to the hearing on 
preliminary issues. In legal terms, that is reasonably efficient, although members of the public 
would not consider it to be so. (Counsel) 
 
It took over six months to resolve the personal grievance. (Counsel) 
 
Detailed evidence required, waiting time for fixture, cross-examination required. (Counsel) 
 
On the issue of expense the following comments were recorded: 
[The] small chamber for dispute resolution has been transformed into a rich hunting ground 
ripe for exploitation by legal fraternity. Employees can no longer read menu or afford price of 
admission. (Advocate)   
 
Legal matters are never inexpensive to resolve and this was probably no different. (Counsel) 
 
Was expensive in terms of downtime for the respondent partners and staff. (Counsel) 
 
Applicant was unable to recover money awarded, so lost out over all. (Counsel) 
 
On the matter of straightforwardness, representatives remarked: 
The adjudicator made life very difficult for both parties. (Advocate) 
 
...it was necessary to argue the preliminary issues before the Employment Tribunal which 
involved some novel and interesting areas of law surrounding delay and whether or not 
applications should be struck out. (Counsel) 
 
Would have had to have been a lawyer to understand what was happening at the hearing. 
(Counsel) 
 
From these comments, it is possible that Counsel themselves experienced no personal 
difficulty with the straightforwardness of the process, but rather that they were 
considering the question from their client‟s perspective.  
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Table 7.25(B): Breakdown of Responses by Representative Type – Quick 
Response Counsel Number Advocate Number 
Yes 32% 26 19% 3 
No 68% 56 81% 13 
Total 100%  100%  
 
Table 7.25(B) outlines whether or not representatives at adjudication thought that the 
process was quick.
100
 Only 32 percent of counsel responded positively. This might 
have depended on the nature of their practice. In comparison with some other 
procedures, such as a civil litigation trial, adjudication could have seemed quick. The 
number of advocates, union advocates and union counsel who believed the process to 
be quick was even lower than the figure for general counsel. This may have been 
because union advocates and counsel worked only in this area with little comparison 
to other types of judicial process.  
 
Table 7.25(C): Breakdown of Responses by Representative Type – Inexpensive 
Response Counsel Number Advocate Number 
Yes 25% 20 20% 3 
No 75% 60 80% 12 
Total 100%  100%  
 
Representatives were asked if they thought that adjudication was inexpensive. The 
significant figure in these results was the similar proportion of counsel and advocates 
who said that adjudication was expensive.  
 
 
 
                                                             
100
 For a discussion on time lapse see above, 7.5.6. See also Chapter 5.4.9.  
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Table 7.25(D): Breakdown of Responses by Representative Type – Straightforward 
Response Counsel Number Advocate Number 
Yes 82% 58 45% 5 
No 18% 13 55% 6 
Total 100%  100%  
 
Representatives were also asked whether they believed that adjudication was 
straightforward. Numbers are too low for reliable analysis, but the lower number of 
advocates, union counsel and union advocates who found adjudication straightforward 
may have been explained by the contrast between the conciliation system which 
applied under the provisions of the Labour Relations Act 1987 and the more legally 
complex process under the Employment Contracts Act 1991.
101
 These figures have 
shown that counsel generally strongly took the view that adjudication was 
straightforward, however they should be read in the context of some of their quoted 
comments quoted above. 
Table 7.26: Did Representatives Believe that Adjudication Resolved the Personal 
Grievance? 
  Yes Number No Number Total 
Counsel Applicant 76% 19 24% 6 100% 
Respondent 66% 34 34% 7 100% 
Advocate Applicant 66.6% 4 33.3% 2 100% 
Respondent 88% 7 12% 1 100% 
 
Table 7.26 shows which party the representative acted for, whether the representative 
thought the personal grievance had finally been resolved, and records the responses as 
a percentage of the type of representative surveyed but small numbers make it 
uncertain whether the apparent proportionately greater number of counsel who 
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believed that adjudication resolved the personal grievance for applicants would be 
reflected in the full set of 1997 data.  
Table 7.27: Did Representatives Believe that there was a More Effective Model to 
Resolve Personal Grievances? 
Model Counsel Number Advocate Number 
Approved 69% 44 33.3% 2 
Investigative/Inquisitorial 20% 13 – 0 
Mediation 11% 7 17% 1 
Other – – 50% 3 
Total 100% 64 100% 6 
 
Table 7.27 shows that counsel made up the greater proportion of representatives who 
approved of adjudication under the Employment Contracts Act 1991. Only a few 
advocates and union counsel shared that view. A large number of participating 
representatives provided some qualifications to their approval and had other ideas as 
to how the system could have worked more effectively. For example provision of 
better funding, less waiting time for hearings and compulsory mediation were 
suggested. Six participants either favoured mediation or a return to the system used 
under the Labour Relations Act 1987.
102
  
7.6.4 OTHER APPROACHES 
 
The Employment Relations Act 2000 introduced a new method of resolving personal 
grievances which involved mediation by the Mediation Service and an investigative 
approach being taken by the Employment Relations Authority.
103
 The personal 
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 See Chapter 2.2.4 for a discussion on the definitions of personal grievances under the Labour 
Relations Act 1987. 
103
 Employment Relations Act 2000, Part 9; Personal Grievances. 
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grievance procedure applicable under the Employment Relations Act 2000 will be 
discussed in Chapter Eight.
104
  
 
The process under the Employment Relations Act 2000 incorporates a number of the 
suggestions made by representatives on a more effective model for resolving personal 
grievances. Another suggestion for dealing with personal grievances was a case 
management/investigative approach. As the management of cases in this manner often 
resolved personal grievances prior to them having to reach adjudication a combination 
of this method and investigation may have been an appropriate resolution process.
105
 
Two more suggestions for resolving personal grievances were inquiry and 
inquisitorial. The precise nature of what was intended by those responses was not 
clear. However, it appears that their idea was that the Employment Tribunal be given 
an investigative function rather than only an adjudicative role. Suggestions for 
mediation and adjudication and mediation/counselling made by both counsel and 
union counsel coincide to some extent with the Employments Contracts Act 1991 
system as it was. Adequately funded adjudication was another favoured solution with 
others suggesting that removal of lawyers from the process altogether would be a 
beneficial approach. The merits of the various alternative suggestions will be 
discussed in Chapter Eight. 
7.6.5 SELF REPRESENTED PARTIES 
 
Only one applicant party of the 28 applicants who replied said that they chose to 
represent themselves.
106
 The respondent employer in this case thought that there were 
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 See Chapter 8.4.5. 
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 See Chapter 6.4.6 for a brief discussion on the case management approach. 
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 Some participants in the survey who represented themselves completed the wrong form and were 
excluded from the survey. 
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no grounds for the personal grievance taken against them and that cost was a factor in 
determining representation. The applicant said that she/he was not a member of a 
union and therefore was not entitled to union representation or funding. This self 
representing applicant described the adjudication process as legalistic. The respondent 
employer had previous experience in mediation but did not advise why mediation had 
been unsuccessful in this case. The respondent believed that adjudication had finally 
resolved the personal grievance and that the process was inexpensive, straightforward, 
but not quick. The respondent advised experiencing no difficulties with the 
adjudication process and no alternative as to how procedures may be improved were 
suggested.  
7.7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
Chapter seven has examined the contrasting perspective of employees, employers and 
their representatives to determine their views on the efficacy of the system. What the 
survey attempted to do was, for the first time, obtain the views of participants in the 
personal grievance procedure and to ascertain their opinions on whether the process 
was accessible, satisfactory and whether it met participants‟ expectations. The 
survey‟s narrow focus upon 150 cases in a one year period is a useful snapshot of 
opinion at the time. A wider survey may have produced more diverse views from 
mainly one-off users (employers and employees) but the overview from the 
representatives who had experience of other cases was mainly consistent. 
 
Responses around how employees and employers chose their representatives and the 
level of representation utilised was useful in order to ascertain perceptions of how 
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accessible the system was and also useful to highlight balance of power issues 
including affordability factors and the competence variables of representatives. 
 
The more focused questions around the adjudication process and employers and 
employees‟ perceptions of the complexity of it starkly indicated how short the process 
fell from the parliamentary ideal of an accessible, inexpensive and essentially „user 
friendly‟ system. The representatives had a markedly different perception in response 
to the questions, which was not surprising due to their background/training and the 
fact that they were often frequent users of the system and familiar with its operation 
and shortcomings. Interestingly, the questions highlighted significant consensus 
between representatives and adjudicators around some deficiencies in the process. 
Aside from complaints about the behaviour of some representatives, all survey 
participants were fairly critical of systemic shortcomings of the process. 
 
The relatively small number of responses received may have been due to the 
possibility that participants were generally satisfied with the process and outcome of 
their cases or that recollection was too traumatic to contemplate or time lapse and 
people wanting to simply „move on‟ being at issue. Some survey respondents did, 
however, indicate levels of approval with the adjudication system. This has assisted 
with answering the thesis question of what participants experiences were when using 
adjudication and whether the adjudication system worked for them.  
 
As indicated by the responses received from representatives to this survey, this group 
indicated most approval for the adjudication process. By contrast, a significant 
number of employees and employers surveyed did not altogether share this view. The 
majority of employers and employees thought the process was slow, expensive and 
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overly legalistic. This indicates that the government‟s intention that adjudication be 
quick, inexpensive and straightforward was not achieved to the satisfaction of the 
crucial user parties.  
 
Representatives were the group who showed the greatest overall level of support for 
the adjudication system. They tended to feel comfortable with the formality of the 
process probably due to their legal background and training but they did indicate that 
the process was at times too cumbersome and in some cases too slow. It needs to be 
borne in mind that in comparison to other types of civil cases the delays experienced 
by parties in adjudication were less pronounced. Likewise, adjudication may not have 
appeared significantly costly by comparison with other civil jurisdictions. However, it 
needs to be remembered that few employees qualified for legal aid and the cost of 
taking a personal grievance could have been prohibitive. When asked what would be 
an ideal process for resolving personal grievances, many representatives, however, 
took the view that a less formal investigative process would be more suitable. Some 
representatives recommended that mediation be made compulsory, with others 
preferring a return to the conciliation system which existed under the Labour 
Relations Act 1987. 
 
It appears from the survey conducted that whilst some support existed for the 
adjudication system used under the Employment Contract Act 1991, support was not 
strong and generally speaking, participants did not believe that the intentions of the 
Government of the day had been met. 
 
Chapter Eight will focus on the issues raised and discussed throughout this thesis. It 
will also identify changes made to the personal grievance system through the 
 471 
Employment Relations Act 2000 and will determine whether identified shortcomings 
in process have been rectified. Chapter Eight will also briefly identify some of the 
legislative changes which are currently being considered by the National Government 
and consider what impact they may have on the resolution of personal grievances. 
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C h a p t  e r  8  
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter draws together the conclusions from Chapters Three, Five, Six and 
Seven. The findings of the research are presented and the major issues and themes are 
identified concerning how the adjudication system under the Employment Contracts 
Act 1991 measured up as a substantive piece of employment law in relation to 
personal grievances. Comparisons are made with other studies undertaken in this area 
to determine whether the findings contained in this thesis are consistent with the 
research findings of others. The main questions of the thesis that underlie the results 
are: 
 What were the experiences of participants using the personal grievance 
adjudication procedure?; 
 Did the personal grievance adjudication system work in the manner intended 
by the government of the day for those participants?; and 
 By identifying the effective features and negative aspects of the process, to 
determine whether the procedure benefits not only policy makers, but all 
participants in the personal grievance adjudication system. 
 
This chapter concludes with a brief reflection upon why the Employment Relations 
Act 2000 was introduced and whether the problems with the Employment Contracts 
Act 1991 identified in this thesis in relation to personal grievances have been 
addressed and resolved. 
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8.1.1 REASONS FOR CONDUCTING THE RESEARCH  
 
 
To ensure that the above research questions were answered, it was necessary to look 
at how the Employment Tribunal worked and whether the process met the 
expectations of parties using the system. This involved a broad examination of the 
legislation and decisions, and whether participants were satisfied with the process and 
its outcomes. 
8.1.1(A) GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVES 
 
The objectives of the National Government were to establish a system for resolving 
personal grievances that was quick, straightforward, and inexpensive. One of the main 
aims of this thesis was to determine whether those objectives were met. This involved 
questions of access to justice and people‟s ability to access the system. For example, 
were people aware of their rights?; was the procedure sufficiently informal and 
flexible to cater for particular circumstances and target groups?; were outcomes 
sufficient in terms of expenses involved in bringing a personal grievance compared 
with the remedies awarded?; and was the system of allocating costs fair? These 
questions relating to the process also focussed on issues of natural justice such as the 
right to be heard and respond, the right to a neutral determination, and whether cross-
examination was permitted.   
8.1.1(B) PEOPLES’ EXPERIENCES USING THE ADJUDICATION SYSTEM 
 
This thesis was unique in seeking to determine from participants of the personal 
grievance process what their views of it were and whether it had worked for them. It 
was important to establish any positive factors in their use of adjudication; the 
negative factors; and what their ideas were for improvement. This provided a unique 
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window into the operation of the Employment Tribunal from the perspective of 
participants and whether it worked in the way it was intended to.   
 
Investigation of these questions involved a detailed analysis of the entire Employment 
Tribunal adjudication process both in terms of what the decisions said – objective 
information such as the types of personal grievance, types of representation, remedies 
and costs sought and granted, and procedural issues – and the resulting impacts on 
participants. In other words, how did participants describe the process?; did it resolve 
the issue at hand?; did the procedure work for participants personally?; and what were 
the outcomes for them? For example, the type of representation chosen may have 
impacted both on the outcome of the personal grievance and parties‟ perceptions of 
the personal grievance procedure. In this way, the thesis was able to examine the 
impacts of varying factors on the success of applicants‟ cases and the personal views 
of those involved.   
8.1.1(C) DATA COLLECTION 
 
This thesis focussed on the results of three main types of data collection with 
information was gathered from three different sources: the Employment Tribunal 
decisions from 1997, interviews with Employment Tribunal adjudicators, and surveys 
of participants and their representatives who had taken personal grievances in 1997.  
The information gathered allowed a comprehensive analysis of the Employment 
Tribunal and its proceedings. 
 
Firstly, it was hoped that the objective data from the decisions (in Chapter Five) 
would help to illustrate whether Government objectives had been met. The objective 
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data built up a profile of participants and their personal grievance cases in an attempt 
to identify trends in the decisions made.
1
 This included consideration of procedural 
matters such as delay, remedies, and costs. 
 
Secondly, questions were devised from the legislative framework of Chapter Two and 
the objective information of Chapter Five as a basis for constructing interviews of 
Employment Tribunal adjudicators. This allowed adjudicators to express their 
opinions on matters relating to five categories: process, types of personal grievance, 
parties, representation, and costs. This material is found in Chapter Six. 
 
Finally, Chapter Seven records the results from surveys of participants of the personal 
grievance procedure and their representatives. These surveys sought views on matters 
relating to process, representation, and outcomes. Again, this allowed participants to 
view their personal opinions on matters relating to the Employment Tribunal 
proceedings, although the low response rates mean that the findings cannot be 
generalised. 
8.1.2 WERE GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVES MET? 
 
As discussed above, the Government objectives at the time were to create a procedure 
that was quick, inexpensive, and straightforward. This intention was reflected in 
Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 76(c), where the object was to establish a low 
level, informal, specialist Employment Tribunal. This section discusses the findings 
from Chapters Five, Six, and Seven in this context.   
                                                             
1
This profile canvassed information such as: who made personal grievance claims; gender of parties; 
how they were represented; types of respondent; types of employment; categories of personal 
grievance; remedies and costs sought and granted. 
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8.1.2(A) QUICK 
 
Time factors were a significant feature of the personal grievance process under the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991 including: the time lapse between the action that 
resulted in the personal grievance and the hearing date; the length of the hearing itself; 
and the time lapse between the hearing and the Employment Tribunal adjudicator‟s 
decision being provided. The average waiting time between the date of the personal 
grievance arising and the date of the hearing was over 16 months. This represents a 
significant waiting period, and was further exacerbated by hearings that lasted on 
average over one and half days, followed by a two month delay for the decision to be 
produced.
2
 Adjudicators discussed various factors that contributed to these delays. 
These included an early backlog of cases from the Labour Relations Act 1987; 
availability of representatives; institutional delays and lack of resources; a procedure 
that required evidence to be presented formally;
3
 and the impact of lawyers.
4
 
Approximately half of employees and employers surveyed who responded thought 
that the process was time-consuming for them. Further, approximately 70 percent of 
both parties said that the adjudication process was not quick.
5
  
8.1.2(B) INEXPENSIVE 
 
One of the main aims of the National Government was to introduce a procedure that 
was inexpensive to the parties involved and therefore accessible to all employees 
regardless of union membership. This was measured in a number of ways, each 
                                                             
2
 See Chapter 5.4.9. See also 5.4.4, which discusses the differing time delays in each regional 
jurisdiction. 
3
 See Chapter 6.4.4. This was further complicated by considerable amounts of evidence presented due 
to the lack of a hearing de novo at the Employment Court. See also Chapter 6.4.9 for adjudicator‟s 
comments on the impact of caseloads on delays in the Employment Tribunal. 
4
 See Chapter 6.10. 
5
 See Chapter 7.5.6 and 7.5.8; and Table 7.13 and associated text. As discussed, it should be noted that 
this does not necessarily indicate levels of satisfaction with the adjudication process. 
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indicating a process that was inordinately expensive for those involved. There was 
large disparity between costs sought and costs granted. For example, for a hearing that 
lasted one day, the average costs sought was $2,576 while only $984 was awarded.
6
 
While there were guidelines for the award of costs laid down by the Court of Appeal, 
from the perspective of a dismissed employee, costs awards were frugal.
7
 This is also 
reflected in terms of remedies sought and granted, discussed below in the context of 
outcomes of adjudication.
8
   
 
The issue of expense was universal: a high number of both employees and employers 
responded that the process was expensive for them. 71 percent of employees and 82 
percent of employers who responded to the survey believed the procedure was 
expensive.
9
 For example, one employer commented: 
Legal and witness fees were approximately $12,500.00 and we were awarded only $1,500.00 
in costs, despite winning the case. 
 
Adjudicators questioned on whether they thought the personal grievance adjudication 
procedure was expensive, agreed that the cost of taking a personal grievance caused 
problems with accessing the procedure.
10
 This was based on the costs of 
representation and lodging fees. How costs were awarded could cause some confusion 
to the onlooker, as on the one hand adjudicators agreed that costs were a barrier to 
accessing the procedure, while on the other hand, low costs were awarded. While 
adjudicators were able to take various factors into account, it should be noted that in 
                                                             
6
 See Table 5.35 and related text. 
7
 For a discussion on costs in this context, see Chapter 5.4.8. 
8
 See below, 8.1.4(b). 
9
 See Chapter 7, Table 7.13 and related text. 
10
 See Chapter 6.8.1 and 6.8.2. 
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this respect, adjudicators were constrained when awarding costs by the limiting 
directions of the Court. 
8.1.2(C) STRAIGHTFORWARD 
 
A further objective of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 was to put in place a 
straightforward procedure for the Employment Tribunal to follow. In response to this 
inquiry, 50 percent of employees and 62 percent of employers agreed that the process 
was straightforward.
11
 Similarly, a small proportion of those surveyed who responded 
(21 percent of employees and 8 percent of employers) described the adjudication 
process as confusing.
12
 These numbers were much lower where parties did not think 
the personal grievance had been resolved by the adjudication process.
13
 In 
determining whether the process was straightforward for parties, more specific 
questions were asked in relation to procedural matters. For example, 64 percent of 
employees reported that new information was brought forward by the employer 
during the adjudication hearing, which may have required the applicant to adduce 
evidence in rebuttal.
14
 The high dependence on counsel and advocates as 
representatives also suggests a process that was less than straightforward for lay-
people. However, 73 percent of representatives, accustomed to working in an 
adversarial environment, agreed that the adjudication process was straightforward.
15
 
 
                                                             
11
 See Table 7.13 and related text. 
12
 See Table 7.12 and Chapter 7.5.1. 
13
 See Table 7.26 and related text. 
14
 Employment Tribunal Regulations 1991, reg 49(1)(e). See Table 7.14 and related text. 
15
 It should be remembered that this figure does not include the fact that the majority of advocates 
found that the process was not straightforward. See Table 7.25(d) and related text. See also Table 7.23: 
6 percent of representatives described the process as confusing. 
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Adjudicators commented on procedural problems such as unseen evidence, wrong 
legislation being used, and inadequate representation, as factors contributing to a 
process that was not straightforward, thus requiring representation of parties.  
However, the approach of adjudicators in assisting parties and their representatives 
who may have encountered difficulties with the procedure mitigated some of these 
effects. For example, the case management approach used in Wellington ensured 
some flexibility in redressing any errors that may have been presented.
16
   
8.1.2(D) EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS ACT 1991, S 76(C) 
 
The Government intentions were reflected in the Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 
76(c), and provided another measure of the efficacy of the Employment Tribunal. The 
object of section 76(c) was to establish a „low level, informal, specialist Employment 
Tribunal to provide speedy, fair, and just resolution of differences.‟ Adjudicators were 
ideally placed to comment on the operation of the Employment Tribunal, and were 
asked to consider the nature of the procedure in light of the statutory intentions. In this 
respect, 75 percent of adjudicators considered that the intentions of the legislation had 
not been met, with the remaining 25 percent indicating the intentions had not entirely 
been met. To clarify, not one adjudicator interviewed agreed that the intentions of the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991 had been fully met. The fact that most adjudicators 
thought the process was formal and legalistic, dominated by directions from the Court 
and the legal profession illustrates this point.
17
   
 
The procedure of the Employment Tribunal was regulated by Employment Tribunal 
Regulations 1991, reg 49. Adjudicators were asked about the effects of this 
                                                             
16
 See Chapter 6.4.6. 
17
 See Chapter 6.4 for details of adjudicators‟ views of the personal grievance adjudication process. 
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regulation, commenting that, for example, this could cause difficulties in the 
presentation of evidence. Adjudicators noted that parties almost always used written 
statements of evidence, which could be complex, evidenced by lawyers drafting briefs 
that were outside the understanding of their clients.
18
 
 
This is underlined by the contrasting responses from representatives, particularly 
lawyers, a clear majority of who believed the adjudication process was satisfactory, 
with their clients who were mostly dissatisfied. Only 21 percent of employees and 37 
percent of employers who responded to the survey thought that the adjudication 
procedure was satisfactory. 
8.1.3 REPRESENTATION 
 
As already observed, representatives played a significant role in the personal 
grievance adjudication process. The type of representation had varying impacts on the 
process itself, and to some extent, the outcomes. In this respect, by sheer numbers 
alone, counsel played a dominant role in the adjudication process. Initially, the 
intentions of the Government were laudable in trying to create a low level and 
informal system. However, the nature of the legislation and its subsequent 
interpretation by the Courts, led to an adversarial process suited to the legal 
profession.
19
 In some cases, having counsel as a representative paid off: on average 
counsel sought and were granted higher remedies.
20
 
 
                                                             
18
 See Chapter 6.4.4, which also notes that self-representatives were the only group that did not always 
use written statements due to a lack of knowledge of the process. 
19
 See Chapters 5.4.4 and 7.4 for comment on the high number of parties who chose to use counsel as 
representatives. 
20
 For example, see Table 5.28 and related text. 
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Opinions on the standards of representation, and the satisfaction of the parties using 
representation, were varied. One whole section of the interview questions related to 
adjudicators‟ views of the standard of representation and whether it was adequate for 
the personal grievance adjudication process. Generally, adjudicators found that 
standards varied across all the groups of representatives, not between the groups. 
Adjudicators indicated a willingness to assist inexperienced representatives and 
allowed some leniencies for poor representation.
21
 Generally though, most parties 
were satisfied with the standard of representation they received, perhaps not 
surprising given the nature of the adjudication process making legal representation, at 
least in the public perception, to be necessary.
22
 Thus, those who were unaware of 
their legal obligations were more likely to be satisfied than unsatisfied with their 
representation.
23
 
8.1.4 OUTCOMES 
 
The outcomes of the personal grievance adjudication process were measured in 
several ways from differing perspectives throughout the findings in Chapters Five to 
Seven. The general intention was to determine whether the process worked for the 
parties and whether parties received an adequate outcome both in terms of objective 
criteria and their expectations. In this way, the ability of the Employment Tribunal to 
resolve personal grievances was tested.   
 
 
                                                             
21
 See Chapters 6.7.2 and 6.7.4. 
22
 Only a quarter of employees and employers surveyed indicated an awareness of their legal 
obligations. See Table 7.11 and related text. 
23
 Ibid. 
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8.1.4(A) SUCCESS OF APPLICANTS 
 
In 1997, 58 percent of all employees who took a personal grievance were to some 
degree successful in their claim. In other words, their personal grievance was 
upheld.
24
 However, this is a limited analysis, as it does not consider the costs involved 
to the parties nor the disparity between remedies granted and expenses incurred, as 
highlighted in the next section. There were some factors that showed some variations 
in the success rate.
25
 Those in the farm and trade occupational category positions had 
a higher rate of success than the average, followed by white collar occupations from 
legislators to associate professionals. As discussed in the previous section, 
representatives also had an impact of the success of employees at adjudication: the 
lowest success rate for employees was when the respondent employer was represented 
by counsel.
26
  
 
As the findings from the 1997 decisions indicated some variations of success rates, 
adjudicators were asked whether certain characteristics of parties affected their 
approach to the case, decision making process, and therefore the outcome. Most 
adjudicators advised that characteristics such as occupation, gender, and membership 
of Equal Employment Opportunity target groups did not affect their perception of the 
applicant or the claim. This was qualified by adjudicators indicating there were 
circumstances where those characteristics were relevant in terms of the capacity of the 
party concerned. So for example, adjudicators indicated they would influence the 
                                                             
24
 See Table 5.13. 
25
 See Chapter 5. 
26
 See Tables 5.19 and 5.20 and related text for discussion on representatives and success rates of 
employees. 
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atmosphere, intervene, aid unrepresented parties, and ensure that the power balance at 
least in the hearing is equal or balanced.
27
 
8.1.4(B) REMEDIES AND COSTS 
 
There was a large disparity between the monetary remedies that applicants sought and 
what was granted:
28
 
 The national average of recovery of wages lost sought was $18,000; an 
average of $4,000 was granted. 
 Compensation sought was $22,000; $3,300 was granted. 
 Total remedies sought were $39,000; $6,000 was granted. 
 
While the reasons for this disparity are related to the constraints on adjudicators, there 
are also small, not statistically significant differences in what was granted related to 
the occupation of the applicant,
29
 representation,
30
 which adjudicator was sitting, and 
the nature of the personal grievance itself. Adjudicators expanded on the above by 
indicating that a variety of additional contextual factors affected their exercise of 
discretion on overall remedies. This allowed them to take into account parties‟ 
individual circumstances.
31
 However, the above figures show a significant gap 
between applicants‟ expectations and outcomes. In assessing quantum of remedies, 
adjudicators took into account additional factors, including court guidelines, previous 
awards levels, an applicant‟s contributory conduct and an employer‟s ability to pay.32 
 
                                                             
27
 See Chapter 6.6.1 
28
 These rounded averages are from Tables 5.21, 5.24, and 5.32. See also related text. 
29
 See Table 5.26 and related text. 
30
 See Table 5.28 and related text. 
31
 See discussion at Chapter 6.4.12(c). 
32
 For an extensive discussion on adjudicators‟ approaches to remedies, see Chapter 6.4.12. 
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Perceptions of adequate remedies granted impacted on parties‟ satisfaction levels with 
the personal adjudication process. For example, of the employees surveyed, 67 
percent indicated they did not believe they received adequate compensation.
33
 This 
was exacerbated by similar issues relating to costs.
34
 
8.2 ANALYSIS OF THE ACCESS TO JUSTICE PRINCIPLE  
 
Although the intention of the National Government at the time of passing the 
Employment Contracts Act in 1991, set out in the Objects section of the Act, was to 
make the adjudication system quick, informal and inexpensive, this has not been 
shown to be the reality for a significant proportion of those involved with 
adjudication. In Chapters Five, Six, and Seven, this thesis has examined issues related 
to time delays, cost and the necessity to use lawyers in a complicated system. 
Commentators and adjudicators have indicated that the detailed Regulations required 
a level of formality that encouraged greater use of legal representation and inevitably 
made the adjudication process more complex, and had limited the statutory ability for 
the Tribunal to set its own procedure.
35
 Such constraints had the effect of increasing 
time delays and costs; which in turn affected access to justice for many people. These 
issues are discussed in detail below however, it should be noted that there is 
considerable overlap between some of these issues.  
 
                                                             
33
 See Tables 7.15 and 7.16 for discussion on perceptions of remedies and outcomes. 
34
 For the quantum and impact of costs, see Chapters 5.4.8, 6.8.3, and 7.5.8. 
35
 See, for example, Neville Taylor, „The Employment Tribunal – Is There a Better Way?‟ [1996] ELB 
101, 102; „Through no fault of the Tribunal, the procedures have, to varying degrees, become quite 
legalistic and formal. Such an approach is time-consuming, expensive, and less “user friendly” to the 
lay-person. Within the existing structure, there is probably no escape from such developments. The 
statute, despite pretensions to the contrary, requires a degree of intrinsic formality and legal procedure.‟ 
See also, John Hughes, „The Issues Paper on Personal Grievances‟ [1997] ELB 136, 139.  
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The Employment Tribunal was established under the Employment Contracts Act 1991 
to hear and determine most employment related matters. The Employment Tribunal 
was the first step in the legal hierarchy of the employment jurisdiction. If either party 
was dissatisfied with the Tribunal‟s decision, appeal could have been made to the 
Employment Court on questions of law. The Employment Court also had first 
instance jurisdiction over some matters.
36
 Further appeal, was then available to the 
Court of Appeal on points of law.
37
 The Employment Tribunal was bound by the 
decisions and directions of the Employment Court and the Court of Appeal. Likewise, 
the Employment Court was required to follow decisions of the Court of Appeal.
38
 In 
the words of Goddard CJ, it was clear that the Employment Contracts Act 1991 
„continue[d] the hierarchical system established by the Labour Relations Act 1987 
under which each lower tier must accept loyally the decisions of the higher tiers on 
questions of law.‟39 
8.2.1 PROCESS ISSUES 
 
8.2.1(A) LOW LEVEL 
 
The then Minister of Labour, William Birch, in his second reading speech to 
Parliament on the Employment Contracts Bill in 1991, said that for the Tribunal „the 
intention [was] to provide a specialist lower level institution which [would] be able to 
resolve many issues closer to the workplace.‟40 However, it has been argued that the 
                                                             
36
 Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 104: examples included breach of contract, compliance, tort 
actions and injunctive relief. 
37
 Ibid, s 135. 
38
 See generally, Chapter 2. See Employment Contracts Act 1991, Part VI. Anderson et al (eds) 
Mazengarb’s Employment Law, Looseleaf, (1991-1998) Vol 1, para VI.1, Introduction. 
39
 New Zealand Public Service Association v Electricity Corporation of NZ Ltd, Marketing Division 
[1991] 2 ERNZ 365, 380, Goddard CJ. 
40
 Hon W F Birch, Minister of Labour, Second Reading Speech, Employment Contracts Bill (1991) 12. 
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Employment Contracts Act 1991 actually had the opposite effect as it focussed on 
individual rights and deregulated the representation market.
41
 This resulted in the 
increased involvement of lawyers and a loss of influence on the part of the unions. 
Roth suggested that this represented:
42
 
…the reorientation of workplace conflict away from the industrial relations arena and towards 
the staking out and enforcement of individuals‟ legal rights in legal forums, so that litigation, 
or the threat of it, [became] the paradigmatic mode for dealing with problems in the 
workplace. This [was] both expensive and inefficient. 
 
Lesser union involvement in dealing with workplace difficulties meant that the union 
„filtering function‟43 apparent under the Labour Relations Act 1987 disappeared.44 
The unions‟ ability to decline representation where they believed cases lacked 
substance was removed from the legislation and potentially all employment related 
problems became part of the waiting list for mediation or adjudication.
45
 However, as 
mediation was not compulsory under the Employment Contracts Act 1991 a 
significant number of cases went directly to adjudication. It is possible to speculate 
that the unions simply adapted to the new system in their own way. One union 
advocate, in response to this thesis survey, said: 
In all our cases we have what effectively is a mediation with the employer but without a 
formal mediator so we then always went direct to adjudication. 
                                                             
41
 This argument was based on workplaces that were previously unionised. In the case of employees 
who had been outside the personal grievance coverage because they did not belong to a union, the 
changes did give them access to a lower level process, as they would previously have had to go to the 
District Court or the High Court. See below, para 8.1.4(b) for discussion on the effects of increased 
legal representation. 
42
 Paul Roth, „The Cost of “Individualising” Labour Law‟ [1997] ELB 82. Roth added that „[b]y 
individualising labour law the way it did, the Government committed itself to industrial relations by 
litigation‟. 
43
 Ibid 
44
 Labour Relations Act 1987, sch 7, cl 4, „Discussion between union and employer – Where the union 
considers that the personal grievance has substance, it shall forthwith take the matter up with the 
employer or a representative of the employer with a view to reaching a settlement of the grievance.‟  
45
 Roth argued that the taxpayer was then left to „foot the bill‟ for mediation and adjudication of cases 
that might previously not have got through the union sieve. Paul Roth, „The Cost of “Individualising” 
Labour Law‟ [1997] ELB 82.  
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Alastair Dumbleton, then Chief of the Employment Tribunal, observed in 1996 that 
the Employment Tribunal was aware that, at times, little if any effort had been made 
by the parties to resolve the matters in dispute before formally filing for 
adjudication.
46
 Dumbleton suggested that rather than using a common sense approach 
to resolving the issues, the grievant was „intent on waving the big stick of 
adjudication and the enforceable remedies available there‟.47 This was arguably 
contrary to the expectation under the Employment Contracts Act 1991 that the 
employer would first be given the opportunity „to remedy the grievance rapidly as 
near as possible to its point of origin.‟48 However, while Dumbleton referred to „the 
grievant‟ in this context, it could equally have been the employer who chose to avoid 
mediation and seek for the matter to go directly to adjudication. The greater influence 
of lawyers may also have been a contributing factor to these decisions.
49
 One union 
advocate, in response to this thesis survey commented: 
Although [under the new Employment Relations Act 2000] mediation seems to be very 
successful but I don‟t believe it always results in a just outcome. Also employees always seem 
to be satisfied, win or lose if they have their day in “Court”. Although resolved, mediation 
seems to lack that “justice at last” feeling.  
 
The procedures and rules contained in the Employment Tribunal Regulations 1991 
arguably made it difficult for the Tribunal to operate at a low level. The adjudication 
process was similar to that followed by the Employment Court and the District and 
High Courts.
50
 The setting for Employment Tribunal hearings was formal (although 
                                                             
46
 Alastair Dumbleton, „The Employment Tribunal – Four Years On‟ [1996] 21(1) NZJIR21, 32. 
47
 Ibid. 
48
 Employment Contracts Act 1991, sch 1, cl 3(1). 
49
 See below, 8.2.1(b), for Margaret Robbie‟s comments on lawyers‟ attitudes to mediation and 
following discussion.  
50
 Walter Grills, „Dispute Resolution in the Employment Tribunal, Part Two: Adjudication‟ [1993] 
18(1) New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations 84. Grills was an Adjudicator and Mediator of the 
Employment Tribunal in Dunedin.  
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not as formal as the ordinary courts) with witnesses sitting at a separate table from 
representatives and parties and the adjudicator separate at the front. How you viewed 
the layout might have depended on what you were comparing it to. A number of 
adjudicators in this research said that it was less formal than the Employment Court 
but more formal than the conciliation process under the previous Labour Relations 
Act 1987.
51
 One representative (counsel) summed it up this way: 
All of those adjectives [in the survey questionnaire] apply. Overall there is a pattern of 
formality, but without the stuffiness or pedantry of civil courts. There is legalism, and it is 
time consuming; not so much in the hearing, but in the preparation of briefs and submissions. 
 
These are not necessarily criticisms, the issue involved concerns legal rights and remedies. 
They should be addressed predictably and carefully, failing which there is often cause for 
dissatisfaction, not only in the result, but whether there has been a fair hearing. The most 
important person is the party who is going to lose. 
 
The formal rules in the Regulations regarding swearing in of witnesses,
52
 presentation 
of evidence,
53
 examination of witnesses,
54
 rebuttal evidence,
55
 and closing 
statements,
56
 together with the formal layout of the rooms and the use of lawyers all 
suggested to participants in the process that the low-level workplace conciliation 
procedure which had applied under the Labour Relations Act 1987 had been replaced 
                                                             
51
 See Chapter 6.4.1. 
52
 Employment Tribunal Regulations 1991, reg 49(1); Procedure in adjudication proceedings: 
   (a) Every witness shall be examined on oath (which term includes an affirmation). 
53
 Ibid, reg 49(1)(b) – (d): 
(b) Each witness may give his or her evidence-in-chief by reading or confirming a written 
brief or statement of evidence: 
(c) The Tribunal shall first hear the applicant and such evidence as the applicant may adduce: 
(d) The Tribunal shall then hear the respondent and such evidence as the respondent may 
adduce. 
54
 Ibid, reg 49(1) (f): The parties may examine, cross-examine, and re-examine witnesses. 
55
 Ibid, reg 49(1)(e): If the Tribunal is satisfied that evidence adduced by the respondent included 
material that could not reasonably have been foreseen by the applicant, it may, if that material requires 
an answer, allow the applicant to adduce evidence in rebuttal. 
56
 Ibid, reg 49(1)(g): Either party may, in an address to the Tribunal, sum up the party‟s case. 
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by a higher (more formal) level of operation. Goddard CJ appeared to anticipate this 
when he commented that:
57
  
…a systemic change is about to be made highlighting even more acutely a hierarchical system 
of dispute resolution.  
 
a) Informal – accusations of legalism 
 
One of the central objects of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 was to create an 
informal system for resolving personal grievances. Concerns about formality and 
legalism had already existed prior to the Labour Relations Act 1987. The 1985 
Parliamentary Green Paper on Industrial Relations had identified „structural and 
operational problems, particularly delays in Court hearings and the alleged tendency 
for greater legalism and focus on technical detail‟.58 Despite this, the Labour 
Relations Act 1987 gave the Labour Court exclusive jurisdiction to hear all legal 
matters arising from the legislation.
59
 Ryan and Walsh argued that this
60
 
…continued and indeed accelerated the trend towards giving the Court a greater authority in 
relation to legal questions, by transferring to it jurisdiction which had until then been with the 
civil courts, and increasing its status by making it inferior only to the Court of Appeal... Thus 
the changes made by the Labour Relations Act gave rise to a considerably more formal and 
legally based system than in the past. 
 
Under the Labour Relations Act 1987, the Grievance Committee process was initiated 
by a union. With the extension of access to personal grievances by non-union 
                                                             
57
 New Zealand Public Service Association v Electricity Corporation of NZ Ltd, Marketing Division 
[1991] 2 ERNZ 365, 381, Goddard CJ. 
58
 Minister of Labour, Industrial Relations: A Framework for Review, New Zealand Government 
(1985). See Rose Ryan and Pat Walsh, „Common Law v Labour Law: the New Zealand Debate‟ (1993) 
Australian Journal of Labour Law 230, 233. See Chapter 3.3.3(b) for Goddard CJ‟s comments in 
United Food & Chemical Workers Union of NZ v Talley [1992] 1 ERNZ 756. 
59
 Labour Relations Act 1987, s 279, Jurisdiction of Labour Court. See Rose Ryan and Pat Walsh, 
„Common Law v Labour Law: the New Zealand Debate‟ (1993) Australian Journal of Labour Law 
230, 233.  
60
 Rose Ryan and Pat Walsh, „Common Law v Labour Law: the New Zealand Debate‟ (1993) 
Australian Journal of Labour Law 230, 234.  
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employees under the Employment Contracts Act 1991 the Government‟s aim in 
introducing the Employment Tribunal to adjudicate employment problems was 
ostensibly to create a low-level, informal process for all employees. While mediation 
remained an option, the adjudication process was however, similar in many respects 
to an ordinary low level court system
61
 and it utilised an adversarial approach rather 
than a conciliatory one, as had been the case under the Labour Relations Act 1987 at 
an equivalent level,
62
 or an investigative model as is now the case with the 
Employment Relations Authority under the Employment Relations Act 2000.
63
  
 
Dumbleton acknowledged that the adjudication process was adversarial in nature.
64
 
He believed that the mediation process met with the intentions of the Act,
65
 but that 
the adjudication system was by its nature formal as parties were examined and cross-
examined in a manner at odds with the expected informality.
66
 However, Dumbleton 
defended the manner in which Employment Tribunal hearings were conducted and 
believed that accusations of excessive legalism should have been directed towards 
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 Margaret Robbie, Representation, Procedure and Process in Mediation and Adjudication Since the 
Employment Contracts Act, Research Paper, Waikato Polytechnic (1993) iii. „The procedures and rules 
of the Tribunal give it the jurisdiction of a lower court. It can hear penalty actions, arrears claims and 
order compliance, functions the mediation service in the arbitration role had no jurisdiction over.‟ 
62
 Labour Relations Act 1987, sch 7, cl 7; Grievance committee. Where a union was not satisfied with 
an employer‟s response to a personal grievance claim, they could call for a grievance committee to be 
established by the Mediation Service. The committee comprised an equal number of representatives of 
the union and the employer. See Chapter 2.2.2. 
63
 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 157, „Role of Authority – (1) The Authority is an investigative 
body that has the role of resolving employment relationship problems by establishing the facts and 
making a determination according to the substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities.‟ 
64
 Alastair Dumbleton, „The Employment Tribunal – Four Years On‟ [1996] 21 NZJIR 21, 23. 
65
 See also, Paul Stapp, The Employment Tribunal in 1998, Paper to the New Zealand Law Society 
Employment Law Conference 1998, 137. „The tribunal‟s role in mediation has I believe been 
successful, particularly if viewed in terms of outcomes and bearing in mind the tribunal‟s total work 
load.‟ 
66
 Ibid 34 [1996] 21 NZJIR 21, 23. „Courtroom litigation is by its very nature, not a people friendly 
process. Even in the Tribunal, where the character of adjudication is required to be low level and 
informal, the necessary questioning and cross-questioning of men and women about relevant (and 
sometimes irrelevant) aspects of their personal lives, and the wear and tear generally of having to be an 
adversary, have a tendency to buckle the spirit of people. I am sure that many people have been left 
rueful of the whole adjudication experience even when they have won the battle.‟  
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how the law was communicated and explained to parties. In his opinion, case law had 
„expand[ed] upon and qualif[ied] concepts‟ that appeared simple in the Act. Further, 
the influence of the Court of Appeal on employment law meant that rights could no 
longer be determined simply by reading and interpreting the Employment Contracts 
Act 1991.
67
  
 
Many Employment Tribunal adjudicators agreed with Dumbleton‟s perceptions that it 
was the influence of the Employment Court and the frequent use of lawyers that 
created a formal atmosphere and increased the degree of legal knowledge required in 
the Employment Tribunal.
68
 In Chapter Six, adjudicators‟ comments displayed a 
strong opinion that the influence of the Employment Court had made the Employment 
Tribunal more formal than it should have been. The objective of the system was seen 
as having been defeated by „overly legalistic supervisory judgments from the Court‟, 
creating an „overly academic approach to employment law‟ which affected public 
perception of the Tribunal.
69
 Three-quarters of the adjudicators interviewed for this 
thesis did not believe that the intentions of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 in this 
area had been met. They felt that the Employment Court „was to blame because it set 
standards too high and moulded the Tribunal in its own image‟.70 Some commented 
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 Ibid [1996] 21 NZJIR 21, 30. „[The Court of Appeal‟s] decisions, many of which are at variance with 
those of the Employment Court, add further to the legal tracts that have supplanted the statute as the 
primary and public source of employment law… I do not know how even practitioners who specialise 
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Tribunal. 
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 See Chapter 6.4.1. 
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 See below, 8.2.1(b) for discussion of the influence of the Employment Court on the operations of the 
Employment Tribunal. 
494 
 
that it had became dominated by the legal profession, who were able to manipulate 
the procedures to „raise fees for law firms‟, slowing the process down.71 
 
However, commentators have suggested that the way that the adjudication process 
was created by statute and regulation made it inevitable that there would be a 
significant level of formality and legalism.
72
 The „statutory design of the adjudication 
role [meant that] the Employment Tribunal [could not] effectively deliver the degree 
of informality that [was] desirable.‟73 Rather than the presence of lawyers in the 
Employment Tribunal being the cause of increased legalism, it was argued that the 
„cause and effect‟ were in fact reversed and that:74  
The extent of the jurisdiction of the Employment Tribunal, the nature of the remedies that 
[could] be awarded, and the inability to raise on appeal matters that could have and should 
have been raised in the Employment Tribunal [meant that] at least in its adjudication role it 
[was] unrealistic to expect that Employment Tribunal proceedings [could] be any more speedy 
informal or low level than they [were]. 
 
The jurisdiction of the Employment Tribunal and the potential to award powerful 
remedies, including reinstatement where practicable, meant that in practice the 
Employment Tribunal could not logically be thought of as informal and low level.
75
 
 
Ralph Gardiner, an Employment Tribunal Member at the time, argued that the greater 
formality of the adjudication hearings should not have been cause for alarm as there 
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 See Chapter 6.4.1. See below, 8.2.2 on delay and 8.2.3 on costs. 
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 John Hughes, „The Issues Paper on Personal Grievances‟ [1997] ELB 136, 139. See also, Neville 
Taylor, „The Employment Tribunal – Is There a Better Way?‟ [1996] ELB 101, 102. See Anderson et 
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always had to be a body „where matters were heard more formally‟.76 He said „that 
Tribunal adjudication hearings [were] more formal than was a Labour Relations Act 
Grievance Committee‟ but that as the adjudication function had previously been 
carried out by the Labour Court, the formality should not be a surprise.
77
 However, 
this view did not take into account that mediation (in the Grievance Committee) was 
compulsory under the Labour Relations Act 1987 and that the Labour Court was the 
next, formal step if that failed. In contrast, adjudication under the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991, with its accompanying formal process, was frequently the first 
stage in attempting to resolve employment issues.     
 
The perception of the Employment Tribunal as formal and legalistic may have been 
an important factor in determining access to justice matters. This was reinforced by 
the comments of participants recorded in Chapter Seven of this thesis. In general, 
respondent parties (usually employers) found the adjudication system less formal and 
intimidating than applicant parties (usually employees).
78
 The differing perceptions of 
applicants and respondents arguably reinforced the power imbalance between the 
parties and may have been explained by greater confidence from employers around 
the use of the system and their ability to retain, and pay for, suitable representation.
79
 
The views of thesis survey participants reflected the general perception that 
employment issues were being dealt with further away from the workplace than had 
been the legislators‟ expressed intention. However, this arguably accorded with the 
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 W R C Gardiner, The Employment Tribunal (A Report from the Trenches) (1998) 7. See discussion 
of restricted appeals and other technical barriers later in this section. 
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 See Chapter 6.6.1 for adjudicators‟ views on the issue of power imbalance.  
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more „pure contractual‟ model on which the Employment Contracts Act 1991 was 
originally based.
80
 
 
The deregulation of the representation market in the employment law arena made it 
possible for parties to represent themselves or more commonly, to be represented by 
lawyers.
81
 Gardiner argued that this (along with the widening of the availability of 
grievance procedures to all employees) „profoundly changed the face‟ of 
representation in the „basement employment institution (previously the Mediation 
Service, now the Employment Tribunal)‟.82 Previously, employees were usually 
represented by the union and the employers by an Employers‟ Association advocate, a 
lawyer, or themselves. Gardiner saw it as inevitable that those whose non-union status 
had previously denied them access to personal grievance procedures would not 
approach a union for representation but would seek independent representation.
83
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The increase in representation by legal counsel was confirmed in research, conducted 
by Margaret Robbie, of all Employment Court and Tribunal decisions between July 
1990 and the end of July 1992. In less than a year after the introduction of the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991 she found that there was a complete reversal of the 
proportions of representation by counsel and advocates and that counsel then 
substantially outnumbered advocates. Unlike the research in this thesis, Margaret 
Robbie‟s research focussed on both personal grievances and disputes and looked at 
two years of comparison as opposed to one.
84
 However, research undertaken for this 
thesis also indicated that under the Employment Contracts Act 1991 in 1997, in 
personal grievance claims at adjudication, counsel significantly outnumbered 
advocate representatives for both respondents though less so for applicants.
85
 It is 
impossible to compare these figures with representation in the Grievance Committees 
under the Labour Relations Act 1987 as data on representation was not kept, but 
anecdotally representation by counsel in those committees was rare. 
 
Despite differing years and types of claims measured, the findings of the two studies 
appear consistent. The increase in the number of lawyers appearing in the Tribunal 
and corresponding decrease in the involvement of union advocates and organisers was 
also confirmed in research by JP Thomson in 1992
86
 and supported by the following 
responses to questions in the thesis surveys: 
 The Tribunal came to be dominated by the legal profession. (Adjudicator) 
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 Margaret Robbie, Representation, Procedure and Process in Mediation and Adjudication Since the 
Employment Contracts Act, Research Paper, Waikato Polytechnic (1993). 
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[A suitable alternative to the system under the Employment Contracts Act 1991:] Keep 
lawyers out of the system as it was prior to ‟91. (Representative) 
 
Gardiner believed that it was inevitable that the greater use of lawyers would have an 
effect on the level of formality and the amount of legal argument used:
87
 
Allowing that adjudication is a more formal process than is mediation, representatives can do 
much to contribute to, or (perversely) to derogate from, the ability of the Tribunal to deliver 
on one of its section 76 objects which is that it is to be “a low level, informal Tribunal.” 
 
Robbie‟s research confirmed this view. She said that the greater involvement of legal 
counsel was one direct result of the change from the informal procedure under the 
Labour Relations Act 1987 institutions to the more formal structure under the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991.
88
 She also argued that lawyers were less likely to be 
trained in or experienced in mediation and were therefore much more likely to prefer 
adjudication as a method of resolution, she suggests:
89
  
Lawyers, by dint of their training, are more litigious, prefer to operate in a formal court 
environment as opposed to a mediation setting, and thus demonstrate little ability or 
willingness to settle matters through dialogue. 
 
Robbie found inexperience of mediation was especially apparent for those lawyers 
who were new to the employment law area. She found that the „overriding 
impression‟ was that many cases that could have been settled in mediation had not 
been referred to mediation because of a lack of understanding of the law or „because 
of the skills (or lack of skills) of the representatives and their attitude to mediation.‟90 
One advocate surveyed for this thesis, who was representing a respondent, 
commented on the inappropriate use of mediation in the following terms: 
                                                             
87
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The fact was that at the end of it [adjudication] it was clear that the applicant had a much 
fuller understanding of where he stood than he did at the outset. In fact, I‟d say there was less 
acrimony between the parties by the end than there had been beforehand. Yes, maybe that 
should have been achieved at mediation with a skilled mediator, but mediation is too often 
approached as a “fact finding” exercise to draw out the other side (for use at future 
adjudication) rather than a genuine attempt to settle, and in my experience most of the 
mediators were pretty bloody useless. 
 
However, Robbie‟s conclusions differ from those of this thesis. By 1997 it was clear 
that this had changed, as virtually all counsel who responded to the survey responded 
had experience in mediation.
91
 Further, a high number of personal grievance cases 
were settled in mediation during 1997.
92
 However, these figures did not give any 
insight on the quality of the mediation, the attitude of representatives in that forum or 
the fairness and equity of the outcomes reached. They do, however, highlight the 
change in the manner of representation at that low level, which Gardiner identified.  
 
The tendency of lawyers to try to transfer court etiquette and rules into the 
Employment Tribunal was remarked on by Goddard CJ in 1993 in Davidson v 
Telecom
93
 in the context of the presentation of evidence. He was surprised by the 
representatives‟ unduly legalistic approach to points of evidence and reaffirmed the 
informal nature of the Employment Tribunal and its ability to admit evidence, 
whether or not it was strictly legal, in equity and good conscience. His comments 
seem not to have had the desired effect, as he made similar comments in 1996, in Reid 
v NZ Fire Service Commission.
94
 Similar concerns regarding an overly legalistic 
                                                             
91
 See Chapter 7.4.4 and Table 7.9 for representatives‟ experience in mediation. 
92
 See Chapter 2.3.2, where it was stated that mediation was successful in over 70 percent of cases. 
93
 Davidson v Telecom Central [1993] 2 ERNZ 819. 
94
 Reid v NZ Fire Service Commission unreported, Employment Court, Wellington, Goddard CJ, WEC 
28/96, 16 May 1996. 
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approach to the adjudication process were reflected in some applicants‟ responses to 
this thesis survey. They suggested:
95
 
 Legal points ruled and grass roots fact never got heard or presented. 
 
If you wanted a Hollywood drama or lawyers dodging issues and saving costs [for the 
respondent] and trying to kick a person‟s self esteem out the door then yes [the process was 
straightforward] but for resolving issues then, no. 
 
Arguments about the use of lawyers in adjudication have become somewhat circular. 
According to some commentators
96
 the use of lawyers in any process tends to increase 
the formality and legalism of that procedure, which reinforces a perception that it is 
necessary for parties to use lawyers to help them understand and access the system. It 
is argued that in the employment context this perception meant that adjudication 
appeared more inaccessible and self-representation became less of a realistic prospect. 
For many, access to good quality legal advice in the first instance was essential to 
access the procedure. The steps outlined in public information brochures on how to 
use the adjudication process were arguably complex.
97
 Further, legal counsel was seen 
as necessary to ensure that relevant arguments and settlement proposals were put 
forward in the best possible light.
98
 As one counsel stated in response to this thesis 
survey, the adjudication process was straightforward from the position of a „legal‟ 
user but „not straight forward for someone [employer or employee] representing 
themselves.‟ Other counsel said: 
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The process and procedure is straightforward once it is known, and it should be known by 
representatives of the parties. Predictable procedure is to be preferred. 
 
It followed a normal adversarial procedure with which I am familiar. 
It is submitted that for the average employee or employer who has never used the 
procedure before and probably would hope never to have to use it again, the fact that 
representatives may have found it more straightforward than they did reinforced the 
need to use representation and that was not necessarily a positive factor in ensuring 
access to justice. 
 
Under these circumstances the procedures contained in the Regulations and the 
practice of how the Employment Tribunal worked arguably created a dependency on 
lawyers that was contrary to the legislative intent of the Employment Contracts Act 
1991. However, this dependency, and its alleged effect on access to justice issues, was 
not unusual in the law generally. In 1986, the Department of Justice research on Legal 
Services observed that:
99
 
The failings attributed to lawyers… will only be resolved by major changes within the legal 
profession itself, and in the processes which create dependency on lawyers. Criticisms… 
include pre-occupation with profit, reputation and status; lack of commitment to justice; 
inability to relate to human realities of other classes and cultures; ignorance and disinterest in 
cases which are unattractive and financially unrewarding… elitist and patronising attitudes to 
women, Maori, Pacific people and non-professionals generally; gross cultural insensitivity and 
arrogance; basic failure to communicate; use of technical legal jargon which excludes lay 
clients from understanding and taking control; plush offices which make commercial clients 
comfortable, and ordinary people uncomfortable; restricted opening hours causing serious 
inconvenience to workers and rural dwellers; unavailability in emergencies; and lack of child 
care facilities and flexibility to meet women‟s needs. 
 
Transposing these views to the employment setting, it can be seen that the approach 
taken by lawyers pushed the resolution of employment problems further away from 
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the workplace and made it more likely that they would be resolved in a formal setting. 
For some parties the manner in which lawyers operated would have appeared „alien 
and alienating‟ and would therefore have acted as a barrier to accessing the system. 
Some applicants in this thesis (50% of whom said in the survey they found the 
process intimidating) provided the following observations about the procedure: 
 [The process] was very formal. 
During the hearing my employer‟s lawyer lied about a crucial aspect and I was not allowed to 
respond. 
The explanation [from the lawyer] was confusing. 
 
Close to one quarter of representatives said parties were not aware of their legal 
obligations. One representative surveyed commented that the hearing: 
…took six days when originally set down for two – increased time mainly down to adjudicator 
questions and other counsel‟s rambling cross-examination which wasn‟t checked by the 
adjudicator. (Counsel) 
 
However, representation can have a positive effect on access to justice for some. As 
one counsel for an applicant said: 
[The process] took all day because the respondent was vocal, unrepresented and therefore 
uncontrolled. 
 
Any inclination which lawyers may have had to complicate and protract employment 
litigation was assisted by the technical nature of the Employment Contracts Act 1991. 
Technical barriers such as the 90-day rule,
100
 jurisdictional issues between the 
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 Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 33; Right to use procedures –  
(2) Every employee who wishes to submit a personal grievance to that employee‟s employer 
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Employment Tribunal and the Employment Court,
101
 and restricted appeals
102
 
increased rather than decreased formality and led to more, and more complex legal 
argument. Universal access to personal grievances also increased both the number of 
claims and their complexity.
103
  
 
Unless a party could show that they could not reasonably have placed relevant issues 
before the Employment Tribunal at first instance,
104
 the Court could consider „only 
those issues, explanations and facts that were placed before the Tribunal.‟105 Paul 
Roth observed that „the limits on introducing new arguments and evidence on appeal 
[rendered] the Tribunal a less informal and speedy forum because ideally all 
conceivable legal arguments need[ed] to be presented and canvassed at first instance 
“just in case”‟.106 This was borne out by one adjudicator‟s response in this thesis who 
indicated: 
I would say on a percentage basis more than 50 percent, no it would be higher than that, called 
either irrelevant witnesses or insufficient witnesses. But more irrelevant witnesses, and why 
was that? Because if they didn‟t get it all on record at that point, they couldn‟t introduce new 
witnesses at the next step, they‟d have to seek leave of the court. So they brought in 
                                                                                                                                                                              
employer consents to the personal grievance being submitted after the expiration of that 
period. 
(3) Where the employee‟s employer does not consent… the employee may apply to the 
Tribunal for leave to submit the personal grievance after the expiration of that period. 
(4) Where, on an application under subsection (3) of this section, the Tribunal, after giving the 
employee‟s employer an opportunity to be heard,–  
(a) Is satisfied the delay in submitting the personal grievance was occasioned by 
exceptional circumstances; and 
(b) Considers it just to do so, – the Tribunal may grant leave accordingly, subject to 
such conditions (if any) as it thinks fit. 
See also Chapter 2.4.1(c). 
101
 Ibid, s 94; Removal of proceedings to Court. Any party to the proceedings could apply to the 
Tribunal to have the case heard at first instance in the Court, in limited circumstances. 
102
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heard de novo. The Employment Relations Act 2000 has returned to the principle of de novo appeals 
from the Employment Relations Authority. See Employment Relations Act 2000, s 179(3).  
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everything but the kitchen sink, and as a result, managed to lengthen the hearing, the cost of it, 
and everything else. It was a fault of the process. 
 
One representative (an advocate) surveyed commented: „…it ran on for days-
irrelevant and unnecessary evidence introduced by the applicant…‟ Average hearing 
length was 1.6 days, with 14% taking over two days in 1997. 
 
The 90-day rule also acted as a constraint on access to justice by requiring the 
applicant to have advised the employer within 90 days that a personal grievance was 
alleged.
107
 It is suggested that whilst it was arguably appropriate to require the 
applicant to inform the employer promptly of a potential personal grievance it may 
have caused difficulties where employees were suffering stress and humiliation. If the 
applicant missed the 90-day deadline it was necessary for an application to be made to 
the Employment Court seeking leave for the claim to be heard out of time.
108
 This in 
itself added another complex tier to the personal grievance process and there was a 
high threshold required to prove that exceptional circumstances existed sufficient to 
allow the late application.
109
 Roth noted that „between 1992 and March 1997 there 
were 110 Tribunal cases and 10 appeals to the Court relating to applications to submit 
personal grievances outside the time limit.‟110  
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Another difficulty for parties was the potential overlap of function between the 
Employment Tribunal and the Employment Court. This „sometimes awkward split‟111 
in jurisdiction resulted in increased numbers of interlocutory hearings and legal 
arguments which resulted in delays in proceedings. 
8.2.1(B) A SPECIALIST COURT? 
 
Commentators and adjudicators agreed that the Employment Court had a significant 
influence on the adjudication process and the role of adjudicators in the Employment 
Tribunal.
112
 This was seen to have an effect on the issues surrounding cost, delay and 
process identified in this thesis and therefore impacted upon access to justice for all 
participants in the Employment Tribunal process. Under s 76(d) of the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991 one of the objects of the Employment Court was to establish a 
specialist court to: 
…oversee the role of the Employment Tribunal and to deal with particular legal issues, it 
being recognised that the nature of employment contracts is such that the parties to 
employment contracts from time to time require the assistance and certainty that can be 
provided by a specialist court. 
 
The Employment Court had jurisdiction under s 104 of the Employment Contracts Act 
1991, among other things, to hear and determine appeals from adjudications of the 
Employment Tribunal and questions of law referred to it by the Tribunal.
113
 In 
discussing the „systemic change‟ that was about to occur under the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991, Goddard CJ said that the appeal structure ensured „not only 
correctness but uniformity and it [was] obviously essential that the low level tribunal 
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should accept without question decisions on questions of law made at each higher 
level.‟114 In Benge v Attorney-General, Goddard CJ said that in enacting s 76(d) 
Parliament had „made it plain that it expect[ed] the Court to be an influence for 
certainty and stability‟.115 
 
The Employment Tribunal was not expected to develop its own line of authority.
116
 In 
McClutchie v Landcorp Farming, Judge Finnigan said that Employment Tribunal 
decisions were:
117
 
…not without their persuasive relevance but they should not be offered to the Court as 
persuasive authorities. It is for the Employment Tribunal to function as “[a] low level, 
Informal, specialist…Tribunal...” resolving differences between parties to employment 
contracts and it is for the Court “to oversee the role of the… Tribunal and to deal with 
particular legal issues”… It is not for the Employment Tribunal to develop employment law or 
to lay down new lines of authority. Rather, it is for the Tribunal to accept and apply principles 
laid down from time to time by the Court when assistance and certainty are required. This 
juxtaposition of the institutions is one of the declared objects of the Act, at s 76. 
 
Soon after Judge Finnegan further clarified the matter in Winstone Wallboards v 
Samate,
118
 indicating that it was appropriate for parties before the Court to cite 
Tribunal decisions.
119
 
This is necessary so that the Court will be aware of the practice of the Employment Tribunal if 
one has been or is being developed, and of any principles or guidelines by which the tribunal 
is steering its course. For that reason those decisions have what I call persuasive relevance, 
particularly if the Court upholds them. They may or may not be upheld however and they 
should not be cited to the Court as persuasive authorities. 
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a) Precedent and Process 
 
The authority of the Employment Court to make law and lay down principles and 
precedents was not really at issue; however, it affected access to justice in two ways. 
Firstly, the Employment Court directed the Employment Tribunal in the exercise of 
their functions.
120
 In this area, the Court was interpreting rules that were already 
tightly prescribed in the Regulations.
121
 The case law demonstrated that the 
Employment Court on occasion, criticised the operation of the Employment Tribunal 
and instructed it to adhere to the technical requirements in the Regulations, for 
example, regarding cross-examination.
122
 This arguably restricted the Tribunal‟s 
discretion to adapt their procedure and therefore their ability to maintain a low-level 
process accessible and comprehensible to all. 
 
Secondly, the Employment Court‟s interpretation of wider principles of employment 
law, such as the definition of „unjustifiable‟ dismissal, led to arguments that there was 
a lack of certainty as to how the law had been interpreted and applied by the Court 
that further restricted the ability of all parties to ascertain and comprehend their rights 
under the Act.
123
 This led to more complex arguments and submissions by parties, 
which in turn led to delays and added to the perceived need for representation. It is 
submitted that this also worked against the ideal of a low-level process.  
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Adjudicators surveyed for this thesis made a considerable number of comments about 
the Court both in terms of its law-making function and the ability of Tribunal 
Members to interpret and apply the principles established by the Court (See Chapter 
6.4.11 and 6.4.12). There was further concern expressed by some adjudicators over 
the Court‟s interference in the Tribunal‟s processes such as: 
 The Court imposed excessive rules so informality suffered.  
 
Some of the operation matters became too formalised. The Court administered the Tribunal by 
way of review and not appeal. The Court created legal complexity that surrounded the 
process. Procedures on filing were too legalistic, there were mechanisms for raising fees for 
law firms and it became too slow which was a resourcing issue. 
The statutory objectives were defeated by the Employment Court… There was nothing wrong 
with the system as it was designed. The Tribunal could have taken a more interventionist role 
like the Employment Relations Authority if it were not overly legalistic with supervisory 
judgments from the Court. 
 
The Tribunal would have worked better if not tied up by Employment Court rules, regulations 
and procedures.  
 
The Court made the Tribunal too legalistic and Tribunal adjudicators did not resist enough. 
 
Dumbleton however, argued that the provisions in the Employment Tribunal 
Regulations 1991 setting out the adjudication procedure were not excessively 
complex or legalistic and that „the overriding consideration [was] fairness to both 
parties.‟124 However, the adjudicators‟ comments show that although this may have 
been so in principle, in practice the Employment Court tended to dictate operational 
instructions to the Employment Tribunal rather than allowing it to apply its discretion 
under the Employment Tribunal Regulations 1991.  
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In a number of cases the Employment Court severely criticised how the Employment 
Tribunal operated. This approach therefore constrained the Employment Tribunal‟s 
ability to adapt their procedures as the legislation allowed. In McHale v Open 
Polytechnic
125
 Goddard CJ strongly criticised the process used by the Employment 
Tribunal and said that the order for trial set down in the regulations „[was] usually to 
be followed and commented that:
126
  
I think that I should express the Court‟s disquiet, falling only a little short of total disapproval 
of the form of proceeding adopted in this case for a number of reasons… While the Tribunal 
has, under the Employment Contracts Act 1991, a wide discretion as to the conduct of 
proceedings before it, that discretion is expressly made subject to the Act and to regulations 
made under the Act. The Act requires the procedure to be fair. The regulations set down an 
order for trial that is usually to be followed. 
 
Now it is true that by reg 49(2) the Employment Tribunal is empowered to intervene at any 
stage, but that provision was inserted to allay fears of a construction leading to an undesirably 
rigid or over-literal application of the order of hearing and to enable the adjudicator to ask 
questions of witnesses as and when some obscurity occurs to him or her rather than having to 
save it up to the end. It was not intended to allow, nor can the regulation be construed as 
allowing, the normal order of trial to be turned upside down except in the most rare and 
unusual of cases. 
 
The perceived interference of the Employment Court was seen by one adjudicator in 
this thesis as restricting their ability to intervene and assist self-represented parties. 
This may have impacted on the ability of self-represented parties to effectively access 
justice, the adjudicator suggested: 
[T]he Court‟s directions are quite clear that as adjudicators we‟re supposed to be hands off.  
It‟s for the parties to conduct their own case and how they are going to present it.  If on the 
other hand I‟m conscious that important issues need to be brought out then rather than ask 
them to ask it, I will ask those questions myself…but again, I was conscious as a Tribunal 
Member of the restrictions on the degree of intervention that the adjudicator has. 
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This perception was reinforced by decisions such as Davidson v Telecom Central 
127
 
where Goddard CJ utilised the requirement of the statutory duty to be „fair‟ as a 
reason to comment on the boundaries for the Tribunal when questioning witnesses. In 
his judgment he talked of preserving judicial „detachment‟128 and approved a „code of 
judicial conduct‟ set out by Lord Denning in the English Court of Appeal which 
suggests that:
129
  
The judge‟s part in all this is to hearken to the evidence, only himself asking questions of 
witnesses when it is necessary to clear up any point that has been overlooked or left obscure; 
to see that the advocates behave themselves seemly and keep to the rules laid down by law; to 
exclude irrelevancies and discourage repetition; to make sure by wise intervention that he 
follows the points that the advocates are making and can assess their worth; and at the end to 
make up his mind where the truth lies. If he goes beyond this, he drops the mantle of a judge 
and assumes the robe of an advocate; and the change does not become him well. 
 
This „guidance‟ was offered despite there being no complaint about the amount of 
questioning by either party in the Davidson case.
130
 Goddard CJ indicated that it was 
not his intention to criticise the Tribunal but said that some Employment Tribunal 
members needed guidance in this area.
131
 He then proceeded to give extensive 
direction to the Tribunal on the circumstances under which the Tribunal should ask 
questions, indicating:
132
  
Putting questions intended to satisfy the adjudicator‟s curiosity about the credibility or 
reliability of observation of a witness is in a different category… Questioning going to 
credibility is for the cross-examiner rather than the adjudicator and, if the former does not 
challenge credibility, there is no need for the Employment Tribunal to doubt it. 
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It is, of course, illogical to criticise any action that leads to the truth being discovered nor 
would I wish to do so, but I sound the caution that a stage can be reached at which witnesses 
become rattled, or browbeaten. 
 
Goddard CJ further indicated that his comments were „intended to be a guide only and 
not to be taken as an exhaustive prescription of the Tribunal‟s duties‟, however, he 
then went on to canvass other procedural matters, stating that „relevance, privilege 
from disclosure, and fairness are the only rules of admissibility and exclusion that the 
Tribunal needs to feel called on to recognise.‟133  
 
Despite the provision in the Employment Contracts Act 1991 that the Employment 
Tribunal should act in a low-level, informal manner, constant reminders and 
directions from the Employment Court as to the operation of the Employment 
Tribunal meant that adjudicators were unlikely to stray far from the process set down 
in the Act and the directions of the Employment Court. This perception was 
reinforced by Paul Stapp, a Member of the Employment Tribunal at the time, who 
said that comments from the Employment Court assisted the Tribunal to discipline the 
parties and avoid excessive legalism during the adjudication process, however, „the 
clear message prevent[ed] the tribunal from intervening too much in the process 
itself.‟134  
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It is interesting to note that under s 188(4) of the Employment Relations Act 2000, in 
an amendment to the original Act, the Employment Court is prohibited from advising 
or directing the Employment Relations Authority in relation to its procedures.
135
 
 
Further uncertainty was caused by the fact that on a number of occasions the Court of 
Appeal overturned decisions of the Employment Court and supported the approach 
taken by the Employment Tribunal. In GFW Agri-Products Ltd v Gibson the Court of 
Appeal thus criticised the Employment Court‟s direction of the Employment Tribunal 
on the application of s 33:
136
  
[W]e consider the Chief Judge went rather too far in some of his remarks in his principal 
judgment critical of the “relatively strict approach” of the Tribunal and directing a more 
liberal approach to applications for leave under s 33. … [I]n upholding the decision we do not 
wish to be taken as endorsing the Employment Court judgment so far as it reversed the 
decision of the Employment Tribunal on the leave application. 
 
b) Lack of Certainty 
 
The alleged lack of certainty caused by judicial interpretation in the case law meant 
that guidance could not be ascertained from the Employment Contracts Act 1991 
alone.
137
 Adjudicators needed to refer to and apply precedent which „expand[ed] on 
and qualif[ied]‟ „plain and simple‟ concepts.138 The increased influence of the Court 
of Appeal and the fact that their decisions sometimes conflicted with those of the 
Employment Court only resulted in further confusion.
139
 As the Employment Tribunal 
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was bound by the decisions of higher courts it was not surprising that legal arguments 
on principles derived from those courts were increasingly being applied in the 
Employment Tribunal. This again acted against the principle of a low level operation. 
 
The Courts‟ development of case law meant that parties needed to have a greater 
knowledge and understanding of employment law than could be gained from a simple 
reading of the Act and Regulations. For example, the concept of what „unjustified‟ 
meant was the subject of a large number of cases which the average employer would 
not generally be aware of. Hughes, discussing the Issues Paper on Personal 
Grievances,
140
 commented that employers claimed to be uncertain of their obligations, 
particularly in relation to the minimum requirements for procedural fairness in 
dismissal. Employers claimed that the case law was „complex and difficult to assess 
without expert advice‟,141 created problems with compliance costs and encouraged 
settlement of unmeritorious claims.
142
 These views were expressed by Louise Freyer 
in her essay on „Procedural Fairness and the Employer‟, where she commented 
that:
143
  
It is surely not unreasonable to ask how there can be fairness to the employer when the 
procedural requirements are contained in an ever-increasing and complicated body of law 
which is not easily accessible to and digestible by the average employer, whose conduct is 
often subject to the pedantic scrutiny of the Courts. 
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However, Hughes‟ believed that „the complexity of the case law [was] considerably 
overstated‟.144 It is submitted that the law relating to dismissals was well settled and 
had been operating effectively long before the Employment Contracts Act 1991 came 
into effect. In the Unilever
145
 case in 1990, Goddard CJ said that procedural fairness 
was almost identical to natural justice and „a moment‟s reflection show[ed] that this 
[did] not involve any injustice for or harshness towards employers.‟146 
 
The expectation that the Employment Tribunal would have followed the decisions of 
the Employment Court was clearly articulated by Goddard CJ in a case determined 
under the Labour Relations Act 1987. He anticipated that the Employment 
Tribunal:
147
 
…may, if it sees fit, establish a jurisprudence based in part upon consistency of decisions 
made by members of the tribunal. I hope that it will but it is entirely a matter for the tribunal; 
but should it feel free not to follow its own decisions, it will not – I venture to suggest – be 
entitled to exercise the same freedom in relation to relevant judgments of the higher tiers, the 
Employment Court and the Court of Appeal. 
 
However, it is clear from this thesis survey of Employment Tribunal adjudicators that 
they had differing attitudes concerning their obligation to follow the directions of the 
Court. In fact, when asked about their attitude to the Court‟s directions on remedies 
one adjudicator stated:  
I ignored them. They‟re so bloody inconsistent in that Court. For two or three years they‟ll be 
thumping one way of approach, then they completely back track. 
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While adjudicators clearly understood their obligation it seems they did not always 
follow the letter of the law one suggested: 
The proper answer is that the Tribunal had to follow the Court‟s decisions… I said that‟s the 
proper answer, but in some cases lip service may be paid to it, ha ha. That‟s not to say that I 
don‟t sit there and say that Court decision is a load of rubbish, and I won‟t sort of find a way 
that I can say that that Court decision doesn‟t actually apply to the facts of this case. 
 
8.2.1(C) EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL DISCRETION TO SET OWN PROCEDURE 
 
The Employment Tribunal‟s ability to vary its procedure under s 88(1) Employment 
Contracts Act 1991 should have enabled it to adapt processes to accommodate 
language barriers, cultural differences, disability requirements and self-represented 
parties, to provide equal access to justice without discrimination and adjudicators all 
said they varied process to ensure justice. However, despite the legislative intent, in 
practice it did not always occur. The Employment Tribunal Regulations 1991 
stipulated the procedure which the Employment Tribunal was required to follow but 
the frequent use of lawyers as representatives worked against any attempt to create an 
informal and non-legalistic procedure. The influence of the Employment Court on the 
Tribunal, discussed above, also meant that in practice this power of discretion had 
little impact.
148
  
 
This thesis research has shown that the overall experience of participants was that the 
process remained formal and intimidating.
149
 The factors contributing to this 
perception are discussed in detail above.  However, some changes were made to allow 
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for greater participation of Maori and people with disabilities.
150
 Language barriers 
were also discussed in the case of Zinck v Sleepyhead
151
 where Judge Colgan said that 
although the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 did not require the Employment 
Tribunal to pay for an interpreter, natural justice would have suggested that if a party 
or witness required the assistance of an interpreter then the Employment Tribunal may 
have had to adjourn the hearing until an interpreter could be arranged. He drew a 
distinction between a criminal case where liberty may have been an issue, and s 24(g) 
of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 that required a free interpreter be 
provided, and civil cases such as a personal grievance. It is submitted that the 
importance of the possible loss of a job should have meant that an interpreter would 
always be provided. Judge Colgan suggested that „in cases of genuine need and 
hardship‟ the Tribunal should have accepted that they should pay for interpreter 
services.
152
  
 
Under s 88(1) the Employment Tribunal had discretion to alter its procedure in claims 
of sexual harassment. However, as indicated in the interviews with adjudicators in 
Chapter Six and data from the Employment Tribunal, very few adjudicators heard 
these types of cases.
153
 The removal of the special procedures that had existed under 
the Labour Relations Act 1987, and the Tribunal‟s failure to introduce a suitable 
replacement procedure meant that complainants preferred to take action through the 
Human Rights Commission rather than by means of a personal grievance.
154
 Arguably 
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this failure actually reduced access to justice for (usually female) complainants in this 
situation.  
 
Section 34 of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 allowed an adjudicator to decide a 
personal grievance on different grounds from those claimed.
155
 This ensured access to 
justice if the applicant had erred in their initial claims. 
 
The ability to vary the procedure should have been a way of ensuring the same access 
to justice for self-represented parties as those who had chosen to be represented. 
Adjudicators commented that they made a special effort in cases where parties were 
self-represented to ensure, firstly, that parties understood the procedure and secondly 
that the correct information was placed before the Employment Tribunal. Often 
Employment Tribunal adjudicators found it necessary to take a more relaxed approach 
in circumstances where parties represented themselves, particularly in relation to 
questions.
156
 In contrast, some felt less willing to help representatives who they felt 
were incompetent as they considered it the responsibility of the representative to 
undertake their role effectively and that parties were responsible for their choice of 
representative. In practice then, self-represented persons would to some extent have 
had greater access to justice than represented parties may have had, depending on the 
quality of their representation.
157
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Robbie‟s research showed that Employment Tribunal Members had a commitment to 
ensuring that the Tribunal operated in „the spirit of the Act‟.158 She stated that 
adjudicators did not always require strict adherence to the Regulations in adjudication. 
Robbie believed that this would counteract the tendency of lawyers to take a litigious 
approach to employment problems. However, this was not supported by adjudicators 
interviewed for this thesis who said that there was a strong „legal faction‟ in the 
Tribunal who „won out‟ over those who preferred informality. An adjudicator in this 
thesis research suggested:
159
 
The Court treated the Tribunal like any other Tribunal when legislation dictated that it was to 
be quick, informal and inexpensive. The Tribunal came to be dominated by the legal 
profession. If the Tribunal had been brave enough to embrace the approach taken by the 
Mediation Service and Conciliation Service, which the ERA is now reverting to, it would have 
been a more effective body. The Court had a group of excessive legalists within the Tribunal 
[who] were responsible for the Tribunal being compromised by delays. 
 
This was reinforced by one counsel‟s response to the thesis survey who indicated it 
was „unduly cumbersome for the issues‟. 
8.2.1(D) SPEEDY 
 
Only two years after the passage of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 it was 
already clear that the National Government‟s intention that the ideal of the 
Employment Tribunal process being „speedy‟, captured in s 76(c),160 was not being 
met. According to one National MP, Max Bradford, while the Employment Tribunal 
was in theory „highly accessible‟ a substantial backlog had arisen which had slowed 
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down the whole process and meant that parties faced a considerable delay in obtaining 
a hearing.
161
 In 1997, a hearing occurred 16 months from notification on average. 
 
Most commentators agree that any delay in a legal process will cause problems with 
access to justice. Whatever the reason for the delay, it will have an impact on parties 
attempting to use the procedure. Sir Ivor Richardson has identified that decisions of 
the courts must be delivered promptly to ensure that remedies are effective. He went 
on to say that:
 162
 
A number of reports in recent years, including the Woolf report in 1996, have stressed that 
efficiency and speed are important features of the right of access to justice. 
 
Judge Finnegan in Meharry v Guardall Alarms New Zealand Ltd overall suggested of 
the Employment Tribunal that it should:
163
  
…strive therefore to meet the objects set out for the Tribunal in s 76 of the Act, particularly in 
the circumstances of this case the object at s 76(c). In hearing and determining the present matter 
therefore the Court sees itself as intended by the legislature to be a “low level, informal, 
specialist… [t]ribunal to provide [a] speedy, fair, and just resolution of [the] differences between 
[the] parties…, it being recognised that in some cases mutual resolution is either inappropriate or 
impossible”. 
 
8.2.2 CAUSES OF DELAY  
 
Adjudicators surveyed for this thesis advised that there had been a substantial backlog 
of personal grievance cases filed under the Labour Relations Act 1987 and still 
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waiting to be heard when the Employment Contracts Act 1991 came into force.
164
 This 
was exacerbated by the three-month delay between the Employment Contracts Act 
1991 coming into effect and the 19
th
 of August 1991 when the Employment Tribunal 
was able to hear its first claims. During this three-month period a „steady influx of 
claims‟ added to the already outstanding workload.165 
8.2.2(A) INCREASED NUMBERS AND COVERAGE 
 
Dumbleton identified the increased coverage of the personal grievance option to all 
employees, rather than just union members, as a significant factor in delays 
experienced in the Employment Tribunal.
166
 As a result many more applications were 
received than prior to the Employment Contracts Act 1991 (described as a „veritable 
explosion‟ by Max Bradford, MP)167 and the union sifting of unmeritorious claims 
had a less significant affect. The greater public awareness of personal rights generally 
may also have been a factor in the increased number of personal grievances 
pursued.
168
 The numbers of applicants lodging personal grievances and other types of 
actions continued to increase after the initial „testing out‟ period of the new 
Employment Tribunal system.
169
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8.2.2(B) INADEQUATE RESOURCES 
 
Dumbleton suggested delays were compounded by a lack of resources, including 
staff, both support staff and Members.
170
 The original number of Employment 
Tribunal members had to be increased but this process took considerable time, 
causing the accumulation of further backlog and longer delays.
171
 Some 
representatives surveyed in this thesis commented on the resourcing issue thus: 
It started off okay, but inadequate resources committed by Government and the length of the 
wait gradually increased in most centres. (Counsel) 
 
Under-resourced. (Counsel) 
 
Should not have been the wait to get a hearing – Government gave inadequate funding to the 
Employment Tribunal. 
 
Adjudicators also commented on resourcing problems as: 
The problems it had were not of its own making – there was a backlog from the [Labour 
Relations Act] and [Employment Contracts Act] and not enough Tribunal members for the 
case loads. 
 
The Tribunal did a good job under difficult circumstances of being insufficiently resourced. 
The problems with it could have been remedied rather than throwing the baby out with the 
bath water. 
 
It operated well; the only problem was backlog and resourcing. There is heaps more money in 
the new system. 
 
The Tribunal was hamstrung by resourcing issues and by the Court. 
 
Neville Taylor, in 1996, also discussed the inadequate resourcing of the Employment 
Tribunal and highlighted the inequitable „shortfall between demand and 
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resourcing.‟172 He also identified geographical differences in access to justice caused 
by delays. Taylor described the marked difference in relative „speed‟ according to 
where people lived and worked,
173
 describing it as „disparate and unreasonable. It 
shows that the resources are not allocated equitably.‟174  
 
However, the findings of this thesis research did not show the same marked 
geographical difference in time delay. The greatest variation between centres was the 
delay between date of hearing and date of decision and length of hearing.
175
 It is 
submitted that access to justice is not complete until the final decision has been made 
and the relevant remedies paid. Taylor gave the example of one of his clients who had 
to wait over a year for a decision. In the meantime the business had been sold which 
caused „difficulties in enforcing the judgment.‟176 One representative surveyed for this 
thesis commented: 
Some adjudicators, and it may be added, judges also, took inordinately long to deliver a 
decision, and by the time they did they had lost the plot. There are examples of twelve months 
after hearing for decision to be given. Presently I am awaiting an Employment Court decision 
on an appeal argued eight months ago. (Counsel) 
 
8.2.2(C) COMPLEXITY OF LEGAL PROCESS 
 
The complexity of the process, both before and during adjudication and the 
significantly increased use of legal representation, discussed in detail above, added to 
issues of delay in adjudication.
177
 Further, the lack of the option of a de novo hearing 
led to increased legal argument and volume of evidence being adduced at the hearing 
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with one counsel suggesting: „The process, like most Court proceedings, was 
protracted due to the evidence produced.‟178  
 
Commentators have also argued that lawyers have an economic incentive to 
complicate and extend legal processes, suggesting the more complex and lengthy the 
case the greater the financial return to lawyers.
179
 Lord Woolf, in his Interim Report 
on the civil justice system in England and Wales,
180
 observed that an adversarial 
system encourages an „adversarial culture‟ and a „battlefield‟ mentality.181 He 
believed that complex rules and procedures encouraged the use of adversarial tactics 
and „is considered by many to require it‟.182 He advocated greater judicial control of 
procedures to ensure that both the complexity and pace of the legal process were 
placed in the hands of the courts rather than the lawyers.
183
  
 
In response to Lord Woolf‟s arguments, Zuckerman agreed that changing the process 
was important, but took the view that this did not go far enough.
184
 A complete 
change to the culture of the legal profession itself would be essential before any real 
change could occur, as lawyers have „economic incentives to complicate and protract 
litigation.‟185 Zuckerman argued that any attempt to make the legal process more 
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accessible and affordable „can and will be defeated by those with an economic interest 
in doing so.‟186  
8.2.2(D) HEARING AND DECISION TIMES 
 
Problems with the length of time taken to get a hearing date after a personal grievance 
was lodged,
187
 time taken in the hearing itself
188
 and the length of time taken for a 
written decision to be provided
189
 have been discussed in detail in Chapters Five and 
Six of this thesis.
190
 This was reinforced by the responses from participants in the 
thesis survey who said amongst other comments that: 
Adjudication took full day. Process from filing proceedings would have taken months, 
possibly one year. (Advocate for respondent) 
 
 Most cases took one year. (Advocate for applicant) 
 
 Took too long to get hearings and the hearings themselves were often unduly lengthy (and 
therefore expensive). (Counsel) 
 
 The hearing was dealt with quickly but it took months or over a year to get it. (Counsel) 
  
 Long wait for hearing followed by long wait for reserved decision. 
 
There is insufficient accountability from some individual members on their output etc. The 
voice of people going through the system didn‟t get heard. The delay in putting out decisions 
was the worst part. (Adjudicator) 
 
In 1994, Skiffington expressed concern that despite increases in staffing average 
waiting times remained high – eight months in the North Island and six months in the 
South Island. She was particularly concerned about an increase in the number of 
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applicants who had withdrawn their claims and suggested that they may have been 
„just giving up on the process.‟191 
 
Zuckerman argued that the legal profession has an economic interest in extending the 
procedure unnecessarily by using interlocutory applications „generally of a tactical 
nature, which may be of dubious benefit even to the party making the application, and 
which may not be warranted by the costs involved.‟192 While opportunities for 
interlocutory applications in the adjudication procedure under the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991 were more limited than in the general courts, representatives 
could extend the procedure by engaging in a „paper war‟ between the parties or by 
tactical applications, one counsel suggested: 
Time to get to a hearing was egregiously long. It was difficult to “jump the queue” even when 
interim reinstatement was sought. Sometimes interim reinstatement was claimed so as to get 
an early hearing, but (rightly) abandoned at that hearing. 
 
8.2.2(E) EFFECT OF DELAY ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
 
Delay in resolving personal grievances disadvantaged both parties. Employees had the 
uncertainty as to whether or not their personal grievance claim would be successful 
and a consequent delay in receiving any compensation awarded. Time away from the 
workplace and co-workers is also a disadvantage to any employee. Delay also made 
the situation very difficult if the employee had sought reinstatement as the employer 
may have made an appointment to their position or circumstances changed. According 
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to Employment Tribunal member David Miller, members‟ were conscious of „the 
need to dispense of [sic] reinstatement grievances quickly‟ and, in conjunction with 
Employment Tribunal members, give them priority, including in the writing of 
decisions where reinstatement was at stake.
193
 He believed that reinstatement 
remained a realistic possibility. However, these comments were made in 1993 and 
waiting times lengthened as problems compounded, so that by 1996, waiting times for 
adjudication were between seven and nine months in the various centres.
194
 For 
employers, delay resulted in them being unable to determine their liability, for loss of 
wages in particular. „The greater the delay in having the matter determined or settled 
[would] often mean that the employer [was] required to pay a larger amount as 
remedy to the employee.‟195  
 
For those on low incomes and those without alternative means of support, delay 
waiting for adjudication could have caused serious financial hardship.
196
 For those 
who had lodged a personal grievance it was possible to claim the Unemployment 
Benefit from Work and Income New Zealand, however this was unlikely to have 
covered all the costs incurred by employees while waiting for adjudication. 
 
Dumbleton however, writing in the New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, 
argued that delays in getting an adjudication hearing could have served a useful 
purpose, acting as an incentive to parties to have their personal grievances go to 
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mediation.
197
 He said that it would have been inappropriate for those who refused to 
attend mediation to have their cases heard at adjudication sooner than those who had 
made the effort to resolve the issues at mediation, thus encouraging resolution of 
employment issues at the lowest possible level. He suggested that:
198
 
Given that the Tribunal does not have the unlimited membership or the resources to be able to 
give the same priority to both mediation cases and adjudication cases, it is appropriate that 
there should be some differential in waiting time so that mediation can be made available 
relatively quickly to those seeking it. Citizens have a proper interest in seeing that, in the 
delivery of justice, the state provided resources of the courts and tribunals are used in ways 
that are most productive and economic. The statistical likelihood is that mediation will resolve 
a dispute brought to the Tribunal, and from the viewpoint of efficiency and economy, 
mediation is clearly superior to adjudication… Should the mediation turn out to be 
unsuccessful, the parties are not penalised with any more waiting time in the queue to 
adjudication than would have been required if mediation had not been attempted. 
 
Dumbleton‟s analysis also showed that the difference between the waiting times for 
mediation and adjudication in the main centres was variable.
199
 This may have been 
an explanation for a comment received for this thesis from one representative: 
Under the Employment Contracts Act, mediation was too long after the events and quite close 
to an adjudication date. “Losses” had accumulated; why settle if a hearing is so close? 
Contrast with current situation where mediation is within weeks. Also, hurt feelings are 
magnified by delay.   
 
The above quote identified the potential emotional impact of delay on parties. It is 
supposed that delay may have caused increased feelings of anxiety and anger. This in 
turn may have led to the parties becoming more entrenched in their positions and 
therefore less likely to resolve the personal grievance at a lower level. Another 
counsel surveyed for this thesis said that mediation had failed because the „attitude of 
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employee and employer had hardened‟ and „personality issues needed the airing of the 
grievance‟.  
8.2.3 FAIR AND JUST RESOLUTION 
 
Under s 76(c) of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 one of the objects of the Act 
was that the Employment Tribunal should „provide fair and just resolution of 
differences between parties to employment contracts, it being recognised that in some 
cases mutual resolution is either inappropriate or impossible.‟ The wording of this 
section implied that adjudication was only intended to settle differences that could not 
be resolved by „mutual resolution‟ during mediation however, mediation was not 
compulsory under the Employment Contracts Act 1991. 
 
The „fair and just resolution‟ of differences relates to the issues of natural justice 
discussed above and encompasses such matters as costs and their effect on outcomes 
and real access to justice for participants.
200
 This again highlights the tension between 
the need to be fair and also to provide natural justice to all parties and, the necessity to 
go through a transparent procedure. 
 
The issue of just outcomes was illustrated by one submission to the Minority Report 
of the Labour Select Committee in 1993, where a dismissed employee had been 
awarded $18,000 by the Employment Tribunal for unjustified dismissal. The award 
was made 17 months after the dismissal and 21 months later he had still not received 
the compensation. In addition, he had incurred $26,000 in legal costs. The grievant 
found the experience „far from speedy, fair or just and I can only express my extreme 
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concern for other workers who are under the false impression that the Act provides 
adequate protection.‟201 
 
One of the adverse effects of delay in the personal grievance procedure was the 
additional costs involved. For simplicity, the broad issue of costs as a barrier to access 
to justice has been divided into four parts, the cost of representation, costs in addition 
to representation, the effect of adverse party costs, that is, costs awarded against the 
„losing‟ party, and the effect of the legal principles applied by the courts in assessing 
costs, on the outcomes for parties. 
8.2.3(A) COST OF REPRESENTATION (INCLUDING LEGAL AID ISSUES) 
 
Under s 59 of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 an employee or employer was 
entitled to choose „any other person‟ to be their representative for any action under the 
Act. To lodge a personal grievance in the specialist employment institutions under the 
previous Labour Relations Act 1987, union membership was generally required. 
Membership „paid off‟, acting as „fire insurance‟202 not only against the actual cost of 
taking a case but also „indemnifying the member against an award of costs if the case 
[was] unsuccessful.‟203 Union representation also meant that „otherwise 
“uneconomic” cases‟ were worth taking and an employee who won „an average award 
for being unfairly dismissed [got] the full benefit of their compensation.‟204   
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The change to the „nature‟ of representation brought about by the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991, discussed in previous chapters,
205
 had a deterrent effect on parties 
even engaging in the process, not only because of the intimidating atmosphere 
associated with the legal profession
206
 but also the cost of legal representation. The 
issue of increased formality introduced by the Employment Contracts Act 1991, 
discussed above, meant that adjudication was longer and more complex than the 
system under the Labour Relations Act 1987. This entailed a greater reliance on 
lawyers and therefore increased cost.
207
 
 
If an employee wanted to take a personal grievance against their employer and they 
were not a union member, one of the first issues to be considered was the cost of a 
lawyer or advocate. This had an „inhibiting effect on access to justice‟,208 as most 
people would not qualify for legal aid.
209
 As Harris has said, „the prospect of a 
substantial legal bill discourages many people, who believe they have been wronged, 
from seeking through the courts the redress to which they are entitled.‟210 Although it 
was possible to seek a review of lawyers‟ fees through District Law Societies, this 
was yet another hurdle for parties to face and advocates were not subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Law Society as they did not generally hold practicing certificates.  
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Harris gave three reasons for the generally high cost of litigation. First, the practical 
reality for most litigants was that to access the system they had to use the services of a 
lawyer. (In the employment law situation this could be lawyers or advocates). 
Secondly, legal representation and necessary research is time-consuming and 
therefore expensive, as most lawyers charge on an hourly rate.
211
 Third, 
representatives‟ hourly rates are usually high and include payment for the task 
involved, its complexity and time commitment.
212
 Harris said that lawyers justify their 
high rates on the basis of their training, skill and responsibility.
213
 
 
Access to justice depends upon how the process treats the participants. Justice is taken 
away if the expense of prosecuting the case negates the compensation and costs 
awarded, even when the applicant is successful. Lord Woolf identified that the 
problem of disproportionate cost was „most acute in smaller cases where the costs of 
litigation, for one side alone, frequently equal or exceed the value of what is at 
issue.‟214 Although Lord Woolf was talking about the courts generally, this comment 
is particularly relevant in the employment arena as a high proportion of claims were 
for relatively small amounts and remedies granted were modest.
215
 This was often the 
case in adjudication under the Employment Contracts Act 1991, as was borne out by 
the following comments from counsel surveyed for this thesis: 
No [Not inexpensive]. Costs outweigh benefits. The result is important and the process itself 
should be careful and accurate, so costs are inevitable. The remedies, however, are modest, 
perhaps unduly modest unless successful employees are also given worthwhile costs awards. 
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The Tribunal costs “tariff” of $1,000 - $1,500 per day is stupid for all but exceptional cases. 
  
Claim was patently hopeless but cost my client close to $10k to resolve.  
Claim was for modest wages – less than fee charged.   
 
The cost of representation in proportion to compensation awarded was highlighted in 
Okeby v Computer Associates where an „unremarkable‟ personal grievance case cost 
the applicant a „grand total of $18,622.80‟.216 
Although, as can be seen and as was common ground, the appellant‟s personal grievance was 
unremarkable, it was obviously a case of importance to the parties for its hearing occupied 
two and a half days and apparently required, since it received, the attention of two counsel on 
each side. It is fair to mention that the appellant‟s solicitors have made no charge against their 
client, let alone any claim against the respondent, for the junior counsel‟s attendance at the 
hearing. Despite this concession, the appellant‟s costs came to $16,000, augmented by GST to 
$18,000 and by a hearing fee of $300, a filing fee of $35, photocopying of $212.80, and 
library copies of judgments costing $75, to a grand total of $18,622.80. The decision appealed 
from awarded $3,000 inclusive of GST, the hearing fee of $300, and half of the remaining 
disbursements. The professional time spent was in the order of 60 hours, so its actual cost 
including GST can be seen as around $300 per hour. The amount awarded also including 
GST, viewed from the same perspective, is equivalent to $50 an hour. 
 
Harris saw four possible ways of dealing with the issue of representation costs in the 
general courts; dispense with legal representation altogether, like, for example the 
Disputes Tribunal; state funding of legal representation, for example by legal aid; 
reform the legal process to increase its speed and efficiency, and the use of 
conditional or contingent fee arrangements.
217
  
 
The response to the need for greater efficiency in the ordinary courts has been to 
introduce a case management approach to litigation.
218
 Case management was 
designed to give the court greater control over the timelines for litigation and „the 
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refining of factual and legal issues, leading up to settlement or trial.‟219 Lord Woolf‟s 
report on access to justice in England pointed out that in litigation generally, control 
over the „initiation and conduct‟ of each case rested in the hands of the parties.220 He 
believed that:
221
  
[w]ithout effective judicial control… questions of expense, delay, compromise and fairness 
may have only low priority. The consequence is that expense is often excessive, 
disproportionate and unpredictable; and delay is often unreasonable. 
 
According to adjudicators in this thesis survey, a case management system was 
adopted in the Wellington region for employment adjudication cases. This meant that 
significant issues could be identified prior to adjudication and any factual questions 
clarified before the hearing. This may have resulted in some reduction in time 
between initiation of the personal grievance and the hearing however, it may not have 
reduced cost to the parties, as preparing briefs of evidence or any process to clarify 
issues required time spent by the lawyer.  
 
In response to Lord Woolf‟s proposed reforms of the English courts, Zuckerman said 
that although he supported the strategy suggested he thought it was susceptible to the 
same subversive interests that had „defeated all past attempts at reform.‟222 
Zuckerman argued that unless the factors that push costs up were addressed, the 
problem would remain unresolved and costs high. These factors were:
223
 
                                                             
219
 Ibid 301. 
220
 Lord Woolf, Access to Justice: Interim Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System 
(June 1995) ch 3, 7. Lord Woolf said that the cause of high costs was the uncontrolled nature of the 
process rather than its complexity. 
221
 Ibid. 
222
 A A S Zuckerman, „Lord Woolf‟s Access to Justice: Plus ça change…‟ [1996] 59(6) The Modern 
Law Review 773, 773. 
223
 Ibid. 
534 
 
the system of remunerating lawyers on an hourly basis, which rewards complexity; the 
indemnity rule whereby the winner recovers his costs from the loser, which encourages a 
competition of investments in litigation; and the availability of almost unlimited legal aid 
funds. 
 
The survey of representatives for this thesis clearly showed that the greatest 
proportion of representatives charged fees on a time-based system.
224
 Zuckerman‟s 
view was that representatives who charged this way had little incentive to minimise 
costs and had a natural desire to get the best reward for their services.
225
 He argued 
that lawyers paid by the amount of work undertaken usually used the court system 
even though there may have been a more effective and efficient way of resolving the 
issue. Further, the usual „counterbalance‟ of the consumer‟s desire to ensure they 
receive value for money is lacking, as lay clients seldom have the necessary legal 
knowledge to be able to determine whether or not they have received a quality 
service.
226
   
 
One contributor to the Woolf inquiry alleged that few lawyers work with a budget in 
mind.
227
 It is submitted that although an hourly rate appeared to provide no incentive 
to work in a „fully efficient way‟ representatives who attempted to reduce cost by 
limiting time spent on the case may not have been able to provide the standard of 
service or necessary time to ensure the client received fully competent 
representation.
228
 The same problems occurred as a result of the low remuneration 
rates received for legally aided cases, discussed below.
229
 These issues suggest that 
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unless an alternative system of charging is adopted by the legal profession the 
problems identified will not be resolved. 
 
Discussion of the time spent by representatives inevitably leads back to the 
complexity of the process. In the Okeby case, the respondent argued that by engaging 
a high profile „Rolls Royce‟ law firm the appellant had chosen to proceed on a „no 
costs spared basis‟.230 The respondent contended that it would be unreasonable for the 
Employment Tribunal to award costs on the basis of the appellant‟s choice of a „top of 
the line‟ representative. Goddard CJ questioned whether representation could have 
been obtained more cheaply and if so whether it was reasonable to expect the 
appellant to do so. He acknowledged that there were limited opportunities for parties 
to „shop around‟ the market for lower cost representation and that „within reason, 
effect should be given to the statutory right to resort to competent representation of 
the litigant‟s choice.‟231 He also noted that the respondent was aware of the 
appellant‟s choice of representative and that he therefore should have been aware that 
any costs awarded against him were likely to be high. These issues raise the question 
as to whether equal access to justice means everyone should have access to the best 
representation available (assuming that counsel are the best). In contrast, commenting 
upon cheaper non-lawyer advocacy Judge Castle in Harris v Nurse Maude [1991] 
opines:
232
 
The engagement of an advocate instead of counsel directly resulted in a substantial reduction 
of costs which would have otherwise had to have been faced by Mrs Harris had she retained 
counsel. The outcome of her case is evidence of the skill possessed by her advocate. 
Nonetheless, the circumstances of her whole case would clearly have justified the engagement 
of senior counsel. That observation draws a large measure of support from the fact that the 
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first respondent took precisely that course by instructing and seeking advice from senior 
counsel immediately after Mrs Harris had been suspended from her employment. 
 
From these examples it can be seen that a party‟s financial circumstances could have a 
major affect on the type of representation that was chosen and consequently on access 
to justice both in terms of the cost of the process and the justice of the ultimate 
outcome. A Pyrrhic victory is not a just outcome.  
 
In Chapter Seven of this thesis, the cost of representation was clearly found to have an 
impact on the choice of representative for some applicants.
233
 In Chapter Five, this 
thesis found that there was some small difference in outcomes (levels of 
compensation) depending on the type of representation chosen.
234
 This was in contrast 
to Ian McAndrew and Kathryn Beck‟s findings, which indicated that those who chose 
counsel as representatives, rather than advocates, received higher levels of 
compensation.
235
 In McAndrew and Beck‟s research, those who represented 
themselves fared worst of all, in contrast to this research which found that self-
representatives fared better than those represented by counsel or advocates.
236
 A 
significant difference between the two pieces of research was that McAndrew‟s 
research was carried out over each year that the Employment Contracts Act 1991 was 
in force and covered all adjudicated decisions. In contrast, this thesis research only 
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looked at adjudications in personal grievances in 1997 and is more intensive.
237
 This 
narrows these findings both in terms of the number of self-representatives included 
and the types of cases analysed. It may also be the case that adjudicators were more 
lenient with self-representatives in personal grievance cases.
238
  
 
One significant issue for self-representatives was that they were unable to claim any 
costs for their time or any disbursements incurred.
239
 Whilst they may have received 
fair compensation at the end of the process, costs and disbursements would have had 
to be paid as they were incurred.
240
 
 
For those people who could not afford representation on a fee for time basis and did 
not have the skills to represent themselves, one alternative was to employ a 
representative on a conditional or contingency fee basis. This meant that no fees were 
payable unless the personal grievance was successful.
241
 Conditional charging meant 
that it was not necessary for a client to pay legal fees „up front‟, thus providing access 
to a service which they would otherwise have been unable to receive. The downside 
of contingency based charging is it encourages providers to pressure applicants to 
settle quickly or the overall charge is excessive in proportion to work undertaken. Any 
costs incurred would be paid out of any award of compensation received. However, 
the risk for the client of an award of costs against them remained.
242
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a) Legal Aid 
 
One of the mechanisms used to achieve access to justice for poorer people in New 
Zealand was the legal aid scheme and use of community law centres. Community law 
centres did on occasion represent clients; however, the service was somewhat 
limited.
243
 Legal aid was provided under the Legal Services Act 1991. Entitlement was 
determined by the Legal Services Regulations 1991 which set the income and asset 
levels under which qualification for legal aid was determined.
244
  
 
Access to legal aid was extremely restricted, as it depended on the income and assets 
of the applicant and the threshold for disqualification was low.
245
 For example, in 
1995, to be entitled to legal aid a married man with three children would have had to 
earn less than $19,000 per annum and have disposable capital of $2000 or less.
246
 The 
1996 census gave median income figures for men of between $19,216 and $25,480 
(depending on location of residency).
247
 The figure for disposable capital was 
calculated after „deductions for debts, interest in a house, domestic motor vehicle, 
household furniture, appliances, personal clothing and tools of trade.‟248 However, as 
discussed in Chapter Five of this thesis, whether or not these assets were exempt was 
at the discretion of the local District sub-committee of the Legal Services Board.
249
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The sub-committee could also take into account the resources of the applicant‟s 
spouse and parents.
250
 This meant that few people qualified for legal aid and a large 
proportion of those on „middle incomes‟ also lacked „sufficient discretionary income‟ 
to meet high litigation costs, which might deny them access to justice.
251
 In contrast, 
people with higher disposable income, or access to financial support would be able to 
exercise better choice and arguably be able to take full advantage of the legal system.  
 
In addition, as previously noted the most popular means of resolving personal 
grievances was by mediation, with over 70 percent of personal grievances being 
resolved in this way. Legal aid was not available for mediation but was for 
adjudication. This therefore had the potential to deprive employees of access to justice 
as they could not obtain financial assistance for this first step. 
 
Even if parties did qualify for legal aid it was granted on a loan basis and would 
require repayment, with possible charges over the applicant‟s income and assets.252 
The availability of legal aid, or other legal assistance through community law centres, 
would therefore have affected the legal aspirations of those with limited means.
253
 In 
the Review of the Legal Services Act 1991 the deterrent effect of the legal aid recovery 
system was noted as a concern for the Legal Services Board.
254
 It was suggested that 
the loan and charging system reinforced the poverty trap and prevented some potential 
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litigants from taking action.
255
 However, according to a Legal Services Board review, 
the charging and loan regimes had created a more responsible attitude to litigation;
256
 
Without a charging regime there is little to discourage the excessive use of lawyers and legal 
services and the promotion of technical defences. 
 
A further restriction on access to legal aid was the unwillingness of representatives to 
undertake legally aided work. The low remuneration rates for legal aid counsel acted 
as a disincentive for firms to take on legal aid work.
257
 In 1997, Gabrielle Maxwell 
and others conducted a survey of legal practitioners‟ views on legal aid remuneration 
in both the civil and criminal jurisdictions.
258
 In response to a question regarding the 
availability of suitably qualified lawyers to undertake legal aid work, fifty-nine 
percent of respondents said that pay rates were a „very important‟ factor.259 The 
availability of other, higher paying work was also a strong reason for lawyers not to 
undertake legal aid work. Some practitioners reported pressure from their firm to take 
on more highly paid work, however these were in the minority in Maxwell‟s 
survey.
260
  
 
There was a perception that the quality of the services provided to legal aid clients 
was lower because fewer senior lawyers undertook this type of work. Maxwell‟s 
survey found that the majority of respondents were dissatisfied with the rates of legal 
aid remuneration payable to intermediate and senior lawyers and, in particular, the 
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low rates for preparation time and appeals, which logically should have been taken on 
by senior practitioners.
261
 Although Maxwell concluded that the recurring perception 
of the „declining quality of legal aid provision because of inadequate remuneration 
[was] more illusory than real‟262 the earlier review of the Legal Services Act 1991 had 
found the same perception that the rate of remuneration payable affected the quality 
of representation as it was often delegated to junior members of staff.
263
 This meant 
that legal aid clients may have been more likely to receive poorer quality 
representation and therefore be deprived of a real opportunity to participate in the 
justice system and the opportunity to choose high quality representatives. 
 
The question of whether limited access to justice is real access to justice must be 
balanced against the public interest in the cost of provision of legal aid. Harris 
acknowledged that the private interest in receiving access to justice through legal aid 
was constrained by the public interest in the necessity to raise taxes to pay for that 
access.
264
 The conundrum of weighing up these competing interests was well summed 
up by Sir Ivor Richardson:
265
 
It is important that we think carefully as a society about the level of access to justice that 
people should be entitled to bearing in mind that resources are necessarily limited. Access to 
justice cannot require that the State ensures unlimited provision of legal services to everyone 
in every situation on a demand driven basis. That would unfairly divert resources away from 
other areas… [A] consideration is that the administration of justice involves the use and so the 
allocation of necessarily limited resources. The criticism is often made that the courts provide 
a Rolls Royce system and that the only people who can indulge in litigation, apart from those 
who have to, are the rich and the legally aided. Justice may be priceless. But it is not costless. 
The acceptable resolution of disputes involved balancing human rights and other moral values, 
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fairness considerations and resource constraints. My point is that proposals to limit legal aid 
cannot be dismissed out of hand as contrary to justice. Other public policy considerations 
involving competing claims on limited resources require a choice at the margin between 
expenditure on health, education, justice, social welfare, defence and so on. Just as in the 
decisions we make as individuals as to how we will spend our energies and our money, there 
are always policy trade-offs between efficiency, fairness and other individual and community 
values. 
 
8.2.3(B) COSTS IN ADDITION TO REPRESENTATION  
 
The initial cost or application fee to lodge a personal grievance was not high by 
average standards. However, they could have been prohibitive for those on low 
incomes or for those whose income had ceased due to dismissal. The lodging fee for 
adjudication of a personal grievance was initially $35.00 in 1991 but increased to 
$70.00 in 1997.
266
 There was also an adjudication fee of $75.00 per half day after the 
first day of a hearing, which increased to $150.00 in 1997. The lodging fee was also 
only one small part of the cost issue. If an applicant was not a union member they 
may have been required to pay representation fees or a proportion of them, up front, 
together with any necessary disbursements. In some cases the opposing party may 
have applied to the Court for security for costs, where they had doubts about the 
applicant‟s ability to pay costs if their case was unsuccessful. 267 
 
Another issue for parties bringing cases before the Employment Tribunal was the 
geographical location of hearings. In late 1997 Matt Gilbert, then CEO of the 
Employment Institutions Service, announced that as a result of a review of 
expenditure adjudication would only be heard in the main centres and not in regional 
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towns.
268
 Although this decision was reversed, the reaction to it highlighted the issues 
related to geographical location and their importance in the access to justice debate. 
Concerns were raised by newspapers, employment lawyers, advocates and the New 
Zealand Law Society Employment Law Committee. Phillipa Muir, the Chairperson of 
the latter committee, suggested that the decision compromised „the Tribunal‟s ability 
to fulfil its statutory function in providing “speedy justice”.‟269  
 
Geography remains „a significant restriction on rights of access to justice to a large 
part of the New Zealand community.‟270 Rural parties face travel and accommodation 
costs for themselves, their witnesses and representative, or if they retain an urban 
representative, costs associated with maintaining contact with that representative. 
Taylor argued that if the proposed policy had been implemented in some cases costs 
would have doubled. This would have created a „two-tiered system of justice‟271 
between urban and rural areas, with those in urban areas having easier access to 
justice than rural dwellers. It is submitted that even though the policy was reversed, 
these concerns are still relevant to a proportion of parties who live outside smaller 
cities. Although the location of hearings would have created difficulties for some 
parties it is difficult to envisage a more effective alternative which would have 
provided greater access to justice.
272
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Geography also had an impact in terms of delay and outcomes. It has been illustrated 
in Chapter Five that geographical location had an impact on both those using the 
adjudication process and to some extent, the eventual outcomes.
273
 Compensation 
outcomes varied slightly in relation to geographical location, although not 
significantly.
274
 It may have been that variations in compensation awarded related to 
such factors as the occupation of the applicant rather than any difference in approach 
of the adjudicators in a particular jurisdiction. This research found a number of factors 
that may have been influential in addition to the regional differences in experiences of 
those using the process. These included: the adjudicators‟ caseloads, the gender of the 
adjudicator and the applicant, the applicant‟s occupation and the adjudicator‟s 
background.
275
  
 
In addition, different rates applied for legal aid in different geographical areas as the 
Legal Services Board in each area could set their own rates. Registrars in each area 
had the discretion to determine whether legal aid was granted, the contribution to be 
made by the applicant and whether any charges were to be made over the applicant‟s 
income and assets. Harris‟ view was that these discretions either granted or denied 
access to justice and that evidence suggested that the principles had not been applied 
consistently across the country.
276
 This view was supported by Maxwell‟s survey of 
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legal aid practitioners in 1997, which identified a need for standardisation of approval 
practices across districts.
277
 
8.2.3(C) PARTY COSTS 
 
Section 98 of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 gave the Employment Tribunal 
authority to make an order for costs. Section 108 was the equivalent provision for the 
Employment Court.
278
 The normal rule was that costs would „follow the event‟.279 In 
other words it was assumed that unless the court used its discretion to direct otherwise 
costs would be paid by the losing party. However, the Employment Court has made it 
clear that their discretion not only included the amount to be awarded but whether 
costs should be awarded at all.
280
 The Employment Tribunal could decline an order 
for costs and allow costs to „lie where they fall‟ or reduce a costs award on the basis 
of contributory fault where they believed the applicant had contributed to the action 
they complained of.
281
 
 
In determining the level of costs to be awarded, the Employment Tribunal had the 
discretion to take into account principles well settled in a number of cases.
282
 These 
principles gave „a wide-ranging discretion… to do that which is just and right.‟283 The 
Employment Tribunal assessed costs based on a reasonable contribution to the 
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successful party‟s costs which were „reasonably and properly incurred‟,284 and the 
means of the parties and the ability to pay of the party against whom the costs had 
been awarded.
285
 The court sometimes had to accept the reality of the situation and 
not make an order for costs that would take the risk that they would „overwhelm‟ the 
party and would never be paid.
286
 
 
What amounted to a „reasonable contribution‟ would depend on the circumstances of 
each case and involved a two-step approach.
287
 Firstly, the Employment Tribunal had 
to examine the costs actually incurred by the party and determine whether or not they 
were reasonable, adjusting them if they were not. Secondly, the Employment Tribunal 
had to appraise the circumstances of the case and decide what level of contribution 
was appropriate. It was generally accepted that 66 percent was a useful starting point 
(the „two-thirds rule‟) before other factors justifying an increase or decrease were 
taken into account.
288
 
 
Costs were not intended as a punishment against the unsuccessful party or a means for 
the Employment Tribunal to express disapproval but to „compensate a party which 
has been put to the expense in either asserting or defending a right.‟289 However, the 
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award should not be so low that the value of any compensation awarded was 
negated.
290
 As Goddard CJ indicated in Okeby:
291
 
After paying his costs and disbursements the appellant was left with $5,500 of the award of 
$24,000. It seems to me as a matter of first impression that such a result greatly favours the 
respondent and punishes the appellant by depriving him of most of the fruits of his victory, 
predominantly wages.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
The conduct of the parties during the procedure could, however, be relevant if for 
example a party unduly lengthened the hearing by their conduct or presented 
irrelevant or unnecessarily complex legal argument.
292
 However, the necessity to 
guard against presenting overly technical arguments was sometimes made difficult 
due to the lack of a de novo hearing and the need to present all possible arguments at 
first instance.
293
 An unreasonable refusal to settle might also be taken into account 
when awarding costs.
294
  
 
Conduct could also be a factor where the extent of the damage caused was so serious 
that it would have been unjust for the applicant to have borne any significant level of 
costs. This concern was illustrated in Harris v Nurse Maude,
295
 a case heard under the 
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Labour Relations Act 1987, where the Labour Court
296
 awarded Mrs Harris 
compensation for what they described as „the unjustified visitation upon her of very 
extensive humiliation, loss of dignity and hurt feelings‟.297 The Court considered that 
the severity of the accusations made against the applicant, and the fact that the 
applicant was successful on all aspects of her case,
298
 meant that the case did not lend 
itself to the application of „mathematical formula‟:299  
We find ourselves forced to rely heavily on our conception of what we consider to be an 
appropriate exercise of our jurisdiction in equity and good conscience, in the particular 
circumstances of this case… To us it would be grossly unfair and would offend against any 
principles of equity and good conscience if a substantial part of the compensation awarded to her 
had to be disbursed to meet her expenses.    
 
The Harris case is good illustration of the depth and complexity of access to justice, 
which means more than simply access to the procedure and adequate monetary 
compensation. Mrs Harris brought her proceedings as much to protect her reputation 
as to gain financial recompense for the „callous‟ manner of her dismissal.300 In some 
cases damage to reputation may have been a reason for taking a case to litigation 
rather than reaching an early settlement, which was likely to have included a 
condition of confidentiality. As Judge Colgan said in Binnie v Pacific Health:
301
  
I accept there are cases, and this is one, where it is necessary and appropriate for a litigant to 
have his righteousness declared in a Court judgment. In some cases that may be all a litigant 
wants, requires and expects, and money is not to the point.  
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Judge Colgan pointed out the potential for costs awards to „create another 
grievance‟:302 
...where success is non-monetary, it is important that the costs of obtaining that are not so 
prohibitive that they either preclude access to the Court or create another grievance for the 
employee for whom the consequences of a favourable judgment is significant financial loss or 
even ruin. 
 
The Employment Court awarded Dr Binnie $80,000 costs and $12,868 disbursements. 
Despite these awards Dr Binnie incurred a further $60,000 for a successful defence of 
his treatment by his employer. In Binnie the Employment Court applied the principles 
set out by the Court of Appeal in Victoria University of Wellington v Alton-Lee;
303
 
that „party and party costs should generally follow the event and amount to a 
reasonable contribution to costs actually and reasonably incurred by the winning 
party.‟304 One other factor which the Employment Court took into account was that 
costs should „not be disproportionate to the money value of the plaintiff‟s 
judgment.‟305  
 
On appeal, the Court of Appeal refused to take such an absolute approach, especially 
in a case where „public vindication of reputation‟306 was an important factor and said 
that justice must be done to all concerned.
307
 On a cross-appeal from Pacific Health, 
who had argued that they had been punished enough by an award against them for 
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exemplary damages, the Court of Appeal held that costs were compensatory not 
punitive commenting that:
308
 
[Pacific Health‟s] submission misses the point that party and party costs are not punishment 
imposed on the losing party. They are a contribution to or reimbursement of the costs incurred 
by the winning party. They are thus entirely compensatory and not punitive at whatever level 
they are fixed.  
 
The Court of Appeal also found that Dr Binnie‟s costs were reasonably incurred and 
ordered Pacific Health to pay 80 percent of them, a sum of $162,577.96 plus 
disbursements of $12,868.00.
309
 
 
Although the figures discussed above were considerably larger than those likely to be 
awarded by the Employment Tribunal, the principles applied in determining the 
appropriate level of costs were also applicable in the Employment Tribunal 
situation.
310
 Further, if a party was dissatisfied with the results of the Employment 
Tribunal hearing, Binnie is a good illustration of the costs which may have been 
involved in keeping a case alive and bringing it to a successful conclusion. Although 
an extreme example, it is submitted that the potential for this level of cost would have 
been, and remains, a huge barrier to access to justice. 
8.2.3(D) EFFECT OF COSTS PRINCIPLES ON OUTCOMES 
 
Compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings was payable 
under s 40(1)(c)(i) of the Employment Contracts Act 1991, at the discretion of an 
Employment Tribunal adjudicator or an Employment Court Judge, if a personal 
grievance was established. Further, s 41(1) Employment Contracts Act 1991 provided 
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for reimbursement of actual remuneration lost as a result of a personal grievance up to 
three months. This was not discretionary; although once loss of remuneration was 
established deductions could be made for contributory fault.
311
 However, under s 
41(2) additional compensation could be awarded at the discretion of the 
adjudicator.
312
 
 
As discussed in Chapter Five, research into personal grievances heard in 1997 
compensation levels were modest, averaging between $2,831 and $4,438, depending 
on the region.
313
 Similar figures were quoted by Paul Stapp, a Member of the 
Employment Tribunal, who found that in 1997, 61 percent of compensation awards 
were under $5,000 and 90 percent were under $10,000.
314
 Stapp said that when 
awarding compensation the Tribunal and Court had to find „a middle road between 
compensation and a windfall, moderation and parsimony.‟315  
 
The main issue with both compensation and costs awards was that as this research and 
that of others has shown the compensation and costs awarded frequently did not meet 
the costs incurred by the parties during the personal grievance process. Despite having 
gone through the whole procedure of taking a personal grievance and having been 
„successful‟, significant access to justice may have been diminished by the outcome, 
although this is a fairly subjective assessment. In a clearer example for instance, legal 
fees could be in excess of the costs awarded by the Employment Tribunal. Lorraine 
                                                             
311
 Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 41(3). 
312
 Ibid, s 41(2). See Chapter 2.4.4; Remedies. 
313
 See Chapter 5.4.7 and Table 5.24. 
314
 Paul Stapp, The Employment Tribunal in 1998, Paper to the New Zealand Law Society Employment 
Law Conference 1998, 146. See also Tony Couch, Statistics and Comment, Paper to the New Zealand 
Law Society Employment Law Conference 1998, 119. 
315
 Paul Stapp, The Employment Tribunal in 1998, Paper to the New Zealand Law Society Employment 
Law Conference 1998, 146. 
552 
 
Skiffington recorded one senior adjudicator stating that the Employment Tribunal‟s 
role was to be conservative when awarding costs, and could not be expected to award 
full costs.
316
 
 
According to Goddard CJ the principles distilled from the case law allowed a just 
outcome to be reached. He suggested:
317
  
This jurisprudence and practice generally results in an exercise of discretion that tempers 
justice with mercy by awarding the successful party a realistic amount for costs without 
mulcting the unsuccessful party in an amount that might, in that party‟s eyes, seem crippling 
or punitive. 
 
However, although the adjudicator had the ability to consider the party‟s ability to pay 
when awarding costs, for many parties a significant cost was the first hurdle to 
overcome. It was possible that the risk of adverse costs would have prevented some of 
those with a reasonable case from taking the first leap.
318
 Alternatively, this may have 
had a deterrent effect against unjustified litigation or may have caused a party to look 
at alternative methods to resolve a dispute, such as mediation,
319
 which, as Harris 
pointed out, would have been „more efficient and less costly to all involved, including 
the state.‟320 Hodges believed that the adverse costs rule provided an element of risk 
for parties taking legal action and may have encouraged them to consider early 
settlement.
321
 These issues have been well illustrated in the previous section. 
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Zuckerman pointed has suggested that the fear of having to pay the opponent‟s costs 
was in itself a deterrent and an injustice, as the wealth of the parties concerned was 
the determining factor as to whether or not legal action was taken.
322
 Further, those 
with the means to intimidate a poorer party by „running a high-cost litigation strategy‟ 
may have coerced the poorer party into agreeing to an unfair settlement.
323
 
 
Harris also suggests that the principle of costs following the event was too simplistic 
and did not „give sufficient weight to the principle of access to justice.‟324 He 
advocated a more flexible approach to costs that did not „shut out potential litigants 
because of legitimate fears about costs‟ awards which they will not be able to 
meet.‟325 However, it is arguable that the general principle that costs follow the event 
created a level of uncertainty between the parties. Lord Woolf believed that this type 
of approach to litigation usually resulted in „total uncertainty for the parties as to what 
litigation will require and consequently the amount of expenditure in which they may 
be involved and the timescale of that involvement.‟326 The formulaic approach of the 
Court in awarding costs often resulted in successful parties being inadequately 
compensated for the costs incurred. This questioned the ability of the Court to provide 
a fair and just resolution. 
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Self-represented parties could have been at a disadvantage in terms of adverse cost 
awards as without representation they would be less able to assess the risks involved. 
This was suggested by Goddard CJ in Reid v New Zealand Fire Service 
Commission
327
 where he opined that the self-represented applicant „may not have 
fully appreciated from the start the perils to which failure could expose him.‟328 In 
Reid the applicant had, however, been warned early that his case had little merit and 
that he faced potentially higher costs if he persisted with his claim. Goddard CJ, 
further in Reid, said that „[a]pprehension of an order for costs effectively enough 
deters most people from going unnecessarily to law.‟329 While this statement may 
have been accurate the fear of potential costs awards against them was objectively 
also likely to have prevented some parties with legitimate claims from taking legal 
action.   
 
In some cases as Harris suggests, the applicant might have been „prevented by the 
court at the threshold from proceeding with the litigation‟ if the opposing party made 
an application for security for costs.
330
 This could happen if either party suspected that 
the other would not be able to pay if an adverse costs award was made against them. 
If security for costs could not be provided, the court could stay the proceedings.
331
 
Again, those on middle incomes were most vulnerable to pressure from the possibility 
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of an adverse costs award as they neither qualified for legal aid nor had the disposable 
income to pay large costs awards.
332
  
 
The principles applied in the awarding of costs could have a profound effect on the 
outcome of a case. There have been cases where the Court has awarded full indemnity 
costs, or close to it, against the respondent
333
 because of their conduct during the 
personal grievance procedure. One example of the Court‟s approach in such cases was 
Harris v Nurse Maude where Gault J ruled that:
334
 
…counsel for the first respondent… must bear some responsibility for the intransigent 
approach of his client from the time of the suspension of Mrs Harris, when he had become 
actively and personally involved in the whole matter, as evidenced by the fact that it was he 
who composed and forwarded to solicitors then acting for Mrs Harris (and not to her) the 
notice of dismissal and the somewhat broad and certainly unspecific reasons for it.  
 
The hearing was unnecessarily prolonged by the first respondent seeking to have the leave 
question determined in the middle of the hearing, despite having agreed at the outset to hear 
the leave and grievance matters together.  
 
Conversely, and more dangerously in terms of fair access to justice, there have been 
cases where the behaviour of the party‟s representative has affected an award of costs. 
In Martin v Browning the appellants alleged, among other things, adjudicator bias 
against their advocate in the Tribunal.
335
 The Employment Court noted that the 
advocate had been „unduly abrasive in his dealings with the respondent‟s solicitor‟, 
making outbursts including „some quite extraordinary and intemperate utterances that 
the adjudicator was obliged to deal with and did so in a remarkably restrained 
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fashion.‟336 This ground of the challenge was dismissed, the Court finding not only no 
disclosure of bias but „judicial tolerance of an excessively technical but erroneous 
approach to the case by the Martins‟ advocate.‟337 In the Employment Tribunal the 
advocate‟s conduct had been taken into account in awarding costs and disbursements 
of $4,500 to the applicant. Counsel for the applicant had submitted that the advocate‟s 
conduct in particular had:
338
 
...significantly contributed unnecessarily to the costs of litigation by repeated failure to 
progress matters leading up to trial and failure to comply with orders of the Tribunal and 
belated attempts to seek disclosure in the course of the proceedings and arguing the point after 
the applicants had presented their case. 
 
The Employment Tribunal had found that the advocate had „employed tactics 
showing “contempt not only to ordinary and accepted standard of procedure but also 
towards follow [sic] practitioners and the Tribunal alike.”‟339 As a result of the 
advocate‟s behaviour, despite „winning‟ most substantive points on appeal in the 
Employment Court, no order for costs in the Tribunal was made with Colgan J ruling 
that:
340
 
The Tribunal‟s orders for costs must be modified to reflect these outcomes on appeal. 
Although the Martins should have been substantially successful in the Tribunal, any award of 
costs must take account of the manner of the conduct of their case by their advocate. I have 
already referred to the advocacy of the Martin‟s case at the hearing. As the Tribunal noted, 
also, the advocate adopted a “trial by ambush” strategy in relation to relevant documents and 
simply refused to comply with an order for disclosure and inspection of documents made by 
the Tribunal, presumably in an attempt to advance his clients‟ case. In these circumstances 
considerations of equity and good conscience dictate that no award of costs should be made 
for the case in the tribunal. 
                                                             
336
 Ibid 421, Judge Colgan.  
337
 Ibid.  
338
 Ibid. 
339
 Ibid, 426, Judge Colgan, quoting the Employment Tribunal judgment. 
340
 Ibid 432. 
557 
 
It is submitted that in such cases the client was at the mercy of their representative. 
Access to justice could therefore be denied by the very person hired to facilitate it.  
 
Levels of compensation awarded could also be affected by the applicant‟s 
remuneration level and position in the employment hierarchy. Ian McAndrew, in a 
survey of the Employment Tribunal in 1999, found a clear correlation between levels 
of compensation for hurt and humiliation under s 40(1)(c)(i) Employment Contracts 
Act 1991 and grievants‟ occupation.341 He found that applicants who were managers, 
professionals, supervisors or administrators were more likely to have been awarded 
more than $5000 in compensation than other occupational groups.
342
  
 
Data collected for this research has shown that employees occupying the professional 
and management occupational classes sought the highest levels of compensation but 
did not receive a great deal more than the next highest group (farm and trades).
343
 
Length of service and seniority may have been factors which contributed to this 
outcome.  
 
Access to justice may also have been affected by gender because of the link in the 
awarding of compensation for humiliation and injury to feelings by the Employment 
Tribunal and the apparent tendency to award higher compensation based upon the 
applicant‟s level of income.344 Caroline Morris, in her research into gender bias in the 
employment institutions, argued that any practice that linked compensation to the 
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employee‟s loss of opportunity to work at that job meant that women would have 
received lower awards as their average income was usually lower.
345
  
 
The research for this thesis found similar results to those of Morris and additional 
possible explanations. In Chapter Five it was shown that although women tended to 
have a higher success rate in establishing their personal grievances, men tended to 
seek much higher compensation. Men were awarded slightly higher levels of 
compensation than women but received a lower proportion of what they sought.
346
 
This was despite adjudicators saying that they did not take gender into account when 
calculating compensation awards.
347
  
 
Morris argued that the emphasis should have been on the impact of the employer‟s 
actions on the grievant and the level of distress caused. Although this has been 
acknowledged by the court, Morris nevertheless, identified a „pattern of differing 
valuations of the hurt suffered by men and women‟ over the four years of her 
research.
348
 She gave a number of examples of cases where the Employment Tribunal 
found a high level of injury to feelings in the case of a woman but recognised it with a 
lesser award than that given in a case of a lower level of distress by a man.
349
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A similar pattern of gender bias was observed by Wendy Davis in sexual harassment 
cases, where she found that awards of compensation under s 40(1)(c)(i) for men 
dismissed for sexual harassment tended to be higher than those paid to women who 
were sexually harassed.
350
 
8.3 PERSONAL GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES OF THE 
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS ACT 1991: IMPLICATIONS AND 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
The issues raised by use of the adjudication system under the Employment Contracts 
Act 1991 relate to questions such as whether Government objectives had been met, 
standards of representation, effectiveness of outcomes, and how these factors affected 
access to justice for participants. This thesis found that the operation of the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991 did not effectively implement the aims and objects of 
the Government at the time, nor of the Act itself. There were lengthy delays, both in 
waiting for a hearing and a subsequent decision, representation was costly and on 
occasion contributed to such delays. Further, a combination of factors meant that the 
Employment Tribunal procedure was formal and, to many parties, legalistic. Indeed, 
where remedies were awarded, including costs, these were often lower than what was 
sought. Despite the best intentions of Parliament at the time, the reality for 
participants was a cumbersome personal grievance system that in fact created barriers 
to rather than access to justice. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
[2004] 1 ERNZ 123; Davidson v Christchurch Civic Crèche [1995] 1 ERNZ 172. See, Caroline Morris, 
„An Investigation into Gender Bias in the Employment Institutions‟ (1995) 21(1) NZJIR 67, 76–78. 
350
 Wendy Davis, A Feminist Perspective on Sexual harassment in Employment Law in New Zealand, 
New Zealand Institute of Industrial Relations Research (1994) 41. 
560 
 
8.3.1 EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS ACT 2000: A NEW APPROACH 
 
The Labour Coalition Government introduced the Employment Relations Act 2000 
with the intention of reforming the labour market, with the main focus being on 
building productive employment relationships and the promotion of principles of 
good faith in those employment relationships.
351
 This implemented Government 
policy to repeal the Employment Contracts Act 1991 and „introduce a better 
framework for the conduct of employment relations.‟352 The preamble to the 
Employment Relations Bill 2000 stated that the new framework was „based on the 
understanding that employment is a human relationship involving issues of mutual 
trust, confidence and fair dealing, and is not simply a contractual, economic 
exchange.‟353 This contrasts markedly with the main object of the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991, which was „to promote an efficient labour market.‟354   
 
To emphasise the change of philosophy between the Employment Contracts Act 1991 
and the Employment Relations Act 2000, it is worth reproducing part of the 
explanatory note to the Employment Relations Bill:
355
 
The overarching objective of the Employment Relations [Act] is therefore to build productive 
employment relationships through the promotion of mutual trust and confidence in all aspects 
of the employment environment. The employment environment encompasses the entire 
complex and dynamic system of relationships. It includes all participants, not just employers 
and employees. In order to achieve this primary purpose, the [Act] specifically: 
 recognises that employment relationships must be built on good faith behaviour; and 
 acknowledges and addressees the inherent inequality of bargaining power in 
employment relationships; and  
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 promotes collective bargaining; and 
 protects the integrity of individual choice; and 
 promotes mediation as the primary problem-resolving mechanism; and  
 reduces the need for judicial intervention. 
 
These principles are reflected in the objects section of the Employment Relations Act 
2000, s 3. The principles of good faith, and the parties to whom they apply, are 
contained in s 4 of the Employment Relations Act 2000. Thus, parties to an 
employment relationship „must deal with each other in good faith‟. This also includes 
a requirement that the parties must not directly or indirectly mislead or deceive each 
other.
356
 This duty of good faith is wider than the implied mutual obligations of trust 
and confidence found at common law
357
 and requires parties to be „responsive and 
communicative‟ in actively maintaining a productive employment relationship.358   
 
The good faith obligations and emphasis on employment relationships in the 
Employment Relations Act 2000 are a new and significant change. In comparison, the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991 had no equivalent provisions for parties to act in 
good faith toward each other. Instead, the implied term as to mutual trust and 
confidence was applied by the Court to individual personal grievance cases.
359
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8.3.2 EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS ACT 2000: IMPLICATIONS FOR PERSONAL 
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES 
 
In general terms, the Employment Relations Act 2000 makes some progress towards 
addressing the concerns raised in this thesis about the adjudication process under the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991. This section examines relevant changes under the 
Employment Relations Act 2000 and how these address the issues raised by the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991 as identified by this thesis. The section concludes 
with a summary of the changes proposed to personal grievances procedures and the 
role of institutions under the Employment Relations Act 2000 as signalled by the 
current National Coalition Government.  
a) Institutions 
One of the principal changes under the Employment Relations Act 2000 was the 
specialist institutional arrangements. Part 10 of the Act establishes the new 
institutions, which are mediation services, the Employment Relations Authority, and 
the Employment Court. Consistently with the new philosophy under the Employment 
Relations Act 2000, the object of Part 10 is to establish procedures and institutions 
that:
360
  
 support successful employment relationships and the good faith obligations that underpin 
them; and 
 recognise that employment relationships are more likely to be successful if problems in those 
relationships are resolved promptly by the parties themselves; and 
 recognise that, if problems in employment relationships are to be resolved promptly, expert 
problem-solving support, information, and assistance needs to be available at short notice to 
the parties to those relationships; and 
 recognise that the procedures for problem-solving need to be flexible; and 
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 recognise that there will always be some cases that require judicial intervention; and 
 recognise that judicial intervention at the lowest level needs to be that of a specialist decision-
making body that is not inhibited by strict  procedural requirements; and 
 recognise that difficult issues of law will need to be determined by higher Courts. 
 
Interestingly, the objects in s 143 Employment Relations Act 2000 are not 
significantly different to those contained in the equivalent s 76 of the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991. Section 76 aimed to provide appropriate services to facilitate the 
mutual resolution of differences between parties to employment contracts, and to 
establish a „low level, informal, specialist Employment Tribunal to provide speedy, 
fair, and just resolution of differences between parties to employment contracts.‟ This 
research has shown that the objects provisions under s 76 were not strictly met. The 
question outstanding at the introduction of the new legislation was whether the 
institutions created under the Employment Relations Act 2000 would be more 
successful in meeting their stated objectives. 
 
Paul Roth notes that the background papers to the Employment Relations Act 2000 
emphasised the importance of resolving employment relations problems swiftly and 
lowering costs by reducing legalism and the need for formal adjudication.
361
 The Act 
achieves these objects in a number of ways:
362
 
 The new legislation separated mediation from adjudication and emphasised speedy, informal 
mediation as a prerequisite before further action could be taken in most cases; 
 The first stage adjudication level in the new Employment Relations Authority was stripped of 
many of the procedural complexities that had existed under the former Employment Tribunal 
framework; 
 A variety of direct and indirect disincentives to seeking legal assistance were introduced. In 
particular, there would be less need for workers to consult lawyers with the promotion of 
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unionism. Moreover, legal aid was no longer available for the mediation stage (since it was no 
longer carried out by a formal Tribunal), and procedure in the Authority was generally 
rendered less legalistic. 
 
This illustrates the ways in which institutions under the Employment Relations Act 
2000 are able to support parties in employment relationships. While the objects 
provisions under both pieces of legislation appear similar, the emphasis has altered 
considerably. Parties are encouraged to resolve employment relationship problems 
themselves, with the provision of expert assistance when required. If this is 
unsuccessful, the matter may be referred to the Employment Relations Authority for a 
speedy and non-adversarial investigation.
363
 The Employment Court remains as a 
more formal method of resolving outstanding issues in a traditional, adversarial 
manner. 
8.3.2(A) MEDIATION 
 
Section 144(1) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 directs the chief executive of 
the Department of Labour to „provide mediation services to support all employment 
relationships.‟ The functions of the mediation services are therefore separate from the 
investigatory body, the Employment Relations Authority. This contrasts with the 
provisions of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 where both mediation and 
adjudication services were provided by the Employment Tribunal. Employment 
Tribunal members were statutory officers and a considerable number held dual 
warrants, which meant they were able to mediate and adjudicate. In contrast, 
mediators under the Employment Relations Act 2000 are now employees of the 
Department of Labour, and are therefore subject to the direction of the chief 
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executive.
364
 The result of this change is that, as employees of the Department of 
Labour, mediators now operate in a more flexible environment and are therefore able 
to work in a less prescriptive manner.
365
 This is further enhanced by s 147 
Employment Relations Act 2000, which empowers mediators to decide what services 
are appropriate in the particular circumstances in each case.
366
 
 
The provision of mediation services is not now strictly limited to face-to-face 
mediation, but extends services to include the provision of:
367
 
 information about employment rights and obligations; 
 information about services available; 
 other services that assist the smooth conduct of employment relationships; and 
 other services that assist persons to resolve, promptly and effectively, their employment 
relationship problems.
368
 
 
The inclusion of these services is intended to reduce the reliance on legalism and to 
facilitate early dispute resolution. This helps to prevent employment relationship 
problems from being resolved in the more time-consuming, and expensive processes 
of the Employment Relations Authority or Employment Court.
369
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A major shift in this employment relationship problem resolution process is that 
mediation is now „obligatory under the Act in all but exceptional circumstances.‟370 
These are defined in the Act as situations where the Authority considers that the use 
of mediation would be futile, contrary to the public interest, or in matters of 
urgency.
371
 In this way, mediation is now „encouraged‟ as an option of first resort:372 
The creation of a service focussed solely on mediation with a separate Employment Relations 
Authority reflects one of the core philosophies of the Employment Relations Act – that 
employment relationships are more likely to be effective if problems are resolved by the 
parties themselves. 
 
Confidentiality in mediation is an important mechanism to encourage effective 
participation in mediation.
373
 Again, the intention underlying the confidentiality 
provisions in the Employment Relations Act 2000 is to enhance the informality and 
effectiveness of the mediation services.
374
 These provisions prevent the disclosure of 
information presented at mediation except where parties consent to disclosure. This 
legislative requirement ensures that confidentiality in mediation is maintained. This 
contrasts with the situation under the Employment Contracts Act 1991, where 
although mediation was privileged, this was not a statutory requirement. While 
Employment Tribunal members treated information in mediation with confidentiality, 
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it was possible for written statements to be obtained by discovery and in limited 
circumstances admissible in subsequent adjudication.
375
   
 
A strict interpretation of the confidentiality provisions in s 148 Employment Relations 
Act 2000 is that participants in mediation have liberty to make statements with little or 
no consequences. Judge Colgan in Shepherd v Glenview Electrical Services
376
 
observed that the combined effects of s 148 are „clear, absolute and draconian.‟377 He 
considered that this appeared to make inadmissible „offences that may be committed 
by one person making a statement to another for the purposes of the mediation.‟378 
While Judge Colgan expressed reservations over this strict interpretation of the 
confidentiality provisions, an alternative approach was not put forward until the later 
case of Jesudhass v Just Hotel Ltd.
379
 In this case, the full Employment Court 
considered the phrase „made for the purposes of the mediation.‟380 It was held that 
where information provided during mediation, was not given for the legitimate 
purposes of mediation, that information would not attract the protections of 
confidentiality and inadmissibility.
381
 To obtain the protection of confidentiality, 
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communications must be given in a genuine effort to „settle existing or potential 
litigation, such as admissions of liability or offers to settle.‟382  
 
However, on appeal, the Court of Appeal overturned the Employment Court decision 
and held, inter alia, that s 148(1) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 „should be 
construed as applying to all documents prepared for use in or in connection with a 
mediation and to all statements or submissions made at a mediation (or a record 
thereof), unless they have come into existence independently of the mediation‟.383 
However, the Court of Appeal considered that in some circumstances, such as 
involving serious criminal offending during mediation, public policy considerations 
may dictate that such conduct would not be caught by s 148(1) of the Employment 
Relations Act 2000 but declined to rule on this point within the context of the 
appeal.
384
 
 
The emphasis on the provision on mediation services under the Employment Relations 
Act 2000 appears to have a high level of success. Over 80% of cases that go to 
mediation are resolved, withdrawn, or settled.
385
 Goddard CJ observes this high level 
of settlement at mediation, noting that many cases do not reach the Employment 
Relations Authority at all. Of the cases that do reach the Authority, „reportedly half 
are settled by further mediation or otherwise by consent.‟386 The higher use of 
mediation and informal methods of settlement means that more cases are being 
                                                             
382
 G J Wood, „Mediation – an Employment Relations Authority Perspective” [2006] ELB 46, 63. See 
also S Robson, „Recent Case Comment‟ [2006] ELB 67. 
383
 Just Hotel Limited v Jesudhass [2007] NZCA 582 (14 December 2007) 44. 
384
 Ibid 43.  
385
 M Quivooy, „Employment Relations Service mediation – statistics and analysis‟ [2006] ELB 45 
386
 T G Goddard CJ, „Farewell from the Chief Judge: Reflections on 15 Years in Office‟ [2005] ELB 
31, 34. 
569 
 
resolved outside the investigative Authority and more formal Court settings. Costs are 
lower as mediation is provided by the mediation services free of charge, and the 
greater emphasis on parties resolving disputes themselves results in more swift 
resolution of employment relationship problems.   
8.3.2(B) THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS AUTHORITY 
 
The Employment Relations Authority was established under the Employment 
Relations Act 2000 to investigate employment problems in a speedy and non-
adversarial way.
387
 The Employment Relations Authority is a specialist low level 
investigatory body intended to operate independently of and from the mediation 
service but both are administered through the Department of Labour. The current 
requisite qualifications to serve as a Member of the Employment Relations Authority 
did not alter from those equivalent to serve as a Member of the Employment Tribunal. 
There are no specific requirements for membership of the Employment Relations 
Authority, nor what constitutes relevant experience and/or background to serve as a 
Member. For example, Members are not required to be lawyers. Section 157 of the 
Employment Relations Act 2000 describes the role of the Authority: 
 the Authority is an investigative body that has the role of resolving employment relationship 
problems by establishing the facts and making a determination according to the substantial 
merits of the case, without regard to technicalities; 
 the Authority must, in carrying out its role, comply with the principles of natural justice, 
aim to promote good faith behaviour, support successful employment relationships, and 
generally further the objects of the Employment Relations Act; and 
 the Authority must act as it thinks fit in equity and good conscience, but may not do 
anything that is inconsistent with the Act or with the relevant employment agreement. 
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The Employment Relations Authority is intended to function as an efficient and 
informal means of resolving legal issues at first instance.
388
 The Employment 
Relations Authority uses an investigative process, with an emphasis on fact-finding at 
its own initiative. It can therefore act in a speedy and less formal and legalistic 
manner. It achieves this in several ways:
389
 
 Mediation: Importantly, the Employment Relations Authority can direct 
parties to use mediation services as it sees fit, even in a case where 
mediation has already taken place.
390
 
 Investigative Powers: The Employment Relations Authority has wide 
investigative powers, and is not strictly bound by the rules of evidence or by 
the parties‟ description of the problem.391 Wide discretion is afforded, 
enabling a process that is informal and flexible to meet the circumstances of 
particular employment relations problems. The Employment Relations 
Authority‟s investigatory powers are set out in s 160(1) of the Employment 
Relations Act 2000. The Authority may, in investigating any matter:
392
 
 call for evidence and information from the parties or from any other person; 
                                                             
388
 New Zealand Amalgamated Engineering, Printing & Manufacturing Union Inc v Carter Holt 
Harvey [2002] 1 ERNZ 74, para 13. See Anderson, G, Hughes, J, Leggatt, M, Roth, P, Employment 
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 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 159(1)(c). 
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 P Bartlett, W C Hodge, P Muir, C Toogood, and R Wilson, Brookers Employment Law (2006) 
ER160. 
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 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 160(1). These powers are supplemented by the provisions of 
Schedule 2, which includes: 
 Parties‟ right to representation; 
 Right of the Employment Relations Authority to summon witnesses and pay their expenses; 
 Power to take evidence on oath; 
 Power to prohibit publication of evidence, pleadings, names, and settlements; 
 Power to award interest on any matter involving the recovery of money; 
 Power to award costs. 
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 require the parties or any other person to attend an investigation meeting to give 
evidence; 
 interview any of the parties or any person at any time before, during, or after an 
investigation meeting; 
 in the course of an investigation meeting, fully examine any witness; 
 decide that an investigation meeting should not be in public or should not be 
open to certain persons; and 
 follow whatever procedure the Authority considers appropriate. 
 
A good example of the Employment Relations Authority‟s move away from more 
formal legal procedures is its power to call for evidence and information, irrespective 
of the legal nature of the evidence.
393
 It can therefore receive information that is not 
properly evidence subject to equity and good conscience, natural justice, and the 
requirement to do nothing inconsistent with the Employment Relations Act 2000:
394
   
 Natural justice requirements: Whilst fulfilling its functions, the Employment 
Relations Authority must act in a manner that complies with the principles 
of natural justice and act reasonably taking into account its investigative 
functions.
395
 This requires that consideration be given to the circumstances 
of each case, allowing adaptable and flexible procedures in a manner that is 
fair to both parties.
396
 Indeed, as Wilson et al note, from the perspective of 
the average employee or employer who brings a problem to the Employment 
Relations Authority, natural justice „is, surely, simply being given a fair 
                                                             
393
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394
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hearing.‟397 The article goes on to observe three components to this 
requirement:
398
 
 Every party has the right to present their case in whatever way is appropriate and 
accessible to them; 
 Each party must have knowledge of all evidence and information put forward by 
the other party and be given the opportunity to reply; 
 The Employment Relations Authority Member must determine the case without 
fear or favour in an independent manner. 
 
Thus, the investigation is a process, not an event; it is for the benefit of the parties, 
aimed at providing an informed decision that is understood by both parties, without 
undue cost.
399
 
 Reduced formality in recording determinations: Section 174 Employment 
Relations Act 2000 places limitations on the matters that must be covered by 
the Employment Relations Authority‟s determinations; the purpose of which 
is to create speedy, informal, and practical justice.
400
 The Employment 
Relations Authority is therefore not, unlike the Employment Tribunal, a 
court of record.
401
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8.3.2(C) NATURAL JUSTICE AND CROSS-EXAMINATION 
 
The Employment Relations Authority did not, in direct contrast to the Employment 
Tribunal, initially encourage cross-examination by either party or their 
representatives. A Practice Note issued by the Chief of the Authority advised that 
once evidence had been presented, the Employment Relations Authority Member 
could ask further questions of the witness.
402
 Cross-examination was not permitted by 
opposite parties or their representatives, although they were able to request further 
investigation in relation to the evidence heard.
403
 However, this practice was 
challenged in the David case, where the Employment Court found that the right to 
cross-examine was intrinsic to natural justice at „every hearing at which a party 
wishes to exercise that right‟.404 Although the Court did acknowledge the decision 
might cause some delay, in the Court‟s view it would only cause slight disruption.   
 
The Government‟s response to the David case was to introduce amending legislation 
to the requirements that the Employment Relations Authority comply with the 
principles of natural justice.
405
 The new legislation does not require the Employment 
Relations Authority to allow the cross-examination of a party or person, but „the 
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403
 Ibid. For an example of the Employment Relations Authority process in relation to questioning 
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Authority may, in its absolute discretion, permit such cross-examination.‟406 Goddard 
CJ, in a subsequent case notes:
407
 
In cases where credibility is in issue, there can in theory still be a tension between the rule 
that the Authority need not permit cross-examination and the rule that the Authority must 
afford natural justice. Anecdotally, I understand that, in cases such as David, cross-
examination is routinely permitted. 
 
8.3.3 JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS AUTHORITY  
 
The processes of the Employment Relations Authority are insulated from outside 
scrutiny by legislative limitations on the Employment Court‟s jurisdiction to 
intervene. For example, it is not the function of the Employment Court to advise or 
direct the Employment Relations Authority on the exercise of its investigative role, 
powers and jurisdiction, or the procedure it follows or intends to follow.
408
 In 
addition, there is limited scope for judicial review of matters before the Employment 
Relations Authority.
409
 Thus, the Employment Court no longer has a supervisory role 
over the lower forum.
410
 Instead, the emphasis is on resolving the employment 
relationship problem in a „speedy, effective, and non-legalistic‟ manner rather than 
how the institutions deal with that problem.
411
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8.3.4 DE NOVO HEARINGS IN THE EMPLOYMENT COURT  
 
Under the Employment Relations Act 2000, parties to a personal grievance may seek a 
hearing de novo of their case in the Employment Court.
412
 Thus, the whole case may 
be heard afresh by the Court; it is not an appeal process restricted to points of law, but 
an original proceeding.
413
 This strongly contrasts with the Employment Contracts Act 
1991, where parties had to be certain that all relevant evidence and information was 
placed before the Employment Tribunal as no new evidence was permitted on 
appeal.
414
 Consequently, a great deal of irrelevant or excess evidence was placed 
before the Employment Tribunal. However, under the Employment Relations Act 
2000, a challenge to a determination of the Employment Relations Authority is not 
restricted to matters that have already been placed before the lower forum. In other 
words, any case appearing before the Court in a de novo hearing may involve any new 
evidence or information that is relevant to the claim.
415
   
8.3.5 PERSONAL GRIEVANCES: DEFINITION AND PROCESS 
 
In relation to the definitions of personal grievances, there has been little change with 
the passing of the Employment Relations Act 2000. The most notable changes that 
have been made, as discussed above, relate to the institutions that resolve personal 
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grievances and the procedures used. The definitions of personal grievances 
themselves have altered little. This section highlights some changes relevant to this 
thesis. 
 
In a significant jurisdictional departure, Employment Relations Act 2000 s 113(1) 
confines personal grievance actions challenging a dismissal to be the sole first 
instance prerogative of the Employment Relations Authority. This abolishes the 
previously available right to bring a common law action for wrongful dismissal in 
other civil courts. The effect of this section ensures all actions for dismissal are now 
heard by the Employment Relations Authority; actions challenging a dismissal by 
way of wrongful dismissal, breach of contract, or under the Contractual Remedies Act 
1977 are no longer permissible.
416
 This covers any aspect of the dismissal, for any 
reason, in any court.
417
 Provided it is not centred upon a dismissal, the residual 
common law action for breach of contract however, remains available as an 
alternative to a disadvantage action.
418
   
 
The definition of a personal grievance, Employment Relations Act 2000, s 103 is 
largely modelled on its predecessor, Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 27. The 
exceptions being that a disadvantage grievance in s 103(1)(b) is expanded to include 
„…any condition that survives termination of the employment‟ and „during 
employment that has since been terminated.‟ Section 103(1)(e) also introduces a new 
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category of personal grievance „that the employee has been racially harassed in the 
employee‟s employment‟.   
 
The most significant recent change to the determination of personal grievances 
effected by the Employment Relations Amendment Act (No 2) 2004, is the passage of 
section 103A; an objective „Test of Justification‟ applicable to both dismissal and 
disadvantage claims. Section 103A provides: 
… the question of whether a dismissal or an action was justifiable must be determined, on an 
objective basis, by considering whether the employer‟s action , and how the employer acted, 
were what a fair and reasonable employer would have done in all the circumstances at the time 
the dismissal or action occurred. 
 
Judicial determination of how this has shifted the law away from that under previous 
legislation has yet to fully evolve beyond the Employment Court.
419
 Shaw J, in 
Hudson, applied an objective test: what would a fair and reasonable employer do in 
the circumstances? On the face of it, this widens the Court‟s enquiry, enabling a 
subjective decision by the employer to be tested against a universal objective standard 
of the hypothetical fair and reasonable employer in light of all relevant circumstances. 
Coupled with the good faith requirements, s 103A can be read as giving stronger 
emphasis on the employer‟s inquiry, addressing any concerns of inherent inequalities 
between the parties.
420
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Categories of personal grievance have also undergone some changes under the 
Employment Relations Act 2000 including: 
 Section 104 Discrimination is extended to include union activities and section 105 now fully 
incorporates the prohibited discrimination grounds contained in the Human Rights Act 1993. 
These extended grounds are: disability, age, political opinion, employment status and sexual 
orientation. In addition, s 107 defines what union activity constitutes. 
 Section 108 Sexual Harassment largely mirrors its Employment Contracts Act 1991 s 29 
counterpart except visual material of a sexual nature is introduced to maintain consistency 
with the Human Rights Act 1993.
421
 A further amendment states „either by its nature or 
through repetition has a detrimental effect‟, whereas the corresponding Employment Contracts 
Act 1991 s 29(1)(b) appeared to have no requirement for detriment to follow on from repeated 
behaviour.
422
 
 Section 109 Racial Harassment is a new provision with no counterpart in the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991, which provides a definition of racial harassment in employment 
relationships, and is therefore subject to the same remedies as other personal grievances. 
 
8.3.6 CONTINUATION OF THE ‘NINETY DAY RULE’ FOR PERSONAL GRIEVANCES 
UNDER THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS ACT 2000   
 
Under the Employment Contracts Act 1991 s 33, any employee submitting a personal 
grievance was required notify the employer within 90 days of the action that allegedly 
amounted to a personal grievance. This requirement has been continued under 
Employment Relations Act s 114, albeit with significant changes in wording. One 
distinction is s 114 replacing the term „submit‟ with „raise‟; that is, an employee „who 
wishes to raise a personal grievance must… raise the grievance with his or her 
                                                             
421
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422
 Ibid, s 108(1)(b)(iii). 
579 
 
employer within the period of 90 days…‟423 However, this appears to have made little 
practical difference on the issue of notifying the employer of the existence of a 
personal grievance.
424
   
 
As under the Employment Contracts Act 1991, the 90-day rule may be set aside and a 
personal grievance commenced if the delay was occasioned by exceptional 
circumstances.
425
 In a departure from the previous legislation, Employment Relations 
Act 2000 s 115 now lists circumstances that constitute „exceptional circumstances‟ 
These include:
426
  
(a) where the employee has been so affected or traumatised by the matter giving rise to the 
grievance that he or she was unable to properly consider raising the grievance within the 
period specified in section 114(1); or 
(b) where the employee made reasonable arrangements to have the grievance raised on his or 
her behalf by an agent of the employee, and the agent unreasonably failed to ensure that the 
grievance was raised within the required time; or 
(c) where the employee's employment agreement does not contain the explanation concerning 
the resolution of employment relationship problems that is required by section 54 or section 
65, as the case may be; or 
(d) where the employer has failed to comply with the obligation under section 120(1) to 
provide a statement of reasons for dismissal.   
 
Although on the face of it, the rule relating to exceptional circumstances appears to 
have been broadened – such as matters that can now be regarded as exceptional 
circumstances – the courts have continued the strict approach used under the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991. Indeed, the Court in Morgan commented that:
427
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„[i]f anything, it is arguable that Parliament has made the “exceptional circumstances” 
test a more difficult one…‟ Further, Colgan CJ notes that it is well settled that 
Parliament did not intend to relax the test for extending the 90-day time limit, but 
sought to exemplify, but not limit, situations that would amount to exceptional 
circumstances.
428
 The application of the exceptional circumstances remains a matter 
of judicial discretion according to the facts of each case:
429
 
Above all, the question of whether an application for leave such as this should be granted is a 
matter of the Court‟s discretion. Although relevant considerations have been established for 
the exercise of this discretion, these only apply as the circumstances of each case allow.  
 
8.3.7 PERSONAL GRIEVANCES: REMEDIES 
 
Section 123 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 re-enacts the remedies provisions 
of Employment Contracts Act 1991 s 40 with some changes. Again it provides for 
three main remedies: reimbursement for wages or other money lost;
430
 compensation 
for humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings;
431
 and reinstatement.
432
 
However, reinstatement has now become the primary remedy, whereas under the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991 it was rarely used.
433
 Where there is a personal 
grievance and reinstatement is sought, the Employment Relations Authority must 
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429
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 ed, 2005) 875. 
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provide for reinstatement wherever practicable.
434
 In addition, the Employment 
Relations Authority can now make determinations ordering interim reinstatement 
under Employment Relations Act s 127.
435
   
 
The provisions for reimbursement remain largely unchanged under Employment 
Relations Act 2000, s 128. There are some minor changes of wording, which do not 
appear to substantially alter the provision.
436
   
 
The provisions in relation to compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity, an injury 
to feelings are unchanged under Employment Relations Act 2000, s 123(c)(i). 
However, the quantum of awards remains controversial. As found in this research, the 
amount of compensation awarded was often low; therefore compromising the justice 
of a finding that a personal grievance existed. Such criticism has continued under the 
Employment Relations Act 2000, and is a topic recently addressed by the Courts.
437
 
The Court of Appeal re-examined the principles and policy of compensation in 
Telecom New Zealand Ltd v Nutter.
438
 It was held that there is no automatic right for 
the full amount of compensation claimed as there is no statutory direction in this 
respect.
439
 Instead, the Court stated policy considerations as to why moderation in 
awards is appropriate:
440
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1. The discretionary nature of the remedy is obviously inconsistent with any principle 
requiring “full” compensation to be awarded. 
2. The concept of unjustifiable dismissal is flexible and a full compensation approach 
may be disproportionate to the nature of the wrong. 
3. Full compensation may be unnecessarily and inappropriately damaging to the 
employer (and indirectly to the position of other employees of the same employer). 
4. Rules of thumb as to appropriate measures of compensation can facilitate both the 
efficient dispatch of litigation and reasonably predictable outcomes, although cf the 
comments made by Cooke P in Bailey v Minister of Education [1993] 2 ERNZ 321 at 
324 distinguishing between “rules of thumb” and “principles”. 
5. A community expectation of “full” compensation extending to compensation for 
years of foregone remuneration could discourage employment and personal 
rehabilitation. 
 
A further ground for reducing compensation awarded is when the personal grievance 
is granted on procedural grounds only.
441
 For example, the Court of Appeal reduced a 
compensation award by 75% where, had the employer followed the correct process, 
the employee would have been justifiably dismissed.
442
   
 
A later case, NCR (NZ) Corporation v Blowes, addresses the specific issue of awards 
for non-economic loss.
443
 Wild J commented in this case that awards for non-
economic loss are in part matters of impression and discretion, within recognised 
parameters. Applying a case law analysis, he then identified what those parameters 
currently are; canvassing the range of awards commonly awarded for compensation 
for non-economic loss. Wild J then observed that the upper end of the permissible 
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range for compensation now lies at $27,000.
444
 Cleary provides a useful commentary 
on this and other cases, observing that „$10,000 is by no means the floor for serious 
grievances with $7,000 considered something like the outer limit for even quite 
insensitive treatment.‟445 These cases demonstrate the importance the Court places on 
consistency with current and past practice and will adjust any awards accordingly.
446
 
This is reflected in studies undertaken by McAndrew that show no clear patterns of 
difference between levels of compensation awards under the Employment Contracts 
Act 1991 and the Employment Relations Act 2000.
447
 It should be noted that 
contributory fault currently reflects the past practice of the courts, and applies to all 
remedies including reinstatement.
448
   
8.3.8 COSTS 
 
The power of the Employment Relations Authority to award costs is found in 
Employment Relations Act 2000, sch 2, cl 15. It is in all material respects similar to 
the power of the Employment Tribunal to award costs in the Employment Contracts 
Act 1991, s 98.
449
 There is wide discretion to award costs as the Employment 
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Relations Authority „thinks reasonable‟ or „as it thinks fit‟.450 For the first three years, 
the Employment Relations Authority exercised this discretion in line with decisions 
made under previous employment legislation when apportioning costs.
451
 However, 
the Employment Relations Authority decided to focus more on its unique 
investigative role in determining applications for costs, thus distinguishing case law 
developed under an adversarial system.
452
  
 
This issue of whether the Employment Relations Authority was bound by decisions 
made under previous legislation was considered by the Employment Court in PBO 
Ltd (formerly Rush Security Ltd) v Da Cruz.
453
 This case held that because of the 
unique nature of the Authority, parties should not have the same expectations of the 
award of costs that might be expected of the Court.
454
 The Court went on to 
distinguish the approach used in quantifying the award of costs, commenting that the 
costs principles applied by the Employment Relations Authority are „not necessarily 
as comprehensive or as prescriptive‟ as those applied previously.455 The Employment 
Relations Authority sets its own procedures, and this is reflected in its approach to 
costs:
456
 
 There is a discretion as to whether costs would be awarded and what amount. 
 The discretion is to be exercised in accordance with principle and not arbitrarily. 
 The statutory jurisdiction to award costs is consistent with the equity and good 
conscience jurisdiction of the Authority. 
 Equity and good conscience is to be considered on a case by case basis. 
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 Costs are not to be used as a punishment or as an expression of disapproval of the 
unsuccessful party's conduct although conduct which increased costs unnecessarily can 
be taken into account in inflating or reducing an award. 
 It is open to the Authority consider whether all or any of the parties costs were 
unnecessary or unreasonable. 
 That costs generally follow the event. 
 That without prejudice offers can be taken into account. 
 That awards will be modest. 
 That frequently costs are judged against a notional daily rate. 
 The nature of the case can also influence costs and this has resulted in the Authority 
ordering that costs lie where they fall in certain circumstances. 
 
Under its investigative role, the Employment Relations Authority can now take a 
more flexible approach when determining the (modest) level of costs to be awarded.   
8.4 CONCLUSIONS 
8.4.1 THE QUESTION POSED 
 
This thesis examined the operation of the Employment Tribunal, what peoples‟ 
experiences were in using it, and the efficacy of the system. The thesis concludes that 
people had mixed experiences with the operation of the Employment Tribunal with 
many being frustrated and dissatisfied with a number of aspects of its actual 
operation.  
8.4.2 OBJECTS 
 
The question of whether the system worked well must be measured against the objects 
of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 which described the Employment Tribunal as 
„a low level, informal, specialist Employment Tribunal to provide speedy, fair, and 
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just resolution of differences between parties…‟457 Adopting this yardstick, the thesis 
found that: 
 The expressed ideal of the Employment Tribunal being low level was a 
misnomer as the process imposed by the Employment Court and the 
Employment Tribunal Regulations 1991 tended to be complex and it, 
over time, adopted an increasingly legalist approach.   
 The notion of informality was largely illusory with most participants in 
the thesis survey finding the process and operation of the Employment 
Tribunal to be Court like, sometimes intimidating and too formal in 
nature. Generally the thesis cannot conclude that the Employment 
Tribunal was particularly user-friendly, although it is acknowledged that 
the low response rate means that more satisfied parties might have not 
bothered to return their completed questionnaires. 
 In contrast to conciliation councils formed under the Labour Relations 
Act 1987 where no reasoned decisions were published, the Employment 
Tribunal has built up a body of transparent, consistent precedent based 
case law.
458
 This evidently fulfilled the intent of the legislation in 
creating a specialist Employment Tribunal.  
 On the issue of providing speedy resolution of personal grievances the 
Employment Tribunal performed poorly. A significant number of 
participants surveyed in this thesis from both employee and employer 
perspectives complained of the negative impact of delay in obtaining an 
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initial hearing and in the processing and issuing of decisions and 
although there might have been bias among this group, the length of time 
from notification to hearings suggests this was more widely experienced. 
 On the question of the provision of „just‟ outcomes, it was, given the 
highly subjective nature of such an ideal, difficult to conclude if the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991 delivered. Participants‟ satisfaction 
levels were variable with many employee applicants taking the view that 
they were happy to secure a resolution in their favour without being 
thrilled by the level of remedies awarded. In contrast, some employers 
took a dim view of the level of remedies. The 1997 case data suggests 
that many applicants were likely to perceive compensation as low and 
costs in engaging with the process high. 
8.4.3 OVERALL, DID THE SYSTEM WORK WELL? 
 
Given the level and variety of criticism of many aspects of the adjudication system 
under the Employment Contracts Act 1991 it is difficult to conclude that it worked 
well for all participants. Those who were comfortable utilising the adjudication 
system included counsel and experienced advocates who arguably benefited by entry 
to an increasingly complex and specialist area of the law which had previously not 
been their preserve; with its attendant income opportunities.  
 
Some adjudicators also expressed frustration around delay and lack of resourcing and 
the failure of parties to initially utilise low level dispute resolution mechanisms such 
as mediation. Adjudicators also bemoaned the complexity and legalism introduced by 
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the Employment Contracts Act 1991‟s emphasis on stricter contractual law principles 
and the legal manoeuvres adopted by counsel. 
8.4.4 ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
 
A central theme of this thesis has been to determine whether users could easily access 
a method of resolving personal grievances which was universal and not prohibitively 
costly. For the first time, all employees and not just union members had access to a 
personal grievance procedure.
459
 The thesis identified a number of barriers for those 
with limited income being able to access the personal grievance procedure which was 
seen as not easily negotiable without obtaining costly specialist advice and 
representation. The extension of personal grievance access to non union members 
whilst laudable, also led to greater pressure on resources than anticipated. 
8.4.5 EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS ACT 2000 – A SAVIOUR? 
 
Whilst it was beyond the scope of this thesis to do a detailed comparison of 
participants‟ experience under both acts it was evident that the Employment Relations 
Act 2000 has addressed a number of systemic shortcomings of the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991 by, amongst other things: 
 Placing greater legislative emphasis and additional resources at the „front 
end‟ of the system to encourage the option of mediation as a first step 
resolution process and allowing the Employment Relations Authority 
adjudicators to direct mediation at their discretion.
460
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 Encouraging emphasis upon preserving employment „relationships‟ and 
making reinstatement a primary remedy.
461
 
 Introducing a requirement of „good faith‟ behaviour in the resolution of 
differences and the specification of an objective approach to assessing 
dismissals and disadvantage actions.
462
 
 Creating a successor to the Employment Tribunal (the Employment 
Relations Authority) that is less formal and more flexible in procedure 
thus freeing up adjudicators to resolve disputes using appropriate 
strategies. 
 Utilisation of an investigatory approach for the Employment Relations 
Authority which encourages a move away from formal adversarial 
proceedings and a model that provides adjudicators with a more 
interventionist role; thus cutting down the need for protracted legal 
submissions and overuse of legal counsel and consequently containing 
costs for both applicant and respondent. 
 An expanded jurisdiction of the Employment Relations Authority 
including the hearing of interim reinstatement disputes. 
 The option of a de novo hearing in the Employment Court if a party is 
dissatisfied with a decision of the Employment Relations Authority. 
 
It is evident that the Employment Relations Act 2000 is not the end of history in terms 
of employment law and any discussion of the implications of reform to personal 
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grievance processes would not be complete without a brief consideration of proposed 
amendments to the Employment Relations Act 2000 signalled by the new National 
Coalition Government. In the lead up to the 2008 General Election, the National Party 
policy clearly signalled an intention to amend the Employment Relations Act 2000 in 
relation to, amongst other things, personal grievances.  
 
In December 2008, the National Coalition Government amended the Employment 
Relations Act 2000
463
 to enable, from 1 March 2009, an employer and a new 
employee to agree to a ninety calendar day trial period without recourse to a personal 
grievance for unjustifiable dismissal if the employment was terminated prior to the 
expiry of a ninety calendar day period.
464
 Details of other proposed reforms to the 
Employment Relations Act 2000‟s personal grievances machinery were initially 
sketchy but have recently been more precisely articulated by the Hon. Kate 
Wilkinson, Minister of Labour for the National Government.
465
 The Government 
proposes to ensure that the Mediation Service is properly resourced and staffed with 
properly qualified mediators.
466
 In respect of the Employment Relation Authority, the 
Government intends that this body act in a more judicial manner which may include 
the recording of its proceedings and automatic access to cross-examination of 
witnesses.
467
 Further, recent advertisements for expressions of interest for 
appointment to the Employment Relations Authority clearly demonstrate a preference 
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for applicants holding legal qualifications.
468
 It seems reasonable to conclude in light 
of the above that the National Coalition Government seeks a more formal and 
legalistic structured process to resolve personal grievances.  
 
To judge whether or not the Employment Relations Act 2000 provides better access to 
justice for parties to personal grievance requires a detailed study adopting a similar 
methodology to that which this thesis applied to the Employment Contract Act 1991. 
In addition, any such study would need to be cognizant of any proposed or actual 
amendments by the National Coalition Government to the Employment Relations Act 
2000‟s personal grievance machinery provisions and to the role of the Mediation 
Service and the Employment Relations Authority in dealing with personal grievances.  
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APPENDIX I 
DATABASE CATEGORIES 
 
Main Database 
1. Reference Number 
2. Additional Reference Number 
3. Jurisdiction 
4. Cause of Action (codes) 
5. Additional Cause of Action (codes) 
6. Applicant (name) 
7. Number of Applicants 
8. Occupation of Applicant (text) 
9. Gender of Applicants (codes) 
10. Adjudicator (name) 
11. Date of Hearing 
12. Length of Hearing 
13. Type of Representative (applicant) 
14. Type of Representative (respondent) 
15. Type of Decision (Sub or costs) 
16. Did mediation occur (yes/no) 
17. Date Personal Grievance Occurred 
18. Remedies Sought (codes) 
19. Remedies Granted (codes) 
20. Amended Cause of Action (codes) 
21. Appeal Sought (yes/no) 
22. Applicant C&D sought (codes) 
23. Respondent C&D Sought (codes) 
24. Applicant C&D Granted (codes) 
25. Respondent C&D Granted (codes) 
26. Disbursement Sought (code) 
27. Disbursements Granted (codes) 
28. Procedural Issues (text) 
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Breakdown of Causes and Remedies 
1 Reference Number 
2 Cause of Action 
3 Additional Cause of Action 
4 Inappropriate Cause of Action 
5 Remedies Sought Pecuniary 
6 Remedies Sought Other 
7 Inappropriate Remedies Sought 
8 Remedies Granted Pecuniary 
9 Remedies Granted Other 
10 Wages Claimed to Date of Hearing (dollar amount) 
11 Weeks  
12 Granted – Wages to Hearing 
13 Future Loss/Loss of Benefit Claimed (dollar amount) 
14 Period  
15 Granted – Future Loss 
16 Weeks/Months  
17 Total Earnings Sought 
18 Total Earnings Granted 
19 Remedies Sought – Injury to Feelings (dollar amount) 
20 Remedies Granted – Injury to Feelings (dollar amount) 
21 Contributory Fault (yes/no) 
22 Percentage Reduction (percentage figure) 
23 Comments (text) 
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Costs and Disbursements Sought and Granted 
1 Reference Number 
2 Type of Action 
3 Actual Costs, Applicant 
4 Applicant Costs Sought 
5 Applicant Costs Granted 
6 Applicant Disbursements Sought 
7 Applicant Disbursements Granted 
8 Actual Costs, Respondent 
9 Respondent Costs Sought 
10 Respondent Costs Granted 
11 Respondent Disbursements Sought 
12 Respondent Disbursements Granted 
13 Legal Aid (yes/no) 
14 Total Sought (costs and disbursements) 
15 Total Granted 
16 Comments 
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APPENDIX II 
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL AND EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS 
AUTHORITY FORMS 
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APPENDIX III 
 
QUESTIONS FOR TRIAL INTERVIEW FOR 
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL ADJUDICATORS 
 
1 PROCESS 
  
1.1 How would you describe the process? Formal? Informal? Legalistic? 
 
1.2 Have the intentions of the ECA been met, i.e. a „quick, informal, inexpensive 
process‟? 
 
1.3 Are you aware of instances where parties seeking adjudication file incorrect 
documents? 
 
1.4 What happens if parties file incorrect or incomplete documentation or fail to 
pay the correct fee? 
 
1.5 Are there problems with statements of claim not containing sufficient 
information? (For instance, remedies sought, incorrect jurisdiction or 
inaccurate grounds of grievance?) 
 
1.6 Are there cases where respondents do not complete an intention to defend 
form? 
 
1.7 If the answer to the above question is yes, how do you remedy the situation? 
 
1.8 Have you ever had to make a direction for a statement of defence to be filed? 
 
1.9 Can you think of instances where either party to a personal grievance has 
called either insufficient or irrelevant witnesses? 
 
1.10 Do you think the allowances and expenses payable to witnesses adequately 
reimburse expenses incurred? 
 
 610 
1.11 Do you think the level of allowances/expenses is a deterrent for witnesses 
appearing at Tribunal hearings without being summonsed? 
 
1.12 Do parties in adjudication hearings ever experience difficulty in presenting 
their evidence in Chief?  
 
1.13 When presenting their evidence do they usually use written statements as 
guidelines? 
 
1.14 Do self-representatives have any special difficulties in presenting evidence 
and examining witnesses?   
 
1.15 If the answer to the above question is yes, how do you assist? 
 
1.16 If previously unseen or heard of material is introduced by the Respondent, 
how do you allow the Applicant to respond? For instance, may they have a 
short adjournment to consider the matter? 
 
1.17 If representatives are inadequate in their method of examining or cross-
examining witnesses, how do you assist? 
 
1.18 How do you deal with hostile parties to a grievance or hostile representatives? 
 
1.19 Do you have a system for collecting accurate information from hostile 
witnesses? 
 
1.20 If parties or witnesses are either hostile, or unduly upset, what approach do 
you use to calm them down? 
 
1.21 If legal representatives bring cases under the wrong legislation, what is your 
approach? 
  
1.22 In what circumstances would you vary the procedure for conducting hearings 
contained in the regulations? 
 
1.23 Have you ever experienced an adverse reaction by parties or their 
representatives to any of your decisions? 
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1.24 How would you describe your caseload in comparison to that carried by other 
adjudicators?   Fair? Heavy? Light? 
 
1.25 What factors contribute to the time lapse between the occurrence of a 
grievance, its filing, and the date of hearing? 
 
1.26 If mediation occurred, does it affect your decision-making process?  If so, 
why? 
 
1.27 What are the advantages and disadvantages to you of mediation having 
occurred? 
 
1.28 What are the advantages and disadvantages to the applicant of mediation 
having occurred? 
 
1.29 What are the advantages and disadvantages to the respondent of mediation 
having occurred? 
 
1.30 What are the advantages and disadvantages to you of mediation having not 
occurred? 
  
1.31 What are the advantages and disadvantages to the applicant of mediation 
having not occurred? 
 
1.32 What are the advantages and disadvantages to the respondent of mediation 
having not occurred? 
 
1.33 Where the remedies sought are unreasonable, how does it affect your 
approach? 
 
1.34 If the remedies sought are not provided for in the legislation, how does it 
affect your attitude to the parties? 
 
1.35 How do you make your decision about what remedies to award? 
Reinstatement: 
Reimbursement:  
Compensation:  
Recommendations: 
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1.36 What about remedies awarded in sexual harassment cases?   
 
1.37 How do you take into account and measure contributory fault? 
  
1.38 For compensation, what factors do you take into account when calculating the 
award (E.g., gender, ethnic origin, wage/salary)? 
 
1.39 What is your attitude to the court‟s directions re remedies? 
 
1.40 What factors affect your decision whether to use or not use s 34? 
 
1.41 Have any of your decisions been appealed? If so, why do you think they were?   
 
1.42 Were cases appealed on substantive issues or remedies awarded? (i.e. 
substantive remedies awarded or procedural issues). 
 
1.43 What is your view of parties not complying with the legal requirements (E.g., 
wrong cause of action, failure to advise respondent that applicant legally 
aided, application not filed in time)? 
  
 
2 TYPES OF ACTION 
 
2.1 How do the types of grievance affect your hearing of the case?  Dismissal 
(nature of dismissal e.g., theft or redundancy), unjustifiable action, 
discrimination, sexual harassment? 
 
2.2 What about a sexual harassment claim?  Do you take a more sensitive 
approach? In what way?   
 
2.3 Do you make recommendations? If not, why not? What factors influence your 
decision to make or not make a recommendation? 
 
2.4 What is your opinion on the overall standard of presentation of claims 
presented by: 
Advocates 
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Union Advocates 
Counsel 
Self representatives? 
  
2.5 Does the presentation standard affect your attitude to the claim or its defence? 
 
 
3 PARTIES 
 
3.1 Do you subscribe to the view that no power imbalance exists between 
employees and employers? 
 
3.2 Do you ever perceive any power imbalances between the parties? How often? 
 
3.3 What do you do to balance the power relationship? 
  
3.4 In cases where there are multiple applicants, would it be more effective for a 
class action to have been brought? 
 
3.5 Does the occupation of a person affect the questions you ask them? 
 
3.6 Do you adjust your approach in relation to the questions you ask on the basis 
of the occupation of a party? 
 
3.7 Does the occupation of an applicant affect your view of the seriousness of the 
action complained of? 
 
3.8 Are there any general comments you could make about the types of responses 
you get from females and males? 
 
3.9 Do you think you take a different approach depending upon the social status, 
gender, ethnicity or disability of the applicant? 
 
3.10 Do you think you take a different approach depending upon the social status, 
gender, ethnicity or disability of the respondent? 
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3.11 If a particular employer or employee reappears frequently before the Tribunal, 
does this affect your objectivity in either the hearing process or in decision-
making? 
 
3.12 Do you think representatives treat witnesses in cross-examination differently 
depending on the gender, ethnicity, disability or social status of the witness?  
 
3.13 Is gender, ethnicity, disability or social status a factor you take into account 
when determining credibility? 
 
3.14 Have you had any training about cultural protocols, disability issues or gender 
issues? 
 
4 REPRESENTATION 
 
4.1 Do you perceive any varying levels of expertise of union advocates, advocates 
and counsel and self-representatives? 
 
4.2 What are the differences? 
 
4.3 Do you take a different approach to dealing with situations depending on 
whether the representative is an advocate, union advocate, lawyer or self-
representative? 
 
4.4 If the self-representative is either party, do you notice a difference in 
presentation styles and standards, depending on whether the self-
representative is an applicant or respondent? 
 
4.5 Do you tend to guide a self-represented party, or do you take a more relaxed 
approach to the legal requirements and process? 
 
4.6 If a lawyer is incompetent, do you assist or guide them? 
 
4.7 What about when a lawyer is inexperienced and not competent, would you 
guide them? 
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5 COSTS 
 
5.1 Does the cost of representation restrict access to the personal grievance 
procedure? (For instance, solicitor‟s costs, advocate‟s fees, union fees etc?) 
 
5.2 Do you think the cost of lodging and bringing a personal grievance is a barrier 
which prohibits people from having access to the Tribunal? (I.e., lodging fee 
and cost for work of representative). 
 
5.3 When awarding costs, do you take into account: 
How the case was conducted. 
How the parties acted during the hearing. 
Significance of the case to the parties. 
Preparation time. 
Time to prepare in a particular case in comparison to the time it 
would normally take to prepare a case. 
Whether arguments lacking substance where brought. 
If arguments which were unnecessarily legalistic and technical were 
brought. 
Actual costs incurred. 
 
5.4 What is your view of the principle that self-representatives cannot claim for 
the cost of their time? 
 
5.5 Were there any cases where you considered awarding a self-representative 
costs for their time, as an exceptional case?  Please give examples. 
 
5.6 How do you determine whether or not expenses claimed are necessarily and 
reasonably incurred? 
 
5.7 How do you determine whether or not to award costs for executive time? 
 
5.8 How do you view the applicant‟s obligation to contribute to the respondent‟s 
costs in out of time applications? 
   
5.9 If the late application was due to either illness of the applicant or action of the 
employer, how do you take this into account? 
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5.10 If a losing party brings a claim without merit, and despite clear warning has 
continued with the dispute, do you award costs against that party? 
 
5.11 Have you had experience of having to adjudicate cases which were frivolous 
or trivial? 
 
5.12 If the answer to the above question is yes, please give examples. 
 
5.13 How do you determine whether or not a case is frivolous or trivial? 
 
5.14 When required to reduce costs awarded due to legal aid being granted, what 
exceptional circumstances persuade you to set this rule aside and award costs? 
 
5.15 Are there any general comments you wish to make? 
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APPENDIX IV 
QUESTIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL ADJUDICATORS 
 
1 PROCESS 
1.1 How would you describe the process? Is it: formal? Informal? legalistic? 
 
1.2 Have the intentions of the Employment Contracts Act been met, i.e. a “quick, 
informal, inexpensive process”? 
 
1.3 Are you aware of instances where parties seeking adjudication file incorrect 
documents? 
 
1.4 Are there problems with statements of claim not containing sufficient 
information? (For instance, remedies sought, incorrect jurisdiction or 
inaccurate grounds of grievance?) 
 
1.5 Are there cases where respondents do not complete an intention to defend 
form? 
 
1.6 If the answer to the above question is yes, how do you remedy the situation? 
 
1.7 Have you ever had to make a direction for a statement of defence to be filed? 
 
1.8 Can you think of instances where either party to a personal grievance has 
called either insufficient or irrelevant witnesses? 
 
1.9 Do you think the allowances and expenses payable to witnesses adequately 
reimburse expenses incurred? 
 
1.10 Do you think the level of allowances/expenses is a deterrent for witnesses 
appearing at Tribunal hearings without being summonsed? 
 
1.11 Do parties in adjudication hearings ever experience difficulty in presenting 
their evidence in Chief?  
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1.12 When presenting their evidence do they usually use written statements as 
guidelines? 
 
1.13 Do self-representatives have any special difficulties in presenting evidence 
and examining witnesses?   
 
1.14 If the answer to the above question is yes, how do you assist? 
 
1.15 If previously unseen or heard of material is introduced by the Respondent, 
how do you allow the Applicant to respond? For instance, may they have a 
short adjournment to consider the matter? 
 
1.16 If representatives are inadequate in their method of examining or cross-
examining witnesses, how do you assist? 
 
1.17 How do you deal with hostile parties, witnesses or representatives to a 
grievance? 
 
1.18 If legal representatives bring cases under the wrong legislation, what is your 
approach? 
 
1.19 In what circumstances would you vary the procedure for conducting hearings 
contained in the regulations? 
 
1.20 Have you ever experienced an adverse reaction by parties or their 
representatives to any of your decisions? 
 
1.21 How would you describe your caseload in comparison to that carried by other 
adjudicators?  Fair? Heavy? Light? 
 
1.22 What factors contribute to the time lapse between the occurrence of a 
grievance, its filing, and the date of hearing? 
 
1.23 If mediation occurred, does it affect your decision-making process? If so, 
why? 
 
1.24 What are the advantages and disadvantages to the parties of mediation having 
occurred? 
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1.25 Where you think the remedies sought are unreasonable, how does it affect 
your approach? 
 
1.26 If the remedies sought are not provided for in the legislation, how does it 
affect your attitude to the parties? 
 
1.27 How do you make your decision about what remedies to award? 
Reinstatement: 
Reimbursement:  
Compensation:  
Recommendations: 
 
1.28 What about remedies awarded in sexual harassment cases?   
 
1.29 How do you take in to account and measure contributory fault? 
 
1.30 For compensation, what factors do you take into account when calculating the 
award (E.g., gender, ethnic origin, wage/salary)? 
 
1.31 What is your attitude to the court‟s directions re remedies? 
 
1.32 What factors affect your decision whether to use or not use s 34? 
 
1.33 Have any of your decisions been appealed?  If so, why do you think they 
were?   
[Were cases appealed on substantive issues or remedies awarded? I.e. 
substantive remedies awarded or procedural issues.] 
 
1.34 What is your view of parties not complying with the legal requirements (E.g., 
wrong cause of action, failure to advise respondent that applicant legally 
aided, application not filed in time)? 
 
2.0 TYPES OF ACTION 
 
2.1 How do the types of grievance affect your hearing of the case? Dismissal 
(nature of dismissal e.g., theft or redundancy), unjustifiable action, 
discrimination, sexual harassment? 
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2.2 What about a sexual harassment claim?  Do you take a more sensitive 
approach?  In what way?   
 
2.3 Do you make recommendations?  If not, why not?  What factors influence 
your decision to make or not make a recommendation? 
 
3.0 PARTIES 
3.1 Do you subscribe to the view that no power imbalance exists between 
employees and employers within the Employment Tribunal framework? 
  
3.2 What do you do to correct any perceived power imbalance? 
  
3.3 In cases where there are multiple applicants, would it be more effective for a 
class action to have been brought? 
 
3.4 Do you adjust your approach in relation to the questions you ask on the basis 
of the occupation of a party?  
 
3.5 Does the occupation of an applicant affect your view of the seriousness of the 
action complained of? 
 
3.6 Are there any general comments you could make about the types of responses 
you get from females and males? 
 
3.7 Do you have difficulty disregarding the social status, gender, ethnicity or 
disability of the applicant? 
 
3.8 If a particular employer or employee reappears frequently before the Tribunal, 
does this affect your attitude in either the hearing process or in decision-
making? 
 
3.9 Do you think representatives treat witnesses in cross-examination differently 
depending on the gender, ethnicity, disability or social status of the witness?  
 
3.10 Have you had any training in the area of cultural protocols, disability issues or 
gender issues? 
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4.0 REPRESENTATION 
 
4.1 Do you perceive any varying levels of expertise of union advocates, 
advocates, counsel and self-representatives? 
 
4.2 Is there a particular group of advocate who you see as not doing a good job?  
 
4.3 Do you think anything can be done to raise or maintain the standards of 
representation? 
 
4.4 Do you make allowances for poor presentation?  
 
4.5 Do you take a different approach to dealing with situations depending on 
whether the representative is an advocate, union advocate, lawyer or self-
representative? 
 
4.6 If the self-representative is either party, do you notice a difference in 
presentation styles and standards, depending on whether the self-
representative is an applicant or respondent? 
 
4.7 Do you tend to guide a self-represented party, or do you take a more relaxed 
approach to the legal requirements and process? 
 
4.8 If a lawyer is incompetent, do you assist or guide them? 
 
4.9  What about when a lawyer is inexperienced and not competent, would you 
guide them? 
 
4.10 Does the presentation standard affect your attitude to the claim or its defence? 
  
5.0 COSTS 
 
5.1 Does the cost of representation restrict access to the personal grievance 
procedure? (For instance, solicitor‟s costs, advocate‟s fees, union fees etc?) 
 
5.3 Do you think the cost of lodging and bringing a personal grievance is a barrier 
which prohibits people from having access to the Tribunal? (I.e., lodging fee 
and cost for work of representative). 
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5.3 When awarding costs, do you take into account: 
How the case was conducted? 
How the parties acted during the hearing? 
Significance of the case to the parties? 
Preparation time? 
Time to prepare in a particular case in comparison to the time it would 
normally take to prepare a case? 
Whether arguments lacking substance where brought? 
If arguments which were unnecessarily legalistic and technical were 
brought? 
Actual costs incurred? 
 
5.4 What is your view of the principle that self-representatives cannot claim for 
the cost of their time? 
 
5.5 Were there any cases where it would have been just to award a self-
representative costs for their time?  Please give examples. 
 
5.6 How do you determine whether or not expenses claimed are necessarily and 
reasonably incurred? 
 
5.7 How do you determine whether or not to award costs for executive time? 
 
5.8 How do you view the applicant‟s obligation to contribute to the respondent‟s 
costs in out of time applications? 
 
5.9 If the late application was due to either illness of the applicant or action of the 
employer, how do you take this into account? 
 
5.10 If a losing party brings a claim without merit, and despite clear warning has 
continued with the dispute, do you award costs against that party? 
 
5.11 Do you penalise parties for presenting an inappropriate claim? 
 
5.12 Have you had experience of having to adjudicate cases which were frivolous 
or trivial? Please give examples. 
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5.13 How do you determine whether or not a case is frivolous or trivial? 
 
5.16 When required to reduce costs awarded due to legal aid being granted, what 
exceptional circumstances persuade you to set this rule aside and award costs? 
 
5.15 Do you think the rule relating to exceptional circumstances in legal aid cases 
is too harsh?  
 
5.16 If the answer to the above is yes, what would an appropriate alternative rule 
be? 
 
5.17 Are there any general comments you wish to make regarding the Employment 
Tribunal and its procedure? 
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APPENDIX V 
SURVEY QUESTIONS: EMPLOYEES 
 
1.  Were you a member of a union when your personal grievance occurred?     
Yes / No   
 
2.  If you were a union member, did the union represent you at your personal 
grievance hearing?    Yes / No 
 
3. If you were not a union member, how did you find a suitable representative? 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
4. If you used a lawyer or advocate, did the cost of using a representative impact 
on your choice?   Yes / No 
 
5. If you did not use a lawyer, union or advocate, was cost one of the reasons, 
which influenced your decision to represent yourself?    Yes / No 
 
6. If you chose to represent yourself, what factors other than cost made you 
decide to choose this option? _______________________________________ 
 
7. Did you apply for legal aid?     Yes / No 
 
8. Was legal aid granted to you?      Yes / No 
 
9. If you were represented by a lawyer, union, or advocate, were you satisfied 
with the service they provided?     Yes / No 
 
10. If the answer to the above question is „no‟, please advise why not? 
_______________________________________________________________ 
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_______________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Were you aware of the employee‟s pre-hearing obligations in personal 
grievance cases contained in the Employment Contracts Act? (E.g., the need to 
complete a statement of claim form?)    Yes / No 
 
12. Please indicate which term(s) describes the adjudication process most 
accurately. You may circle more than one option. 
a. Confusing 
b. Formal 
c. Informal 
d. Legalistic 
e. Intimidating 
f. Time-consuming 
g. Satisfactory 
h. Other (please state) ____________ 
 
13. Did you attend mediation?     Yes / No 
14. If the answer to the above question is „no‟, please indicate why you, or your 
employer did not attend mediation. ______________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
15.  If you attended mediation, why do you think this process did not resolve the 
grievance? ______________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
16.  Do you consider that the adjudication process was?  
(a) Quick?    Yes / No      
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Please explain. ____________________________________________  
 
(b) Inexpensive?     Yes / No 
 Please explain. ____________________________________________ 
 
(c) Straight forward?     Yes / No 
 Please explain. ____________________________________________ 
 
17.  In your opinion, did the adjudication process finally resolve the personal 
grievance?     Yes / No 
 
18. Do you think there is a more effective procedure to resolve personal 
grievances than adjudication?     Yes / No  
 
19. During the hearing, did you learn anything new about the employer‟s case 
which you had not previously been aware of?     Yes / No 
 
21. Did you return to your previous job after the adjudication decision was made?      
Yes / No 
 
22. Do you think that you were compensated adequately for your personal 
grievance?      Yes / No 
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APPENDIX VI 
SURVEY QUESTIONS: EMPLOYERS 
 
 
1. What was the date of the incident causing the personal grievance? 
_______________ 
 
2. Were you aware of the employer‟s pre-hearing obligations in personal 
grievance cases contained in the Employment Contracts Act? (E.g. the need to 
complete intention to defend forms).     Yes / No 
 
3. Who represented you at the hearing? 
(a) A lawyer 
(b) An advocate 
(c) An in-house representative  
(d) Self-represented 
4. Were you satisfied with the standard of representation you received?     Yes / 
No 
 
5. If you were not, please indicate why not?  
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
6. If you represented yourself, how did you find out what your legal obligations 
were in relation to defending personal grievances? (E.g. which documents to 
file at the Employment Tribunal?) 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Please indicate which term(s) describes your experience of the adjudication 
process most accurately. You may circle more than one option. 
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a. Confusing 
b. Formal 
c. Informal 
d. Legalistic 
e. Intimidating 
f. Time-consuming 
g. Satisfactory 
h. Other (please state) _________________ 
 
8. Did you attend mediation?     Yes / No 
9. If the answer to the above question is „no‟, please indicate why you chose not 
to attend mediation. ______________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
10. If you attended mediation, why do you think this process did not resolve the 
personal grievance? 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
11. In your opinion, did the adjudication process finally resolve the personal 
grievance? (E.g. problems did not continue in the workplace after 
adjudication).     Yes / No 
 
12. Do you consider that the adjudication system was  
(a) Quick?    Yes / No      
Please explain. ____________________________________________  
 
(b) Inexpensive?     Yes / No 
 Please explain. ____________________________________________ 
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(c) Straight forward?     Yes / No 
 Please explain. ____________________________________________ 
 
Do you think there is a more effective procedure to resolve personal grievances than 
adjudication?     Yes / No 
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APPENDIX VII 
SURVEY QUESTIONS: SELF-REPRESENTATIVES 
 
1. Which party were you at the adjudication hearing: applicant or respondent? 
_______________________ 
 
2. Did you believe there were grounds for the other party‟s case?     Yes / No 
3.  Were you a member of a union at the time of the personal grievance?     Yes / 
No 
 
4.  If the answer to the above question is „yes‟, why did the union not represent 
you? __________________________________________________________ 
 _______________________________________________________________ 
 
5.  Was cost a factor in your decision to represent yourself?     Yes / No 
 
6. Please indicate which term(s) describes the adjudication process most 
accurately in the personal grievance case you were involved in. You may 
circle more than one option. 
a. Confusing 
b. Formal 
c. Informal 
d. Legalistic 
e. Intimidating 
f. Time-consuming 
g. Satisfactory 
h. Other (please state) ______________ 
7. Do you have experience in the mediation process?      Yes / No 
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8. Did you attend mediation ?     Yes / No 
9. If the answer to the above question is „no‟, please indicate why you did not 
attend mediation. ______________________________________________ 
 _______________________________________________________________ 
10. If you attended mediation, why do you think this process was unsuccessful? 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 _______________________________________________________________ 
 
11. In your opinion, did the adjudication process finally resolve the personal 
grievance?     Yes / No 
 
12. Do you consider that the adjudication process was:  
(a) quick?    Yes / No      
Please explain. ____________________________________________  
 
(b) inexpensive?     Yes / No 
 Please explain. ____________________________________________ 
 
(c) straight forward?     Yes / No 
 Please explain. ____________________________________________ 
 
13.  Did you experience any particular difficulties with the process?     Yes / No 
 Please explain. __________________________________________________ 
 _______________________________________________________________ 
 
14. If the adjudication system was not in your opinion an ideal method of 
resolving personal grievance cases, what would a suitable alternative be? 
_______________________________________________________________ 
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 _______________________________________________________________ 
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APPENDIX VIII 
SURVEY QUESTIONS: REPRESENTATIVES 
 
1. Please indicate which role you performed in the personal grievance hearing: 
advocate, union advocate, or counsel? ________________ 
 
2. Which party did you represent at adjudication: applicant or respondent? 
_________________________ 
 
3. Did you believe there were grounds for the employee‟s grievance?     Yes / No 
4. Was your client legally aided?     Yes / No 
5. How did you set your fees for representing your client? __________________ 
 _______________________________________________________________ 
 6. Please indicate which term(s) describes the adjudication process most 
accurately in the personal grievance you advocated for in 1997. You may 
circle more than one option. 
 
i. Confusing 
j. Formal 
k. Informal 
l. Legalistic 
m. Intimidating 
n. Time-consuming 
o. Satisfactory 
p. Other (please state) ______________ 
7. Do you have experience in the mediation process?      Yes / No 
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8. Did you attend mediation?     Yes / No 
9 If the answer to the above question is „no‟, please indicate why you did not  
attend mediation. ______________________________________________ 
 _______________________________________________________________ 
10. If you attended mediation, why do you think this process was unsuccessful? 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 _______________________________________________________________ 
 
11 In your opinion, did the adjudication process finally resolve the personal 
grievance?     Yes / No 
 
12. Do you consider that the adjudication process was:  
(a) quick?    Yes / No      
Please explain. ____________________________________________  
 
(b) inexpensive?     Yes / No 
 Please explain. ____________________________________________ 
 
(c) straight forward?     Yes / No 
 Please explain. ____________________________________________ 
 
13. If the adjudication system was not in your opinion an ideal method of 
resolving personal grievance cases, what would a suitable alternative be? 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 _______________________________________________________________ 
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APPENDIX IX 
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATIONS 
 
Initially the definitions of occupational class contained in the 1996 census were not 
considered in detail in this thesis as they classified the general working population as 
a whole. In contrast, the definitions specified in this research originally related only to 
the categories of occupational class of employees who had lodged personal grievances 
in 1997. This appendix presents an outline of this original classification and, where 
relevant, the original versions of the tables.  
 
The original occupational classification tended to describe employees working in the 
State Sector as Public Service. It was later determined that this description was an 
imprecise way of categorising the nature of employment as Public Servant related to 
the place of employment rather than the nature of the occupation concerned. This 
inconsistency of description was not fully recognised until the same data was coded 
again using different criteria of the occupational classifications contained in the 
census. During this process, it became clear that it was the occupation itself which 
was relevant rather than the whereabouts of the employment. The description of 
employees of Public Servant was too general and covered a vast array of occupational 
classes. For example, a prison officer was a Public Servant but it was the nature of the 
work itself; guarding prisoners, which was relevant. Further distinctions such as these 
emphasise the differences between the original occupational classifications and those 
contained in the census.  
 
On investigation, the classification of occupational classes contained in the census 
data and the classifications illustrated in this research have some significant 
deviations. For example, where originally Retail and Service Industry were classified 
separately, the classification in the census has merged these two classes into category 
five, which encompasses both Service and Sales. 
 
Another area of distinction between the research for this thesis and the classifications 
contained in the census related to the classification of Managers. In this thesis, the 
classification of management related to the nature of the occupation itself, which 
included (if specified) the size and nature of the enterprise. In comparison, the census 
classification of managers was significantly broader and contained classifications 
such as service and sales type managers. Therefore a direct comparison between the 
classifications contained in the thesis and those in the census could not accurately be 
made. A particular area of difficulty related to the classification of managers in the 
retail industry. Since frequently the size of the enterprise was not specified, it was 
therefore difficult to determine whether the employee ought to be classified as a 
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corporate manager, retail worker, or how to decide which occupational class was the 
most accurate in describing the work of the employee.   
 
In addition, the definition of clerical work contained in the original classification in 
this thesis had a broad definition
1
. It included occupations like receptionists, office 
managers, and general clerical assistants. In contrast, the definition of clerical 
specified in the census is comparatively restricted and much more specific. For 
example, it was limited to including such occupations as Library, Mail and Related 
Clerks. As a consequence of the classification distinction, the definition of clerical 
work has contracted and resulted in the range of occupations included in this 
classification being reduced. Consequently, there were more people categorised as 
clerical workers who took personal grievances than there would have been if the 
definition of clerical work contained in the census had been used.  
 
The original General category in this thesis, which included unskilled work, 
labouring, and general work not requiring formal training represented the highest 
number of personal grievances. This category was significantly broader and larger 
than the elementary category of employees contained in the census.  
Table I: Occupational Class of Applicants 
Occupational Class
2
 Auckland Hamilton Wellington Christchurch Dunedin Total 
Clerical 27 1 10 4 2 44 
Education 6 0 1 6 0 13 
General 32 17 17 35 1 102 
                                                             
1
 See ch 5, n 19. 
2
 In this research, Occupational classes have been divided as follows: 
Clerical – office work, secretarial 
Education – all types of teaching and tutoring 
General – unskilled work, labouring, general work which did not require any formal training 
Health Sector – nursing, medical health professionals 
Management – managerial position 
Management/General – employees carrying out management tasks but also involved with general 
work, for example those managing farms; 
Professional – legal, accounting, work requiring a professional qualification 
Public Sector – public service or state sector employees 
Retail – those occupying retail positions 
Service industry – hotel work, food, bars 
Trade – all work requiring a trade qualification 
Voluntary Sector – all those employed in the voluntary sector, for example the Foundation of the Blind. 
It was decided to devise new categories of identifying occupational classes from those used by 
McAndrew, „Determinations of the Employment Relations Authority‟ (2002) 27 (3) New Zealand 
Journal of Industrial Relations 323, 328. These were not specific enough to identify what class of 
employee took personal grievance claims and whether or not the type of occupation affected the 
outcome for employees. 
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Health Sector 4 1 0 5 1 11 
Management 13 4 13 6 1 37 
Management/General 4 0 0 1 2 7 
Professional 12 1 0 4 1 18 
Public Sector 3 1 8 2 0 14 
Retail 17 3 12 15 1 48 
Service Industry 26 3 6 15 1 51 
Trade 15 3 2 9 0 29 
Voluntary 4 0 1 0 0 5 
 
Table I shows that in all jurisdictional areas (except for Dunedin) the „General‟ 
occupational class, which included unskilled work, labouring, and general work not 
requiring formal training, represented the highest number of personal grievances. 
Statistics obtained from the 1996 Census show that numbers of those employed in the 
„elementary occupations‟ class comprised 6.6 percent of the total number employed in 
all occupations across the Auckland, Hamilton, Wellington, Christchurch, and 
Dunedin regions.
3
 This suggests that although employees from the „elementary 
occupational‟ class did not comprise a significant proportion of all employees, they 
did appear more frequently in personal grievance claims. However, while the 
definition of „elementary occupations‟ from the census information is similar to that 
of the „general‟ occupational class contained in this analysis, they are not identical.4 
Similarly, in this analysis of the Employment Tribunal, all geographical areas in New 
Zealand were covered by a jurisdictional office of the Employment Tribunal,
5
 
whereas the regions displayed in the census information cover a particular 
geographical area.
6
 Hence it was not possible to make a direct comparison between 
surveys of Employment Tribunal statistics and objective Census information, as the 
two geographical areas are different.  
 
                                                             
3
See: 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/domino/external/web/ExtraPages.nsf/htmldocs/Standard+Regional+Tables+C
ensus+1996+-+Map. 
4
 „Elementary Occupations‟ included; Labourers and related elementary service workers; Building 
caretakers and cleaners; Caretakers and cleaners; Cleaners; Building caretakers; Pest control workers; 
Messengers and doorkeepers; Couriers and deliverers; Hotel porters; Refuse collectors and related 
labourers; Refuse collectors; Street or park cleaners; Packers and freight handlers; Packers; Loaders 
and/or checkers; Railway shunters; Labourers; Surveyor‟s assistants; Builder‟s labourers; Sawmill 
labourers; and general labourers. See the schedule for the New Zealand Standard Classification for 
Occupations; 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/domino/external/web/carsweb.nsf/94772cd5918085044c2567e6007eec2c/ef7c
87fcece9546ccc2568c40000836e/$FILE/ATTY5OX6/NZSCOall.txt. For a definition of the „general‟ 
occupational class used in this research see above n 2. 
5
 W R C Gardiner, The Employment Tribunal (A Report from The Trenches) 13 May 1998, 5. 
6
 For an illustration of the geographical areas categorised in the 1996 census see: 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/domino/external/web/ExtraPages.nsf/htmldocs/Standard+Regional+Tables+C
ensus+1996+-+Map. 
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Unsurprisingly, Auckland, having the largest population and the largest working 
population had the greatest number of applicants in many occupational classes. Table 
IX.1 also shows that Wellington had a proportionally higher number of public sector 
applicants. Census information from 1996 showed that Auckland had the highest 
number of legislators, administrators and managers, with 68,481, while Wellington 
had less with 27,111. However, in this analysis the category of „public sector‟ has 
been restricted to those employed in public service departments, crown entities and 
state agencies. Therefore, this may explain why, in this analysis, there were more 
applicants from the public sector in Wellington although it remains unclear as to why 
there were the same number of applicants from management occupations in both 
Wellington and Auckland.  
 
Table II: Gender of Applicant and Occupational Class 
Occupational Class Female Male Both Total 
Clerical 37 8 - 45 
Education 4 9 - 13 
General 17 82 4 103 
Health Sector 6 5 - 11 
Management 6 30 1 37 
Management/General 0 5 - 5 
Professional 5 13 - 18 
Public Sector 7 7 - 14 
Retail 14 32 - 46 
Retail/General/Trade - - 2 2 
Service Industry 19 28 4 51 
Trade 3 26 - 29 
Voluntary Sector 4 1 - 5 
 
 
 
Table III: Types of Grievance per Occupational Class 
Occupational Class Unjustifiable 
Dismissal 
Constructive 
Dismissal 
Unjustifiable 
Action 
Other Total 
Clerical 34 6 2 3 45 
Education 10 1 1 0 12 
General 83 9 5 6 103 
Health Sector 8 0 2 1 11 
Management 29 2 2 4 37 
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Management/General 6 0 0 1 7 
Professional 15 0 1 3 19 
Public Sector 6 4 3 1 14 
Retail 34 2 0 5 41 
Service Industry 38 3 5 5 51 
Trade 21 4 0 4 29 
Voluntary Sector 3 1 0 1 5 
 
 
Table IV: Average Compensation by Occupational Class  
Occupational Class Compensation Sought Compensation Granted 
Clerical $16,360 $3,395 
Education $35,000 $1,070 
General $17,310 $2,598 
Health Sector $42,500 $1,583 
Management $30,104 $4,571 
Management / General $19,000 $5,200 
Professional $42,000 $6,486 
Public Sector $22,000 $944 
Retail $25,018 $3,678 
Service Industry $16,500 $3,277 
Trade $17,775 $3,320 
Average Total $21,892 $3,339 
 
 
Table V: Occupational Class of Applicant and Average Costs Sought and Granted 
Occupational Class Average Costs 
Sought 
Average Costs 
Granted 
No. of cases 
Clerical $2,671 $954 10 
Education $2,887 $1,375 2 
General $2,669 $1,160 21 
Health Sector $31,808 $11,000 1 
Management $6,248 $2,432 8 
Management/General $8,736 $2,250 2 
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Professional NIA
7
 $1,500 1 
Public Sector NIA NIA 0 
Retail $3,056 $1,130 12 
Retail/General/Trade NIA NIA 1 
Service Industry $3,597 $1,689 12 
Trade $1,910 $1,155 9 
Voluntary Sector $5,550 $2,800 1 
 
 
It appears from Table V that average costs sought and granted in the health sector 
were substantially higher than other occupational classes. However, this was as a 
result of one large claim and award of costs that skewed the figures for the health 
sector.
8
 
Table VI: Average Length of Hearing (Days) and Occupational Class 
Occupational Class Average Length of Hearing (days) 
Clerical 1.39 
Education 1.82 
General 1.55 
Health Sector 2.43 
Management 1.95 
Management/General 1.86 
Professional 1.82 
Public Sector 2.64 
Retail 1.39 
Retail/General/Trade 1.00 
Service Industry 1.32 
Trade 1.38 
Voluntary Sector 2.50 
  
Table VI shows that personal grievances brought by public sector employees took the 
longest lasting an average of 2.64 days. Hearings for those employed in the voluntary 
sector and health sector also took longer, with average hearing times of 2.50 and 2.43 
days respectively. One reason for the extended hearing times in these areas of 
                                                             
7
 NIA = No Information Available. 
8
 See above Table IV. The case in question was HT 05/97. 
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personal grievances may have been the complexities of the cases. For example, a 
public sector personal grievance may have had extraneous circumstances to consider 
under the State Sector Act 1988 in addition to obligations under the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991.  
 
Table VII: Occupational Class and Applicant Success 
 Wholly 
Successful 
Partially 
Successful 
Unsuccessful Total 
Clerical 11.11% 53.33% 35.56% 45 
Education 0.00% 38.46% 61.54% 13 
General 3.88% 50.49% 45.63% 103 
Health 9.09% 27.27% 63.64% 11 
Management 10.81% 54.05% 32.43% 37 
Management / General 14.29% 85.71% 0.00% 7 
Professional 5.56% 44.44% 50.00% 18 
Public 0.00% 14.29% 85.71% 14 
Retail 10.87% 54.35% 34.78% 46 
Service 1.96% 66.67% 31.37% 51 
Trade 3.45% 51.72% 44.83% 29 
Voluntary 20.00% 40.00% 40.00% 5 
 
„Confusing‟ 
To test the premise that users found the procedure confusing, it was decided to 
analyse Tables 5.1 and 5.7 from Chapter Five, to see whether the respective groups 
had, or lacked, certain skill sets that would have enabled them to participate in the 
process without finding it confusing. 
A breakdown of the applicants figures contained in Table 5.7, Chapter Five, showed a 
high percentage of those classes which were least likely to possess skills which they 
could bring to bear during adjudication. Those classes considered less likely to 
possess the requisite skills included: general (27 percent); retail (12.6 percent); service 
industry employees (13.4 percent); trades (7.6 percent); and the voluntary sector at 
(1.4 percent).   
The total of these classes accounted for 62 percent of all applicants in the adjudication 
procedure for the 1997 year. The remainder is accounted for by members of the 
education, health, and public sectors, along with those who were in clerical, 
managerial and professional classes. Those considered most likely to have the least 
difficulty with the adjudication process, the professional class, made up only 4.7 
percent of the total number of applicants.  
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For an analysis of respondent employers, the figures needed were readily available.  
Respondents were classified as belonging to the Government, company, or „other‟ 
categories when, due to their structure, they could not be classified by gender.  The 
„other‟ category related to entities such as incorporated societies, trusts, and 
polytechnics.  It can be seen in Table 5.1, 89 percent of the total respondent figure had 
some type of organisational structure from which to draw. However, this might have 
varied from the high degree of organisation and diverse skill base available to public 
servants, to a minimally capitalised limited liability company made up of a majority 
shareholding managing director and a minority shareholding domestic partner, where 
the requisite skills might be less likely to exist. Although it is acknowledged that a 
wide range of skills was likely to have existed in both applicant and respondent 
groups, it would seem that respondents generally were more likely to have had access 
to a wider range of support networks from which relevant skills were available, such 
as the Employers Chamber of Commerce and professional organisations. This may 
provide one explanation for respondents finding the adjudication process less 
confusing than applicants. However, it is important to keep in perspective that the 
total number of either party who found the adjudication process confusing was small.  
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